CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004600050001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 6, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

%
Approved For ReleaseTOp/25EICIR Y00975AO04600050001-5
/
2
6 July 1959
Copy No. C ')
CLr..,,;. Ci, D
NEXT REVIEW UATE:
RUTH: -9
DATE. 1 REVIEWER: 25X1
/ ? yr .7GLRC
State Dept. review e i dcFor Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600050001-5
r
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600050001-5
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600050001-5
 Approved Four Rele~
A004600050001-5
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
6 July 1959
j
DAILY BRIEF
i
I
/
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600050001-5
 Onnrov d For RPIPasP 9(1(13/(19/97 CID-RIlP79TM9750MdRM(15M(11-5
in
an effort. Top Iranian leaders show no signs of weakening,
but if Moscow's propaganda is not abated, the Shah may agree
to seek measures that would bring the campaign to an end.1
Iran- USSR: Lonservativep neutralist elements in Iran
may be promoting a move to appease the USSR in an effort to
end Moscow's cold war against Iran. Former Prime Minis-
ter and elder statesman Seyed Zia Tabatabai, who apparently
was influential in promoting the abortive. Soviet-Iranian non-
aggression treaty negotiations early this year, is reported
25X1 Ito be urging such
25X1
25X1
H. ASIA-AFRICA
25X1
1
25X1 0
1
A
6 July 59
DAILY BRIEF
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600050001-5
p
 j Approved Fq elea a 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79T00975 004600050001-5 25X1 j
j 25X1%
25X1
25X1
III. THE WEST
25X1
e o Prime Minister Bandaranaike's government has
been further weakened by unfavorable domestic reaction to the
ineffectual speech from the throne at the opening of Parliament
on 30 June and by continuing leftist strike activity. The most
powerful labor group in Colombo port remains on strike,' and
leftist leaders threaten to call out other unions on 6 July.C~ chile
various conservative groups continue to consider possible coup
action apparently none plans to act in the immediate future:
6 July 59
DAILY BRIEF
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600050001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600050001-5
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600050001-5
 25X1
Approved F
who is traditionally neutralist, has been trying to promote a move
to appease the USSR in order to end the five-month-old Soviet
propaganda campaign against Iran. 25X1
25X1 the elder statesman has become
greatly concerned over the Soviet threat and is convinced that
Iran has only "a couple of months" before the Russians will in-
cite a Baghdad-type revolution in Iran
II. ASIA-AFRICA `""i 25X1
Iranian Elder Statesman Urges Appeasement of USSR
~Seyed Zia Tabatabai, 73-year-old former prime minister
Tabatabai proposes that the Shah immediately send a good-
will mission to Moscow as a gesture to permit Soviet leaders to
save face. He feels Moscow would overlook Iran's participation
in the Baghdad Pact and in the bilateral agreement with the United
States, providing Tehran agrees to sign a nonaggression pact?
C further pacify the USSR, Tabatabai believes a scapegoat
must be found to take the blame for the unfortunate situation fac-
ing Iran. He proposes, therefore, that the Eqbal government
be dismissed on a vote of no confidence and that a new govern-
ment be formed to take its place. While Tabatabai could be seek-
ing the premiership for himself, as rumored in 1954, this does
not appear to be his primary motive. He apparently is sincere
in his fear for the future of Iran and is said to be urging many in-
fluential persons to put pressure on the Shah.
Tabatabai is regarded by the American Embassy in Tehran
as one of a small,highly respected group who can best be called
the "old-fashioned elder statesmen" of Iran. These men view the
country in its historical perspective and believe its independence
can best be maintained by remaining inconspicuously balanced
between more powerful countries. They want Iran protected by
the shield'of Western military power without going so far as to
annoy Soviet might, and would accept limited economic aid from
both sides.
Neither the Shah nor Eqbal has yet shown any sign of weaken-
ing in the face of threatening propaganda. Nevertheless, with
foreign propaganda demanding their death--as in the East German
Persian-language broadcast of 30 June--and with pressure mount-
ing to end the impasse with the USSR, the Shah, who often feels
isolated and is easily depressed, may agree to investigate moves
to end the Soviet "cold war" against Iran-.)
6 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600050001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600050001-5
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600050001-5
 Approved
Situation in Ceylon
Prime Minister Bandaranaike's government has been fur-
ther weakened as a result of parliamentary developments and
continuing leftist-led strike activity. Reaction in Ceylon to the
government's throne speech opening Parliament on 30 June has
been unusually critical. The lack of constructive new proposals
to alleviate the country's worsening economic and political prob-
lems- -in effect an admission by the government that it can re-
main in office only by avoiding controversial issues--has fur-
ther damaged Bandaranaike's prestige.
Despite its bare majority, however, the government prob-
ably will survive a parliamentary vote following debate on the
speech on 8 or 9 July, as some members of the opposition ap-
parently are reluctant to force national elections at this time.
Leftist political and labor leaders continue their effort to
discredit the government and increase their support through re-
current strike activity. While five small Colombo port unions
have accepted Bandaranaike's concessions and returned to work,
the most powerful group--led by the Trotskyite Lanka Sama
Samaj Party (LSSP)--has decided to remain on strike despite
a government ultimatum., LSSP leaders also threaten to call
out workers in commercial firms on 6 July and may attempt to
stage a general strike.
Army troops ordered into the port on 25 June are still try-
ing to handle some cargo, raising the possibility of clashes with
those workers who have returned. Mobilization of "volunteer"
groups by the government to act as strike breakers may lead to
additional violence.
CDeteriorating political and economic conditions are encour-
aging various conservative- groups to consider "direct action"
to replace the present parliamentary government with authoritarian
rule. While the Governor General's order of 26 June mobilizing the
armed-forces reserves increases opportunities for such action,,,
there is no indication that any group plans a move in the immediate
future.
25X1
25X1
6 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Page 6
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600050001-5
 Approved Igor Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975k004600050001-5
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600050001-5
 /izz, /i/ZZZ. /ZZi~i~iiiiiii, 5V///~'/////////3W4
Approved For se [Q1p/25Ey00975A1600050001-5
Approve For Release 2003/02/ 7 : CIA-RDP79TO09