CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004500030001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 14, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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DATA. ~ ' .REVIEWER;
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
14 May 195 9
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DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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USSR-Burma; Apparently as a result of the severe dam-
age one recent y to the USSR's prestige in Burma, Moscow
is replacing its ambassador, A. D, Shchibor~in, who would.
have become ;dean of the 'diplomatic corps next month.
Hostile public reaction to the Soviet Embassy's high-handed
Yraethods in handling the case of the Soviet military attachd
aazd Shchiborin's failure to quash a libel suit against a TABS
representative probably prompted Moscow's decision.
Watch Committee conclusion--Berlinq r1o significant in-
dications bearing on the possibi, ity of hostilities.
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IIo ASIA-AFRICA
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j Watch Committee conclusion--Meddle Eastr Situations
susceptib e o direct exp oitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which
j would 'eo ardize US interests exist in the Middle East articu-
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j la,rly in Iraq and Iran, The situation in the area remains pre-
j carious, but a deliberate initiation of large-scale hostilities is
unlikely in the immediate future,
Iraqi Qasim shows no signs that he is taking resolute anti-
communist action; consequentl the Communists ursue their
course toward control of Iraq,
rate;
Indonesia; in return fora '?guarantee" against further at-
tacks on o year's Wingfoot rubber estate, the largest in
Sumatra, the Indonesian dissidents have demanded 10 percent
of the estate?s revenue,.- Both Goodyear and LTS Rubber interests
in: Sumatra have been severely harassed in recent mnnthse The
dissidents estimate- the pr?po~ed levy on:.;~Govdy~ar wot~ld,~moiant
te. the., equivaldnt of about $~0, 000 ~`ionthly "at the ,official exchange
14 May 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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to break out and resume dissidenceo
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LATE ITEMS
*Laos: Two battalions of former Communist dissident
troops, scheduled to be integrated into the Laotian ~1xmy' on
11 May9 boycotted. the ceremonies and have barricaded tf~~m-.
selves in their compounds, located in northern and central
Laos, These former Pathet Lao units, although surrounded
by superior Laotian Army forces, are armed. and may attempt
*Peruo The Peruvian Government apparently expects dis-
affecte~c military elements9 with some backing from the oligarchy,
to attempt assassinations of key political figures and the over-
throw of the government within the next few days. A coup at-
tempt is unlikely to succeed, but the government alert may be
a prelude to a new suspension of constitutional guarantees or
President Prado from office.
may lead. to intervention by the regular milit~ary to remove
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DAILY E3RIEF iii
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USSR Replaces Ambassador in Burma Following Incidbnts
Soviet Ambassador A. D. Shchiborin in Rangoon revealed
~to the Burmese foreign minister7on 11 May that he was being re-
assigned, ~nd requested agr~ment for his successor, tentatively
identified as A. M. Ledovsky, a former deputy chief of the Far
East Division of the Soviet Foreign Ministr~i] Shchiborin had
been assigned to Rangoon since September, 1954; he would have
become :dean. of the `diplomatic ,corps there next month.
The change apparently results from Burmese reaction to
'the Soviet Embassy's high-handed methods in handling the case
of the Soviet military attache on 26 April, as well as Shchiborin's
.recent failure to quash a libel suit against a TASS representative.
The continued decline of Soviet prestige and influence in Burma.
since the Ne Win government came to power last September may
also have influenced the replacement.
t e general Burmese- reaction will probably
e one o sa isfaction that the ambassador is apparently bein
punished for the incident,
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Indonesian Dissidents Demand Protection Money From American-
iJwned Rubber Estate ~~
Indonesian dissidents on 4 May demanded ten percent of the
income from Goodyear's Wingfoot rubber estate, the largest in
Sumatra, in return fora "guarantee" against further attack, ac-
cording to Wingfoot's manager. The manager told. the American
consul at Medan that the dissidents estimated this amount at 300;
000 rupiahs monthly--approximately $30,000 at the official ex-
change rate, A similar approach has been made to a Goodyear
official in Singapore, where a dissident representative stated
that the rebels' increased activity against Goodyear was provoked
by American arms aid, to the central government.
Goodyear's managing director for Indonesia. gave the Amer-
ican consul the impression that he is prepar. ed to recommend ac-
ceptance of the rebel proposal, since adequate security appears
otherwise unavailable~:in~the immediate future? The rebels have
given Wingfoot two weeks to consider the proposition, The deputy
territorial army commander in North SumatY~a appears "not un-
duly disturbed," and, told. the consul more troops would be stationed
eventually in the Wingfoot area. Prime Minister Djuanda also
stated. recently that a decision had. been madf; to transfer addi-
tional troops to Sumatra?
Despite army claims of improved security$ Indonesian gov-
ernment forces have been notably unsuccessful in protecting the
estate area, and, even an increase in forces assigned is unlikely
toy forestall hit-and-run raids, Goodyear's Wingfoot estate alone
comprises 40,000 acres. With the exception of the towns, the
ar. ea appears largely rebel controlled. The government`s two
limited offensives in the past six months were disastrously am-
bushed by the dissidents.
US Rubber, with the knowledge of the local Indonesian army
commander, agreed in mid-April to a dissident demand that the
rebels be permitted to tap a section of US Rubber?s Damoeli es-
tate. Dissident attacks on foreign estates in North Sumatra be-
gan in June 1958, and. have become increa~in.gly serious since
January 195 9.
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LATE ITEM
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Former Pathet Lao Troops Resist Integration
Two battalions of former dissident Pathet Lao troops have
defied an order to integrate into the Laotian Army and. have bar-
ricaded. themselves in their compounds in northern and central
Laos. Although Laotian army units in superior force have sur-
rounded. these troops and have given them an ultimatum to sur-
rc:nder, they may attempt to break out.
These former Pathet Lao troops, who a~?e armed and con-
sidered. hard-core pro-Communists, have been virtually held
p~?isoner since January, 1958, when they placed. themselves un-
the two battalions throughout the regular army in small units, in
this context, may be construed by the forme~? Pathet Lao as the
first step toward. repression and elimination..
dc;r Laotian command as required by the unification settlement.
Their treatment has fostered. discontent, and. there have been
some desertions. (~_ here were reports that they feared the gov-
e~?nment planned to wipe them out] Vientiane`s plan to disperse
awned. dissidence, the Laotian army could probably maintain in-
ternal security only along major communications routes and. in
In the event the NLHZ should feel compelled to resume major
populated. areas?
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LATE ITEM
Peruvian Government Expects Coup Attempt
The Peruvian Government expects disaffected military ele-
ments, with some backing from the oligarchy, to attempt as-
sassinations of key political figures and, the overthrow of the
government within the next few days9 according to American
Ambassador Achilles. The minister of government is staying
away from home and. has warned. certain others--including the
leader of APRA, Peru's most popular political party--to do
lil~ewise. The government prefers to catch the conspirators
in the act rather than make preventive arresia.
The constitutional government of conser~~ative President
Prado has completed almost three years in office, despite the
country's long tradition of authoritarian rule. Prado's weak
leadership in the face of deteriorating economic conditions and
increasing Communist activity, however, has led. to considerable
dissatisfaction and unrest. Army Chief of Staff Cuadra told the
American ambassador prior to a 30-day suspension of constitu-
tional guarantees, which is to end. on 16 Mays that the motivation
for such a step would be the regime's concern over aCommunist-
aided revolutionary effort on 17 March.
Although the possible coup attempt probably would. be unsuc-
cessful, the present government alert may fareshadow a new
suspension of constitutional guarantees and could even be a pre-
lude to intervention by the military to remove President Prado
in favor of an equally conservative but more ~ener~etic regime.
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19; May 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the- White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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