Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 7, 2002
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 10, 1957
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A003200350001-7.pdf248.55 KB
zsx~ 10 August 1957 0001" Copy No. 136 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 13 C -T 0: N"' I L,:V Chit: /RUTH: HFU 70-2 T OFFICE OF CURREN INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an un- authorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri- ment of the United States. DIA and DOS review(s) completed. 0e, TOP SECRET 2 0 0 2 / 0 7 / 3 0: C I A - R D P 7 9 WZZM ~ xvZX/06.1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03200350001-7 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03200350001-7 Approved For 25X1 25X1 25X1 4? LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT CRISIS ENDED (page 6). 5. INDIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 10 Aug, 57 COMMITTEE CONTENTS ARMED REVOLT REPORTED IMMINENT IN CUBA 6-k- 2, SOVIET SHAKE-UP MAY BE REACHING PARTY CENTRAL Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 , Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003100350001-7 Approved For I 1. ARMED REVOLT REPORTED IMMINENT IN CUBA Comment on: An armed revolt against President Batista is tentatively planned for the week end of 9-11 August, according to information received by the US army attache in Havana. The source said Batista had rejected an ultimatum to turn over power to a military junta. Revolutionary activity has been delayed because of the necessity of winning the support of several officers of the tank unit at Camp Colum- bia, army headquarters outside Havana. This revolutionary attempt is probably the same as the one which was reported to have been planned on 4-6 August. The general strike which broke out in Santiago on 1 August presumably was expected to spark spon- taneous popular support for an uprising. It failed to spread to Havana, however, and popular enthusiasm for a general uprising has apparently dissipated. The government, which imposed modified martial law on 1 August, has reasserted at least temporary control over the country. Opposition leaders no doubt feel that if they fail to act within the next few days, increased re- pressive measures by the government will make even more difficult any attempt to oust Batista. The political situation, especially in San- tiago and other areas of rebel-dominated Oriente Province, remains tense, however, and unrest will probably continue. The press on 9 August reported a clash between government troops and the forces of rebel leader Fidel Castro in Oriente the day before as well as the "clandestine arrival" of a plane- load of revolutionaries during the night, It also reported that a high-level army shake-up would include the removal of Col. Pedro Barrera from his position as commander of op- erations against Castro. 10 Aug 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3 25X1: 25X1 Approved For a ease 200210/130 : - 01-7 25X1 25X1 Approved Fq' 2. SOVIET SHAKE-UP MAY BE REACHING PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE Comment on: Aleksandr Sheremetyev, a candidate member of the USSR's Communist Party central committee and an industrial ad- ministrator, has been replaced by party official Mikhail Solomentsev as chairman of the Chelyabinsk Council of National Economy (Sovnarkhoz). This action sug- gests that the June shake-up of the party presidium is being extended to central committee members who may have shared the ousted leaders' opposition to some of Khrushchev's policies. Sheremetyev had been minister of ferrous metallurgy until that ministry was abolished on 10 May in Khrushchev's sweeping reorganization of Soviet industrial man- agement. He was appointed chairman of the Chelyabinsk Sovnarkhoz shortly after it was created on 29 May. Solomentsev had been second secretary of the Chelyabinsk Oblast party committee at least since mid- 1955. He was first identified as chairman of the Chelyabinsk Sovnarkhoz on 3 August. The presidium shake-up in which party careerists replaced governmental officials set the pattern for changes such as. Sheremetyev's removal, which may presage further incursions of party functionaries into the industrial management field. 10 Aug 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4 25X1 Approved For a ease 20`1215111 'Ili j - 0350001-7 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03200350001-7 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03200350001-7 25X1 Approved Fo 4. LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT CRISIS ENDED Comment on: The Laotian National Assembly in- vested Souvanna Phouma premier on 9 August by a 26-to-8 vote with a re- duced cabinet of only five other minis- ters. He announced he will press for a swift settlement with the Pathet Lao, leading to a broad coalition government. Party leaders Katay Sasorith and Phoui Sananikone, however, both of whom are included in the cabinet, have indicated the government's first order of business will be to simplify the investiture voting procedure which caused the protracted cabinet crisis. Katay estimates the reforms can be completed in about two months, after which the present emergency cabinet can be expanded to normal size. In his speech to the National Assembly on 8 August, Souvanna termed peaceful reunification of Laos the "number-one requirement." He pleaded for national unity to achieve a rapid settlement and called for good faith on the part of the Pathets in implementing previously concluded ac- cords for their military and civil reintegration into the na- tional community. Phoui,who speaks for exponents of a "hard" attitude toward the Pathets, has expressed confidence that Souvanna will be prevented from taking any "dangerous steps." 10 Aug 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003200150001-7 25X1 Approved 25X1 5. INDIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS Comment on: The $38,600,000 decline of India's for- eign-exchange reserves, during the week ending 2 August, to $843,800,000 indi- cates that the government will be forced to reduce the legal reserve requirement of $840,000,000 within the next few days. There is widespread apprehension in Indian financial circles that such a move would start a financial panic which in turn would result in increased smuggling, flight of capital, and a weakening of the value of the Indian rupee in international markets. While the $21,000,000 first installment of a loan India is making to Burma accounted for the unusual size of the recent week's decline, India's foreign-exchange re- serves, which stood at $1. 566 billion when the Second Five- Year Plan began on 1 April 1956, have been falling by nearly $20,000,000 a week in recent months. The reserves are likely to continue to decline rapidly unless the scope of the plan is re- duced or large-scale foreign aid is received, Finance Minister Krishnamachari probably will request such assistance from the United States during his visit scheduled for September. The government has emergency powers to reduce the reserve requirement to $630,000,000. 10 Aug 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7 25X1 Approved Fpr Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003200350g01-7 25X1