CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A002900060001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 21, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

20TZ/ IAv 'STIR bP79Vg
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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21 December 1956
Copy No. liz
NO CHANGE IN CLASS
1-1 DZ-CtAll;GW',lDL
AUTH Mti t v
DATA ? t rZ; EWE
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONTENTS
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0. SHIFTS IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP RUMORED
(page 2a)..
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3. QUIET APPEARS RESTORED IN HUNGARY
(page 5).
5. SUKARNO MAY SOON ANNOUNCE PROPOSALS FOR
"GUIDED DEMOCRACY"
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6. INDONESIAN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR FOR
MILITARY EQUIPMENT
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7. YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW COMMENTS ON
MOSCOW-BELGRADE DISPUTE
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ANNEX -- Conclusions of the Watch Re ort of the Intelli-
gence Advisory Committee 25X1
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0. SHIFTS IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP RUMORED
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The American embassy in Moscow has
been told
that a plenum of the Soviet Communist
Party central committee has already be-
77- an a personnel shifts within the hierarchy will re-
sult from the meeting.
OMalenkov will succeed Khrushchev as party first sec-
retary and that Khrushchev will take over Bulganin's post
as premier. Bulganin, in turn, is to replace Voroshilov,
who will retire from his position as chairman of the Presid-
ium of the Supreme Soviet.
The explanation given for this move,
"which came up at the last minute," is that Khrushchev,
who is identified with successes in agriculture, would be
responsible as premier for the governmental program to
improve the economic situation of the working class. Mal-
enkov's appointment as first secretary would bring in a
man with "requisite firmness plus greater finesse" to deal
with ideological shortcomings of students and the intelli-
gentsia.
I olotov
apparently has played a considerable role in bringing about
the changes and has formed a close association with Malen-
kov.
Comment Repeated Soviet setbacks in Eastern
Europe and increasing signs of popular
dissatisfaction inside the USSR may have caused the Khru-
shchev leadership to lose its hold over the party presidium.
A dramatic shift within the hierarchy at this time, however,
would probably compound current Soviet difficulties by re-
vealing a lack of unity in the party presidium and casting
doubt on the continuance of the policies laid down at the
20th party congress.
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3. QUIET APPEARS. RESTOREI) IN HUNGARY
The repressive measures of the Kadar
regime during the past two weeks have
restored a degree of.order in Hungary
which may enable the. regime to turn its
attention to restoring the Hungarian econ-
omy.. Although widespread distrust and
dislike of the regime remain, there appears
to be a growing belief among workers that
little is to be accomplished, at this point,
by continued active resistance or strikes.
The Kada:r regime is combining its stern
police tactics with many promises of concessions, which
would represent an acceptance of a number. of the pre-revolu-
tion economic demands of Communist moderates. It has,_ for
example, promised pay increases for those workers presently
active in certain industrial sectors, particularly coal mining.
A re-examination of foreign trade treaties has also been called
for and "substantial cuts" in capital investments will be made.
The regime has stressed, however, that economic chaos threat-
ens the fulfillment of such pledges and may result in extensive
unemployment.
Efforts to broaden the basis of political
power continue but have met with little if any success. Kadar
has reportedly failed to establish a coalition utilizing Small-
holder or Peasant Party officials, and apparently will be un-
able to achieve a compromise as long as he is so closely asso-
ciated with the Soviet elements in Hungary.
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5. SUKARNO MAY SOON ANNOUNCE PROPOSALS FOR
"GUIDED DEMOCRACY"
President Sukarno may unveil his plan
for correcting Indonesia's internal prob-
lems on 22 December before the All-
Indonesian Veterans' Congress. Sukarno
statea a month that he would offer suggestions in mid-
December on a "guided democracy" and de-emphasis of po-
litical parties.
Among the 2, 000 veterans .that are to be
brought into the city are 500 students whose attendance has
been especially arranged by army chief of staff Nasution.
These student veterans, noted for their "direct and violent"
approach to political actions, could easily be used as a hard
core for a demonstration demanding that political parties
capitulate to Sukarno.
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6. INDONESIAN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR FOR
MILITARY EQUIPMENT
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Indonesia may be turning to the Soviet
Union for military equipment. The gov-
ernment is known to be planning to re-
equip its armed forces, now handicapped
by both shortage and obsolescence of arms
and equipment.
An army spokesman stated on 17 Decem-
ber that any purchases would be made in
accordance with Indonesia's "independent and active foreign
policy:' He was also quoted as saying that the choice of the
source was usually determined by considerations of quality
and price.
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The Soviet Union's attempts to forge closer
links with Indonesia are considerably facilitated by President
Sukarno9s admiration for material accomplishments under Com-
munist systems, particularly in China. On his return from a
tour of bloc countries last fall, Sukarno publicly advocated
closer contacts with the Orbit and specifically mentioned the
advantages to be gained through co-operation in the military
field.
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7. YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW COMMENTS ON
MOSCOW-BELGRADE DISPUTE
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In a series of recent conversations with
Ambassador Bohlen, the Yugoslav am-
bassador in Moscow has expressed the
belief that Soviet-Yugoslav relations will
deteriorate further in "all aspects," but will stop short of
any rupture similar to that of 1948.
He felt that Soviet leaders resented Yugo-
slav vice president Kardelj's speech of 7 December more than
President Tito's speech at Pula in November because it ex-
plored questions of ideology more deeply and was more crit-
ical of Soviet action in Hungary. The Yugoslav ambassador
believed that the Soviets were finding it more difficult to ex-
ercise restraint in replying to Yugoslav arguments.
Comment Apparently convinced that Moscow does
not intend, to permit the controversy to
result in an open breach, the Yugoslav regime seems to be
enjoying its ideological jousting with the USSR. The Yugo-
slavs presumably see the exchange as furthering significant-
ly Yugoslav influence and prestige throughout the world, par-
ticularly among the uncommitted nations.
Yugoslavia's leading paper Borba, in its
latest contribution to the debate on 19 December, tok issue
with Pravda's recent suggestion that the current exchange is
now inopportune "when reaction is attacking Communist par-
ties." It declared that the seriousness of the current interna-
tional situation, in fact, demands "open, loyal and comradely
exchanges of views between Communists." The Yugoslavs have
been particularly critical of Moscow's refusal to give full and
accurate press coverage to the Yugoslav argumentation.
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ANNEX
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Watch Report 333, 20 December 1956
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee
Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the
Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:
A. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate hostili-
ties against the continental US or its possessions in
the immediate future.
B. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate hostili-
ties against US forces abroad, US allies or areas periph-
eral to the Orbit.
C. A deliberate initiation of hostilities in the Middle East
is improbable in the immediate future. The USSR con-
tinues to give diplomatic, propaganda, and material
support to Egypt and Syria, and persists in its effort
to prevent a settlement of outstanding issues in the Mid-
dle East.
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