CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003500240001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 28, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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28 February
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
*USSR: ? Sign of disagreement noted earlier in
the Soviet leadership over Khrushchev's agricultural
proposal were not reflected in the 27 February an-
nouncement of the party central committee's approval
of the plan. Implementation now appears certain.
High-level opposition is no longer possible without
provoking a political showdown.
(Page 2)
28 February 1958
DAILY BRIEF
1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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Yugoslavia: The regime appears to be preparing
to undertake a dramatic new diplomatic initiative for the
I
purpose of fostering East-West summit talks, in an effort
to bolster Yugoslavia's international prestige. Frustrated
as a result of Belgrade's increasingly isolated position be
tween East and West, Tito probably feels compelled to
c_
im-
create the impression that he is once again playing an
th
portant role in international affairs beforee national
0
\ elections on 23 March and the Yugoslav party congress
\\\\
scheduled for April.
5 X 6
respite.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Spanish West Africa: The second. phase of Spanish-
French operations in Spanish Sahara has ended with Army
of Liberation irregulars absorbing a "hard beatin 11
Many
of the guerrillas have probably taken temporary re uge on
Moroccan territory, giving the French and Spanish only a
"Arab Palestine" to appeal to the Arab refugees in Jordan.
Nasir's 26 February speech: Nasir's public attack on
the Baghdad Pact and the Iraqi-Jordanian federation as
unions formed by "imperialists" opposing his program for
Arab unity probably foreshadows another Egyptian-Syrian
campaign to drive a wedge between King Saud and the Iraqi-
Jordanian federation and to undermine the government of
Jordan. In developing psychological support for such a
campaign, Nasir may use a rejuvenated government of
I
I
N NOR
E
smo-
011
DAILY BRIEF ii
28 Feb 58
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On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee as of
27 February 1958, the Intelligence Advisory Committee con=
NON,
INEENON
eludes that tensions in the Middle East continue to create
ossibilities for serious incidents Although Arab states
0100101111111,11
p
1 NQ have recently appeared concern
intentions, a deliberate initiatic
dle East is considered unlikely.
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Cyprus - New British proposals are anticipated which
will pro ably include an interim period of self-government
followed by a plebiscite on the island's future status, and
the granting of a military base on Cyprus to Turkey. Al-
though the Greek foreign minister seems receptive to these
ideas, the immediate reaction of Archbishop Makarios,
EOKA. and Turkey will probably be unfavorable.
Java and exploitation by the. Sino-Soviet bloc.
ministrative deterioration favor the Communist position on
likely. Sukarno's uncompromising attitude, his charge of
Western interference, and the continuing economic and ad-
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee as of
27 February 1958, the Intelligence Advisory Committee
concludes that there is no evidence of Sino-Soviet intention
to become militarily involved in the Indonesian situation.
The Djakarta government is apparently determined. to take
measures to subdue the dissidents by economic blockade
and military action, An early resolution of the issue is un-
III. THE. WEST
Argentina: President-elect Frondizi,
has told the American Embassy in Buenos
Aires tnat e desires "frank and informal discussions."
with the United States. This approach is probably a build-
up to a request for a large loan.
(Page 8)
28 Feb 58 DAILY BRIEF .
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Cuba: Rebel leader Fidel Castro's campaign against
President Batista has apparently entered a new phase of
attracting attention by daring exploits in Havana in lieu of
inconclusive military skirmishing in the mountains of
eastern Cuba. Scattered incidents of terrorism. and sa-
botage continue throughout the island, and Castro continues
to call for a general strike as a means of ousting Batista
electiodled fo
f th
f
i
e
o
or
orc
ng p ostpV11V111G116ns scale- 1 June. There is as yet no indication that the government's
position is seriously threatened.
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week. )
Estimate of the World Situation. National Intelligence
Estimate Number 100-58, 26 Feb 58.
Prospects and Consequences of Arab Unity Moves.
Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 30-58,
20 Feb 58.
I I
1 110 MMENSE\'
Sino-Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in Under
Areas, 1 July through 31 December 1957. Econom
ligence Committee. Economic Intelligence Re art
EIC -R14-S4 28 Feb 58.
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40
developed
ic Intel
Number
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Central Committee Approves Khrushchev's gricuitural
.Proposal
The central committee. of the USSR-Is. Communist party
has endorsed Khrushchev's proposal for transferring, So-
viet agricultural machinery from the machine tractor sta-
tions to the collective farms. Implementation of ;the re-
organization is practically assured and the approval gives
Ihrushchev a club with which to beat down any rearguard
opposition such as the "anti party group" which formed
against his industrial reorganization plan last year.
The central committee convened on 25-26 February,
heard a report by Khrushchev, and, "recognizing the cor-
rectness and timeliness of the proposal," apparently
adopted it in short order. Neither the speed with which
the plenum reached a decision nor the wording of the an-
nouncement reflect earlier suggestions of high-level dis-
agreement over the proposal.
The central committee put forth a five-point deci-
sion which followed closely the pattern laid clown by Khru-
shchev last month in Minsk. A nation-wide discussion of
the plan is now to take place, after which it will be sub-
mitted to the next session of the Supreme.-Soviet for ap-
proval. Khrushchev himself has been appointed to pres-
ent the final proposal to the. Supreme .Soviet.
While specific details of the proposal have appar-
ently still not been formulated, control of the machinery
by the collective farms should result in real improve-
ment in agricultural efficiency, perhaps even during the
1958 growing season for those collective farms receiving
machinery immediately.
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Tito Seeks to Restore Yugoslav International Prestige
President Tito apparently is about to attempt to re-
gain his influence in international affairs. His recent
efforts to assume a leading role among the "unattached"
states and in the preparations for a summit meeting have
failed, as apparently have his efforts .to overcome his
isolation between East and West. The US :Embassy re-
ports that the Tito regime considers the decline in its
international prestige "intolerable."
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Ambassa- air Rankin ob-
served on'26 February that the "atmosphere in Belgrade :.
is ripe for some type of Yugoslav effort to reassert the
pretension of.playing a~major role on the world scene."
The Yugoslav party congress in April and national
elections scheduled for March are immediate reasons
for Tito to attempt some dramatic gesture. In the past,
his ability to give the appearance of playing an interna-
tional role far beyond that which his country merited
has been a major element in stemming his internal op-
position and maintaining popular support for his regime..
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# Spanish defense perimeters
established?at these p&nt$
in December.
Army of Liberation concen-
trations reported to
January. i
ATLANTIC OCEAN
C Z., Prot
Colomb-
Agudir . ~) Bechar
idi :fni
. _ e0ao:bov6
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 Approved F,
Situation in the Western Sahara
Army of Liberation guerrillas absorbed a "hard beat-
ing" as a result of the Spanish-French military operations
in Spanish Sahara which ended on 25 February,
Official casualty
statistics will apparently not e r , but Madrid offi-
cials are saying they expect the Sahara to be quiet "for
some time:' This seems unlikely, however, as many of
the guerrillas have probably taken temporary refuge in
Moroccan territory. At best, the two powers may get a
short breathing spell during which Spain apparently intends
to reorganize its defenses in the area and to maintain daily
liaison by radio with French forces in Mauritania. The
Spanish are sending more supplies and equipment to the Ifni
enclave, where some fighting presumably continues.
A statement may soon be forthcoming from Rabat offi-
cially endorsing for the first time most of the extensive
western Saharan claims long advanced by extremists of the
dominant Istiglal party. Such a statement would probably
include an assertion that Colomb-Bechar and Tindouf, now
administered by France as parts of Algeria, are Moroccan.
Already Moroccan King Mohamed V, in a 25 February speech
at a remote Moroccan village near the undefined frontier with
the Algerian Sahara, has specifically underscored. Morocco's
"historic rights" and. the determination of his government to
seek the return of "our Sahara:' This week Rabat also, in
effect, formally protested consideration by the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development of a loan requested
by a French mining company which hopes to exploit iron ore
deposits in the.Forf.Gouraud area of Mauritania.
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Nasir's Speech May Herald New Pressures on Jordan
Nasirb, 26 February speech in Damascus attacked the
Baghdad Pact and the Iraqi-Jordanian union as "false fed-
erations" which would be overcome by the movement for
greater Arab unity, presumably led by his own United
Arab Republic (UAR). By suggesting that the federation
of the two monarchies is an "imperialist" device, Nasir
probably hopes to scuttle Iraqi and Jordanian efforts to
gain the adherence of King Saud and at the same time
further his own campaign to undermine the Jordanian Gov-
ernment. Before Nasir's speech, a Saudi Foreign Minis-
try official had said the King intended to favor the Iraqi
Jordanian union although he would join neither group for-
mally.
Nasir is reported to be planning to bring Gaza into
the UAR, after restoration of an all-Palestine government.
A preliminary step in that direction seems to be indicated
by an Egyptian announcement on 25 February that new ex-
ecutive and legislative councils have been established in
Gaza. These councils would probably serve as the instru-
ments for approving union with the UAR.
Such a move would provide psychological support for
Palestinian Arab agitation against the Jordanian Govern,
meat, which in 1950 annexed a portion of Palestine along
the west bank of the Jordan River. Further pressure on
the Iraqi-Jordanian federation could result from an in-
crease of Egyptian-Syrian military strength in Syria.
American military attachds in Damascus re ort indica-
tions that such a build-up may be planned.
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Cyprus Situation
The Greek Government now appears ready to accept
British proposals, which it expects within .20 days, for a
Cyprus solution, and Foreign Minister Averoff is optimis-
tic that a settlement of the issue is possible. Averoff be-
lieves that the proposals will involve a period of self -gov-
ernment for Cyprus, to be followed by a plebiscite to deter-
mine the island's future status. The Cypriots probably
would vote for enosis--union with. Greece. The Greeks
assume that, to placate the Turks, the British plan will
include provisions for establishing a Turkish military
base on Cyprus and international guarantees for the Turk-
ish minority on the island.
While Averoff?s apparent willingness to accept a Turk-
idh base on the island is a hopeful sign that progress on the
Issue is possible, his optimism about a settlement is prob-
ably unwarranted. London probably has not yet decided on
as pecific plan for a Cyprus settlement. While proposals
along this line were discussed during the recent Anglo -
Greek conversations, London is likely to consult further
with the Turks before making definite offers,. The. Turks
remain firmly opposed to enosis and continue to demand
partition of the island. There is also little likelihood
that Archbishop Makarios or EOKA would accept any plan
including the presence of Turkish troops on Cypruss In
addition, a cabinet crisis,, which appears to be developing
rapidly in. Greece, could seriously weaken the Karamanlis
government and reduce chances for advance on the Cyprus
issue at this time.
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III. THE WEST
New Argentine Government Probably Will Seek US Loan
President-elect Frondizi's request to the American
Embassy in Buenos Aires for "frank and informal" dis-
cussions is his first direct contact with any United States
official- and it probably foreshadows a request for a large
When he takes office on 1 May, Frondizi will be con-
fronted with increasingly serious trade and payments deficits
and with the task of rehabilitating the state-owned power,
transport, steel, and oil-producing facilities. The provi-
sional Aramburu government has estimated the cost of
Argentina?s immediate needs for transportation and basic
industry in the government sector as $1.3 billion in hard
currencies. The government has recently sent a trade mis-
sion to the Soviet bloc in search of industrial credits.
Frondizi plans to send a representative to the United
States immediately to solicit investments. He says he also
plans to encourage local private enterprise but that he must
first get financial help for existing government utilities.
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NON,
S
M
zsm
A
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
28 February 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC
provoking a political showdown.
(Page 2)
of the plan. Implementation now appears certain.
High-level opposition is no longer possible without
*USSR: ? Signs of disagreement noted earlier in
the Soviet leadership over Khrushchev's agricultural
proposal were not reflected in the 27 February an-
nouncement of the party central committee's approval
Yugoslavia: The regime appears to be preparing
to undertake a dramatic new diplomatic initiative for the
purpose of fostering East-West summit talks, in an effort
to bolster Yugoslavia's international prestige. Frustrated
as a result of Belgrade's increasingly isolated position be-
tween East and West, Tito probably feels compelled to
create the impression that he is once again playing an im-
portant role in international affairs before the national
elections on 23 March d thV_yV
goslav party congress
~?. ril.
2 e basis of fYlnd ngs by 1 s atch Committee as of
27 February 1958, the Intelligence Advisory Committee con-
eludes ,that tensions in the Middle East continue to create
possibilities for serious incidents.. Although Arab states
have recently appeared concerned over immediate Israeli
intentions, a deliberate initiation of hostilities in the Mid-
likel
. . ti nd gs by its Watch Committee as of
Java and exploitation by the Sino-Soviet bloc,
,
Western interference, and the continuing economic and ad-
ministrative deterioration favor the Communist position on
7 February 1958, the Intelligence Advisory Committee
concludes that there is no evidence of Sino-Soviet intention
to become militarily involved in the Indonesian situation.
The Djakarta government is apparently determined to take
measures to subdue the dissidents by economic blockae
and military action. An early resolution of the issue is un-
likely. Sukarno's uncompromising attitude
his charge of
25X1
Cuba -Aebe1 leader Fidel Castro's campaign ag L..w,
President Batista has apparently entered a new phase of
attracting attention by daring exploits in Havana in lieu of
inconclusive military skirmishing in the mountains of
eastern Cuba. Scattered incidents of terrorism and sa-
botage continue throughout the island, and Castro continues
to call for a general strike as a means of ousting Batista
pplhwetktopfttp 2flGW7 lh(e a'sOeeka*desb6ax0001-6
1 June. There is as yet no indication that the government's
nosition is seriously threatened..