CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003800030001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 23, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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23 June 1958
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State Dept. review completed
Copy No. 140
TELLIGE.,.-'
TOP SECRET
DOCUMENT NO.
N") CIIr;A'GE IN CLASS.
70: TS S C
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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atis ied wit the recent CEMA conference decisions, which
pparently require the Czechs to reduce consumer goods
roduction and thereby lower their relatively high standard
Of living. Party First Secretary Novotny may seek a reap-
23 June 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Czechoslovakia: Prague officials are said to be dis-
praisal of Czechoslovakia's role in the plan to integrate the
bloc economy when he visits Moscow on 2 July.
* USSR- Lebanon: Soviet propaganda has carefully avoided
committing the USSR to any specific course of action. The
USSR, however, is seeking to convey the impression that it
is opposed to Western action in Lebanon by propaganda
charges of Western preparations for military intervention.
In addition, a Soviet member of the UN Secretariat was used
privately to warn a US official that the USSR would imme-
diate) send "volunteers" to oppose any American interven-
tion.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
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Yemen: The Imam is planning a 20-day trip to Italy in
the near future for reasons of health. In his absence, the
rivals for the succession, Crown Prince Badr and the Imam's
brother, Prince Hassan, are to govern jointly. A struggle
could break out if Hassan makes some move to supplant Badr,
whose pro-Soviet views have incurred the Imam's displeasure.
23 June 58
DAILY BRIEF ii
101 MEMN
IN
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North Africa: Tunisian, Moroccan, and rebel Algerian
leaders meeting in Tunis last week reaffirmed their common
commitment to the goal of Algerian independence and took
further steps toward the eventual creation of a North African
federation. Establishment of an Algerian government-in-
exile was again deferred. However, the decision to proceed
with the formation of a "provisional consultative assembly"
for North Africa promises to enhance the status of the FLN
rebel leaders and to associate Morocco and Tunisia more in-
timately with the FLN.
Morocco-France: Morocco has notified Paris it is ready
to discuss the French offer to withdraw most of its ground
forces if Morocco will grant France training bases. Because
of strong public pressure for complete evacuation, negotia-
tions may be difficult.
III. THE WEST
France: French Communist activity now apparently
centers on organizing "committees of republican defense"
and on preparing all-out demonstrations against De Gaulle
on 14 July. These efforts are hampered by continuing lack
of enthusiasm among the party rank and file and by the strong
French reaction to the executions in Hungary.
23 June 58
DAILY BRIEF iii
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Venezuela: Opposition within the armed forces against
junta President Admiral Larrazabal is rising, partly as a re-
suit of his weakness in the face of the civilian demonstrations
of 17 June. The army, air force, and national guard may
need only a little more provocation to stage a coup against him.
23 June 58
DAILY BRIEF iv
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1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
800030001-6
Czechoslovakia Reported Displeased With CEMA Assignment
The US Embassy in Prague reports that the Czech party is
displeased with the orders it received at the recent CEMA con-
ference in Moscow to reduce consumer goods production. The
embassy received one report that party First Secretary Novotny
"walked out" of the meeting in disgust.
According to the embassy, recent developments tend to
substantiate this reported dissatisfaction. Novotny returned
to Prague immediately following the CEMA conference without
remaining for the Warsaw Pact meeting which the other satel-
lite party first secretaries attended. Premier Siroky displayed
"hypersensitivity" when the US ambassador
I Imentioned Czechoslovakia's acceptance of
Soviet dictation not to participate in the Marshall Plan. US
tourist requests to visit an automobile factory, reportedly af-
fected by the CEMA dictum, have recently been refused, a de-
parture from earlier practice. Finally, the embassy reports
that some press comments on the CEMA conference hinted at
local dissatisfaction with the role alloted Czechoslovakia and
rumors of a last minute recall of the party paper on 17 June ap-
peared to be confirmed by its late delivery to the embassy that
day.
According to the story circulating in Prague, CEMA ordered
a Czech cutback in consumer goods production of from 80 per-
cent of that needed for domestic consumption to 50 percent. This
would affect particularly the private automobile and fruit canning
industries. Novotny is reported to have replied that this would
cause a serious curtailment of living standards and create polit-
ical difficulties by increasing the social dissatisfaction already
prevalent as a result of the economic reorganization now under
way.
Novotny may be prepared to present his case more firmly
when he visits Moscow on 2 July, although the USSR probably
feels Czechoslovakia is better prepared both politically and eco-
nomically than any other satellite to participate in economic co-
opeation for the good of the bloc.
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USSR Displays Caution in Lebanese Crisis
The Soviet Union has so far shown considerable caution
in its efforts to exploit the Lebanese rebellion. It has re-
frained from a heavy propaganda and diplomatic offensive
comparable to that mounted during the Turkish-Syrian dis-
pute in the fall of 1957 and the Suez crisis in 1956. Moscow's
caution and restraint probably have been dictated by its un-
willingness blatantly to identify itself with the rebel attack
on the legitimate regime of President Chamoun and thus ex-
pose the USSR to charges of interference in Lebanon's inter-
nal affairs.
Moscow's caution probably also reflects the uncertainty
of the Soviet leaders as to the likelihood of Western military
intervention in behalf of the Lebanese Government. Soviet
propaganda has attempted to discourage Western intervention
by a steady stream of charges that the United States, Britain,
and France are making preparations, under cover of the UN
Observer Group, for military action. A Soviet member of the
UN Secretariat told. an American official on 20 June that the
USSR fears that the United States, under British pressure,
would land marines in Lebanon. He warned that if this occurs,
the USSR would immediately send "volunteers" to oppose such
action.
The choice of a Soviet member of the UN Secretariat, who
later could more easily be disavowed than an official of the
Soviet UN delegation,, reflects.the Soviet leaders' unwillingness
to commit themselves to any specific course of action at this
time. The Soviet press has published, but without comment,
appeals by Syrian and Lebanese rebel sources for volunteers
from "Arab and other friendly peoples" to repel any Western
intervention.
If the Soviet leaders should come to believe that the possi-
bility of Western military action has diminished or disappeared,
they may adopt a more active role, including implied threats of
Soviet counteraction, and then claim subsequent credit for again
preventing "imperialist aggression" against an Arab state.
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Political Rivalry May Intensify Among Yemeni Princes
Imam Ahmad's absence from Yemen during his forthcom-
ing visit to Italy may bring an intensification of the rivalry
between his brother, Prince Hassan, and his son, Crown
Prince Badr. The date of the Imam's departure has not been
announced, but he reportedly wishes to leave as soon as pos-
sible on a 20-day trip to take a "hot-springs cure." The two
rivals for-succession to the throne are reported slated to gov-
ern jointly during this period.
Badr is now in Cairo discussing the implementation of
the United Arab States agreement with the UAR and the Aden-
Yemen border situation, and he will presumably return to
Yemen prior to the Imam's departure. Until this spring, the
Imam appeared determined that Badr would be his successor.
Recently, however, he has had doubts about his son's pro-
Soviet views, and this may be related to Hassan's recall to
Yemen last month.
Hassan, who had been serving with the Yemeni UN dele-
gation in New York, was given a welcome of "unconcealed
enthusiasm" upon his return. He had been considered out of
favor with the Imam, and his duty abroad appeared to be a
semiexile.., His recall and appointment to joint governor-
ship with Badr suggest a significant change in his brother's
attitude.
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North African Leaders Conclude Talks in Tunis
Tunisian, Moroccan, and rebel Algerian leaders, who met
in Tunis last week to reappraise their position in the light of
recent developments in Algeria and France, have reaffirmed
their determination to work for Algerian independence and an
eventual North African federation. A joint communique issued
on 20 June after four days of tripartite meetings- -described
locally as "sessions of the Permanent Secretariat of the United
Arab Maghreb" envisaged by- the conference of North African
political parties held last April at Tangier- -categorically re-
jected proposals, recently revived by French rightists, to
"integrate" Algeria with France. The communique stated that
recognition of Algeria's "right to sovereignty and independence"
is the sole basis for a solution to the French-Algerian conflict.
Morocco and Tunisia, anxious to avoid new complications
in their momentarily improved relations with France, again
avoided the issue of an Algerian government-in-exile. How-
ever, the blurring of the line between Moroccan-Tunisian dis-
cussions publicized as being at "governmental level" and the
simultaneous tripartite talks appears to have been deliberately
designed to satisfy the desire of the Algerian National Libera-
tion Front (FLN) for at least "near-government status."
The conferees' decision to proceed with the formation of
a "provisional consultative assembly" for North Africa prom-
ises to enhance the FLN's stature. The growing formal ties
of Tunisia and Morocco with the FLN will tend increasingly to
inhibit any actions by Tunisia and Morocco which the FLN might
consider inimical to its interests.
Although still highly skeptical of French Premier de Gaulle's
willingness and ability to move toward an acceptable solution of
the Algerian problem, top Tunisian and Moroccan leaders appar-
ently feel every effort should be made behind the scenes to test
De Gaulle's intentions. They can thus probably be expected to
continue efforts to persuade the FLN to refrain from actions which
might further impede eventual negotiations with France and to re-
spond to any French overtures in that direction by indicating a
willingness to settle for something less than immediate independ-
ence. Simultaneously, the two governments appear to be stepping
up their attempt to induce Paris to make such overtures. .
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Morocco Agrees to Negotiations for Evacuation
Of French Troops
The Moroccan Government has formally responded to
French proposals regarding a partial evacuation of French
troops by renewing its oral request of last March that France
make a solemn declaration that it is evacuating its troops
from Morocco. When this declaration of intention is pub-
lished, Morocco will negotiate a temporary arrangement for
the retention by France of some air, naval, and possibly army
training bases in Morocco.
The French Embassy believes it has reached tentative
agreement with Morocco on certain aspects of the problem of
French forces in Morocco, and will soon attempt to pin the
Moroccans down to a formal agreement. The French propose
a special regime of two months duration during which Moroccan
restrictions on French troops would be relaxed and negotiations
could be completed.
The American ambassador comments that the fact that
Morocco has formally agreed to negotiate concerning the reten-
tion of French bases is a step forward and should facilitate nego-
tiations. Nevertheless, two aspects of these proposed negotia-
tions may prove difficult: the timing for the evacuation of troops
along the Algerian border and the extent to which Morocco will
cooperate with France on training facilities.
The precedent of the 17 June Tunisian-French agreement
on the partial evacuation of French troops from Tunisia should
prove helpful, in the view of the American ambassador-
A new clash between French and Moroccan military units in
the undefined region of the Moroccan-Algerian border may excite
popular demands for the evacuation of all foreign troops from
Morocco, thereby complicating the projected Moroccan-French
/eotiations. F7
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III. THE WEST
French Communist Party Tactics
The French Communist party is now pointing toward "all-
out" anti-De Gaulle demonstrations for 14 July on a scale greater
than those it mounted on 28 May against De Gaulle's investiture,
The party still
suffers from lack of enthusiasm among i s rank and file, how-
ever, and will probably be further hampered by the strong
French reaction to the executions in Hungary. The US Embassy
reports that the Communist call for counterdemonstrations to
the De Gaulle anniversary celebrations of 18 June went largely
unheeded.
The party is reportedly prepared to resort to illegal methods
of opposition to De Gaulle, but is avoiding provocative action for
fear of being outlawed and because of its desire not to get too far
ahead of the elements in the non-Communist left it hopes to at-
tract into an eventual popular front. The party believes its main
task is to arouse anti-De Gaulle sentiment, in alliance with the
non-Communist left, and is concentrating on the formation of
"committees of republican defense" to counter the committees
of public safety. The embassy reports that the Communists ap-
parently are also concentrating on generating opposition to the
coming constitutional reforms and, more immediately, on sup-
porting labor's demands for higher wages.
There has been no significant response from the non-Com-
munist left on the popular front idea as yet, and it is reported
highly skeptical of cooperation with the Communists. The em-
bassy comments that cooperation would become more of a pos-
sibility if a clearly reactionary successor to the present De
Gaulle government were in prospect. The two main non-Com-
munist labor unions have condemned the Hungarian "acts of
savagery" and warned that "nothing has changed in the doctrine
or dealings of Stalinist Communism."
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Growing Military Opposition to Venezuelan Junta May
Result in Coup
Opposition within the armed forces against junta Pres-
ident Admiral Larrazabal is rising, partly as a result of his
weakness and partly as a result of growing leftist influence.
The possibility of a coup before the November elections has
now increased. the army,
air .force, and national guard need. only a little more provoca-
tion to act, and there are indications that at least part of the
navy agrees with them.
The civilian demonstration on 17 June, protesting the dis-
missal of a leftist-linked engineer by the career military gov-
ernor of the federal district and resulting in Larrazabal's re-
hiring of the engineer, is taken as further indication of Larraz-
abal's weakened control and of his responsiveness to civilian
over military pressures. On the following day, quite possibly
as a result of military insistence growing out of this incident,
Larrazabal publicly renounced his ambition to run for the pres-
idency in the November elections
The military are also apprehensive over the rising leftist
influence. A recent indication that the minister of interior is
pro- Communist has been strengthened by the appointment of
a chief assistant. with a pro-Communist history. Furthermore,
the Communist party which was legalized on 23 May, was given
a seat on the 23-man Supreme Electoral Council named on 18
June.
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