CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004300240001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 14, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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14 February 1959
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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14 February 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
4 Im
* UK-USSR. (The American Embassy in London reports indi- 25X1 j
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cations that Prime Minister Macmillan has "election fever" and 25X10
may be tempted to make proposals to the USSR primarily moti-
vated by domestic political considerations. A large number of
top-level officials will accompany the prime ninister land more
than 100 newsmen: are seeking yisasl
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U AR: LNasir intends to end, at least for the time being,
his campaign against Communist influence in Iraq, according
to an emissary from Nasir to Ambassador Hare. The emissary
said. this action is to be taken because Nasir believes he can-
not continue to attack the Communists while the British and
French governments remain hostile to him. Nasir may hope
that the US will bring some pressure to bear on London and
Paris in order toj create a unified backing for him in the event
xi of a further worsening of his relations with Moscow. A more
important consideration for Nair, however, robabl is that
his tactics toward Iraq have not succeeded..
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is apparently forcing a showdown in Parliament on the ques-
tion of whether to make the constitutional changes necessary
to permit his return to the premiership indefinitely or to
call for elections in April. Ne Win may expect significant
opposition to his request for such a constitutional amend-
*Burma: #General Ne Win, through his statements ex-
plaining resignation as prime minister on 13 February,
ment, particularly from former Prime Minister U Nu. How-
ever, he is probably counting on the threat of extra-legal ac-
tion by the army to influence Parliament to, return him to of-'
f' eon his terms.
Japan - South oreae In an a or to oc implementa-
tion of Japans decision to repatriate Koreans wishing to go
to North Korea, the Rhee government has suspended further
talks with Japan and begun demonstrations. It apparently in-
tends also to cut off trade and step up seizures of Japanese
fishing vessels. Despite an alert of South Korean armed
forces, no military action is likely except for possible clashes
between South Korean Coast Guard vessels and Japanese patrol
craft,
LATE ITEM
LLD
*Cuba: The resignation of Prime Minister Miro Cardona
and his cabinet on 13 February and the assumption of the top
cabinet post by Fidel Castro on 16 February will probably
sharpen the latent conflict between Castr&s "26 of July xmve-
ment" and other groups that opposed former dictator Batista.
This is possibly Castro's first move toward the presidency;
he was made eligible for the post by a recent constitutional
revision lowering the age requirement. Another revision, con-
ferring citizenship rights on foreigners who fought with the
14 Feb 59 DAILY BRIEF
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rebels, also mattes the controversial leftist Argentine, "Che"
Guevara, eligible for any high government post.
Castro's former position as chief of the armed forces now
will probably fall to his younger brother, Raul, whose past
actions have demonstrated his irresponsibility.
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DAILY BRIEF iv
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Soviet Views of Macmillan's Visit to Moscow
[The Soviet leaders apparently believe that British views
on Berlin and Germany and the likelihood of British elections
this year can be exploited to weaken Western unity. The first
secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Bonn implied 25X1
that the USSR considers ri -
ain the "weakest link" in the es ern front and may drive a
"hard bargain" during Prime Minister Macmillan's visit. He
hinted that the USSR might suggest withdrawing its Berlin de-
mands in exchange for cancellation of plans for West German
nuclear rearmament
Moscow probably feels that Macmillan's desire for a "peace-
maker" role, together with the pressure of British public opinion
for a lessening of East-West tensions, makes him particularly
vulnerable on the German issue.
The Soviet leaders, reminded of the benefits former Prime
Minister Eden derived in his 1955 election campaign from having
advocated a summit meeting, may seek to obtain at least a tacit
endorsement from Macmillan of the desirability of another heads-
of -government conference and favorable reference to European
security measures. such as a nonaggression pact or a reduction
of foreign forces in Germany. Soviet propaganda is stressing
the British people's concern over trends in West Germany and
their desire for a policy "independent of that imposbd by the
Adenauer-Dulles partnership;T')
Lin discussing the Berlin problem with Macmillan, Khru-
shchev probably will repeat the line 1 e'took with the Norwegian
ambassador on 9 February, when he warned that Soviet troops
would immediately react to Any violation of the East German
frontier by Western forces. He remarked on the significance
of Secretary Dulles' reference to the formula that the East Ger-
mans might act as "agents" of the USSR and said this formula-
tion, while unfortunate, was a move in the right direction. Khru-
shchev again denied that his Berlin proposal was intended as]
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Macmillan's Visit to the Soviet Union
CThe British Foreign Office is preparing a list of questions
to be used as "guideposts" for Prime Minister Macmillan's dis-
cussions during his week- to ten-day visit to Moscow beginning
on 21 February. According to a Foreign Office official, London
hopes to ascertain how confident Khrushchev is that the USSR is
sufficiently strong to prevent any modification of the European
situation. Britain would also like to determine whether the USSR
is so apprehensive of a "German-US alliance in NATO" as to con-
sider war to prevent its further development. The importance
London attaches to the forthcoming trip is indicated by the large
number of top-level officials who will accompany Macmillan.,
lThe US.Emb .s.syfeels thatMacmillan-now has entered the period
of "election fever" and may have to be held back "by the coattails"
from pushing proposals aimed at impressing the British electorate.
The embassy also feels that if British elections were scheduled to
follow an East-West conference, the British Government would be
under pressure to produce results and "agreements.'~
Macmillan may be considering a nonaggression pact with the
Soviet Union. In a possible trial balloon, Reuters on 11 February
said that London diplomatic quarters expect Khrushchev to pro-
pose a bilateral pact during Macmillan's visit. According to these
diplomats, Soviet leaders believe Macmillan's denial of an inten-
tion to negotiate would. not rule this out-.A
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Nasir Says 11a Plans to Drop Campaign Against Iraqi Communists
11.Nasir, through Cairo newspaperman Muhammad Hasanayn
Haykal, informed Ambassador Hare on 11 February that the UAR
campaign against the Iraqi Communists will be gradually abandoned
for "tactical reasons." Haykal added that suppression of Egyptian
and Syrian Communists would continue, however, as would the
UAR's "basic hostility" toward those in Iraq. ~
l.Nasir's reason for dropping the campaign, according to
Haykal, is his feeling that he cannot continue while the French
and British still show no indication of changing their opposition
to the UAR. He complained specifically of press and clandestine
radio attacks against him and alleged British delay in completing
financial negotiations with the UAR& Haykal stated that Nasir's
complaint did not include the United States, whose position through-
out the Iraqi-UAR dispute was "unprecedented in its wisdom:";
Cvarious considerations, besides that put forth by Haykal, prob-
ably-entered into the decision. Nasir has had virtually no success
in shaping events in Iraq according to his desire, and he has run
considerable risk of seriously damaging his relations with the
Communist bloc, which backs Iraqi Premier Qasim4 Nasir is
unlikely to stop all clandestine opposition to Baghdad, however,
and would probably still attempt to aid any internal movement
in Iraq which appeared to him capable Of displacing-the present
regime. The approach to Ambassador Hare may have been partly
designed to elicit some assurance of American support
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Japanese - South Korean Crisis
South Korea has responded to Japan's decision to permit
the voluntary repatriation of Korean residents in Japan who de-
sire to go to North Korea by breaking off negotiations to normal-
ize relations with Japan, by commencing nationwide anti-
Japanese demonstrations, and by announcing an intention to step
up seizures of Japanese fishing boats and to cut off trade.
The South Korean Coast Guard and the Air Force alleged-
ly have been alerted to intercept "any ships" carrying repatri-
ates. These orders are unlikely to result in military action.
Actual sailing of repatriation vessels is several months away,
and. the most serious incidents likely at the present time are
clashes between South Korean and Japanese patrol vessels.
The Japanese have intimated they might arm their patrol
vessels, which heretofore have been defenseless,Qbut Tokyo is
planning to request International Red Cross or possibly North
Korean transportation for the repatriates
The Kishi Government's decision to act unilaterally on
the repatriation issue probably stems from a desire to keep it
from developing into a major domestic political problem. Other
factors such as the problem of internal security, the expense
of maintaining many destitute Koreans, pressure on the labor
market, and Japan's vulnerability to charges of violation of
"human rights" also entered into the decision] In any event,
Japan sees little chance of normalizing relations with South
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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