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December 12, 2016
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May 31, 2002
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May 13, 1958
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Approved ForrRReleas Pl/35ECRETT00975AO03700110001-8 TO 4or 2 NEXT R VlEVVDA{E: -- State Dept. review completed TOP SECRET 13 May 1958 Copy NO- Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03700110001-8 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03700110001-8 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03700110001-8 25X1 13 MAY 1958 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Khrushchev's 6 May speech on Soviet chemical industry is his most positive statement to date claiming Soviet eco- nomic superiority over US. Polish-Hungarian communique avoids mention of Soviet dispute with Belgrade. Lebanon - Disorders continue, with growing indications of UAR support for President Chamoun's Opponents. Husayn of Jordan and Faysal of Iraq scheduled to meet shortly to set up framework of Arab Union government. Greece - Karamanlis should be able to form one-party government; Communist- front party shows gains. New Moroccan cabinet reflects Istiglal party's political dominance. Indonesia - Mass demonstrations planned on Java to protest foreign intervention, ? Communist and leftist gains in Laotian elections portend further inroads, takin? advantage of conservative disunity. India - Forced resignation of two state governments may be start of Congress party house cleaning. France - Politicians' willingness to risk long crisis increases chances of a De Gaulle solution or Communist support for leftist premier. Iceland may shortly announce unilateral extension of territorial limits to 12 miles. @ Leftist trend in Chile furthered by congressional action to make Com- munist party legal. 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003700110001-8 Approved Fo CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN corn programs. 13 May 1958 DAILY BRIEF I. TIM COMMUNIST BLOC Soviet economic planning: Khrushchev's lengthy speech on the expansion of the chemical industry delivered to the Soviet party central committee on 6 May is his most positive and detailed claim to date that the superiority of the Soviet economic system now has been demonstrated. The speech, containing extensive comparisons of current US and Soviet economic data, will be a basic document for Soviet propa- gandists. Khrushchev asserts that the successful estab- lishment of the Soviet heavy industrial base will--in the shortly-to-be-announced Seven-Year Plan (1959-1965)-- begin to compensate the Soviet consumer for his 40 years of self-sacrifice. Khrushchev is now beating the drums for chemical synthetics in textile production with the same enthusiasm that marked his support of the virgin lands and divided Hungarian party. position of Kadar and the centrist faction in the badly Poland-Hungary: The joint Polish-Hungarian declara- tion signed in Budapest- -unlike the Polish-Bulgarian com- muniqu6 in Sofia- -emphasizes "complete agreement on all questions discussed," and the omission of any reference to Yugoslavia reflects the desire of both parties to remain uninvolved in the bloc dispute with Belgrade. The com- muniqu6 shows clear signs of an attempt to shore up the \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ III 25I 2'5 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003700110001-8 Approved II. ASIA-AFRICA Lebanon: Army troops are patrolling the larger cities, but sporadic disorders and acts of sabotage are likely to con- tinue. In the countryside, especially in areas near the Syrian border, the presence of armed Syrian tbesmen sug- gests that the UAR authorities may have revived the idea of a tribal revolt, originally planned for April. Acts of sabo- tage, such as the damaging of an oil pipeline from Syria to northern Lebanon, may well have been the work of UAR or Communist agents. The political impact of the disorders on President Chamoun's re-election plans is not yet clear. Moderate opposition elements are urging that Chamoun postpone his plans and install a "national" cabinet. The attitude of army chief $hihab, whom opposition leaders are urging as a stopgap prime minister, is likely to be Iraq-Jordan: King Husayn of Jordan and King Faysal of -Iraq- are _ ;expectdd to meet in Baghdad very. soon. to determine the composition; of the Arab Union government and parliament. The meeting follows ratification of the Arab Union constitution by the Iraqi Parliament on 10 May, which completed the legal measures required to set up the new government. Unless the Arab Union begins to display more dynamism than it has thus far, it is unlikely to be ef- fective in blocking Nasir's growing influence among the Arabs \ reece: Kara man is will be able to form a one-party, 7r pro-Western, right center government, although his Na- tional Radical Union has failed to receive as large a per- centage of the vote in the 11 May election as it did in the elections of 1956. The strong showing made by the Commu- nist-front United Democratic Left is probably due more to a large protest vote against the policies of the major non- Communist parties than to any substantial increase in hard- core Communist strength in Greece. 13 May 58 DAILY BRIEF N 25X4 l \pmmagga umONNINN"I" Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03700110001-8 25 25: 25 Approved F% elease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03I7 Morocco: A new Moroccan cabinet headed by moderate pro-Western Istiqlal leader Ahmed Balafrej was invested on 12 May, ending a four-week-long government crisis. The new cabinet contains nine members of Istiqlal and one inde- pendent, and represents a compromise between the party, which had demanded an all-Istiglal government, and the King, who desired to maintain some non-Istiglal representa- tion. *Indonesia: Mass demonstrations, apparently Communist- instigate&, against foreign intervention in the Indonesian fighting are scheduled for 16 May in Djakarta and 20 May in Surabaya. Protests will be directed specifically against the United States, Nationalist China, and SEATO. Laos: Partial election returns indicate victories for Communists and their allies in as many as 14 of the races for 21 seats at stake in the::supplementary assembly elections. Unless conservative elements cooperate more closely than they have in the past, Communist and leftist forces stand a good chance of exploiting their present gains for an even more significant victory in the 1959 national elections. Lack- ing such cooperation, conservative influence in the assembly apparently has been reduced to the point where the present administration may have difficulty forming an effective gov- ernment. India: Orders from New Delhi which forced the resigna- tion on-8 and 9 May of the Congress-dominated state govern- ments of Mysore and Orissa indicate that the Congress party may have begun intensive house cleaning. Top party leaders apparently lost patience with the members in Orissa, whose wavering loyalty had endangered the Congress party govern- ment's already precarious working majority in the state as- sembly. In Mysore, where the opposition is weak, New Delhi probably hopes to end ciontinuous' intraparty bickering. New Delhi's sense of urgency is probably heightened by the 13 May 58 DAILY BRIEF Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03700110001-8 M 1110 \ Approved F Release 2002/07/30 CIA-RDP79T00975A 03700110001-8 '\ possibility that the Congress party will not be able to cap- ture a seat from the Communists in a critical by-election in Kerala State on 16 May. France: European extremists in Algiers have called for a general strike and mass demonstrations against Pflimlin, who will seek National Assembly endorsement on 13 May. Some party leaders in the center and on the right are be- lieved willing to "risk a long crisis" in the belief that it would force the Socialists to reverse their policy of not participating in the next government. Prolongatioa of the crisis, however, would probably bring about a stepped-up compaign for the return of De Gaulle, and would raise the possibility that, in the interim, a leftist candidate such as 25X'1 Mitterrand might receive Communist support for a "liberal" Algerian Policy. I T1 1\1 a\\\O@ celan The government intends shnrtly to anno nce 7ciX1 \ unilateral extension of its territorial waters to the 12-mile N limit. The US ambassador to NATO believes it will be difficult to persuade Iceland to delay an announcement beyond 14 May in the absence of any new proposals. Failure of the recent Geneva conference on territorial waters to agree on the 12-mile limit issue aroused almost unanimous indigna- tion in Iceland and occasioned threats that the US armed forces at Keflavik would be asked to leave. The presently projected move would antagonize a number of Western European countries with important fishing interests, par- \ Chile: Congress's final approval of an act legalizing the Communist party, though still subject to possible presidential veto, will further strengthen the recent leftist trend in Chile. This trend will probably be encouraged by anti-US sentiment growing out of the copper question and Chile's feeling of III. THE WEST 13 May 58 DAILY BRIEF iv Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003700110001-8 ti\ >\ \\\ neglect over loans. It will particularly benefit the prospects of the Communist- supported Socialist candidate, Salvador Allende, in next September's presidential election. He has recently proposed heavy increases in the tax burden on the US-owned copper companies. 13 May 58 ti DAILY BRIEF Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03700110001-8 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003 00110001-8 25X1 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Khrushchev's Challenge to the West Khrushchev's lengthy speech on 6 May to the Soviet party central committee on the future expansion of the chemical industry will be a basic document in the Soviet propaganda campaign against the West. The speech ex- pands and again renews his challenge to the West, es- pecially the United. States, to economic competition in order to demonstrate the superiority of one system over the other. This is the most positive and optimistic state- ment to date of the Soviet propaganda theme that the pres- ent economic situation in the United States clearly demon- strates the superiority of the Soviet system. Soviet achievements to date are alleged to be the direct results of the "heroic self-sacrifice" by the knowledgeable "Soviet man" in order to establish the heavy industrial base which now has grown to sufficient size to allow a "better life for the working people;' This will be achieved by "con- siderably greater" production of consumer goods. Khru- shchev stated, "When the Soviet Union reaches the American production level and leaves the capitalist world behind, then we shall say, 'our socialist country... assures for all work- ing people the highest standard of living. II ' Khrushchev said the armaments industries of the bloc will manufacture some of the equipment required for the ma- jor expansion of the Soviet chemical industry. This will be possible, he said, because the reduction in the troop strength of the "socialist countries" left their armaments plants with idle capacity. American, West German, and British indus- tries were also offered the opportunity to contribute to supply- ing equipment for a'25-billion-dollar expansion of the Soviet chemical industry. Western technical personnel qualified in chemical synthesis were offered employment in the Soviet Union,, and Western governments were told that these offers could- lead to a partial resolution of their economic difficul- 13 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003700110001-8 Approved Gomulka-Kadar Rapprochement Omission of any reference to Yugoslavia in the joint Polish-Hungarian communiqud issued on 11 May in Buda- pest reflects attempts by both countries to remain unin- volved in the Yugoslav-Soviet dispute. Although both Gomulka and Kadar will avoid taking a public position on this issue as long as possible, they may eventually suc- cumb to Kremlin pressure. Emphasizing "complete agreement on all questions discussed" the communiqud contains several references which are an attempt by Gomulka to shore up Kadar and the centrist faction in the badly divided Hungarian party. While the communiqud called revisionism the chief danger, it condemned dogmatism with almost equal vigor. The failure to mention Gomulka's concepts of sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs as an essential element of relations among Communist states probably represents a significant concession to Kadar, who was put in power by Soviet intervention in Hungary. The two men also found an acceptable formula on the question of the Hungarian revolu- tion, condemning the counterrevolution yet avoiding refer- ence'to aspects which the Poles cannot accept, such as the "treason" of Imre Nagy. The communiqud expressed. the need for the Warsaw Pact and. unity in the "socialist" camp, and a desire for closer economic cooperation. It supported the Soviet condemnation of the nuclear armament of West Germany and. the refusal to discuss the status of Eastern Europe at the proposed summit 7rference. 13 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003700110001-8 Approved For I ease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A%3700110001-8 MEDITERRANEAN SEA 30 inch pipeline How 12 inch pipeline G:. Tripoli . (RItYFj PIPELINE \_ X16 inch pipeline Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003700110001-8 J f? S Y R I A 25X1 25X1 Approved ForrRel H. ASS -Al