CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004600040001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 4, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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4 July 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - Guinea: The arrival in Guinea of
Communist China's ambassador to Morocco and his discus-
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
sions with President Tourd as well as with other senior offi-
cials suggest that Peiping is pressing for formal relations
with Conakry. The ambassador's visit also appears timed to
take maximum advantage of Communist China's 5,000-ton gift
of rice which arrived 30 June, just one day after the arrival
of the first installment of the American allotment of 5,000 tons
of rice.
I l. ASIA-AFRICA
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Iran-Ira : Tension has again risen between Tehran and
Baghdad over Iraqi restriction of navigation on the Shatt-al-
Arab River. An Iranian Foreign Ministry official has con-
firmed that a private Iranian launch was fired on by an Iraqi
border patrol last Sunday. Iranian naval units in the area have
standing orders to return fire immediately if fired on. Iran
disputes Iraq's claims of complete jurisdiction over the river,
and claims the right of free passage. Tehran has vacillated
between a desire to avoid irritating Qasim on this matter and
indignation over what it regards as arbitrary Iraqi actions.
Morocco; Statements attributed to Premier Ibrahim dur-
ng his`' recent visit to the UAR appear to have publicly com-
mitted his government to achieving early progress toward the
evacuation of the five US air bases in Morocco. The premier.
for the first time was directly quoted in a press conference in
Damascus on 25 June as saying that he would appeal to "inter-
national bodies" if direct negotiations did not provide satis-
action. King Mohamed V, in a discussion with Ambassador
Yost on 29 June, again urged an early public declaration by
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the US recognizing the principle of evacuation-la step vig-
.ous,ly opposed by France and Spain as establi ing a prec-
or '
edent which could lead to French and Spanish withdrawal
from Morocco,}
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y
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III. THE WEST
Finland: CIn order to assure a greater market in Finland for
Soviet petroleum products, which would bring Soviet- Finnish
trade into closer balance, the Finnish Government has requested
4 July 59
DAILY BRIEF
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willing to take additional Soviet petroleum.
1965. In current negotiations for. a long-term trade agreement
(1961-65), the Russians reportedly have demanded the entire
Finnish market. This the Finns have refused. although the are
Western oil companies operating in Finland to accept substan-
tially reduced import quotas for the six-year period 1960 through
*Caribbean area: Cuba is reported to be preparing new
rebel incursions into the Dominican Republic or Haiti. Cuba's
two eastern provinces have been designated a zone of military
operations, and the Cuban cabinet is believed to have discussed
on 29 June the advisability of a declaration of war against the
Dominican Republic. At the same time, however, Cuban leaders
fear Dominican counteraction. Venezuela, which also strongly de-
sires the elimination of Trujillo, has threatened to withdraw from
the OAS if that body agrees to investigate any Dominican charge of
foreign intervention. The Council of the OAS met in urgent ses-
sion on 2 July, at Dominican request, and set a further meeting
for 6 July.
4 July 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Peiping Seeking Closer Ties with Guinea
Communist China's ambassador to Morocco, Pai Jen, met
with Guinea's President Tourd in Conakry on 26 June. The
reported presence of Guinea's minister of economic affairs and
secretary of state for foreign affairs suggests that Peiping is
following its usual pattern of trying to expand trade in an of -
fort to gain diplomatic recognition. His visit presumably was
timed to take propaganda advantage of the arrival of a 5,000-
ton gift of Chinese rice in Conakry on 30 June. The first in-
stallment of a US gift--which will total 5,000 tons of rice,and
3,000 tons of wheat flour- -arrived the previous day.
A trade agreement with Guinea would be even more polit-
ically inspired than those which preceded formal recognition
by Egypt, Syria, and Morocco, as Peiping has little need for
any of the products exported by Guinea. Because of Peiping's
interest in increasing influence among underdeveloped nations,
it might also offer a small technical assistance program sim-
ilar to that given Yemen.
Peiping recognized Guinea on 7 October 1958. Although
Conakry has not yet reciprocated, Tourd said in an interview
on 12 June with the Chinese Communist correspondent resident
in West Africa that he hoped to expand Guinea's diplomatic con-
tacts soon. Peiping will probably encounter little difficulty in
obtaining formal recognition.
While in the area Pai might visit Ghana, which has twice
supported Peiping's inclusion into the United Nations although,
like Conakry, Accra has no formal relations with the Chinese
Communists.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Tension Mounting Between Iran and Iraq Over Use
Of Shalt-al-Arab River
Tension between Iran and Iraq over navigation on the Shatt-
al-Arab has increased sharply as the result of an Iraqi border
patrol firing on an unarmed Iranian motor launch on 28 June.
Iranian naval units in the area have standing orders to return
th,if fired onr and any miscalculation by either side could
result in "full-scale military operations" according to the mil-
itary attach6s in Tehran.
Iran has sought unsuccessfully for several years to dis-
cuss with Iraq the control of the river. Iran claims that the
treaty of 1937, which placed. the boundary between the two coun-
tries on the Iranian side of the river, was agreed to only under
British pressure. Tehran regards it as intolerable that its
principal navigable river, the Karun, and the important oil
ports of Abadan and Khorramshahr are accessible from the
Persian Gulf only through foreign waters.
Since the Iraqi revolution, Iran has been particularly an-
noyed by the use of Iraqi river pilots and armed Iraqi search
parties boarding ships destined for Iranian ports. Tehran also
has expressed concern over Baghdad's replacement of British
supervisors and technicians with Russians at the port of Basra.
Iraq recently refused to supply the necessary pilotage to a ship
o the Iran-Pan American Oil Company seeking to establish a
supply base at the Iranian river port of Khosroabad Iran has
delivered a note demanding that Iraq permit real ble use of
Khosroabad and name members for a joint commission on the
use of the river. Prime Minister Eqbal on 30 June told the
Iraqi ambassador that unless Iraq cooperates, Iran may take
unilateral action.
To demonstrate its continuing good will toward the Qasim
government, however, Iran has decided to permit its ambas-
sador to attend Iraq's celebration of the 14 July revolution.
4 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Morocco Likely to Increase Pressure for Evacuation
Of US Bases
Recent public statements attributed to Moroccan Premier
Ibrahim just before or during his 15-27 June visit to the UAR
appear to have committed his government more explicitly than
heretofore to achieving early demonstrable progress toward
the evacuation of the five American air bases in Morocco. An
early acceleration of official pressure by the Moroccans--who
seem to regard the US position as the key to securing also the
complete evacuation of the 22,000 French and 10,500 Spanish
forces still in Morocco--may be imminent.
According to the Egyptian press, Ibrahim said that all
three countries with troops in Morocco have already agreed
in principle to evacuate and that negotiations are under way to
end all forms of "occupation:' Actually, only the United States
has given private assurances of eventual evacuation or engaged
in recent negotiations on the subject. Subsequently, Ibrahim
was quoted as telling a press conference held in Damascus on
25 June that he would appeal to "international bodies" if direct
negotiations failed to achieve evacuation.
This step was also advocated publicly in Rabat on 23 June
by Allal el-Fassi, leader of the antigovernment and more con-
servative faction of the divided Istiglal party. In addition, El-
Fassi called for active steps within Morocco to "evict" the
bases if a UN appeal failed. Meanwhile, the small Commu-
nist element in Morocco has begun, through a new weekly pub-
lication, to contribute its bit toward stimulating popular de-
mands for "direct-action" tactics.
In an audience with Ambassador Yost on 29 June, King
Mohamed V again urged as "most important" an early public
declaration b the United States recognizing the principle of
evacuation. 1~Suuch a statement, however, is vigorously opposed
by France, which fears its possible effects on French hopes of
retaining "indefinitely" certain air and naval installations in
Morocco as well as the important Bizerte base in Tunisia?
4 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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THE WEST
I.
Situation in the Caribbean Area
Although Cuban leaders now appear to recognize the failure
of the initial insurgent effort launched against the Dominican
Republic from Cuba last month, they remain determined to over-
throw the Trujillo dictatorship. There are persistent reports
of preparations in Cuba for further rebel incursions into the
Dominican Republic,
Fidel Castro is pressing Haitian exiles in Cuba to speed up
eir preparations, to invade Haiti. Action in Haiti would be pri-
marily a means of opening another front against Trujillo.
Cuba's two eastern provinces- -those closest to the Dom-
inican Republic--have been designated a zone of military opera-
tions. On 29 June the Cuban cabinet discussed a possible declara-
tion of war against the Dominican Republic,
Doubt as to Cu a s military pre-
paredness, however., reportedly has led some cabinet ministers
to oppose such action. Others probably question the wisdom of
precipitate measures that would almost certainly lead to imme-
diate OAS action and the subsequent revelation of Cuban direction
of the Dominican insurrection and, Cuban support for Nicaraguan
rebels.
The Council of the OAS met in Washington in urgent session
on 2 July, at Dominican request,., and set a further meeting for
6 July. Venezuela., which is also supporting the anti-Trujillo
effort, has informed a number of hemisphere governments that
it would. consider withdrawing from the OAS if that organization
votes to investigate any Dominican charge of foreign interven-
tion. Official sources in Havana told the press on 2 July that the
Cuban Government would probably refuse to let a committee of
OAS investigating officials visit Cuba.
Cuban leaders fear Dominican counteraction against Cuba,
possibly by means of the force of Cuban exiles now in the Dom-
inican Republic. The exiles are regularly using Dominican radio
facilities to suggest that before long they will open a fighting
front inside Cuba. However, the outbreak of guerrilla activity
in Cuba's Pinar del Rio Province, which led Castro to send troops
there on 1 Julys is probably not Dominican inspired, "This is an
area where small farmers, have bitterly protested Castro's agrar-
ian reform law.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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