CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004600100001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 11, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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11 July 1959
SC No.
Copy 0' L;
G,UTII: H
REVIEWER;
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DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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11 July.1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: /Ehrushchev named Frol Kozlov as his eventual
successor wring a conversation with Governor Harriman on
23 June. Although he cautioned Harriman against wishful
thoughts of his own early death., Khrushchev said that both
he and Mikoyan agreed that Kozlov will "follow us," He added
"Kozlov will be worthy of us;' Khrushchev seemed to elim-
inate his chief party lieutenant, Aleksey Kirichenko, from the
succession sweepstakes, but gave no indication how an orderly
transfer of power is to be prearranged. Some move to give
Kozlov formal authority over the party machine, which he now
lacks, would be a necessary step in the process.
China-Cuba: The Chinese Communists have established a
branch o their official news agency in Havana and are report-
edly planning to publish a Chinese-language newspaper. A
Chinese Communist "journalist" delegation is currently mak-
ing a substantial propaganda effort in. Cuba, following earlier
visits to Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay. This activity reflects
the sharply increased Chinese Communist effort in Latin
America especially apparent since Latin American Commu-
nists met with top Chinese officials in Peiping earlier this
year. The Chinese apparently view Cuba--where Commu-
nists have made considerable gains under Castro--as a par-
ticularly favorable center for developing a propaganda net-
work in the area.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
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Malaya: /-A threat to the stability of Malaya has arisen
from tie breaking away of about half the Chinese leaders of
the ruling Alliance, a coalition of Chinese, Malay, and Indian
parties, The Alliance has heretofore prevented political polar-
ization along racial lines. Unless repaired, this split in the
j V Alliance prior to national elections on 19 August is likely to
j intensify racial animosities,; widespread disorders could re-
sultj
N
he cit
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III. THE WEST
West Germany - West Berlin: Mayor Brandt has appar-
ently won agreement from Adenauer and Foreign Minister
Brentano to a larger role for West Berlints representatives
during the second phase of the Geneva, negotiations. Bonn
will presumably request that Berlin officials be included as
technical advisers in any working group formulating proposals
11 July 59
DAILY BRIE F
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Cuba-Czechoslovakia: uba is interested in purchasing
a light--arms factory from Czechoslovakia, according to a
reliable source of the American Embassy in Havana. A
Czech official already in Cuba discussing tractor sales has
indicated. that a Czech expert on arms sales is, expected in
Havana on 13 July.
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DAILY BRIEF
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1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev States Frol Kozlov Will Succeed Him
L rushchev and Mikoyan have picked Frol Kozlov as their
eventual successor,, according to statements Khrushchev made
to Governor Harriman on 23 June. Khrushchev said, "When we
pass on, we will rest easily because we know Kozlov will carry
on Lenin's work:' "Kozlov will be worthy of us," he added.
However, Khrushchev cautioned Harriman against any wishful
thoughts, of his own early death
[Aleksey Kirichenko,, second-in-command of the party secre-
tariat, is apparently out of the running. When asked about Kir
ichenko, Khrushchev replied, "Why do you ask of Kirichenko ?
.... Don't try to bet on our followers. If you bet on Kirichenko,
you will lose.... Bet on our country, not on individuals.
(kLh-rushchev gave no indication of how he intended to arrange
for Kozlov's succession to the top leadership position. At the
present moment Kozlov, despite Khrushchev's support, probably
lacks the personal following in the professional party machine to
ensure his succession, and, as a first deputy premier, he is not
in the best spot to develop a larger following.)
Ultimately Kozlov will have to transfer from the government
bureaucracy to the party secretariat and assume more and more
responsibility and authority from Khrushchev if he hopes to take
over control and maintain his position against other contenders.
Khrushchev, however, has shown no disposition to transfer such
authority to Kozlov, "I am very jealous of my prerogatives and
while I live I will run the party," he told Harriman. Moreover,
by being designated heir apparent beforehand, Kozlov is likely to
become the target of plotting by other hopefuls and may find it
difficult to keep his standing with Khrushchev
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11 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Peiping Moving to Expand Influence in Cuba and Other Latin
American Countries
A group of Chinese Communist "journalists" is making a
substantial propaganda effort in Cuba, following earlier visits
to Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay. In a press conference in Havana
on 7 July, the group's spokesman--an individual in the propaganda
department of the Chinese Communist party central committee--
said he hoped to discuss trade possibilities with business leaders
and suggested that, in view of Cuba's impending land reform, the
exchange of Cuban sugar for Chinese Communist agricultural
implements might be arranged. The Chinese group will prob-
ably propose Cuban adoption of Peiping's earlier land-reform
techniques.
Peiping apparently views Cuba as a particularly favorable
center for developing a regional propaganda network. It has es-
tablished a branch of the official New China News Agency in
Havana and plans to publish a Chinese-language newspaper. in...
cooperation with the Cuban Communist press. This paper would
be intended to influence the local Chinese community--the largest
in Latin America, with 20,000 in Havana alone.
'The Chinese, who bid for a larger share in the guidance of
Latin American Communists earlier this year .when Communist
delegattor -from the area were in Peiping, are also increasing
travel and training programs for Latin Americans. Many more
Latin Americans traveled to China in the first half of 1959 than in
all of 1958. These visitors included sizable parliamentary delega-J
tions from Peru and Colombia. The Mexican and Ecuadoran Com-
munist parties are reportedly attempting to carry out a recommenda-
tion made by Chinese Communist leaders in Peiping-to establish a-
clandestine party apparatus distinct from overt party organizationq
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Split in Ruling Party Threatens Stability in Malaya
LA serious threat to the political stability and econ
progress of the Federation of Malaya has arisen as a result
of a split within the ruling Alliance party. About half of the
leaders of the party's Chinese component, the Malayan Chi-
nese Association (MCA), broke with the Malay section of the
Alliance when the Malays refused to accept Chinese demands
on candidate apportionment for the 19 August general elections
and on the use of the Chinese language in examinations in Chi-
nese schools.
DAApparently the dissidents, who are the most politically
potent group of MCA leaders, feel that the extreme pro-Chi-
nese position which they are now free to take will result in
election victories in all of the 39 districts having a Chinese
population majority. They also apparently have some hopes of
winning up to 17 more constituencies where it appears the Malay
vote might split
(~MCA leader Lim Chong Eu is reported to have already met
with the leaders of other predominantly Chinese opposition groups
in an apparent effort to gain unified Chinese support for single
Chinese candidates in each district. Lim's minimum goal is to
seat enough Chinese to prevent unilateral Malay amendment of the
constitution, which requires a two-thirds majority
Lim apparently has some hope of actually achieving a Chinese
majority in the 104-seat lower house which would p.avve the way for
Malaya's merger with the predominantly Chinese state of Singapore.
The Malays, who control the police and army, could be expected
to resist forcibly any Chinese effort to force a merger
In any event, the MCA break with the Alliance, unless repaired,
appears likely to lead to nearly complete polarization of the electorate
along racial lines in the forthcoming elections. This split, during
the heat of the election, campaign, may intensify racial animosities
to the point where widespread disorders could result
11 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Cuba Reported Interested in Purchase of Czech
Arms Factory
Cuba is interested in purchasing a light arms factory from
Czec oslovakia, according to a reliable source of the American
Embassy in Havana. A Czech official in Cuba discussing trac-
tor sales reportedly said that a Czech concerned with the sale
of military equipment is, expected. in Havana on 13 July.?
the Cuban Government is nego-
tiating with the Czechs- through Major Raul Castro, Cuban
armed forces chief and brother of the prime minister. Cuba
has been unable to secure military equipment legally from the
United. States because of the US embargo on arms shipments to
the area during the current Caribbean crisis. At least one
Cuban military mission has recently gone to Europe in search
of arms. In addition, Major "Che" Guevara, pro-Communist
close associate of Fidel Castro, is believed to have discussed
the possibility of arms purchases from the UAR during his re-
cent visit there. Unconfirmed reports allege that Guevara plans
to visit Czechoslovakia before returning from his current ex-
tensive trip to Afro-Asian countries.
The Cuban Government is undoubtedly aware of the mas-
sive arms purchases made in Europe during the last several
months by the hostile Dominican Government, which has an ef-
ficient arms factory3.
Since 1955 the Sino-Soviet bloc has frequently and success-
fully exploited. the need or desire of nonbloc underdeveloped coun-
tries for military assistance, in many instances employing it as
the first stage in an economic penetration program. Czechoslo-
vakia, in particular, has often represented the bloc in such
transactions with free-world countries. Prague presumably
would be willing to grant long-term, low-interest credits to
Cuba to finance the building of an arms factory and, in addi-
tion, accept partial or even total repayment in the form of
commodities.
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11 July 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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 Approved Fc
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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