CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003700210001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 24, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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24 May 1958
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Satellites Differ on Yugoslav Question
Hungarian, Rumanian and Polish comments on the Mos-
cow-Belgrade dispute have emphasized "comradely criti-
cism," They have avoided vituperation and, although
fully a~dhering'tabasic bloc positions on "revisionism," have
called for further interparty talks and continuance of amic-
able government-to-government relations. This reaction-,
which in the case of Hungary admittedly reflects "conster-
nation" of party members over Yugoslav .developments --is
significantly different from the uncompromising stand taken
by Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.:
Comment in the official Hungarian party newspaper of
21 May, while closer to the Kremlin?s position than Warsaw's
guarded defiance, is nonetheless conciliatory. It calls for
furtheer discussions with the Yugoslav party "as between
comrades" and warns Hungarian party members not to
"backslide" to the vituperative line of the 1949 Cominform
resolutian against Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the
I~ungarian article does condemn the Yugoslav party for its
"anti-Marxist views," admits the 1948 resolution e~elling
Belgrade from the Cominform was "essentially" correct,
and alleges Yugoslavia approved of the Hungarian revolution.
Rumania, like Hungary, apparently still desires to
avoid direct involvement in the dispute. The official Ru-
manian comment on the Yugoslav question issued on 18
May avoided polemics while carefully siding with Moscow
on the ideological questions in dispute.
Polish comment goes much further, approaching open
disagreement with the KremlinQs line and even hinting that
Moscow does not fully support the Chinese Communist de-
nunciation of Tito. An 18 May article in' Swiat i Polska, un-
official organ of the Foreign Ministry dec. are that the Poles
considered the isolation of Yugoslavia in 194$ "unjustified."
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Egyptian Activity in .the-'Sudan
The UAR's subversive campaign against Sudanese
Prime Minister Khalifs pro-Western government may be
gaining strength, and events in Lebanon have apparently
shaken the confidence of high. Sudanese officials in their
ability to resist a possible Egyptian effort to vverthi?ow.
Khalifs coalition.
Egypt was apparently unchastened by the setback in
prestige it suffered in the Sudanese .border dispute .last Feb-
ruary and Khalifs subsequent parliamentary election victory
over the pro-Egyptian National Unionist part .
Disaffection of a relatively small number of
members in the all-important house of representatives
would threaten the slim majority now held by Khalifs Um-
ma party in coalition with the People's Democratic party
(PDP), which has its own small but troublesome pro-Egyp-
tian wing.
Egypt is also reported to have been active in the south-
ern Sudan, where resentment toward the central government
is of long standing, Members of the Southern delegation in
Parliament, on whom the cualxtior~ also depends: for suppgrt,
walked out of the 22 May session in protest against ~~~c form
of the new constitution now being writteno Their dissatisfac-
tion with the government's stand against regional autonomy
may make them amenable to Egyptian advances.
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Situation in lgeria
There are increasing indications of friction and dis-
cord within the ranks of the dominant military and civilian
extremists in Algeria and also between these elements and
more moderate leaders who have been caught up in the re-
cent developments there.
The American consul general in Algiers reports that as
the stalemate continues, extremist civilian elements among
the resident Europeans are beginning to envisage,. with equa-
nimity a prolonged split with metropolitan .France and even
eventual secession. The army's only political objective, how-
ever, continues to be to bring about the desired change of re-
gime in Paris,. a goal to which General Salan committed him-
self more explicitly than heretofore when on 23 May he issued
a statement saying the new all-Algeria committee had been
formed to facilitate the establishment in Paris of a "govern-
ment of public safety presided over by General de Gaulle:'
The Algiers leaders are not known to be planning to initiate
in the near future any further action of a drastic nature to
achieve this objective, but pressure for such- action--which
could conceivably take place in Tunisia, Algeria or France--
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III. THE WEST
The French Crisis
Premier Pflimlin~s proposals far strengthening the execu-
tive power appear s,lready.to b~ running into major parlia-
mentary opposition. The decision of the National Assembly's
steering committee to postpone discussion of the issue un-
til 27 May probably reflects the basic distrust on the part
of many deputies of any move curtailing their own powers,.,
and may also indicate stronger opposition from the Independ-
ents than was anticipated. The Independents, including their
top leaders Pinay and Senator Duchet, appear to be sliding
more toward De Gaulle as the only alternative to a popular
Front.
According to some press reports, the French Commu-
nists are under pressure from Moscow to withdraw their
support from Pflimlin. Since Soviet and French Communist
propaganda has been proclaiming that Communist support
for Pflimlin in the assembly has saved the Republic, it
would be difficult for the Communists to reverse their posi-
tion. They might, however, find a pretext in the consiitu-
tional issue, arguing that they have always opposed strengthen-
ing the executive.
There is renewed speculation that Pflimlin will make
contact with De Gaulle this week end to discuss "the steps
by which the general could assume power'' if President
Coty were to call him to form a National Union government.
Although Pflimlin still has a chance to retain office
himself, a split or even a relative strengthening of the left
in his broad parliamentary support would bolster the case
of those urging a De Gaulle solution
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Panama Still Tense
The state of siege declared on 22 May in Panama has
not. eliminated antigovernment activity in the capital.. A
disruptive general strike called by students. and joined by
several unions continues, and unidentified mob leaders have
threatened renewed violence. At least 500 rebellious students
are in control of the national university area--which is out-
side national guard jurisdiction--although many took refuge
in the Canal Zone when armed hoodlums turned student demon-
strations over school administration into rioting and terrorism.
The agitators who incited the crowds in Panama City and
Colon reportedly were armed and directed by various groups
anxious to oust President de la Guardia for business or poiiti-
cal reasons and further to discredit the unpopular guard by
goading it into repressive measures. These opposition forces
are disparate in motive and distrus ful of one another and would
probably have difficulty working together. Hvwevera their ini-
tial success in arousing the public may encourage them to new
efforts. They have often resorted to attacks an the United States
position in the Canal Zone for political purposes in the past and.
have used De la Guardia's moderate approach to USrelations
against him.
National Guard Commandant Bolivar Vallarino, who evi-
dently made the decision to impose martial law and censorship,
has arrested some of the alleged agitators and. appears to be
the .strongest figure in Panama at present. He may insist that
De la Guardia make some cabinet than es to ensure to
within the administration ranks
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DISTRIBUTION
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Operations Coordinating Board
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intell}genre, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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