CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004600070001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 8, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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8 July 1959
DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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8 July 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUTIIST BLOC
Communist China: Peiping has retreated on a fundamen-
tal fea ure o its commune system. A leading regime spokes-
man on agriculture s-tated in a recent magazine article that
peasants are no longer required to eat in communal mess.halls.
This$ in effects constitutes a significant admission of failure
to obtain peasant compliance in a major regime program.
II. ASLA-AFRICA
Iraq: Iraqi Communists are reportedly planning a majo
demonstrate n in Baghdad. on the night of 9-10 July. Qasim
presumably has been alerted to this plan. A large Cornmu-
nest demonstration would. be likely to end in considerable vio-
lence9 and might well test the determination and. ability of
Qasim and, the army to meet such a Communist chahenge~
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 IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
The USIB has, taken note of the following conclusions reached
by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee
pointed out that its conclusions are to he used in context with all
SNIEs relevant to the Berlin situation.
1. During the recess- of the foreign ministers'
conference, ending 13 July, the USSR will not con-
clude aseparate peace treaty with the GDR or turn
over acres.s. controls to the East Germaps~a Moscow
will continue to use threats of such actio~r as a form
of pressure on the West; nevertheless,p as long as
it estimates that there are any prospects for nego-
tiations profitable to the USSR, it probably will not
take such action. The actual physical transfer of
controls could be accomplished with little or no warn-
ing.
2, Soviet diplomatic activity relating to the re-
sumption of East-West negotiations at Geneva continues
to aim. at weakening the Western position with a com-
bination of professed willingness to .reach agreement
and threats of crisis and possible war if no agreement
is reached.
3. While there are no reliable indications of a
bloc intent to deny Allied or West German access to
West Berlin, or to seal off West Berlin in the imme-
diate future, such action could be taken with little or
no warning.
4. While public morale continues at a high level,.
some West Berlin political leaders during the past week
have become concerned over Western "disunity" and.
fear that "Berlin fatigue" may gain ground in the United
States. There has been no significant change in Berlin4s
economic situation.
$ July 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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5. .There have been no significant changes. in
Soviet capabilities to respond to possible Western
actions in the event of turnover? harassmentp or
blockade.
DAILY BRIE F
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I. THE CaMMUNI5T BLOC
Further Modification in Chinese Communist Commune Program
The most significant madification to date of Peiping's com-
mune program is revealed in the 16 June issue of China Youth,
in an article by Teng Tzu-hui, the regime's leading spokesman
for a conservative approach to agricultural problems. Rural
cadres have been authorized to permit peasants to withdraw from
commune messhalls without risking criticism as "backward ele-
ments" or reflection upon their "progressiveness." While other
reports have indicated that some messhalls in South China were
being closed temporarily, this is the first indication of a coun-
try-wide movement to reduce their services.
Teng's article reports that only the "activists"--unmarried
young people and childless couples--support the messhall idea,
while the majority of peasants are either indifferent or opposed.
Teng admits that many messhalls were inefficiently run and that
some cadres had been guilty of graft, Teng also admits that some
messhalls may have to close if voluntary withdrawals are permitted,
but calls for the continuation of this service no matter how few
persons participate. He justifies the retreat on the grounds that
the opponents would withdraw whether permitted or not--a serious
admission of Peiping's inability to extract total compliance from
the rural population.
Teng, however, endorses the basic idea of the messhalls.
He urges their reorganization with emphasis on reduction in
size to 100 persons each and greater flexibility, The system
has been undergoing overhaul since early last fall, but a suc-
cessful solution has eluded the Communists.
Teng's article shows some of the same concerns that were
forced on Soviet party leaders during ?a similar experiment with
communes in the early days of the USSR. The experiment was a
failure, and the program was abandoned by Stalin in t~~e earl
1930s.
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 II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraqi Communists Planning Massive Demonstration
~he Iraqi Communists are planning a major demonstra-
tion in Baghdad on the night of 9-10 Jul
[A number of bloody clashes between Communist and anti-
Communist forces have been broken up by the army and police
in Baghdad's suburbs recently, and such clashes may increase
in frequency as the 14 July anniversary of last year's revolu-
tion draws near. A major Communist demonstration could well
be the occasion for large-scale violence and might be designed
to test the ability and determination of the Qasim regime's security
apparatus.
The Communists have been dealt several severe blows during
the past few days: f~asim has publicly expressed his disapproval
of the Communist effort to .re.can~titute: a "National Front" and
has openly differed with his Communist-inclined aide-de-camp,
Col. Lutfi Tahir, aver the latter's suspension of an anti-Commu-
nist newspaper. The military governor of Baghdad publicly re-
futed an article in the official Communist newspaper on 4 July,
calling it ''.a lying report." Salim Fakhri, Communist-line
director of broadcasting, has been reported arrest
[The Communists may renew their demands for participa-
tion in a new cabinet expected to be announced around 14 Julv.~'
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Communist Bloc Expected to Protest Joint US-French Training
a~ Laotian Army
~T~e Communist bloc is likely to set up a greater cry over
the introduction of American military personnel into Laos to
begin joint US-French training of the Laotian Army than it did
during the recent episode involving the rebellion of a former
Pathet Lao battalion. Britain, in anticipation of Communist
charges that joint US-French training violates the Geneva .agree-
meats, has informally requested the United States to supply it
with an explanation of the training that it could use, in its
capacity as cochairman of the 1954 Geneva conference, to
counter the Communist char~es.7
Hanoi would regard the introduction of American military
advisers into Laos as "confirmation" of its charges that the US
is attempting to turn Laos into an American military base, and
redouble its efforts to have the International Control Commission
recalled. Since mid-June mast of 1~lorth :Vietnam's statements
on Laos have criticized the recent Vientiane-Saigon .agreements,
which Hanoi describes as an effort to bring Laos illegally into
SEAT
CPresident Ho Chi Minh will undoubtedly review the Laotian
situation during his current unofficial visit in the USSR, although
the primary reason for his trip is probably medical,
~eanwhile, Prince Souphannouvong, chief of the Communist-
front party in Laos, and only recently released from house ar-
rest following the mutiny of the Pathet Lao battalion, has threatened
to return to guerrilla warfare unless the regime ceases its alleged
persecutions.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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III. THE WEST
Austria`s- Political Crisis,
After eight weeks, of effort to bring his conservative Peo-
ples party and the Socialists together in a new coalition,
Austrian Chancellor Raab has as-ked and received. his, party's,
permission to let someone else carry on future negotiations
to form a new government. His resignation as chancellor-
designate has been accepted. by President Schaerf.
The two parties have been at loggerheads since the gen-
eral elections of 10 May in which Socialist gains reduced.
the People's- party's plurality to one parliamentary seat. The
Socialists, with t:~~a largest popular vote, have accordingly in-
sisted. on a larger role in the government. Their demand for
preponderant control over the nationalized industries. apparently
caused. the talks to break down. The Socialists contend that this
point had previously been conceded to theme and it is possible
that Raab may again have been overruled. by conservative ele-
ments within his- own party who oppose his conciliatory tactics..
Prospects for restoring the coalition, which contributed sa
much to Austrians postwar economic and political stabilityy now
largely depend on the mediation of President Schaerfo A Social-
ist devoted to the coalition idea9 Schaerf reportedly does not sym-
pathize with his party's tactics. There is., however, no readily
apparent solution to the impasses and its. continuation would en-
courage the partisan excesses which c~rs~r~,r:.terized Austria in the
interwar period.. The Socialists probably could. not form aminor--
ity government; and an attempt by the People's party to rely on
the support of the small, right-wing, pan-German, Liberal art
would. be certain to provoke a violent Socialist reaction.
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THE PRESIDENT
The dice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corpa
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Farce
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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