CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A002800190001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 10, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

I 200T/12T12'E=RDP79TQQ} AO
.410
NOT RELEASABLE TO
10 November 1956
FOREIGN NATIONALS
SC No. 05745/56
CONTINUED CONTROL
Copy No. 11,)
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE mm"T" -~-- ~-:
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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This document contains classified information affecting
the national security of the United States within the
meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections
793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission
or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an un-
authorized person, as well as its use in any manner
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri-
ment of the United States.
THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS
INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES
It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated
and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
information; its security must be maintained in accordance
with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.
No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to be
gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central
Intelligence.
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CONTENTS
1..NASR "SUSPICIOUS" OF UN POLICE FORCE PLAN
(Secret Noforn) (page 3),
2. SOVIET MOVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS (Secret
Noforn) (page 4).
40 BAGHDAD PACT POWERS SEEK GREATER INFLUENCE
IN MIDDLE EAST (Secret) (page 6).
6. THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION (Secret Noforn) (page 9).
7. YUGOSLAV OFFICIALS EXPLAIN ATTITUDE TOWARD
SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (Secret) (page 11)
. ASIAN CRITICISM OF SOVIET ACTIONS: IN HUNGARY
GROWS (Confidential) (page 12).
V
9. EAST GERMANS .OPENLY CRITICIZE SOVIET ACTION
IN HUNGARY (Secret Noforn) (page 14).
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1. NASR "SUSPICIOUS" OF UN POLICE FORCE PLAN
Nasr told Ambassador Hare on 8 Novem-
ber that while he appreciated the necessity
for a prompt reply to UN secretary general
Hammarskjold's message on the formation
and activity of a UN force, he was a naturally "suspicious"
person and had a number of questions he intended to raise con-
cerning the UN plans. Nasr cited as examples such questions
as the duration of the UN force's stay and its deployment. He
also questioned the impact on the Egyptian public of the use of
Canadian forces which, in the popular mind, might not be
readily distinguished from British.
Comment General Burns.is in Cairo to make arrange-
ments for the entry of the UN police force.
UN authorities in New York are attempting to arrange for a.
landing in Egypt within a day or so of an advance contingent
composed of Canadians and Scandinavians.
Nasr's attitude, as revealed by this inter-
view as well as by his two-hour speech on 9 November "e:x-
plaining" the events of the past two weeks, is one of revived
self-confidence in his ability to parry Anglo-French action
and to play off one group of powers against another. This at-
titude is apparently shared by the Egyptian public, whose
morale has risen sharply since the allied air bombardment
stopped, and by popular opinion in other Arab states. -
Moslem sentiment
there reversed itself between 6 and 8 November; Nasr is now
a hero and Port Said is being called the "Stalingrad of the
Arabs" by the Beirut press. (NOFORN)
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24 SOVIET. MOVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
The USSR remains opposed to a UN
sponsored international police force
which does not include bloc forces.
Soviet UN delegate Kuznetsov on
7 November said the UN plan was an
"undisguised attempt" to solve the
Suez dispute in favor of Great Britain
and France, and charged that it was a
violation of the UN charter because
only the Security Council was compe-
tent to act in cases involving armed
forces.
25X1
e United Nations, Soviet UN dele-
gate Sobolev told Arab delegates on
7 November that a conspiracy would
develop during the next two to three
weeks to impose on the Arabs a settle-
ment in line with two resolutions intro-
uced by the United States on l November.
rnder the terms of these draft resolu-
tions, the General Assembly would es-
tablish committees to negotiate among the parties concerned
a settlement of the Suez Canal question and the entire Arab-
Israeli question. Sobolev's attempt to arouse Arab suspicions
of UN action may foreshadow an attempt by the USSR to have
Egypt reject the plan in its present form.
Since 29 October many families of the
Soviet bloc personnel in the Middle East have been evacuated,
and the files of the Soviet embassy in Tel Aviv reportedly
have been burned.
An earlier report that the USSR had asked
Turkey for permission to send five warships through the Dar-
danelles has been denied by the Turkish government. (NO:FORN)
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4. BAGHDAD PACT POWERS SEEK GREATER INFLUENCE
IN MIDDLE EAST
The insistence by Turkey, Iran, Iraq
and Pakistan that the United States im-
mediately join the Baghdad pact reflects
their desire to maintain their influence
in the. Middle East and to appease popular anti-British sen-
timent in their own countries. Other moves made by these
four members of the Baghdad pact in their 5-9 November
meeting in Tehran suggest that in the future they will seek
to use the Baghdad pact organization not only for defense
planning against the USSR but as an instrument for contest-
ing Egypt's bid to dominate the. Middle East.
In an effort to increase their. own influ-
ence in the Arab world, the four nations are seeking credit
for persuading the British to withdraw from Egypt. A
British Foreign Office spokesman stated on 8 November that
the demand of its Baghdad pact allies "weighed heavily in
the decision to bring an end to military action in Egypt."
London probably, however, primarily intended the state-
ment to counter Soviet claims that the USSR had forced the
cease-fire by its threats of force.
Iraq's attempts to expand its influence in
Jordan by sending troops there have been blocked by Jordan's
close association with Syria and Egypt, which desire to con-
tinue Iraq's isolation from the rest of the Arab world.
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iftm
6.. THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION
No Soviet troop movements in Hungary
have been reported.,, since: the. withdrawal-
of a number of Soviet tanks and motorized
equipment from Budapest on the evening
of 8 November. The situation in the Hun-
garian capital remained tense as Soviet
soldiers continued a house-to-house search
for insurgents who, reportedly, were hold-
ing out because of uncertainty as to whether
or not they would be shot after surrender.
The status of fighting in the provinces is
unclear. No rebel radios have been heard since early on 8
November. Press reports indicate continued fighting--possi-
bly of a guerrilla warfare nature--in at least southern Hungary
near Pecs.
The legation reported on 8 November that
numbers of people were in the Budapest streets searching for
food, in disregard of the Soviet-imposed curfew. The regime-
controlled Budapest radio has indicated that extensive loot-
ing of storage depots, textile and furniture stores as well as
food shops has taken place.
In an effort to speed the restoration of or-
der, Budapest police headquarters announced on 9 November
the creation of special guard groups, composed in part of
armed workers. The regular police have proved completely
inadequate and the regime has appealed to the civilian popula-
tion as a whole to help prevent the looting.
Premier Kadar and other members of his
cabinet continue to echo a soft line in domestic policies. Kadar,
according to Budapest radio on 9 November, said that the "peace-
ful demonstrations of 23 October placed correct and justified
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demands before the party and the government!' Implying
.that Nagy's government was not itself a counterrevolution-
?ary force, Kadar stated that Nagy tried to eliminate the
counterrevolution through political maneuvers and in a
.peaceful manner, but achieved diametrically opposite re-
sults, (SECRET NOFORN)
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7. YUGOSLAV OFFICIALS EXPLAIN ATTITUDE TOWARD
SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS
Yugoslav officials believe Khrushchev's
policies remain in effect and cite Suslov's
October Revolution speech as evidence.
They believe they must seek to retain
influence with the Soviet leaders "at no
matter what cost;' presumably to sus-
tain Khrushchev's more liberal policy.
They claim that serious efforts are be-
ing made by French, Italian, Bulgarian,
and even Soviet Communists to blame
Yugoslavia for Moscow's recent trouble
in Poland and Hungary.
Foreign Secretary Popovic has said that
although Kadar's Hungarian government was carried to
power on Russian bayonets, he still was not convinced that
the Kremlin would disavow the "many roads to socialism"
concepts to which it had agreed in the Yugoslav-Soviet
communique in June. A Yugoslav diplomat expressed the
view, however, that Yugoslav ideas on relaxation of con-
trol had been "set back two years in the last week:' He
claimed that if the "schedule" had not been interrupted by
the Hungarian catastrophe, there would have been changes
in Czechoslovakia within.a few weeks.
Belgrade blames the Soviet leaders for
failure to push "democratization" and "national Communism"
in Hungary fast enough to avoid trouble. The Yugoslavs also
blame Nagy for being weak and indecisive, thus allowing
events to get out of hand to the point where "Horthy adherents"
were exercising some power and a fascist man-hunt of Com-
munists was going on. Popovic stated that Nagy's conces-
sions had also been exploited by foreign intelligence agencies
and by Radio Free Europe, but he approved of US modera-
tion in its statements on Eastern Europe.
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8. ASIAN CRITICISM OF SOVIET ACTIONS IN
HUNGARY GROWS
India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia are
now trying to correct the impression
created by their abstention on the UN
General Assembly's resolution of 4.Novem-
ber condemning the USSR's aggression in
Hungary and calling for a withdrawal of
Soviet troops.
Nehru has strongly condemned the Soviet
move and requested an explanation from
Premier Bulganin. Krishna Menon on
8 November emphasized in the General
Assembly that India's abstention did not
imply "unconcern or lack of interest."
Ba Swe at the Asian Socialist conference
in Bombay condemned the Soviet actions in Hungary as the
"most despicable form of colonialism:' A Burmese Foreign
Ministry communique announced on 8 November that the
Soviet ambassador had been informed of Burma's deep con--
cern and was asked to convey to Moscow Burma's request
for the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
The Ceylonese prime minister told a
press conference on 7 November, "I feel that the steps
taken by the Soviet Union in Hungary are to be deplored:'
The government of Indonesia on 8 Novem-
ber issued a communique stating its regret that Soviet troops
interfered with the process of democratization in Hungary.
The communique added that this is not in accord with the
spirit and principles of the Bandung conference.
In India, Ceylon.. and Indonesia, growing
popular pressure has been at least partially responsible for
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official criticism of Russian action in- Hungary.. It is un-
likely, however, that the Hungarian issue, in which the
Asian-African bloc is not directly involved, will arouse
feelings as intense as those expressed on. the Suez problem.
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9. EAST GERMANS OPENLY CRITICIZE SOVIET
ACTION IN HUNGARY
Residents of Dresden, particularly
workers and students, have reacted
vigorously to the ruthless: Soviet crush-
ing of the Hungarian revolution,-
On 4 and 5 November,
groups of people were discussing events in Hungary and
condemning Soviet actions in very strong terms, regard-
less of who might be overhearing them.
Dresdeners are particularly disturbed
by Communist assertions that the East German people sup-
ported the Soviet action in Hungary. They are disturbed
also by the failure of the West to give active :support to the
Hungarian rebels. The prevailing opinion in Dresden is
that the outcome of the Hungarian revolution proves the
futility of any attempt to overthrow the hated East German
regime.
Comment Efforts of the East German regime to
convince the people that the Hungarian.
revolt was a fascist putsch engineered by "Horthy emigres"
with the objective of restoring "reactionary capitalism" have
failed. High party and government officials, aware of the
tension and anti-Communist sentiment within the country,
are making vague promises of better working and living con-
ditions, but they have indicated they will make no real conces-
sions or fundamental changes in policy and will ruthlessly
suppress any antiregime activity. (NOFORN)
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A. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate hostili-
ties against the continental US or its possessions in
the immediate future.
B. 1. Recent Soviet activities reflect an effort to improve
the Soviet military posture and readiness to deal
with the critical world situation.
a. Soviet troop movements, alerts and other
military activities in the Satellites and the
USSR do not indicate intentions to initiate
hostilities in the immediate future against
non-Bloc territory in Europe, including
Turkey, or US forces abroad.
b. As a result of its own statements and ac-
tions, the USSR is under much political
pressure to come to the aid of the Arabs.
There are many indications that the So-
viets are preparing to provide volunteers
and equipment, particularly in the form of
pilots and aircraft, to. Syria and some
other Arab states in as yet unknown quan-
tities. There are no known Soviet mili-
tary moves which conclusively reflect a
Soviet intention to intervene unilaterally
in the Middle East.
2. An unprovoked. North Korean attack on South Korea
is unlikely at the present time. Nevertheless,
President Rhee, encouraged by tensions elsewhere,
has launched a propaganda campaign for the reuni-
fication of Korea by subversion or force. This
campaign, accompanied by subversion or force,
could lead to a major incident between North and
South Korea. (TOP SECRET NOFORN)
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