CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A002700560001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 13, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONTENTS
1, THE SIX- POINT AGREEMENT ON THE SUEZ DISPUTE
25X1A
2. FRENCH READYING NEW APPROACH TO ALGERIAN
25X1A REBELS
3. COMMUNIST CHINA'S REACTION TO HONG KONG RIOTS
25X1A
4. DRIVE AGAINST BURMESE COMMUNIST STUDENTS MAY
25X1 A CAUSE VIOLENCE
5. YUGOSLAV-SOVIET DIFFERENCES UNCHANGED BY TITO-
25X1A KHRUSHCHEV TALKS
6,; SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS PRESSURE ON
25X1 A COMMUNISTS
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13 Oct 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
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1. THE SIX-POINT AGREEMENT ON THE SUEZ DISPUTE
The agreement by Britain, France, and
Egypt to a set of six principles for future
negotiations on the Suez crisis further re-
duces the threat of war over this issue and
is an important step toward a settlement.
The six principles appear to be sufficiently
generalized to offer a framework for an agreement which
would satisfy Nasr's nationalization demands o British and
French insistence on international guarantees covering the
canal can probably also be satisfied. A protractet period of
negotiations is likely during which serious differences will
almost certainly tax the good will and ingenuity of the partici-
pants
The agreement makes unlikely any direct
Soviet participation in the next round of negotiations. It thus
decreases the USSR's ability to influence the terms of a
settlement or to claim credit for a final solution. The USSR
will be anxious to keep open a behind-the-scenes advisory
channel to Egypt. It will probably continue to lobby against
the _18-nations proposal and urge Egypt to take a hard line
toward a settlement. Cairo, however, has shown a distinct
tendency to "go it alone" on this issue and is unlikely to be
significantly swayed by Moscow in the negotiations ahead.
Egypt can be expected to publ.ct e the
accord as a clear-cut victory. In Britain, the agreement will
be criticized by those Conservatives who have been urging a
firmer policy on Prime Minister Eden. Outside this group,
however, the accord will probably be welcomed as a sign of
progress toward a settlement.
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The French government is likely to play up
the Egyptian guarantee that the canal will not be used as an
instrument of Egyptian policy, but the French public will
nevertheless look upon the accord as a capitulation on the
part of the West, There will be increased pessimism that
France will not be able to get a favorable settlement in
Algeria. F7 I
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2. FRENCH READYING NEW APPROACH TO
ALGERIAN REBELS
The French government is now con-
templating a declaration of intent
outlining plans for an Algerian statute
in the hope that responsible Moslem
ULUMUMb in ria can be induced to negotiate, accord-
ing to a spokesman for Premier Mollet. The government
has decided to drop its earlier plan to impose a new statute.
Mollet is considering a status for Algeria-along the lines of
that granted Tunisia.
Mollet reportedly now favors inscrip-
tion of the Algerian question on .the agenda of the UN Gen-
eral Assembly this fall, and he may come to New York to
defend the French position.
Comment Autonomy patterned on the 1955 Tunisian
accords probably would be accepted by
Algerian nationalists if accompanied by a promise of pro-
gression toward eventual independence. Such progression
was not envisaged in the Tunisian accords, however, and
present indications are that Paris is contemplating a static
rather than an evolutionary program for Algeria.
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3. COMMUNIST CHINA'S REACTION TO HONG KONG RIOTS
Peiping's initial reaction to the Hong
Kong riots was to accuse the Chinese
Nationalists of inspiring the violence
and to charge the British authorities
with failure to take adequate preventive measures,, The
Peiping daily, Ta Kung Pao, declared that the "British
authorities in Hong Kong are guilty of connivance" and
asserted that the "Chinese people cannot tolerate the sit-
uation in British-dominated Hong Kong!"
The British were also subjected to the
same sort of charges on the occasion of the sabotage of an
airplane last year carrying Chinese Communists from Hong
Kong to the Bandung conference, Apparently, Peiping does
not consider the riots an excuse at this time for military ac-
tion against the Colony. "We shall watch what attitude the
British authorities in Hong Kong take toward the Kuomintang
agents;' declared the party newspaper, People's Dail yo
Communist China. has previously asked
to be allowed to establish a commissioner in Hong Kong,
The riots will probably provide Peiping with an excuse for
pressing its demand for such a commissioner to protect
Chinese interests, F7 I
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4. DRIVE AGAINST BURMESE COMMUNIST STUDENTS MAY
CAUSE VIOLENCE
I urmese military police reportedly have
een ordered to use firearms if necessary
I? quell demonstrations that are expected
o result from the government's decision
o expel Communist student leaders from
Burma's schools and universities, Accord-
ing to the American embassy in Rangoon,
public opinion will not necessarily be
on a Me o e government in the "serious demonstrations"
25X1A
that may follow this action.
The embassy notes that the Communist-
controlled Student United Front has recently, for the second
year in succession, made a clean sweep in student union elec-
tions at Ran oon University and its Mandala and Moulmein
affiliates.
Comment Burma's leaders, although in the past re-
luctant to take repressive action, have
been alert to the danger of Communist control of student or-
ganizations because of their own experience in such groups,
The government has shown a more uncom-
promising attitude toward domestic Communism since the
April elections, when the pro-Communist National . United
Front showed surprising strength.
13 Oct 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin
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5. YUGOSLAV-SOVIET DIFFERENCES UNCHANGED BY
TITO-KHRUSHCHEV TALKS
Speaking for Yugoslav president: Tito,
Yugoslav under secretary for foreign
affairs Prica told Ambassador Riddle-
berger on 10 October that Yugoslav-Soviet
i erences naci not been solved at Yalta. However, Tito
gained the impression that further co-operation with the
Soviet Union is still possible, particularly in the economic
field. He felt that by the end of the talks, the Soviet leaders
showed a greater willingness to understand the Yugoslav
point of view.
Tito believed the USSR did not intend to
reverse its policy of recognizing "independent roads to social-
ism" set forth in the Soviet-Yugoslav party declaration last
June. In reply to a query by. Riddleberger whether future
Yugoslav-Soviet co-operation required any Yugoslav conces-
sions, Prica said "Yugoslav policy remained unchanged."
Tito said at least some of the. Soviet
leaders regretted the issuance of the 3 September circular
warning the East European Communists against Yugoslav
influence. Prica felt, however, that they would do nothing
to show their regret.
Tito still holds the opinion that good rela-
tions with the USSR are necessary to continue the "thaw" in
both the USSR and the Satellites, and reiterated his intention
of maintaining good relations with both East and West.
Comment Although it seems that serious Soviet-
Yugoslav differences will continue, no
immediate crisis appears to be threatening relations be-
tween Moscow and Belgrade. It is likely that agreement
was reached at Yalta to play down the dispute and continue
co-operation.
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6. SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS PRESSURE
ON COMMUNISTS
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An illegal student mass meeting on
8 October provided the Singapore gov-
ernment with justification for a further
crackdown on subversive activity. It
as arrestea ur students and ordered the expulsion of
two teachers and 142 students from Chinese middle schools,
precipitating the current "sit-in" strike of 4,000 students
in two large Chinese schools. The inability of school
authorities to control the students may cause the govern-
ment to take over the schools.
Failure to resist the government will
result in loss of face for, the People's Action Party. The
consulate general believes that an all-out student-labor
attack against the government is possible in view of the
support pledged to the students by the secretary of the
militant Singapore Factory and Shop Workers' Union.
Comment The People's Action Party previously
had given the government little excuse
for following up its action from 18 to 20 September, when it
arrested seven Communist-front leaders .and banned three
organizations.
13 Oct 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
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