CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004200130001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 17, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved FQr Release1c)I/0 ~00975A004200130001-0
25X1
17 December 1958
25X1
Copy No. C h ()
III - MEMONO
rIOCUMu:NT NO. (3
i-O r HA^ GE IN ,,, 5. ..
a
O
5X1
, r~MF .J
25X1
State Dept. review completed
Approved For Releaser f04Cr~-1~F 00975AO04200130001-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200130001-0
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200130001-0
 Approved F ele 2002iW04 - 400130001-0
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
17 December 1958
r)A11Y RPIPF
25X1
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
)40
*USSR.- Recent Soviet public statements and private re-
bark-s-5y-nrushchev provide further evidence that the USSR
envisages its Berlin move as the opening phase of a major
political offensive in Europe. In a conversation with the Ital-
ian ambassador on 13 Decembert Ehrushchev expressed his
desire for a top-level meeting to discuss not only Berlin, but
also a German peace treaty, a nonaggression pact, European
security, reduction of forces in Germany, and withdrawal of
foreign troops from Europe. He said the Berlin problem was
probably the least important of all these measures. .
25
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79TOO975AO04200130001-0
 ~nm~inrl For Dnlne~n ~f111~IfIQ/Ad . !`DIID]OTf1110]5Af111d~f111~Qf111f11
PP J1
Approved For Release 2002/09/04 CIA-RDP79T00975A004200130001-0
M
j
UAR-,Iraq: Nasir may be beginning an open propaganda
campaign against Communist influence in Iraq, which he has
hitherto sought to combat clandestinely. Cairo's Al-Akhbar,
a newspaper published by a confidant of Nasir, has re erred for
the first time to anti-UAR activity by Communists in other
Arab states, citing such activity in Baghdad. The pro-UAR
press in Lebanon has been attacking the Iraqi Communists for
the past week.
Burma: Former Premier U Nu, in his first major polit-
ical address since leaving office last October, has expressed
confidence that General Ne Win would hold elections in April
as promised, thus in effect warning the army not to try to
stay in power indefinitely. U Nu also denied that he would quit
politics. Nu's speech may foreshadow increased efforts by
Burmese political elements to mobilize public opinion against
the army's indefinite retention of power.
I
25X1
17 Dec 58 DAILY BRIEF ii
j Approved ~~,el ase - 975A004200130001-0
j III
 Approved For Release 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004200130001-0
III. THE WEST
Cuba: Demoralization continues to spread in the army,
and even high officers are now reported to believe there is no
hope of defeating the rebels. The government, however, has
been building up its forces in Santiago and dropping leaflets in
Oriente Province urging the civilian population to leave imme-
diately to avoid air and land attacks against the rebels. A ma-
jor offensive by the government at this time is not likely to
end in a decisive victory for either side.
25X1
Ii
0
I
17 Dec 58
DAILY BRIEF iii
j Approved FI ase 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T 0975A004200130001-0 j
 25Approved For R elea
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR Seeks to Exploit Berlin Crisis to Advance Broader
Aims in Europe
There are increasing indications that the Soviet leaders
envisage their move to precipitate a crisis over Berlin as the
opening phase of a major political offensive in Europe. Recent
Soviet public pronouncements and private remarks by Khru-
shchev reflect the Soviet desire to exploit the Berlin issue to
attract greater interest in various disengagement schemes
which would. lead to the demilitarization and neutralization
of Germany.
In a conversation with the Italian ambassador on 13 De-
cember, Khrushchev indicated his desire for a top-level meet-
ing to discuss not only Berlin, but also a German peace treaty,
a nonaggression pact, European security, reduction of forces
in Germany, and withdrawal of foreign troops from Europe. He
said the Berlin problem was probably the least important of all
these measures.
Khrushchev took this same line in an interview with the
correspondent of a Munich newspaper. He contended. that ac-;,
ceptance of his Berlin proposal would be a "point of departure"
for improving the general European situation and would create
"favorable preconditions" for dealing with such problems as
the creation of a demilitarized zone in Central Europe by a
pull-back of the forces of the "two opposing military groups."
He also proposed. a mutual reduction and eventual withdrawal
of foreign forces in Germany and even the complete withdrawal
of foreign forces from Europe.
The Norwegian ambassador in Moscow believes Khrushchev
dangerously misjudges Western firmness regarding Berlin. He
says Khrushchev asked him two weeks ago if he really thought
the Western powers would fi ht over Berlin and said it was un-
thinkable they would do so.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A004200130001-0
17 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200130001-0
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200130001-0
 25.X1
25X1
Nasir and Iraqi Communists
The 13 December issue of the Cairo daily Al Akhbar,
published by a confidant of President Nasir, carried t ree
brief items critical of Communist anti-UAR activity in Iraq.
With the exception of infrequent announcements of the arrest
of local Communists, this is the first known instance of Egyp-
tian press comment on Communist activity in an Arab coun-
try. Together with recent attacks on the same subject in the
pro-UAR Lebanese press, the Al Akhbar items could fore-
shadow an open propaganda campaign by the UAR against Com-
munist influence in Iraq.
The Iraqi situation poses a dilemma for Nasir. Heavily
dependent as he is on Soviet economic and military support,
he may hesitate to force a showdown on the Communist issue
at this time. He is said to be convinced, however, that the
USSR will not ignore an opportunity to effect a Communist
take-over in Iraq.
The Communist-led demonstrations against.Assistant
Secretary Rountree, showing again the Communists' capabil-
ity to incite mob action in the face of army security meas-
ures, seems likely to increase the Iraqi Army leaders' con-
cern for internal security. The Rountree visit is being used
by the Communists, not only to whip up anti-American senti-
ment, but also to maintain the condition of political tension
which they helped create last week when the
was exposed by Qasim.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200130001-0
17 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
 25X6 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200130001-0
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04200130001-0
 25X1 Approved for Rele~
CIA RDP79T0 5A004200130001-0
III. THE WEST
Cuban Army Preparing New Offensive Against the Rebels
A build-up of Cuban Army troops in Santiago and the ar-
rival of tanks, armored cars, and other supplies in the last
few days indicate that the Batista government may be prepar-
ing its long-expected offensive against the rebels. The army
has dropped leaflets urging the civilian population to evacuate
areas where action is contemplated, warning that air and land
attacks will be made. Opposition elements claim that the gov-
ernment is planning a "scorched-earth reprisal policy:'
Despite these signs that the army is preparing a concerted
drive, discontent and demoralization continue to spread in the
armed forces. Even high officers close to the chief of staff
are now reported to believe that there is no hope of defeating
the rebels.
Previous "all-out" government offensives have failed, and
it seems unlikely that a new offensive will be any more success-
ful, despite the government's superior arms. Many of the army
troops are green and lack the will to fight, whereas the rebels,
riding a wave of successful campaigns, are a determined battle-
hardened force. A major offensive now would probably not re-
sult in a decisive victory for either side.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A004200130001-0
17 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
 Approved fW Rele - 04200130001-0
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
Approved For Rel
se 2()E)2f()9f()4 . e'A-RE) =
25X1
25X1
 A F R 9/ T00975A0 00130001 0
J A
10,
Approved For Releaselb/p/04-JWJYO0975AO04200130001-0
7,00