CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A002800260001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 18, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
CONTINUED CONTROL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
18 November 1956
SC No0 05752/56
Copy No 0 112
NO Ciji;{,iuE IN CLASS.
C7 DECLASSa~ "?.ED
CLASS. CHANGED C O.
IN-1 I __
RUTH: H I V (1-6514
EVIEWEP:.---_---
pATE
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains classified information affecting
the national security of the United States within the
meaning of the espionage laws, USCode Title 8, Sections its transmission
793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits manner to an un-
authorized the revelation of its contents in any manner
authorized person, as well as its use in any
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri-
ment of the United States.
THIS DOCUMENT MUSTBE KEPT IN
CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES COMMUNICATIONS
INTELLIGENCE CH
It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated
and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
information; its
CATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATION`S accordance
with COMMUNICATIONS
action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
which un unless su contained herein, regardless of the advantages to be
on is first pprovedby the Director of Central
gained, ,
Intelligence.
TOP SECRET
2001/12/12: CIA-RDP79T
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CONTENTS
2. TURKISH MILITARY ALERT MEASURES (Top.Secret) (page 4).
4. BOHLEN REPORTS RUMORS THAT KHRUSHCHEV MAY BE
SHIFTED (Confidential) (page 6).,
5. USSR SEEKS TO RECOUP PRESTIGE THROUGH NEW DIS-
ARMAMENT PROPOSALS (Confidential) (page 7).
6. LATEST SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST (Secret) (page 9).
9. STRIKES CONTINUE IN HUNGARY (Confidential) (page 12).
18 Nov 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
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2. TURKISH MILITARY ALERT MEASURES
The Turkish government has instituted
a series of measures to increase the
readiness of its armed forces on the
Syrian frontier, according to the Amer-
ica em assy in Ankara. Internal security has also been
strengthened.
Leaves for all personnel. have been can-
celed and all training that interferes with operational readi-
ness has been dropped. An armored battalion has been moved
to southern Turkey, reinforcing a division stationed near the
Syrian border. The Turkish air force is on stand-by alert.
The antiaircraft units, hitherto grouped in gun parks, have.
moved to assigned sites and are manned on a 24-hour basis.
18 Nov 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4
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4. BOHLEN REPORTS RUMORS THAT KHRUSHCHEV MAY
BE SHIFTED
The American embassy in Moscow re-
ports that it has received rumors during
the past few days that Khrushchev is in
trouble and may be removed as first
secretary o the party. One rumor relayed on 14 November
that "Khrushchev
is on his way out" and that a en ov s s ar is rising." On
15 November, an isiting in
Moscow claimed that a member of the Gomulka delegation
had informed him that Khrushchev "is stepping down."
Another rumor is that Khrushchev would
be replaced by Molotov as first secretary and that Khrushchev
would take charge of agricultural affairs;. Malenkov would be
reappointed as chairman of the Council of Ministers, replac-
ing Bulganin.
The embassy points out that it has no con-
firmatory evidence for these rumors and notes that Khrushchev
has continued to be much in evidence and was identified as
first secretary on 16 November. He met Gomulka on the ar-
rival of the Polish delegation on 15 November and has since
headed the Soviet contingent in the negotiations with the Poles.
Comment The continuing ill effects of Soviet liberal-
ization policy toward the Satellites has
probably put the Khrushchev leadership squarely. on the de-
fensive and made Khrushchev, as architect of this policy;, the
most vulnerable to attack. At the same time, other Soviet
leaders who may have long favored a tougher line probably
now regard their position as vindicated by events in Hungary,
and their views may have greater. influence in "collective"' de-
cisions of the near future. Accordingly, some shift in the
balance of power within the party presidium may be taking
place, although there are no other indications that Khrushchev
is scheduled for quick removal.
18 Nov 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
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COITFIDENTIAL
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5. USSR SEEKS TO RECOUP PRESTIGE THROUGH NEW
DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS
The Soviet statement of 17 November
on disarmament and easing interna-
tional tension is a major propaganda
maneuver designed to divert world at-.
tention from the setbacks sustained by
.Soviet policies and prestige in Eastern Europe and to re-
capture the diplomatic initiative. It was aimed particularly
at reassuring neutralist governments and the USSR's friends
throughout the world that Moscow's threatening posture in
the Middle East crisis and its suppression of the Hungarian
uprising do not foreshadow the abandonment of the "soft"
approach in foreign affairs of the past eighteen months.
The Soviet leaders have seized upon the
Swiss government's proposal for a five-power conference
of heads of government to call for another summit meeting
to consider this latest omnibus disarmament plan. They
probably believe that new moves in the disarmament field
offer the most effective means of exploiting widespread con-
cern over the Middle East conflict and of striking a blow at
the NATO alliance.
The statement was intended to show that
the USSR is exercising restraint in the Middle East crisis in
contrast to the "reckless adventures" of the Western powers.
This theme of restraint, however, is accompanied by a pointed
reminder of Western Europe's vulnerability to Soviet military
power. The statement contends that if the USSR had in fact
been guided by the aggressive intentions which the West has as-
cribed to it, it could have used the present situation "for coming
out against the armed forces of the Atlantic bloc and could ac-
complish the military aims with regard to Western Europe as-
cribed to it, even without the use of up-to-date nuclear and
rocket weapons.'
The Soviet leaders probably expect this
reminder, together with the announcement of the nuclear
weapons test, will have an inhibiting effect on the actions of
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CONFIDENTIAL
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Britain and France in the Middle East and promote neu-
tralism in Europe. They were probably encouraged to
deliver their implied threat by a belief that the cease-fire;
in Egypt was the direct result of Bulganin`s threatening
notes of 5 November to Eden, Mallet and Ben-Gurion.
The only new feature in the statement's
disarmament proposals is the expression of Moscow's read-
iness to "examine" the question of using aerial photography
"in the area of Europe where forces of the Atlantic bloc and
Warsaw pact member states are stationed to a depth of up
to 800 kilometers (about 500 miles) to the west and east from
the border line of the above-mentioned forces." This shift on
aerial inspection was intended to create the impression that
the USSR has made an important concession to the West in an
effort to break the deadlock on disarmament, whereas almost
no Soviet territory is involved and much of Western Europe is
included,
The statement's seven-point program was
drawn from various Soviet disarmament plans over the past
eighteen months. Unlike the proposals of 10 May 1955 and
27 March 1956, this latest package plan does not offer a logi-
cal and coherent disarmament procedure. The seven points
selected were those calculated to produce the most favorable
immediate impact on world opinion. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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6. LATEST SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST
The USSR announced that on 17 Novern-?
ber it had conducted a successful nuclear
weapon test at great altitude. .
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9. STRIKES CONTINUE IN HUNGARY
The regime of Janos Kadar has tightened
restrictions on the delivery and distribu-
tion of food in Budapest in an effort to
exert increased pressure on workers, who
have apparently largely ignored a call by
the Central Workers` Council of Budapest
to end the general strike, Only govern-
ment food trucks are permitted to enter
the city and no individuals may go into the
country for supplies.
The American legation in Bucharest re-
orted on 16 November
young Hungarians through Cluj, Predeal
and Ploesti en route to the Soviet border. The
the pas-
sage of sealed freight cars loaded with
Budapest legation says Kadar told worker groups on 16 Novem-
ber that he was powerless to stop deportations. The Soviet
Military Command has said reports of deportations were "in
error"
In an attempt to reorganize the remnants
of the army, Minister of Armed Forces Muennich on .16 Novem-
ber ordered all army personnel who were: still . away from their
places of duty to report by 1900 on 18 November or be consid-
ered deserters. This move may be a forerunner to a purge of
military personnel who supported, and continue to support, the
insurgents against the Soviet troops.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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