CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A002400500001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 23, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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Copy No.
1-03
CURRENT
DOCUMENT NO.
INTELLIGENCE NOCHANGEINCLASS
/ ^ DECLASSIFIED
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BULLETIN NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: gp REVIEWER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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State Department review completed
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1. AMBASSADORS APPRAISE VIEWS OF ISRAELI CABINET
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2, FRANCE ASKS NATO FOR STATEMENT SUPPORTING
TROOP TRANSFERS TO ALGERIA
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4. USSR BEGINS ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON JAPAN AS LONDON
CONTENTS
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TALKS BREAK OFF
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SOVIET TWIN-JET TRANSPORT FLIES TO LONDON
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7. NORTH KOREA MAY BE ADOPTING COLLECTIVE LEADER-
SHIP
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23 Mar 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
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1. AMBASSADORS APPRAISE VIEWS OF ISRAELI CABINET
The American and British ambassadors
in Tel Aviv appraise the attitude of
Israeli prime minister Ben-Gurion and
the majority of his cabinet as including
the following elements:
(1) No settlement with the Arabs is
possible for a long time. The Israelis are convinced that
the Arabs, from their present position of strength, desire
at best a type of settlement which would merely facilitate
the subsequent destruction of Israel.
(2) Israel distrusts Anglo-American
moves for a settlement, because it feels Western strategic
interests will "load the dice" heavily against Israel. The
Israelis also believe the West underestimates Egypt's ex-
pansionisttendencies.
(3) Any intervention, if it occurred at
all, would come too late to protect Israel, particularly
against air bombardment.
(4) Militarily, the Israelis are confi-
dent they could defeat an Arab attack within the next few
months or contain it until the end of the year if Soviet arms
are not effectively absorbed by Egypt. They now believe,
however, that even a military victory would give them only
a temporary respite, and have shelved the idea of initiating
a preventive war. They nevertheless may react strongly
against Arab terrorist tactics or continued "breaches" of
the armistice agreement, even at the risk of war.
(5) Israel wants neither war nor an arms
race., It does, however, want sufficient arms to protect it-
self during an initial period of attack until outside assistance
could become effective.
23 Mar 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
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2. FRANCE ASKS NATO FOR STATEMENT SUPPORTING
TROOP TRANSFERS TO ALGERIA
The French have asked the North
Atlantic Council to consider issuing
a public statement of political sup-
port for French troop transfers to
Algeria. (These transfers have been
at the expense of France's NATO com-
mitments in Western Europe,,) The
French stressed the necessity to dem-
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lons ra a NATO solidarity in an area recognized by military
authorities as necessary to NATO's strategic interests.
They hope for a decision by 27 March.
Ambassador Perkins reports that the
Belgian, German and Italian representatives were initially
favorable to this request, which involves a new departure
for NATO. The British Foreign Office feels committed not
to oppose the French, The Netherlands, Norway and Den-
mark felt their governments would need to give careful
consideration to the implications of such a statement.
Canada and others indicated they were awaiting instruc-
tions.
Comment Among the many problems this request
presents is whether to categorize the
Algerian situation as a French internal or a NATO security
concern. There is sympathy in NATO for the French pre-
dicament, but some members wish to avoid any action that
might provide a precedent on other issues, such as Cyprus
and Goa.
.23 Mar 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4
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4. USSR BEGINS ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON JAPAN AS
LONDON TALKS BREAK OFF
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Suspension of the Japanese-Soviet
treaty talks in London has been fol-
lowed promptly by a Soviet move to
force Japan into concluding a peace
treaty through economic pressure.
he USSR announced a decree on 21 March restricting
salmon fishing in the North Pacific "until conclusion of
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sides have agreed that a .definitive agreement on settling
the fisheries problem will.be incorporated as an annex
to the treaty, but the USSR will not discuss the annex
until the treaty itself is agreed upon.
About 90 percent of last year's
Japanese salmon catch came from the area that has
now been restricted by the Russians. Japanese fishing
interests, which exert a powerful influence on the Hato-
yama government, will probably press for a resumption
of the. Japanese-Soviet peace talks and for concessions to
Moscow.
The Soviet move, however, may not
provoke a strong official reaction. Influential Japanese
leaders recently expressed the view that the Japanese
people are accustomed to Soviet intransigence, and im-
plied that, far from being able to act like a great power,
Japan was too weak even to protect Japanese fishing ac-
tivities from depredations arisin from South Korea's
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unilaterally imposed Rhee line.
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5. SOVIET TWIN-JET TRANSPORT FLIES TO LONDON
A CAMEL (T U-104 ), the Soviet Union's
first twin-jet passenger aircraft, carry-
ing Soviet security chief Ivan Serov, ar-
rived in London on 22 March. Strict
security precautions were imposed while the aircraft refueled
prior to its return to Moscow.
This trip marked the first appearance of
the CAMEL outside of the USSR and the first indication that
this aircraft is ready for operational use. The CAMEL was
first seen in the July 1955 Air Day show in Moscow. Since
that time no more than two such planes have been observed
simultaneously.
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the TU-104 was being use or limited ex-
press g s to the Far East and would be introduced into
regular passenger service this spring.
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7. NORTH KOREA MAY BE ADOPTING
COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP
The first indication that the Soviet-
endorsed principle of collective
leadership may be applied to a Far
Eastern Satellite has been noted in recent North Korean
broadcasts. Heretofore the North Korean home radio
has consistently accompanied its evening broadcast with
the slogan, "Long live Marshal Kim Il-sung, the respected
and beloved chief of the Korean people:' Since 19 March
this slogan has been omitted,
Soviet influence is paramount in North
Korea, and the recent emphasis on collective leadership
in the USSR is likely to have repercussions in North Korea.
Kim was installed as premier by the USSR in 1948, and
North Korean propaganda has long shown him a deference
much like that which was accorded Stalin in the USSR.
Omission of the slogan hailing Kim is not believed to be
an indication that he is in political disfavor.
Propaganda from Communist China and
North Vietnam has continued to give special attention to
the personal leadership of Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh.
No Far Eastern Communist country has mentioned the
Kremlin's recent denunciation of the "cult of the individual"
or Khrushchev's speech criticizing Stalin.
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