CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003900190001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 23, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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23 August 1958
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
23 August 1958
LEA] DAILY BRIEF
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Middle East resolution: Nasir probably believes that the
Arab-sponsored resolution .serves his long-range interests.
He may feel that the governments of Lebanon and Jordan will
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may be consistent with reported UAR plans for a revival of
come under his influence in due course and that a show of
moderation and a desire to cooperate with Hammarskjold at
this time are the most effective tactics for obtaining the
withdrawal of British and American forces from the area
and increasing Arab prestige. The resolution's emphasis
on agreements reached within the context of the Arab League
the League as a pro-Nasir alliance.
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Western military intervention, is permitting more open ex-
pression of anti-Western--particularly anti-American--senti-
ments which it had earlier tried to curb. While the- p'reaent
leaders with some exceptions appear to be relatively moderate,
competition among factions may lead to still greater em-
phasis on anti-Western themes and possibly to earl con-
sideration of such moves as oil nationalization.
(Page 3)
Israel-UAR: The Israeli Army appears to be continuing
its military preparations for any trouble arising out of the
situation in Jordan. There are indications that armor is
being concentrated near Beersheba in southwestern Israel.
The UAR has complained publicly this week that Israeli pa-
trols had crossed its frontier in this area.
23 Aug 58
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Pakistan: Prime Minister Noon's statement on 21 August
that "we do not want Iraq to stay with us in the Baghdad Pact;'
may have been designed to encourage Iraq to make a formal
break. Pakistani leaders have long believed that Iraq's in-
volvement in Arab affairs created problems for the other Bagh-
dad Pact members and that closer cooperation would be pos-
sible without Iraq.
Greece: There are an increasing number of indications
that the Karamanlis government may resign over failure to
settle the Cyprus controversy. Any successor government,
while basically pro-Western, might feel compelled to adopt
a moXe neutralist policy.
Japan-Burma: Japan intends to grant a $20,000,000
credit to -Burma as part of a campaign to expand economic
ties with free Asian countries. This loan will offer competi-
tion to the bloc economic offensive in Burma; the USSR has
granted credits of $37,000,000. Tokyo has already extended
a $50,000,000 credit to India and is studying similar action
for Ceylon and Pakistan,
Indonesia: Dissident troop defections apparently are
proving a -significant factor in the government's progress in
subduing the insurgents in North Celebes. In North Sumatra,
the dissidents' shortage of ammunition, following intensive
action earlier this month, has forced at least a temporary
cessation of guerrilla activities there.
(Page 7)
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraqi Regime Moving Toward More Anti-American Policy
Although Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim and certain other
ministers have given repeated assurances of friendship to-
ward the US, the government is relaxing curbs on anti-West-
ern--particularly anti-American--actions.
Among the disquieting signs of this trend are the rabble-
rousing speeches of Vice Premier Arif, who harps on the
"evils of imperialism"; the emphasis on "imperialist plot-
ting against Syria" in the current "treason trials" for former
military leaders;,, an., attempt to "nationalize" the American
Mission Hospital at Amara; and a refusal to allow reopening
of the USIS and Military Advisory Assistance Group offices
andahterference withthe work of Point IV technicians. Other
irritants are restrictions on diplomatic pouches and diplo-
matic visas as well as on the communications and movements
of the American counsul at Kirkuk.
Public hostility toward Americans has been reflected
in the spitting on and stoning of embassy officers, a rash of
Iraqi student withdrawals from "imperialist" Point IV scholar-
ships, and charges that Point IV has been used to organize
"anti-Communist cells" for carrying out sabotage. Iraqi
friends of Americans are afraid to be seen talking with them
in public. Western contractors are experiencing labor troubles
on the large development projects and some have intimated
that they will accept no more new contracts, a move which
might induce the Iraqis to look to the Soviet bloc for technical
help.
Should the current Baathist- Communist struggle or other
factional fights for influence assume wider proportions, indi-
vidual members of the regime may feel compelled to voice in-
creasingly anti-Western propaganda lines in order to retain
their positions. It is likely that demands for denunciation of
the Baghdad Pact and for "nationalization" of the nation's oil
will be favorite themes, as well as the opening up of develop-
ment ment contracts to the Soviet bloc.
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Pakistani Prime Minister Calls for Iraq to Leave
Baghdad Pact
Pakistani Prime Minister Noon said in a speech on 21
August that Iraq should leave the Baghdad Pact, that Pakistan
believes Arab unity under the leadership of Nasir would lead
to 'greater Islamic unity, and that Pakistan would be willing
to enter a federation with Iran and Afghanistan. In contrast
to his 8 March speech in which he threatened to leave all de-
fense pacts if Western support for Pakistan on the Kashmir
issue was not forthcoming, the recent speech was not anti-
Western and explicitly defended the concept of collective se-
curity arrangements.
While Noon's statement may have been timed to impress
public opinion prior to elections, Pakistani leaders have long
believed that Iraq's involvement in Arab affairs createdprob-
lems for the other Baghdad Pact members. andthat'.closer coopera-
tion would be possible without Iraq. Pakistani leaders are un-
likely, however, to approve his remarks on Arab unity because
of their distrust of Nasir and his willingness to cooperate with
the USSR. While recognizing that an accommodation with
Arab. nat pnalism is necessary,' they probably hope that Arab .
unity willtake the form of a loose fede ration rather than a
united state.
Noon's offer to federate with Iran and Afghanistan may
heighten Afghan suspicions of Pakistani intentions, as the
Afghan leaders have already stated that they are not interested
in such a federation. His remarks on Islamic unity may cause
increased apprehensions in India, which has supported Arab
nationalism but is fearful of the emergence of a pan-Islamic
bloc..
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Greek Government May Resign Over :Cyprus Dispute
Extreme pessimism regarding recent and anticipated
future developments in the Cyprus controversy has been
voiced by pro-Western Greek government leaders, and the
cabinet has discussed. resigning. Prime Minister Karaman-
lis has earlier said that he :.7ould have to resign if adverse
developments in the Cyprus ispute continued.
Greek frustration over Cyprus reached a new high with
London's 15 August announcement that it intended to begin im-
plementationof a'modifiedversion of the British seven-year
"Partnership" Plan for Cyprus. Provision for Turkish repre-
sentation in the proposed Cyprus government and the general
acceptance of "organic partition" between the two communities
on the island made the plan unacceptable to Greek Cypriot
Archbishop Makarios. His immediate rejection, of the plan
made eventual rejection by Athens a certainty.
The Cyprus issue is only one of many factors in a grow-
ing estrangement between Greece and the West which may lead
Greece to dissociate itself-possibly even `withdraw- -from
NATO. Large segments of the public and the government be-
lieve that Greece has been abandoned by the US in the Cyprus
controversy and that Washington discriminatbs in favor of Tur-
key politically, economically, and militarily. In addition,
cordial relations between Greece and the UAR have resulted
in widespread condemnation in Greece of recent Western moves
in the Middle East.
If the present government resigns, it will probably be
followed by a weaker coalition of non-Communist parties--
possibly, under conservative leader Panagiotis Kanellopoulos.
It is doubtful, however, that such a government could do more
than its predecessor to reach a settlement of the Cyprus issue,
particularly if Makarios refused to acquiesce in such moves.
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Japan Approves Economic Credit for Burma
The Japanese Government on 22 August approved a
Burmese request for a $20,000,000 credit to be used for
purchasing Japanese products, probably machinery and
other industrial products. The credit would be in addition
to reparations payments to Burma and is part of a Japa-
nese campaign to expand its own economic ties and counter
Communist bloc penetration in the area.
Japan thus far has extended a $50,000,000 credit to India
and is studying similar action on requests from Ceylon and
Pakistan. The credit to Burma would tend to counter a. Sino-
Soviet bloc economic offensive in which Peiping has offered
a $4,200,000 loan for construction of a textile plant and Mos-
cow has extended $37,400,000 in credits. The United States
has lent $42,300,000 to Burma.
Tokyo, fearful of Communist China's call for a boycott
of Japanese products by Overseas Chinese residents in
Southeast Asia and by price reductions of up to 20 percent
on competitive Chinese products, is anxious to expedite
measures for orienting Asian trade toward Japan. As one
means of achieving this, Foreign Minister Fujiyama will
ask for US assistance in establishing a multinational develop-
ment fund for South and Southeast Asia when he visits Wash-
ington on 11 and 12 September for discussions of problems in
American-Japanese relations.
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Indonesian Dissidents Suffering Losses
The surrender of three battalions of dissident troops at
Tomohon has " Token the back" of the dissident movement in
North Celebes. I
F Djakarta army headquarters is now op imis.-
ic over of a quick settlement with the North Celebes
dissidents.
the defec-
tion of the sector commander at Tomohon, their lass major
stronghold. caused its fall to central government troops on 16
August.
Despite supply difficulties, the North Sumatra dissidents nave
succeeded in denying to the central government all but a few ma-
In North Sumatra, the dissidents I
have suspended operations on 18 August because of a shortage
of ammunition. They probably nearly expended their slim stocks
of ammunition during their intensive campaign of hit-and-run at-
tacks against government posts during the first half of the month.
for towns.
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23 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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