CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A002500500001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 22, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONTENTS
1.o FRENCH-SOVIET TALKS CONCLUDE
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2. ELECTION RESULTS OPEN PERIOD OF INSTABILITY
IN SOUTH KOREA
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40 RESIGNATION OF JORDANIAN CABINET
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50 BURMESE IMPRESSED BY SOVIET TECHNICAL PERSONNEL
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22 May 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
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1. FRENCH-SOVIET TALKS CONCLUDE
Sharp differences between the French and
Soviet negotiators at the talks in Moscow
forced omission of several controversial
points from the joint communique. It was
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agree in principle to expand both cultural and commercial
relations
The USSR rejected as premature or inap-
propriate a French proposal approving UN secretary general
Hammarskjold's efforts for Near Eastern peace. It refused to
insert a statement approving any future UN measures to put an
end to the arms race, such as an embargo on shipment of arms
to the Near East, unless specific mention was made of Iran and
Pakistan. This suggests that the USSR will insist on including
Middle East members of SEATO and the Baghdad pact in a Mid-
dle East arms embargo.
The French say they expect the communiqu6's
reference to France's Algerian policy to have a sobering effect
on both the French Communist Party and such Arab countries as
Egypt. They believe the statement makes it clear that Algerian
policy is a Paris responsibility. This effect may be nullified,
however, by the Soviet version of the communique, and by Khru-
shchev's toast at a reception to "the Arabs and all others who are
struggling for national independence."
The American embassy in Moscow considers
that Mollet was firm with the Russians throughout the conversa-
tions, particularly on the point of France's allegiance to NATO.
The Russians bluntly rejected French efforts to include some
reference to German unification and to Paris' loyalty to its inter-
national alliances.
22 May 56
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2. ELECTION RESULTS OPEN :PERIOD OF INSTABILITY
IN SOUTH KOREA
President Rhee's 19 May acknowledg-
ment of Chang Myon's election as vice
president, together with opposition ac-
tion in postponing the funeral of Demo-
cratic leader Sin Ik-hui, appears to
have averted large-scale violence in
South Korea. Rhee's cabinet has sub-
mitted its resignation, however, and
this may open a period of political instability as the Rhee
administration attempts to cope with a degree of opposition
unprecedented in South Korea.
Defense Minister Son has stated to
American charge Strom that the present situation is danger-
ous for both Rhee- and Chang, with the possibility of assas-
sination.
President Rhee will probably accept the
resignations of certain of his ministers, and may offer cer-
tain government posts to members of Chang Myon's Demo-
cratic Party. Chang, however, while indicating a willing-
ness to co-operate with Rhee, has stated that he does not
desire a coalition government at this time.
22 May 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page .4
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4. RESIGNATION OF JORDANIAN CABINET
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The resignation of the Jordanian
cabinet of Prime Minister Rifai on
20 May clears the way for a govern-
ment more responsive to Arab na-
tionalism and will probably result in
c oser co-ordination of the external policies of Jordan and
Egypt. For some months Rifai has not enjoyed the confi-
dence of King Hussain, who has shown a tendency to exer-
cise increasing authority. Rifai, who has attempted to
resist the spread of Egyptian influence in Jordan, has been
attacked by Egypt for failing to end his country's friendly
relations with Britain.
Said al-Mufti, who has been invited
to form a new government, has been prime minister three
times previously. He last resigned the premiership in
December 1955 during Britain's attempts to draw Jordan
into the Baghdad pact. One of his first acts in his new ca-
pacity was to announce his intention to amend the Anglo-
Jordanian treaty to make it "more compatible with Jorda-
nian interests."
He has also emphasized his plans for
a "purely Arab" cabinet. Some of the new cabinet mem-
bers will be chosen from outside parliament, according to
Arab press releases.
22 May 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
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5. BURMESE IMPRESSED BY SOVIET TECHNICAL PERSONNEL
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Initial skepticism in Burma regarding the
desirability of the technological institute
which the USSR has offered to build has
been overcome by eight Soviet experts
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by the Russians' excellent technical qualifications and their
understanding of the Burmese viewpoint.
who have been in Burma for three weeks, according to the
American embassy in Rangoon. The embassy quotes one Bur-
mese government official as saying he has been impressed
The USSR reportedly plans to staff the pro-
posed institute with English-speaking instructors and is ready
to begin construction as soon as the Burmese government gives
its formal approval.
Comment The scope of the proposed institute had
aroused reservations among some Bur-
mese officials regarding its practicality, and they were also
concerned over its subversive possibilities.
The technological institute is the first
large project to be undertaken by the USSR in Burma. Soviet
success in gaining Burmese confidence in this project would
facilitate Moscow's entire assistance program in Burma.
22 May 56
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