CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A004300160001-6
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
13
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 7, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 24, 1959
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A004300160001-6.pdf682.02 KB
Body: 
jjjj%/////////////////////////////////////~i~iiiiiiiii~/ / ~ _ R ~ Approved For Relea~~09~~E~9T009~004300160001-6 / tir' 2 1 / 24 Feb~~.~,~y 1959 / e i i i i ~ ~ i tate Dept. review completed QOrUPAENTN~.._ ' RUT}-I~ Fi ' 2 C)AtE~~'I~ REVIEVdER: rdFXT R~Vi'vV DATE; .___ ~~~ ~ TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300160001-6 25X1 gpproved For Release 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300160001-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300160001-6 ///////////O/O///////O//////////%~%/O~%~%~/O~/O%%%%%%~%%%//////%%%~ iiiiii~iiiiiii~iiioiiiii~i~i~iyi~iai~i~i~ j ~ Approved Fo R le 04300160001-6 j j 25X1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 24 February 1959 DAILY BRIEF I I. ASIAAFRICA Iran-USSR: The Shah is enraged by the strong public at- tack made on ham by Khrushchev on 17 February. Iranian Prime _ Minister Eqbal believes that the Soviet Union's tough propaganda campaign against the Shah may have considerable internal re- percussions and has again asked for American support and guar- antees: UAR-USSR: Nasirps 21 February speech in Cairo con- cerned largely omestic and Arab affairs, but it also reflected his preoccupation with Soviet relations. The recent letters ex- change~i between Nasir and Khrushchev show that both are di- rectly interested in containing. their differences and consequent- ly are likely to make further appropriate gestures in that direc- tion.. However, their divergent policies, including those toward Iraq, are likely to continue creating problems in their relation- ship. Approved For Release 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300160001-6 Approved For Release 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300160001-6 25X1 ey on: a one- ay genes s ri e p anne or e~ r - ary has been postponed, possibly until 3 March. Tension re- mains high, however, and powerful plantation labor unions are reported willin to 'oin Colombo's urban workers when they strike 25X1 Somalia: Violence is anticipated during elections far a legislative assembly in the Italian trust territory of Somalia from 4 through 8 IVla.rch. The 90-member assembly selected will draft the constitution and make other preparations for in- dependence in 1960. The opposition party, boycotting the elec- tion in protest against questionable electoral methods employed by the Somali Youth League--the ruling party,--may engage in violence, including attacks on foreigners and destruction of for- eign installations. Police are aware of the threat and are taking emergency measures. Morocco.~Abdelkhaiek Torres, an important nationalist leader anT d~oroccan ambassador to Cairo, intends to resign and return to active politics. Torre' decision probably has the approval of the King, who may look on him as a conserva- tive and as an acceptable future preim.ier. Premier Ibrahim had 24 Feb 59 DAILY BRIEF ii - fl Approved For Release 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300160001-6 ' ~ Approved For?,~R lease 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A 04300160001-6 ~~ estimably over- j party's right wing, 25X1 party control, Following in nprth- ~ 2 istitute the Islah. j L~J~"I -- -- ----- - - - -- - --- ------- ~ .. - ., his former party, which had a wide following in the North. 24 Feb 59 DAILY BRIEF iii % 2 ~. j iiii/ ~~ hiii i iii ~ iii ii ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ii ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~ ~ ~ Approved For Release 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300160001-6 25X1 gpproved For Release 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300160001-6 Approved For Release 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300160001-6 25X1 Approved For Relea 300160001-6 ~~ FRICA ranian- vie a ions ecoming Increasingly Strained. The Iranian Government, while maintaining a tough public posture, is becoming worried. over possible domestic and fore sign repercussions from the sharp and. continuing Soviet prop aganda attack since the Soviet-Iranian discussions ended in anger on 10 February. Prime Minister Eqbal is appealing for strong public assurances from London and Washington. He has asked, for statements to the effect that Iranrs security and in~ tegrity are of primary importance and that Soviet aggression against Iran would not be tolerated. Egbal believes such sup port of the regime v~ould bolster Iranian morale and. discourage antigovernment activity. He also suggests that foreign praise of Iran9s evolutionary social and. economic progress and poten~ tial would be beneficial. CEgbal's concern over the worsening situation is further em- phasized. by his claim. that Soviet Ambassador Pegov is spread~~ ing the warning around Tehran-among both Iranians and the dip- lomatic corps-that if Iran signs the proposed. bilateral agreement with the United States, the Soviet Union will occupy Azerbaijan in northwest Iran. At a UAR Embassy reception on 22 February, however, Pegov denied that he had made such a statement. Egbal says he regards Pegov's threat as "purely bluff" but fears such propaganda will arouse fear and concern among the Iranian peo- ple. Eqbal also maintains that Moscow has established a special agent training school near the western Soviet-Iranian border for purposes of stirring up activity against the Shah; CThe Shah, who is enraged over KhrushchevPs recent tough personal attacks against him and, his family, is threatening to break diplomatic relations with the USSR unless a public apology is forthcoming,. Ambassador 'Wailes believes it is very_unlikel however, that the Shah will actually go to this extreme, 24 Feb 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300160001-6 25X1 Approved For Nasir?s Anniversary Speech in Cairo Nasir's Cairo speech commemorating the first anniversary of the union between Syria and. Egypt emphasized. his great con- cern with the unsettled. conditions in Syria. He extolled. the bene- fits and achievements of the regime in Syria since the union--land, distribution, development projects, increased. education oppor- tunities, and. exploitation of natural resourcesp Continual refer- ence was made to Arab nationalism's mission to bring about "so- cial revolution"--including both political and social democracy. However, Nasir gave no hope to those who desire the rebirth of political parties, which he described. as vestiges and tools of the former "imperialist" rule in the Arab, states. As a sop to politically conscious Syrians, Nasir said. a National Union would be organized. immediately in Syria along the lines of its mono- lithic counterpart in Egypt. He promised elections in the near future to choose members for the executive committees of the Syrian and. Egyptian National Unions; the committees will have the task of organizing the "social revolutiono' Nasir also made his usual review of the Arab and interna- tional situations. The Baghdad Pact received a standard blast. Israel was treated. in the context of increased Jewish emigra- tion from the Soviet bloc--a "threat" he dismissed by quoting Izvestia's denunciation of Western reports that the USSR might permit some of its 3,000,000 Jews to .leave for Israel. Nasir referred to the ticklish problem of UAR-Soviet rela- tions by mentioning Khrushchev's reaffirmation of Soviet sup- port for the UAR in his reply of 20 February to a letter from Nasir. This and the Izvestia article reflected. the Soviet lead- er's desire to prevent "ideological" differences from undermin- ing governmental relationsA Khrushchev?s letter, which said. Cairo's attitude toward Communism is solely an internal UAR matter, and the Izvestia article on Jewish emigration probably were timed. to influence Nasir's speeches during the UAR anni- versary celebrations. These conciliatory gestures may also have been timed to counter any possible adverse effects on Soviet- UAR relations of President Tito's visit to Cairo and Damascus. Despite the Soviet assurances and Nasir's conciliatory ref- erence to Iraq, it is doubtful that the struggle between the UAR and the Soviet Union far control in Iraq will be affected. ~ 24, Feb 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300160001-6 25X1 gpproved For Release 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300160001-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300160001-6 25X1 Approved Fo ~el Rioting May Occur During March Legislative Elections in Somalia Police officials in the Italian trust territory of Somalia fear that violence, including attacks on American and Euro- pean interests, may erupt in connection with legislative elections from 4 to $ March. Rumors alleging that the pro- Egyptian, opposition Greater Somalia League (GSL) plans to attack Italian, American, and Ethiopian personnel and facil- ities appear to be an exaggeration, However, party president Hagi Mohammed Hussein admitted, to police that hotheads might resort to violence, but he denied that a recent party congress resolved to use every means, including bloodshed, to ensure success of its election boycott. The circumstances surrounding these important elections suggest that bath the opposition and the ruling Somali Youth League (SYL) may resort to sporadic terrorism. The March elections will determine which party will write Somalia9s con- stitution, select its form of government, and guide the new state after its scheduled independence in December 1960. The Somali Youth League, presently of pro-Western orientation, has already used its control of the police and, administration to hamper the opposition's registration and to jail several of its leaders. The expected lopsided Youth League majority--already assured of at least 55 of the 90 seats--may itself cause the party grave difficulties. A lack of legislative opposition will favor the re-emergence of bitter tribal animosity within the governing- coalition and probably be reflected in the police and administrative staffs. Furthermore, the questionable election methods employed by the SYL will furnish opposition groups and. their UAR sponsor excellent propaganda material. Such charges of corruption could play a significant role in 1960 when the TJnited. I~'ations will discuss the procedure for termination of the trus- base 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004 ~i00160001-6 teeship preparatory to complete independence. 24. Feb 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300160001-6 25X1 Approved For Rel ~r aaca 9(1(19/f19/fld C`ID_RIlP79TM97~OMd~ Mor ccan a er a urns o -enter Politics ~Abdelkhalek Torres, leader of the nationalist Islah party whit merged with the ruling Istiqlal party in 1956, intends to resign as Moroccan ambassador to Cairo and return to active politics. Ostensibly an Istiqlal neutral but publicly siding with Allal e1~Fassi in the latter's struggle with left wing dissidents for control of the party, Torres plans to rebuild his personal following in northern Morocco, where anti-Istiqlal tribal dis- orders have occurred during the past five months. He also in- tends to enlarge his following in other areas. He claims that in the as-yet-unscheduled. municipal elections he is certain of at least 25 percent of all municipal assembly seatsw~ Torres' return to politics, opposed by left-wing Istiqlal Premier Ibrahim, apparently has the approval of King Mohamed V, who is concerned. about instability in northern Morocco. 25X1 25X1 e ng, w~ axis ed pas s iq a emp s o ins a a one-party po- litical systenx, seems to favor atwo-party rather than a multi- party system and for that reason may not have sanctioned at this time the desire of many Torres followers to break away from Istiqlal The I~.ng apparently discussed with Torres during an aud~ fence on 11 February the possibility of succeeding Premier Ibrahim, whose cabinet was installed. in December as a stop gap measure and was specifically charged with holding early municipal elections. American Ambassador Yost believes Torres is generally friendly to the West and. would make a sat- isfactory premier. If invested, as premier, Torres probably would follow the policy of his predecessors and demand the evacuation of foreign troops, including the- American bases; 5 25X1 24 Feb 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN age Approved For Release 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300160001-6 25X1 Approved For_~ amp ~nn~inaind ? r~m_RnpvaTnnav~nia04300160001-6 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Comrnissfon The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004300160001-6 Approved Folease 0 - 009704300160001-6 ' -/ '~~ ~~ -