CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 6, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

T
I w , .,. n,,,,rnvnrl Gnr Rnln~m~f~~/9'I~~~~~nna~~nnnd~nnm~~~~ c
/ ~~ ~
/ 6 March 1959
25
25X1
opy o.
Nd CHAN(;E IN CLAS
i=4=CLl1SSIFIED
GAT!'
L'LAS; . CHANi,ED TC:
NEXTR`~ViEVyC,1TE: --FU
REVIEWED; _~
25X1
DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
 ///////O/////////D/~/O%%/////////////////////////////////////O////////~O////// ~ ~iaiai~iai~i~i~i~i~iiii~ii~~iiiiii oii~i
j ~ Approved F_~ - 04300070001-6
j
% 25X1 j
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
/' 6 March 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUIrTIST BLOC
25X1
USSR: Khrushchev's statement on 5 March that the USSR
would-willing to postpone the 27 May deadline on Berlin for
a month or two if the West is prepared to "negotiate reason-
ably" is probably intended to undercut Western objections to
negotiations. under threat of an ultimatum and increase public
interest in summit talks. Khrushchev's remarks provide a
further indication that Soviet control functions will not be trans-
ferred to the East Germans until after a separate peace treaty
is signed.
25
USSR-Iran: With the conclusion of the US- ranian i a -
eral a ense agreement on 5 March, Moscow can be expected
to step up its pressure on Tehran. Prior to the signing, Soviet
spokesmen termed the agreement a "hostile act;' and, the USSR
is reported to have notified the Iranian Government that it would
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
 25X1
Approved For I
Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev Offers to Extend Berlin Deadline
~rushchev's offer on 5 March to defer the trans er o
Soviet control functions to the East Germans for a month or
two if the West is prepared to "negotiate reasonably" is in-
tended as another demonstration of Soviet reasonableness and
desire for a peaceful settlement of the Berlin and German
questions. The Soviet premier also indicated again that the
USSR-and its satellites intend to sign a separate peace treaty
with East Germany before the transfer of Berlin access con-
trols takes place
The Soviet leaders, in public and private statements
over t e past two months, have sought to give the impression
of flexibility on the Berlin deadline. Mikoyan, at a press con-
ference in Moscow on 24 January, implied that the deadline
could be extended for as much as two or three months if the
USSR were convinced that the Western powers were negotiating
"with the ob'ect of ending the occupation regime in West Berlin,"
Khru-
shchev denied that the USSR a impose an u ~.ma um and
stated that his "bureaucrats" had insisted that some time limit
must be fixed. He said the transfer of controls could take place
earlier or later than 27 May?
6 Mar 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
 Approved For R lease 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A00 300070001-6
Ambassador Thompson believes Khrushchev wants a
summit meeting so badly that he would drop his insistence
on parity. Thompson suggests Khrushchev would discuss
reunification at a summit conference but would not accept
an agenda which clearl im lied a c nt to do so~
6 Mar 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
 25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A00
New Soviet Pressure on Iran Expected
Moscow is expected to step up its pressure on Iran follow-
ing conclusion of a US-Iranian bilateral defense agreement on
5 March. Soviet officials in Tehran had. previously notified the
Iranian Foreign Ministry that the USSR would regard. conclu-
sion of the agreement as an "implied declaration of enemy
status:' When questioned as to Soviet intentions, however, the
Soviet military attache in Tehran, Kuzmenko, said that "there
is nothing in Iran" aver which the US and the USSR "must be-
come militarily involved in what could develop into World
War IIIo'
The Soviet attachd warned that in the propaganda field,
"the Shah will personally suffer the full consequences of his'
irresponsible acts:' Moscow's Persian-language broadcasts
attacking the Shah's regime have continued at a high level, par-
ticularly stressing the theme of Khrushchev's speeches at Tula.
and Moscow--that no kind. of treaty can save a "rotten throne"
from its own people.
Kuzmenko declared he anticipates a complete economic
boycott by the USSR--a move which may stimulate local unrest
and strengthen antiregime elements. While the USSR will not be
able to upset Iran's foreign-exchange earnings from oil royalties,
a boycott could affect up to 25 percent of Iran's exports and LO
percent of total imports. Moscow could discontinue purchases
of Iranian wool, cotton, and minerals--for which there is no
ready free-world. maxket. It could also disrupt the economy
temporarily by failure to deliver a wide varlet of construction
materials and light industrial goods.
25X1
25X1
25X1
6 Mar 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Page ~
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
 25X1
Approved Fob
Ceylon Plans to Extend Civil Air Route to Communist China
The scheduling by Communist China and. Ceylon of negotia-
tions on a civil air route is the first indication that Ceylon`s
efforts of over two years to obtain traffic rights at Canton may
be successful. The Ceylonese delegation, which is to leave
for Peiping about 14. March, apparently hopes to extend Air
Ceylon's international service to Canton and. Hong Kong via
Rangoon, The present service terminates at Singapore<
The eventual extension of reciprocal rights at Colombo to
the Chinese would. provide Sino-Soviet bloc airlines with an ad-
ditional access to South Asiao Moscow already has civil air
agreements with India and. Afghanistan, ~nd is attempting to
supply Nepal with civil aircraft. The King of Nepal, however,
has said he would reject the Soviet offer if the United States
could furnish planes.
Peiping has been unwilling to grant Air Ceylon traffic rights
at Canton in the past, primarily because that airline was almost
half controlled by the Dutch KLMa Recently, however, the Cey-
lonese Government is said to have increased its participation in
Air. Ceylon to 74 percent which may account for Peiping's policy
reversal. Peiping recent y permitted Burma to extend. its Ran-
goon-Hong Kong route to Canto
Britain probably will continue to refuse Air Ceylon traffic
rights at Hong. Kong, particularl if doin so would facilitate the
airline4s service to Cantono
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
6 Mar 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Page 6
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
 25X1
Approved For
Chinese Nationalists. Concerned Over Possibility of Anti-
American- Incident
~hinese Nationalist Vice Foreign 1Vlinister Shen Chang-
huan has expressed anxiety that the recent death of Legislator
Ma Hsiao-chun in an accident involving an auto driven by an
American sergeant might lead. to a serious incident, Shen told
Ambassador Drumright on 3 March that the Chinese public
might find it difficult to understand US judicial concepts and
legal procedures, He was concerned that some step in the le-
gal process might touch off an explosion, and. inquired into the
possibility of avoiding a public trial:
CShen evidently fears a repetition of the pattern of the Rey-
nolds case of 1957, in which acquittal of an American sergeant
for the shooting of a "Peeping Tom" led ultimately to violence
and the sacking of the American Embassy,
~nlike the coverage of the Reynolds case,. most Nationalist
press comments on the Ma case have been objective and free
from inflammatory comment, Furthermore, the Nationalist
Government appears anxious to avoid a vi?lent reaction' A few
independent papers, however, have printed strong articles
~he incident has led to pressure in the Legislative Yuan
for the conclusion of a status-of-forces agreement, but so far
those members who tend to be critical of the government have
not seized upon the case as a political weapons The status-of-
forces agreement has been under negotiation since 1956, with
the issue of jurisdiction over US forces the chief problem:
25X1
25X1
6 Mar 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Page 7
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
 25X6 gpproved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
 Approved For elease 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975
France Readying Intensified Effort A#;ainsi Algerian Rebels
France is preparing an in a si e e or n B-
rian ational Liberation Front (FLN), including diplomatic as
well as political and military measures, according to a French
Foreign Ministry official. He linked the diplomatic aspect with
criticism of France's allies, particularly the United. States, far
tolerating activities of FLN representatives in their territories.
De Gaulle's personal diplomatic adviser told. an American Em
bassy officer in Paris that such activities in the United. States
give the rebel Provisional Algerian Government "stature" at
the UN and greatly increase De Gaulle's difficulties in seeking
an Algerian solution. The French ambassador to Washington
also has seemed to link representations on the same subject to
De Gaulle's demands that his principal NATO allies, particu-
larly the United States, support French policy in North Africa
25X1
25X1
25X1
D~e Gaulle may be under pressure, particularly from the
French Army in Algeria, to achieve an early cease-fire which
could be claimed by the army as a victory. This may be an
important factor behind his current tactics in NATO, includ-
ing threats to withdraw the Mediterranean Fleet from its pros-
ent status as well as his reiterated demands that the alliance
back French policy in Algerian)
25X1
25X1
25X1
6 Mar 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Page 9
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
 25X1
Approved Fo~i
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordinatiop
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300070001-6
 %///// /// ///// // // / // // / / / / / / // // / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /. % / / / / / / ,