CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A004400100001-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
14
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 2, 2002
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 25, 1959
Content Type:
REPORT
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Body:
Approve or ReleaTeO(PI09$E 91Q,D975A004400100001-1 47)
25 March 1959
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State Dept. review completed
Copy No. C
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f1CY,T R DATE: fry __
DAT , REVIEWER
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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25 March 1959
DAILY BRIEF
Io THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: Soviet propagandists are claiming that President
Eisen iTower and Prime Minister Macmillan have, under the
pressure of world opinion., at last acceptectheSoviet proposal
for a summit meeting. Moscow is also stressing alleged dif-
ferences between American and British views and has credited
Macmillan with having persuaded the President to agree to sum-
mit talks not dependent on. the outcome of a prior foreign min-
isters' conference. Soviet propaganda says, however, that the.
two leaders offered no new proposals on Berlin or on measures
to reduce international tension, such as military disengagement
in Europe.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq: The Qasim regime's announcement of withdrawal from
the Baghdad. Pact, although a long-expected development, is
likely to be interpreted in Iraq and the UAR as a concession to
Communist demands that this step could no longer wait. The
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announcement as such will have little practical effect, since
Iraq has not participated in any pact activities since the July
revolution. Other and more significant Communist demands
include arming the popular Resistance Force and the execution 11111,
i01 imprisoned leaders of the Nuri government.
Morocco - Communist China: Four Chinese Communist of-
ficials arrived in Morocco on 23 March to set up an embassy.
Agrement has been granted for an ambassador who may arrive
to inaugurate the Chinese Communist pavilion at the Casablanca
International Fair next month. This would be the first Chinese
Communist ambassador in xcept for the one at Cairo.
Burma: [he Ne Win government, already following a
strong y~anti-Communist policy internally, wishes to adopt
a more openly pro-Western posture in international affai:rs
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Ne Win however, is said to be reluctant to make is
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hitht "t idiation" the United States will
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provide Burma with grant aid as a means of iustifvine this
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course in the eyes of the Burmese people
Indonesia: Dissident troops in Sumatra are continuing;
destructive attacks against American-owned rubber estates.
The Goodyear Wingfoot estate south of Medan, the largest
rubber estate in Sumatra, has suffered considerable property
damage in three raids this year:,, the most recent occurring on
20 March. Attacks on other foreign-owned estates, including
US Rubber, have also been carried out, presumably in an at-
tempt to deny their revenues to the central government.
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III. THE WEST
Cyprus: A Turkish Cypriot economic boycott against the
Greek Cypriots, enforced by intimidation, is causing new strains
in cbmmun.al relations on. the island. The boycott is designed,. ac-
cording to the Turks, to build up the economic status of their
community. Greek Cypriot retaliation, which is likely to occur,
would further embitter relations.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached
by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee
pointed out that its conclusions were to be used. in context with
SNIE 100-2-59 (24 February 1959) and with the review of that es-
timate in SNIE 100-2/1-59 (17 March 1959):
1. The USSR will not turn over access controls
to the GDR in the near future. However, the USSR con-
tinues to carry out measures necessary to a withdrawal
of its forces from East Berlin, and the physical transfer
of access controls could be accomplished with little or no
advance warning.
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2. A strong effort to play down the appearance of
an ultimatum in the Soviet position on Berlin and to em-
phasize the prospects for negotiations has been increas-
ingly evident in Soviet and East German statements and
propaganda since Khrushchevts German visit. This may
reflect a Soviet conclusion that the prospects for improv-
ing the USSR's position through negotiations have increased.
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3. There are no reliable indications of a bloc in-
tent in the near future to harass or blockade Allied or
West German access to West Berlin, or to seal off West
Berlin from the East. However, the USSR could take
such actions with little or no warning.
5. The situation in West Berlin remains basically
unchanged.
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DAILY BRIE F
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Communist China Establishes Embassy in Morocco
Four Chinese Communist officials arrived in Casablanca
on 23 March to establish an embassy in Rabat in accordance
with an intergovernmental agreement announced on 31 October.
Last month King Mohamed V granted agrement for Pai Ion, who
has been an assistant to the Chinese Communist minister of for-
eign trade and was appointed as Peiping's first ambassador to
Morocco on 19 February. Pai, who may be a Chinese Moslem,
probably will arrive in time to inaugurate the Chinese Communist
pavilion at the Casablanca International Fair opening on 24 April.
Moroccans have been intensely interested in China's economic
and social development, and the observations of various Moroccans
who have visited China since 1956 have been widely publicized. A
$24,300,000 trade agreement signed on 27 October is the second
between Morocco and Communist China but is the first providing
for balanced trade. Morocco expects to offset its purchases of
green tea with exports of canned goods and raw and processed
phosphates.
Rabat may delay the establishment of an embassy in Pe i-
ping, both because of the expense involved and because of a
shortage of trained diplomatic personnel.
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Burma Reportedly Considering More Open Alignment With West
The Burmese ernm n its foreign pol-
icy from neutralism to a more openly anti-Communist position,
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U Nu, Ne Win is opposed to additional loan assistance as consti-
he gov-
ernment is reluctant to take such action without a concrete indi-
cation that it will receive grant aid from the US as a means of
justifying this policy switch to the Burmese people.]
INe win has sent U Law Y one, the editor of the influential
Rangoon daily Nation, to Washington as his "personal emissary,"
probably to obtain such an assurance and to pave the way for sub-
sequent formal requests for funds. In contrast to his predecessor
tuting too heavy a budgetary strain on the government.
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& win and his military followers have the domestic power
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and prestige to alter Burma's international course)
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Nip-
Indonesian Dissidents Continue Attacks on American-owned
Rubber Estates
A group of 50 armed rebels attacked the Goodyear Wingfoot
estate south of Medan on 20 March, beat several of the company
personnel, and caused considerable property damage. Estate
guards failed to challenge the rebels, and a call to nearby army
troops for assistance was unanswered.
Wingfoot, the largest rubber estate in Sumatra, has been
attacked about once a month during the past year. The local
Indonesian Army commander recently proposed replacement of
the estate guards at Wingfoot with regular army troops for one
year if Goodyear will bear the expense. The proposal envisages
regular pay by Wingfoot for the soldiers as well as a bonus scheme
if and when production increases as dissidence decreases.
Other foreign-owned estates have been subjected. to similar
attacks. The latest attack on the US Rubber Company estate oc-
curred on 24 February when a large rebel force burned laborers'
houses and threatened the workers with physical harm if they
continued to live or work on the estate. An attack on a ;British-
managed estate on 1 March involved the first instance of violence
against a European. This particular attack resulted in the man-
agement's closing of the estate, the third. such closure in the
immediate area.
The dissidents' aim is obstruction or even paralysis of pro-
duction in this region--the most important estate area in Indo-
nesia--and the resultant reduction of government revenues.
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New Tensions Developing Between Greek and Turkish Cypriots
A Turkish Cypriot boycott of Greek Cypriot business es-
tablishments is causing new strains between the two ethnic
groups. Turkish Cypriot leaders say the widespread boycott
is designed to strengthen the economic status of the Turkish
minority to a point where they will no longer be "the serfs of
Greeks." This statement is indicative of Turkish sensitivity
to the Greek Cypriots' generally higher standard of living..
Turkish Cypriot leaders have further embittered relations by
publicly proclaiming that the ultimate guarantee of their status
depends on the strength of the Turkish troops stationed on Cy-
prus.
If the Turks continue their boycott, the Greek community
will probably seek economic retaliation. Economic warfare be-
tween the two communities would seriously endanger the orderly
transition to independence.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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