CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003500110001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 13, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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13 February 1958
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR Presses Japan for Peace Treaty
The USSR is using deadlocked negotiations on fishing
rights as a means of compelling the Japanese to reopen
peace treaty talks. Moscow probably hopes to force the
Kishi government to abandon its claim to the Soviet-oc-
cupied southern Kuril Islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri--
the major obstacle to a peace treaty between the two
countries.
In the fishery negotiations which began on 13 January,
the USSR has introduced proposals which would greatly
hamper Japanese fishermen. On 5 February, Soviet of-
ficials refused to discuss measures to safeguard Japa-
nese fishermen from seizure by Soviet patrol boats ex-
cept in a framework of peace treaty talks.
Japanese Prime Minister Kishi announced on 12 Feb-
ruary that his government is willing to undertake peace
treaty negotiations with the USSR, but that they should
not be linked with any fishing talks. His position, as
stated last May, has been that Moscow must first accept
Japanese views on the Kurils issue. Domestic pressure
by fishing interests may now force Tokyo to allow the
peace treaty and fishing talks to be linked, Tokyo,prQbably
will not, however, change its stand on the territorial is-
sue despite the major importance to Japan, of fishing in
the restricted northwest Pacific waters.
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Opposition to Ulbricht Not Ended by 'Party Purge
Opposition to Walter Ulbricht, the Stalinist boss of
the East German Socialist Unity (Communist) party (SED),
was not ended by last week's purge of three party leaders,
Karl Schirdewan,
second man in the SED ierarc y un i e was purged, has
mansu porters in the province1
There is little likelihood, however, that Schirdewan
and his supporters will be able to defeat Ulbricht or his
policies as long as the East German leader enjoys Soviet
sup ort. Ulbricht coordinated the purge with Moscow,
I I and convinced. the Russians that
the Germans mus still be handled with force and brutality.
In an effort to maintain his control of the ;QED, Ulbricht
will probably undertake an extensive purge aimed at elim-
inating pro-Schirdewan elements and others suspected of
holding revisionist or liberal views.
there was no organized con-
spiracy against Ulbricht, but that Schirdewan and. other
party officials had attempted. "in a friendly manner" to
persuade Ulbricht to revise his political and economic
policies. I Schirdewan favors German
reunification, which the USSR refuses to consider, and
believes East Germany should have more freedom in deal-
ing with its own political and, economic problems.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
The Indonesian Situation
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A period of political and military maneuvering is probable-
with all factions hoping to avoid violence. However, iso-
lated incidents, possibly leading to localized conflict,
could occur.
President Sukarno is expected to return to Djakarta
on 16 February.
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III. THE WEST
Total French Evacuation of Tunisia Sought by Bourguiba
The American Embassy in Tunis reports that President
Bourguiba plans to ask the UN Security Council to order the
evacuation from Tunisia of all French forces, including
those at the Bizerte base. Bourguiba would be willing to re-
frain from the UN appeal if assured that France will publicly
agree within a few days to evacuate its forces. A phased
withdrawal over a period of time would be acceptable to
Bourguiba, but he insists that French evacuation of southern
Tunisia must be "almost"..immediate.
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Free World delegations are seeking to de-
vise some type of UN machinery which would ease the impact
of future incidents. French Premier Gaillard's defense before
the National Assembly of the military action which created the
crisis suggests the French Government will be unable to make
any major concessions to Tunisia, and is not likely to evacuate
Bizerte.
The establishment of a UN observer patrol along.; the
Tunisian-Algerian border--similar to those used. during the
dispute between Greece and`its Balkan neighbors--has been
suggested. France, sensitive to any "internationalizing" of
the Algerian question, would most likely refuse to allow the
patrols on the Algerian side of the border, and Tunisia has
pointed out that such patrols would not be able to prevent incur-
sions by air.
An arrangement similar to the UN Emergency Force now de-
ployed. along the Egyptian-Israeli border probably would not be
acceptable to France. Moreover, the Tunisian incident is not
yet sufficiently critical to encourage UN members to contribute
troops and equipment for another UNEF. However, some kind
of UN action is inevitable.
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DISTRIBUTION
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Operations Coordinating Board
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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