CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A004300160001-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
13
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 7, 2002
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 24, 1959
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T00975A004300160001-6.pdf | 682.02 KB |
Body:
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
24 February 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I I. ASIAAFRICA
Iran-USSR: The Shah is enraged by the strong public at-
tack made on ham by Khrushchev on 17 February. Iranian Prime _
Minister Eqbal believes that the Soviet Union's tough propaganda
campaign against the Shah may have considerable internal re-
percussions and has again asked for American support and guar-
antees:
UAR-USSR: Nasirps 21 February speech in Cairo con-
cerned largely omestic and Arab affairs, but it also reflected
his preoccupation with Soviet relations. The recent letters ex-
change~i between Nasir and Khrushchev show that both are di-
rectly interested in containing. their differences and consequent-
ly are likely to make further appropriate gestures in that direc-
tion.. However, their divergent policies, including those toward
Iraq, are likely to continue creating problems in their relation-
ship.
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ey on: a one- ay genes s ri e p anne or e~ r -
ary has been postponed, possibly until 3 March. Tension re-
mains high, however, and powerful plantation labor unions are
reported willin to 'oin Colombo's urban workers when they
strike
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Somalia: Violence is anticipated during elections far a
legislative assembly in the Italian trust territory of Somalia
from 4 through 8 IVla.rch. The 90-member assembly selected
will draft the constitution and make other preparations for in-
dependence in 1960. The opposition party, boycotting the elec-
tion in protest against questionable electoral methods employed
by the Somali Youth League--the ruling party,--may engage in
violence, including attacks on foreigners and destruction of for-
eign installations. Police are aware of the threat and are taking
emergency measures.
Morocco.~Abdelkhaiek Torres, an important nationalist
leader anT d~oroccan ambassador to Cairo, intends to resign
and return to active politics. Torre' decision probably has
the approval of the King, who may look on him as a conserva-
tive and as an acceptable future preim.ier. Premier Ibrahim had
24 Feb 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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party's right wing, 25X1
party control,
Following in nprth- ~ 2
istitute the Islah.
j L~J~"I -- -- ----- - - - -- - --- ------- ~ .. - .,
his former party, which had a wide following in the North.
24 Feb 59 DAILY BRIEF iii
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~~ FRICA
ranian- vie a ions ecoming Increasingly Strained.
The Iranian Government, while maintaining a tough public
posture, is becoming worried. over possible domestic and fore
sign repercussions from the sharp and. continuing Soviet prop
aganda attack since the Soviet-Iranian discussions ended in
anger on 10 February. Prime Minister Eqbal is appealing for
strong public assurances from London and Washington. He has
asked, for statements to the effect that Iranrs security and in~
tegrity are of primary importance and that Soviet aggression
against Iran would not be tolerated. Egbal believes such sup
port of the regime v~ould bolster Iranian morale and. discourage
antigovernment activity. He also suggests that foreign praise
of Iran9s evolutionary social and. economic progress and poten~
tial would be beneficial.
CEgbal's concern over the worsening situation is further em-
phasized. by his claim. that Soviet Ambassador Pegov is spread~~
ing the warning around Tehran-among both Iranians and the dip-
lomatic corps-that if Iran signs the proposed. bilateral agreement
with the United States, the Soviet Union will occupy Azerbaijan in
northwest Iran. At a UAR Embassy reception on 22 February,
however, Pegov denied that he had made such a statement. Egbal
says he regards Pegov's threat as "purely bluff" but fears such
propaganda will arouse fear and concern among the Iranian peo-
ple. Eqbal also maintains that Moscow has established a special
agent training school near the western Soviet-Iranian border for
purposes of stirring up activity against the Shah;
CThe Shah, who is enraged over KhrushchevPs recent tough
personal attacks against him and, his family, is threatening to
break diplomatic relations with the USSR unless a public apology
is forthcoming,. Ambassador 'Wailes believes it is very_unlikel
however, that the Shah will actually go to this extreme,
24 Feb 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
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Nasir?s Anniversary Speech in Cairo
Nasir's Cairo speech commemorating the first anniversary
of the union between Syria and. Egypt emphasized. his great con-
cern with the unsettled. conditions in Syria. He extolled. the bene-
fits and achievements of the regime in Syria since the union--land,
distribution, development projects, increased. education oppor-
tunities, and. exploitation of natural resourcesp Continual refer-
ence was made to Arab nationalism's mission to bring about "so-
cial revolution"--including both political and social democracy.
However, Nasir gave no hope to those who desire the rebirth
of political parties, which he described. as vestiges and tools of
the former "imperialist" rule in the Arab, states. As a sop to
politically conscious Syrians, Nasir said. a National Union would
be organized. immediately in Syria along the lines of its mono-
lithic counterpart in Egypt. He promised elections in the near
future to choose members for the executive committees of the
Syrian and. Egyptian National Unions; the committees will have
the task of organizing the "social revolutiono'
Nasir also made his usual review of the Arab and interna-
tional situations. The Baghdad Pact received a standard blast.
Israel was treated. in the context of increased Jewish emigra-
tion from the Soviet bloc--a "threat" he dismissed by quoting
Izvestia's denunciation of Western reports that the USSR might
permit some of its 3,000,000 Jews to .leave for Israel.
Nasir referred to the ticklish problem of UAR-Soviet rela-
tions by mentioning Khrushchev's reaffirmation of Soviet sup-
port for the UAR in his reply of 20 February to a letter from
Nasir. This and the Izvestia article reflected. the Soviet lead-
er's desire to prevent "ideological" differences from undermin-
ing governmental relationsA Khrushchev?s letter, which said.
Cairo's attitude toward Communism is solely an internal UAR
matter, and the Izvestia article on Jewish emigration probably
were timed. to influence Nasir's speeches during the UAR anni-
versary celebrations. These conciliatory gestures may also
have been timed to counter any possible adverse effects on Soviet-
UAR relations of President Tito's visit to Cairo and Damascus.
Despite the Soviet assurances and Nasir's conciliatory ref-
erence to Iraq, it is doubtful that the struggle between the UAR
and the Soviet Union far control in Iraq will be affected. ~
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Rioting May Occur During March Legislative
Elections in Somalia
Police officials in the Italian trust territory of Somalia
fear that violence, including attacks on American and Euro-
pean interests, may erupt in connection with legislative
elections from 4 to $ March. Rumors alleging that the pro-
Egyptian, opposition Greater Somalia League (GSL) plans to
attack Italian, American, and Ethiopian personnel and facil-
ities appear to be an exaggeration, However, party president
Hagi Mohammed Hussein admitted, to police that hotheads might
resort to violence, but he denied that a recent party congress
resolved to use every means, including bloodshed, to ensure
success of its election boycott.
The circumstances surrounding these important elections
suggest that bath the opposition and the ruling Somali Youth
League (SYL) may resort to sporadic terrorism. The March
elections will determine which party will write Somalia9s con-
stitution, select its form of government, and guide the new
state after its scheduled independence in December 1960. The
Somali Youth League, presently of pro-Western orientation,
has already used its control of the police and, administration
to hamper the opposition's registration and to jail several of
its leaders.
The expected lopsided Youth League majority--already
assured of at least 55 of the 90 seats--may itself cause the
party grave difficulties. A lack of legislative opposition will
favor the re-emergence of bitter tribal animosity within the
governing- coalition and probably be reflected in the police and
administrative staffs. Furthermore, the questionable election
methods employed by the SYL will furnish opposition groups and.
their UAR sponsor excellent propaganda material. Such charges
of corruption could play a significant role in 1960 when the TJnited.
I~'ations will discuss the procedure for termination of the trus-
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teeship preparatory to complete independence.
24. Feb 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Mor ccan a er a urns o -enter Politics
~Abdelkhalek Torres, leader of the nationalist Islah party
whit merged with the ruling Istiqlal party in 1956, intends to
resign as Moroccan ambassador to Cairo and return to active
politics. Ostensibly an Istiqlal neutral but publicly siding with
Allal e1~Fassi in the latter's struggle with left wing dissidents
for control of the party, Torres plans to rebuild his personal
following in northern Morocco, where anti-Istiqlal tribal dis-
orders have occurred during the past five months. He also in-
tends to enlarge his following in other areas. He claims that
in the as-yet-unscheduled. municipal elections he is certain of
at least 25 percent of all municipal assembly seatsw~
Torres' return to politics, opposed by left-wing Istiqlal
Premier Ibrahim, apparently has the approval of King Mohamed V,
who is concerned. about instability in northern Morocco.
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e ng,
w~ axis ed pas s iq a emp s o ins a a one-party po-
litical systenx, seems to favor atwo-party rather than a multi-
party system and for that reason may not have sanctioned at
this time the desire of many Torres followers to break away
from Istiqlal
The I~.ng apparently discussed with Torres during an aud~
fence on 11 February the possibility of succeeding Premier
Ibrahim, whose cabinet was installed. in December as a stop
gap measure and was specifically charged with holding early
municipal elections. American Ambassador Yost believes
Torres is generally friendly to the West and. would make a sat-
isfactory premier. If invested, as premier, Torres probably
would follow the policy of his predecessors and demand the
evacuation of foreign troops, including the- American bases; 5
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24 Feb 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Comrnissfon
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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