CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A002900530001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 16, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

16 February 1957
Copy No.
h 2002/'I9/A~'R- bP79T1
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-
DATt REVIEWER:
131
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Dept. review completed
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CONTENTS
1. THE SHEPILOV-GROMYKO SHIFT
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SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM
(page 4).
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4. POLES REPORTEDLY TURN DOWN SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR
ANTI-YUGOSLAV DECLARATION
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5. POLISH PARTY CALLS FOR PURGE OF CONSERVATIVE AND
"REVISIONIST" ELEMENTS
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8. SOVIET ECONOMIC OVERTURES TO GOLD COAST
(page 10).
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9. POLITICAL INSTABILITY RENEWED IN PAKISTAN
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1.6 Feb 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
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1. THE SHEPILOV-GROMYKO SHIFT
The transfer of Shepilov from the For-
eign Ministry to his old job on the party
secretariat and his replacement as for-
eign minister by First Deputy Gromyko,
announced on 15 February, does not ap-
pear to presage major policy changes. It seems primarily
intended to place the Soviet leaders in a better position to
deal with problems currently facing them. Shepilov's stature
within the top echelons of the party does not appear to be di-
minished. As late as 12 February he delivered the foreign
policy report to the Supreme Soviet, and he continues to be a
candidate member of the party presidium.
He may have been transferred to direct
the party's campaign against ideological nonconformity, which
has become a major problem in the USSR since the Hungarian
crisis. By training and experience he is well fitted for this
job, having served as head of the party's propaganda depart-
ment and as editor of Pravda for a number of years.
The shift may also have been designed to
permit a change of emphasis or manner in the conduct of So-
viet foreign policy within established lines. Soviet leaders
probably consider Gromyko one of their most knowledgeable
diplomats in dealing with the United States.
The appointment of Gromyko to succeed
Shepilov in effect downgrades the importance of the ministry,
since Gromyko is a foreign policy technician rather than a
policy maker. He ranks lower in the party than any foreign
minister since 1939, when Litvinov was replaced by Molotov.
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2. SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM
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The Soviet Central -Committee meeting
of 13 and 14 February which decided on
the replacement of Foreign Minister
Shepilov also heard and approved a re-
port by First Secretary Khrushchev on
the "further perfecting of the organization of the adminis-
tration of industry and building."
In its only policy "decision" published
thus far, the plenum pointed out that the "existing forms of
directing industry and construction through specialized min-
istries.. impede full use of the possibilities of our economy
and do not insure concrete and efficient guidance:' The
party presidium and the Council of Ministers were directed
to submit solutions to the Supreme Soviet for the correction
of this shortcoming. Specific decrees on reorganization
and personnel changes can now be expected.
The,.Central Committee's directives ap-
parently derive from economic conditions which have forced
the USSR to cut back its production growth rates planned for
1957.
Over the years, the USSR's administrative
policy has shifted back and forth between the concept of few
units with broad responsibilities and the concept of special-
ized units. This decree appears to reverse the trend towards
specialization prevailing since the fall of 1953, In addition,
it reaffirms the policy of transferring powers to the union
republics from Moscow, together with "strict observance" of
centralized planning. The "decision," however, goes con-
siderably beyond that of the December plenum and suggests
that a basic reorganization may be contemplated.
The plenum also elected F. R. Kozlov a
candidate member of the party presidium. Kozlov has been
serving as first secretary of the Leningrad Oblast party com-
mittee since November 1953, when he was sponsored by
Khrushchev to replace Malenkov's protege, V. M. Andrianov.
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4.: POLES REPORTEDLY TURN DOWN SOVIET PROPOSAL
FOR ANTI-VTTrOS AV DECLARATION
the Polish Commu-
nist Party has turned down a Soviet
proposal for a "joint declaration of
the Communist Parties" condemning Yugoslavia and its
"road to socialism:' A member of the Polish Communist
Party politburo was quoted as saying that the rejection of
this proposal by the Chinese and Italian Communists as
well as the Poles had prevented a mistake similar to the
Cominform condemnation of Tito in 1948.
Comment If true, this report would indicate that
the Soviet leaders were willing to risk
a serious rupture in relations with Belgrade, but deferred
the attempt in the face of Polish, Chinese and Italian ob-
jections, probably because it would dramatize disunity
rather than unity in the bloc.
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5. POLISH PARTY CALLS FOR PURGE OF CONSERVATIVE
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the Polish party's politburo
recently sent a letter to all regional or-
ganizations suggesting the exclusion of
both Stalinists and those liberal elements who adhere to
"revisionist" theories.
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I he central
committee has demanded the exclusion from the party of
members who have shown anti-Semitic sentiments.
Comment This letter is probably intended as a warn-
ing which, if unheeded, may be followed
by a move to exclude these groups when new party cards are
issued.
Gomulka apparently hopes to avoid offense
to the Kremlin without compromising his internal reform pro-
gram, which in many of its facets is repugnant to the Soviet
leadership. The simultaneous removal of active liberals
along with some Stalinists would facilitate this course.
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SOVIET ECONOMIC OVERTURES TO GOLD COAST
The USSR "bought heavily" in the Gold
Coast cocoa market in early February,
apparently as the first step in a friend-
ship campaign toward the. Gold Coast,
which ecomes the independent state of Ghana on 6 March.
According to the consul general in Accra, a Soviet trade
representative entered a falling market and bought possibly
as much as 1.0,000 tons of cocoa, the Gold Coast's principal
b
uys , 000
The USSR normally
tons a year from the-Gold Coast.
By helping to bolster the cocoa market the
USSR will improve its chances for the establishment of diplo-
matic relations with the new state.
Moscow undoubtedly sees in the new state an
opportunity to extend its influence into West Africa, after its
unsuccessful attempt to establish diplomatic relations with
Liberia last year. The USSR and three Satellites have already
accepted invitations to attend the independence celebrations in
Accra next month, but a Soviet request for permission to send
planes to Accra for the celebrations was turned down because
of inadequate facilities.
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9. POLITICAL INSTABILITY RENEWED IN PAKISTAN
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Pakistan's Prime Minister Suhrawardy
has suffered several recent setbacks
which threaten to reverse the progress
he has made in consolidating his politi-
cal position. He failed to win control
over his party in a contest with his chief
rival, Maulana Bhashani, pro-Communist
president of the East Pakistan Awami
League, at the 6-8 February session of
the East Pakistan7&. Awami League Council.
Suhrawardy had intended to push a reso-
lution supporting his pro-Western foreign
olicies through the meeting, but Bhashani'
strength made it impossible without splitting the party. A
compromise was worked out which confirmed the council's res-
olution of 1956 calling for the abrogation of military pacts, but
left Awami League members of the National Assembly free to
support Suhrawardy's foreign policies in the Assembly.
In addition, Pakistan's 1957-58 budget has
come under such heavy attack from elements associated with
the government as well as the opposition that on 13 February
the finance minister was forced to withdraw his proposal for
new taxes on a wide range of products. Such a retreat under
pressure will undoubtedly encourage opposition forces to press
their attacks on the government,
Suhrawardy's failure to gain Awami League
support for his foreign policy will also prevent him from giv-
ing adequate attention to Pakistan's pressing economic prob-
lems, thus reducing the chances of halting the deteriorating
economic situation. Despite reported pressure from President
Mirza to arrest Bhashani for treason, Suhrawardy probably will
continue to be unwilling to precipitate a crisis lest it split the
party. The Bhashani forces probably are also unwilling to force
a showdown lest it result in the downfall of the Awami-led cen-
tral government which benefits East Pakistan.
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