CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A002800160001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 7, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
CONTINUED CONTROL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
7 November 1956
0001,
No. 05742`56
Sc
Copy No. 112 4/
DQLUMT-1 - -
NO CHANCE iN CLASS, -9
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CLASS. c:FF,NCF TO:
NET iIEV? DATE: i
AUTK NR '7O-2 ppg 14 .02 _ rn O.
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains classified information affecting
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CONTENTS
2. BRITISH AND FRENCH ACCEPTANCE OF SUEZ CEASE-.
FIRE (Secret) (page 5).
5. THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION (Confidential) (page 9).
6. WESTERN EUROPEAN REACTION TO HUNGARIAN CRISIS
(Secret Noforn) (page 11).
1
7. RUMANIAN REACTION TO HUNGARIAN DEVELOPMENTS
(Secret) (page 13).
POLAND READY TO NEGOTIATE US AID (Confidential)
(page 14).
9. GOMULKA SEEKS SUPPORT OF ALL POLISH FACTIONS
(Confidential) (page 15).
S
10. SUSLOV SPEECH REAFFIRMS DECISIONS OF SOVIET
20th PARTY CONGRESS (Confidential) (page 16).
ANNEX--SNIE 11-9-56: SINO-SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE
SUEZ CRISIS (Secret) (page 19).
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2. BRITISH AND FRENCH ACCEPTANCE OF SUEZ CEASE-
FIRE (information as of 2200, 6 November)
Quick acceptance by Britain and France
of a cease-fire with Egypt under . condi
tions considerably less than they had
demanded on 5 November evidently re-
flects a sharp turn toward caution
following receipt of threatening notes
from Moscow.
The. cease-fire terms accepted by the
two nations notably fail to provide for
any approach to a general Middle East
settlement or for any regime for the
Suez Canal itself, as demanded by Eden and Mollet.
Acceptance enables Britain and France
to evade the risks inherent in trying to maintain a position
athwart the length of the canal without destroying the Egyp-
tian army and seizing Cairo and the Nile delta. From their
present holdings they can block any canal arrangement un-
satisfactory to them. French premier Mollet has claimed
to have all the necessary equipment on the spot to reopen
the canal, but the British Admiralty estimates it will take
two to three months to reopen it.
The overthrow of Nasr presumably re-
mains an important objective, especially for Paris. Though
apparently obliged to forego his overthrow immediately, the
British and French still hope to induce the Egyptian people
to replace him.
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5. THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION (information as of 1700,
6 November)
Although armed patriots continue to re-
sist Soviet attack in Budapest and in at
least two areas in the provinces, the
Hungarian revolution is for all practical.
purposes at an end. The American lega-
tion in Budapest has reported that Hun-
garian security police were back in uni-
forms and, under the protection of Soviet
troops, were already searching houses
and arresting people.
Radio Pecs announced at 0530 on 6 Novem-
ber that all those still bearing arms could return home un-
harmed if their weapons were surrendered by 0800. Although
this was only noted on a regional radio network, presumably
such an amnesty was in effect throughout the country. It
represents an extension of the amnesty announced on 5 Novem-
ber.
The Budapest legation reports that the
Soviet forces in their efforts to storm the Kilian barracks.--.
one of the last rebel strongholds- -fired on a children's clinic,
ignoring the protests of several Western legations. The lega-
tion also reported that the Soviet troops had fired on the
Yugoslav legation and "killed one younger diplomat, while
wounding several others."
The Kadar regime is faced with a seri-
ous problem in restoring the nation's economy. Hourly ap-
peals over most of the nation's radio stations reveal the size
of the job now confronting the regime: foodstuffs, medicines
and other staples are in short supply, transportation is at a
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virtual standstill, and most industrial plants, if in opera-
tion at all, are working with skeleton labor forces. On
5 November, Moscow announced that the Soviet government.
would send free food, building supplies and medicines im-
mediately, as well as raw materials and fuel in advance of
the regularly scheduled time of shipment. This was in
apparent response to a plea for aid by Kadar to all Com-
munist countries.
Western relief supplies have been held
up at the Austrian-Hungarian border since the renewed
Soviet offensive of 4 November.
Kadar`s regime has continued to promise
a national Communist program, dedicated to Hungarian in-
dependence within the socialist camp and an internal policy
characterized by moderation and economic reform.
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6. WESTERN EUROPEAN REACTION TO HUNGARIAN CRISIS
The Soviet Union's repression of the
Hungarian rebellion has aroused greater
concern in Western Europe than the
situation in .the Middle East. Public
opinion in several countries tends to
regard Western impotence to deal with
Soviet brutality in Hungary as a sign
of grave flaws in the Western alliance.
In West Germany, the Adenauer govern-?
ment interprets Hungarian developments as a warning of
what could happen in East Germany. According to the press,
the Bonn government is considering a program to form a
corps of troops ready for immediate action. A crash build-
up of two or three divisions was reportedly discussed at a
cabinet meeting on 5 November. Foreign Minister Brentano
told the American embassy immediate action is necessary
to restore the Western unity disrupted by the Anglo-French
moves in Egypt.
In France, the press echoes the government's
criticism of the slowness of the United Nations to condemn the
Soviet Union while it was quick to act against the British- French
intervention in Egypt.
Portions of the British press friendly to
Eden deplore Britain's intervention in Egypt when world at-
tention should be focused on Hungary. Editorials .critical-Of
the government's Middle East policy state that the attack on
Egypt may have tipped the scales in Hungary.
All speakers at the North Atlantic Council
session on 5 November urged positive measures against the
Soviet Union. The Netherlands proposed UN action to send
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observers to Hungary. The Italian representative, how-
ever, did not advance Italy's tentative suggestion, made on
4 November to the American embassy in Rome, that all
Western nations consider breaking off relations with the
entire Soviet bloc.
The Scandinavian press condemns the
Soviet Union in the strongest terms, and expresses the
opinion that events prove the impossibility of peace and co-
existence with the USSR.
Chancellor Raab and the Austrian cabinet
do not appear concerned over possible extension to Austria
of the hostilities in Hungary, according to the American em-
bassy in Vienna. Vienna evidently expects, however, that
Soviet press charges of Austrian interference in Hungary may
be followed up with official protests. (NOFORN)
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7. RUMANIAN REACTION TO HUNGARIAN DEVELOPMENTS
The American legation in Bucharest has
received information
that repressive ac ion
was taken last week against students in
three universities in western Rumania.
One thousand students were arrested in Timisoara University
immediately following a student meeting, where the students
had been encouraged by invited authorities to speak freely.
Many arrests were also reported in Targu Mures University,
ahd the Cluj Hungarian University has been closed.
party first
secretary Gheorghiu-Dej was summoned to Moscow on 31 Oc-
tober and had not returned by 4 November. On the morning
of 2 November, the extreme nervousness on the part of Rumanian
officials was replaced by a show of complete confidence, which
indicated that this was the date on which the .So-
viet decision to move additional forces into Hungary was com-
municated to Bucharest.
Comment The Rumanian regime appears to have the
situation under control, despite limited un-
rest and discontent, particularly among the large Hungarian
minority in, Transylvania.. To forestall any outbreak, it has
taken a number of precautionary measures during the past two
weeks. Identity cards are being checked, factory, guards have
been doubled, surveillance of diplomats has increased, and
diplomatic travel has been sharply and arbitrarily restricted.
The USSR's strong action to quell the Hun-
garian revolt has served further to intimidate the general popu-
lation and has reinforced the regime's sense of security. The
legation in Bucharest believes that the Rumanian regime will
resist popular pressures for the removal of Soviet troops.
(SECRET)
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8, POLAND READY TO NEGOTIATE US AID
The Polish news agency's announcement
of 3 November that Poland is ready to
conclude aid agreements with the United
States suggests that the Poles are pre-
pared to negotiate regardless of the outcome of future eco-
nomic talks with the Kremlin. The pointed insistence, how-
ever, that such agreements should not be conditioned by
various forms of control indicates that the Poles will not ac-
cept economic assistance involving an American voice in
the use of the aid. Poland is acting in accord with its own
concept of sovereignty but at the same time probably wants
to reassure the USSR of its orientation. Poland may also
fear that the United States may raise the question of com-
pensation for the nationalization of American property in
Poland.
The announcement indicates that the
Warsaw regime is more interested in credits than grants,
and would probably like to negotiate a long-term loan as
well as favorable trade exchanges.
While current food shortages could intensify
Poland's need for immediate aid, Ambassador Jacobs in War-
saw believes that the Poles may not pursue the matter further
unless the United States replies to the Warsaw note of 8 Octo-
ber calling for an American-Polish discussion of "all prob-
lems, the settlement of which would contribute to normaliza-
tion and widening of Polish-American relations. "
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9_., GOMULKA SEEKS SUPPORT OF ALL POLISH FACTIONS
Polish first secretary Wladyslaw
Gomulka is taking further measures,
including attempts to gain the sup-
port of a variety of political factions,
to ensure Poland's "independent" po-
sition. In a 4.November speech he
appealed to the nation to refrain from
demonstrations, and stated that every-
one--including former socialists and
pro-Soviet Communists--who believes
in the party's present policies should
be allowed to work for the party, be
elected to party organs, and be judged
according to the quality of his work.
This policy will probably be attractive
to many socialists who were purged in 1948, when the social-
ists merged with the Communists. While most of the pro-
Soviet party leaders have already been dropped by Gomulka,
he probably thinks that the leaderless elements of the pro-
Soviet faction pose no serious threat.
According to an official Polish announce-
ment, 35 Russian officers in the Polish armed forces, in-
cluding five generals, have been replaced by Polish officers.
Gomulka has also promised that the scope
of the security apparatus will be reduced and that secret po-
lice methods will be changed. He added that the regime '"can-
not, however, let anybody spit in our faces." He also stated
that press statements must conform to the party's program,
and only if they do so will the need for censorship be elimi-
nated. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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10. SUSLOV SPEECH REAFFIRMS DECISIONS OF SOVIET
20TH PARTY CONGRESS
The speech delivered by party presidium
member Suslov at the Soviet revolution
anniversary celebration on 6 November
maintains the Soviet leaders' commitment
to the broad lines of foreign and domestic
policy established at the Soviet 20th Party Congress last
February.
In the field of foreign affairs, Suslov gave
no indication that the setbacks to Soviet policies and prestige
caused by recent events in Eastern Europe and the Middle
East will lead the Soviet leaders to abandon or substantially
alter the general policy orientation established by the party
congress.
Suslov stated that despite Western efforts
to increase international tension, the past year has witnessed
a further relaxation which has improved the prospects for
consolidating peace. He stressed the USSR's willingness to
meet the Western powers half way in the settlement of out-
standing problems and its determination to improve relations
with the United States, Britain and France.
Suslov offered no new proposals for deal-
ing with the Middle East crisis. He noted Bulganin's letter
to President Eisenhower calling for joint Soviet-American ac-
tion to end the fighting in Egypt and repeated the standard
charges that Britain and France, by attacking Egypt, are try-
ing to halt the "steady crumbling of the colonial system:'
There was no reference of any kind in the
speech. to Poland's bid for greater independence from Soviet
control. Suslov's lengthy discussion of recent events in Hungary
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followed the established line that reactionary antisocialist
elements, directed by international reaction, were attempt-
ing to restore the capitalist order. He argued that a victory
for "reaction and fascism" would have created a danger to
other socialist countries "by bringing their frontiers closer
to the imperialist bases:' As for the future, Hungary will
continue to be a member of the "family of socialist countries."
Suslov indicated that the main lines of
Soviet internal policy will remain in effect. Priority of heavy
industry, the agricultural program including the new lands
campaign, and recent measures for improving the welfare of
the people were among the policies reaffirmed. As was the
case in the public speeches at the 20th party congress, the at-
tack on the cult of Stalin was not emphasized, however.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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ANNEX
Special National Intelligence
Estimate 11-9-56 of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee, dated 6 Novem-
ber 1956 and titled "Sino-Soviet Inten-
tions in the Suez Crisis," follows:
1. The Soviet notes to Eden and Mollet constitute strong
threats of military action against the UK, France, and Israel
in connection with the Suez crisis. These threats are im-
precise, however. They do not include a definite expression
of Soviet intent to take unilateral military action; they still
specifically call for UN action. Nevertheless, they are clearly
intended to imply that the USSR may act alone.
2. There are several reasons for strong Soviet action
in the Suez crisis:
(a) to reassert the Soviet position as the
champion of Egypt and of anti- colonial countries gen-
erally;
(b) to distract attention, both within and out-
side the Bloc, from the situation in Hungary;
(c) to damage the interests and prestige of the
UK and France and further divide and weaken the Western
Alliances;
(d) possibly, to re-establish, the fear of the use
of Soviet military force as a primary factor in world af-
fairs.
3. We believe that our previous estimate that the USSR
wishes to avoid general war continues to be valid.
4. It is our present estimate that the USSR:
(a) will almost certainly not attack metropol-
itan UK or France - primarily because such an attack
would make general war practically certain;
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(b) will probably not employ. Soviet forces
on a large scale in the Eastern Mediterranean - pri-
marily because their capability to do so at an early
date is inadequate, also because the risk of general
war arising from such action would be very great;
(c) may make small-scale attacks by air
or submarine against UK and French forces in the
Eastern Mediterranean - for the purpose of creat-
ing further pressures toward a UN settlement satis-
factory to themselves, and showing themselves as
the reliable champion of Egypt;
(d) will continue to furnish military aid in
the form of materiel, technicians, and logistics to
Syria, and through Syria to the other Arab States,
probably on an increased scale. They will probably
send volunteers;
(e) will at the least continue by threats to
seek to create alarm in the West, in order to produce
a UN settlement tolerable to the USSR.
5. With respect to the implied threat to the UK of using
"rockets" (presumably guided missiles with nuclear warheads),
the USSR is estimated to have the capability of delivering low
yield atomic weapons by ballistic missiles with 800 nautical
mile range which could reach the UK if launched from the
Satellites. The 800 mile missile could reach major Israeli
and Cypriot targets but not Egypt itself. Air-to-surface mis-
siles, and probably submarine launched missiles with nuclear
warheads are also within current Soviet capabilities and could
pose a threat to all areas. We do not believe that the USSR
would employ guided missiles with nuclear warheads in the
Egyptian-Israeli conflict.
6. To attack Israel or Franco-British forces in the East-
ern Mediterranean (except those on Cyprus) from present Bloc
bases, the USSR would have to use aircraft of the Long-Range
Air Force, or use IL-28 jet light bombers on missions involv-
ing no return to the Bloc. Establishment of bases for IL-28
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bombers in Syria, Jordan, or Iraq is an alternative possi-
bility, but would involve considerable problems of logistical
support and defense of such bases, especially if they were
used for sustained operations.
7. With respect to the Far East, we believe it possible,
though it does not at present seem probable, that the Suez
crisis might develop in such a way as to cause the Chinese
Communists to take advantage of it by an attack on the British
Crown Colony of Hong Kong.
8. This estimate is based on intelligence received up
to 1100 hours EST, 6 November. In the fast developing situa-
tion our estimates of this situation must be kept under constant
review. The flow of events will be drastically affected by day
to day decision and action of the main participants, including in
particular the USA, and the estimate the Soviet Union reaches
as to the probable course of action; of the USA, and the UK and
France.
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