CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A004400100001-1
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 2, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 25, 1959
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A004400100001-1.pdf682.62 KB
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Approve or ReleaTeO(PI09$E 91Q,D975A004400100001-1 47) 25 March 1959 i i i i i i i i ~~ State Dept. review completed Copy No. C F&M f1CY,T R DATE: fry __ DAT , REVIEWER Approved For Rele p0904r.CR T9T00975A004400100001-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04400100001-1 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04400100001-1 Approves r - 400100001-1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN p Env, 25X1 25 March 1959 DAILY BRIEF Io THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR: Soviet propagandists are claiming that President Eisen iTower and Prime Minister Macmillan have, under the pressure of world opinion., at last acceptectheSoviet proposal for a summit meeting. Moscow is also stressing alleged dif- ferences between American and British views and has credited Macmillan with having persuaded the President to agree to sum- mit talks not dependent on. the outcome of a prior foreign min- isters' conference. Soviet propaganda says, however, that the. two leaders offered no new proposals on Berlin or on measures to reduce international tension, such as military disengagement in Europe. II. ASIA-AFRICA Iraq: The Qasim regime's announcement of withdrawal from the Baghdad. Pact, although a long-expected development, is likely to be interpreted in Iraq and the UAR as a concession to Communist demands that this step could no longer wait. The p j Approved Fdi?Reloase 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AOQ4400100001-1 announcement as such will have little practical effect, since Iraq has not participated in any pact activities since the July revolution. Other and more significant Communist demands include arming the popular Resistance Force and the execution 11111, i01 imprisoned leaders of the Nuri government. Morocco - Communist China: Four Chinese Communist of- ficials arrived in Morocco on 23 March to set up an embassy. Agrement has been granted for an ambassador who may arrive to inaugurate the Chinese Communist pavilion at the Casablanca International Fair next month. This would be the first Chinese Communist ambassador in xcept for the one at Cairo. Burma: [he Ne Win government, already following a strong y~anti-Communist policy internally, wishes to adopt a more openly pro-Western posture in international affai:rs 25 Mar 59 DAILY BRIEF 25X 25X1 j 4400100001-1 25 r7WW7=2r 04400100001-1 j j j 25X1 25X1 Ne Win however, is said to be reluctant to make is 25X1 hitht "t idiation" the United States will cange wou aconcreenc provide Burma with grant aid as a means of iustifvine this (L course in the eyes of the Burmese people Indonesia: Dissident troops in Sumatra are continuing; destructive attacks against American-owned rubber estates. The Goodyear Wingfoot estate south of Medan, the largest rubber estate in Sumatra, has suffered considerable property damage in three raids this year:,, the most recent occurring on 20 March. Attacks on other foreign-owned estates, including US Rubber, have also been carried out, presumably in an at- tempt to deny their revenues to the central government. 25X6 III. THE WEST Cyprus: A Turkish Cypriot economic boycott against the Greek Cypriots, enforced by intimidation, is causing new strains in cbmmun.al relations on. the island. The boycott is designed,. ac- cording to the Turks, to build up the economic status of their community. Greek Cypriot retaliation, which is likely to occur, would further embitter relations. 25 25 Mar 59 DAILY BRIEF ii:i j ^NNI Vvca1 1 VI 1\GIG JG LV VL/VN/V?r VI^-1\Vr I N 1 VVNI ~J^VV ?rVV IVVVV 1-1 /~1' 25X1 Approved Forlea - 400100001-1 IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee pointed out that its conclusions were to be used. in context with SNIE 100-2-59 (24 February 1959) and with the review of that es- timate in SNIE 100-2/1-59 (17 March 1959): 1. The USSR will not turn over access controls to the GDR in the near future. However, the USSR con- tinues to carry out measures necessary to a withdrawal of its forces from East Berlin, and the physical transfer of access controls could be accomplished with little or no advance warning. p 2. A strong effort to play down the appearance of an ultimatum in the Soviet position on Berlin and to em- phasize the prospects for negotiations has been increas- ingly evident in Soviet and East German statements and propaganda since Khrushchevts German visit. This may reflect a Soviet conclusion that the prospects for improv- ing the USSR's position through negotiations have increased. 25X1 3. There are no reliable indications of a bloc in- tent in the near future to harass or blockade Allied or West German access to West Berlin, or to seal off West Berlin from the East. However, the USSR could take such actions with little or no warning. 5. The situation in West Berlin remains basically unchanged. 25 Mar 59 DAILY BRIE F iv 25X1 j Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO0440010000 -1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04400100001-1 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04400100001-1 25X1 Approved For_RI'Iease 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975 0A 0440 Communist China Establishes Embassy in Morocco Four Chinese Communist officials arrived in Casablanca on 23 March to establish an embassy in Rabat in accordance with an intergovernmental agreement announced on 31 October. Last month King Mohamed V granted agrement for Pai Ion, who has been an assistant to the Chinese Communist minister of for- eign trade and was appointed as Peiping's first ambassador to Morocco on 19 February. Pai, who may be a Chinese Moslem, probably will arrive in time to inaugurate the Chinese Communist pavilion at the Casablanca International Fair opening on 24 April. Moroccans have been intensely interested in China's economic and social development, and the observations of various Moroccans who have visited China since 1956 have been widely publicized. A $24,300,000 trade agreement signed on 27 October is the second between Morocco and Communist China but is the first providing for balanced trade. Morocco expects to offset its purchases of green tea with exports of canned goods and raw and processed phosphates. Rabat may delay the establishment of an embassy in Pe i- ping, both because of the expense involved and because of a shortage of trained diplomatic personnel. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04400100001-1 25 Mar 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 25X1 25X1 Approved F% Re Burma Reportedly Considering More Open Alignment With West The Burmese ernm n its foreign pol- icy from neutralism to a more openly anti-Communist position, 25X1 25X1 25X1 U Nu, Ne Win is opposed to additional loan assistance as consti- he gov- ernment is reluctant to take such action without a concrete indi- cation that it will receive grant aid from the US as a means of justifying this policy switch to the Burmese people.] INe win has sent U Law Y one, the editor of the influential Rangoon daily Nation, to Washington as his "personal emissary," probably to obtain such an assurance and to pave the way for sub- sequent formal requests for funds. In contrast to his predecessor tuting too heavy a budgetary strain on the government. 25X1 25X1 & win and his military followers have the domestic power 25X1 and prestige to alter Burma's international course) 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A004400100001-1 25 Max 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved Fo Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A00440 100001-1 Nip- Indonesian Dissidents Continue Attacks on American-owned Rubber Estates A group of 50 armed rebels attacked the Goodyear Wingfoot estate south of Medan on 20 March, beat several of the company personnel, and caused considerable property damage. Estate guards failed to challenge the rebels, and a call to nearby army troops for assistance was unanswered. Wingfoot, the largest rubber estate in Sumatra, has been attacked about once a month during the past year. The local Indonesian Army commander recently proposed replacement of the estate guards at Wingfoot with regular army troops for one year if Goodyear will bear the expense. The proposal envisages regular pay by Wingfoot for the soldiers as well as a bonus scheme if and when production increases as dissidence decreases. Other foreign-owned estates have been subjected. to similar attacks. The latest attack on the US Rubber Company estate oc- curred on 24 February when a large rebel force burned laborers' houses and threatened the workers with physical harm if they continued to live or work on the estate. An attack on a ;British- managed estate on 1 March involved the first instance of violence against a European. This particular attack resulted in the man- agement's closing of the estate, the third. such closure in the immediate area. The dissidents' aim is obstruction or even paralysis of pro- duction in this region--the most important estate area in Indo- nesia--and the resultant reduction of government revenues. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A004400100001-1 25 Mar 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 25X6 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04400100001-1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04400100001-1 25X1 Approved For Relase 2002/09/04: CIA-R0P79T00975A0044001 New Tensions Developing Between Greek and Turkish Cypriots A Turkish Cypriot boycott of Greek Cypriot business es- tablishments is causing new strains between the two ethnic groups. Turkish Cypriot leaders say the widespread boycott is designed to strengthen the economic status of the Turkish minority to a point where they will no longer be "the serfs of Greeks." This statement is indicative of Turkish sensitivity to the Greek Cypriots' generally higher standard of living.. Turkish Cypriot leaders have further embittered relations by publicly proclaiming that the ultimate guarantee of their status depends on the strength of the Turkish troops stationed on Cy- prus. If the Turks continue their boycott, the Greek community will probably seek economic retaliation. Economic warfare be- tween the two communities would seriously endanger the orderly transition to independence. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04400100001-1 25 Mar 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 25X1 Approved Fg elease 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A004400100001-1 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04400100001-1 25X1 Approved For Fzlea09M`9T00975'4400100001-1 1 / Approved For Rele~09y9T00975A004400100001-1