CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004600140001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 16, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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16 July 1959
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16 JULY 1959
1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
uggests possible device
Gromyko may propose for getting West-
ern agreement to an all-German com-
mittee.
Iraqi political groups may see Qasim's
remarks on 14 July as signal to start
new maneuvering.
Ethiopia planning strong protest to UK
over press attacks from British Soma-
liland.
West Germany soliciting support for
French position in UN debate on Al-
geria, possibly in return for French
support on reunification issue.
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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
16 July 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Watch Committee conclusion--Berlin: No significant
,D indications ea-ring on the possibility of hostilities,
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USSR- Geneva:G,romyko may seek to obtain Western
agreement to an all-German committee by offering to make
this organ, subordinate to a four-power commission on the
whole German problem.
25X1 Isuch an "autonomous" all- rman com-
mittee should report to a "four-power senior body" by a
certain date but that this time limit would not apply to West-
ern rights in Berlin. He suggested that the foreign ministers
could agree in principle on a time period of two or three
years and that the precise date could be established at a
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that the all- German committee proposal was intended to
make Western recognition of the East German regime "more
palatable." (Page 1)
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I I. ASIA-AFRICA
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Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: Situations
susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action
which would jeopardize US interests exist, particularly in
Iraq and Iran.
nificant hostilities is unlikely in the
initiation of si
Th
g
e
immediate future.
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in view of their policy on Cyprus and their Middle East interests,
but the German action is evidence of willingness to make an ef-
fort on behalf of France. This may indicate that Bonn has shelved
its long-standing policy of staying out of colonial controversies
and has begun a more active role in support of France, in return
for French diplomatic support for the West German position on
25X1 reunification, (Page 5)
~ F77
may lead to a new deterioration in Ethiopian- British relations,, I
Iraq: Qasim's announcement that the period during which
political parties. should refrain from activity will end before
6 January 1960, and that following this an elected "national
council" will be created, appears intended to remove the force
of Communist criticism and pressure for open political action
now. The announcement is likely to be regarded by the various
political elements as an invitation to strengthen their organ-
izations and mass following, as well as to try to obtain control
of key government departments. This may lead to intensified
factionalism rather than to the political truce Which Qasim
seems to hope for.
Ethiopia- UK: fThe Ethiopian Government plans a strong
protest tote United Kingdom over press attacks on Haile
Selassie, apparently originating from British Somaliland. This
coming just after the Emperor's acceptance of a 400,000,000
ruble credit ($100,000,000 at the official rate) from 'Moscow.
The reaction in Addis Ababa to the Soviet credit is genera y
one of elation because of the anticipated Soviet help for eas-
ing Ethiopia's economic difficulties. However, some top offi-
cials reportedly fear the Emperor has gone too far,
III. THE WEST
West Germany - France: nn is seeking to gain support
for France in the UN debate on Algeria this fall. Following up
a personal letter from Chancellor Adenauer to Greek Prime
Minister Karamanlis, the West German ambassador in Athens
urged the Greek Government to demonstrate NATO unity by sup
porting the French position. The Greeks are unlikely to agree,
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 Approved For
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Spokesm Hint at compromise on 11-German Committee
foreign Minister Gromyko may seek to obtain Western agree-
ment to an all-German committee by offering to make this organ
subordinate to a four-power commission.
such an "autonomous" all-German committee should repor o a
,~waa,:rc-power senior body" by a certain date. He insisted, how-
ever, tnat the USSR would not press for a terminal date on West-
ern rights in West Berlin, E: I
that a our-power commission to work out the terms of a German
peace treaty could be part of a compromise settlement on Berlin),
viet spokesmen are seeking to create the impression that
the time limit on any interim agreement is harmless by suggest-
ing that it would apply only to the all- German committee and not
to the duration of Allied rights in Berlin.
14romyko, however, made it clear in his public statement of
28 June that a "definite time limit will be established for the tem-
porary status of West Berlin and for the work of the all- German
committee:' He said the temporary status agreement would be
"designed. for a year and a half," and specified that the "all-
German committee would have to complete its work by the end
of that period.'
~.?ne USSR probably would insist that the four-power commis-
sion should be confined to negotiating a German peace treaty, with
reunification left to the Germans. Moscow rejected a West German]
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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L proposal last September for a four-power commission with ad-
visers from both German states to discuss the "German questions"
proposing instead that the four powers work toward the conclu-
sion of a treaty and leave the reunification problem to an all-
German committee
suggested that the foreign minis-
ters could agree in principle on a time period of two or three
years and that the precise date could be established at a summit
meeting. He agreed that an all-German committee would imply
substantial Western recognition of East Germany, and added that
"it would seem to be one way of making recognition more palat-
able."
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
The Iraqi Situation
Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim's declaration on 14 July that
the "transitional period" of the revolution will draw to an end
before 6 January 1960 probably is a' move to mitigate the force
of Communist criticism and pressure for immediate political
activity. Qasim has opposed activity by political parties dur-
ing this period, despite Communist and extreme leftist demands
that political life be restored. Qasim also announced that a "na-
tional council" will be elected before the next anniversary of the
revolution.
Iraqi political factions are likely to view Qasim's declara-
tion as an invitation to begin strengthening their organizations
and mass following, as well as to seek control of government
departments that could be used to further their objectives. Al-
though the National Democratic party recently has been stepping
up its efforts to gain support outside the cities,, the Communists
appear to have better organization at the grass-roots level. This
may lead to an increase of factionalism and friction rather than
the stability and political truce which Qasim probably hoped for.
Qasim's reorganized and expanded cabinet, which appears
to reflect a shift toward the left, may be intended to satisfy the
Communists in order to balance recent moves favoring the army
and nationalists. At least three of the four new members are ex-
treme leftists--Faysal Samir, Guidance; Awni Yusuf, Works and
Housing; and Nadia Dulaymi, Municipalities. Dr. Dulaymi, Iraqi's
first woman cabinet minister, has a long record of association
with Communist-front groups; she is reputedly a member of the
Iraqi party's central committee.
In early July all three signed. the Communist-sponsored
charter issued by the Communist-dominated "United Front" de-
manding participation of political parties in the government,
arming of the Communist-dominated Popular Resistance Force,
and a purge of "corrupt" elements from the army and govern-
ment.
16 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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. Ethiopian Relations With London May Deteriorate
Addis Ababa will shortly protest to the United Kin dom
over press attacks in the British Somaliland Protectorate on
Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie and demand that they be
stopped, according to the American adviser of the Ethiopian
Foreign Ministry. This action may lead to a new deteriora-
tion in Ethiopian-British relations, which only recently were
reported to be "back to normal." Addis Ababa had reacted
sharply to L;ondon's policy statement of 9 February on British
Somaliland, which Ethiopia claimed was support for a greater
Somalia state affiliated with the British Commonwealth at the
expense of Somali-inhabited Ethiopian territory.
CA,ddis Abba's proposed protest comes at a time when Ethiopian
ties with the West may be subject to new strains over the Emperor's
acceptance on 11 July of a $100,000,000 credit from Moscow. The
Emperor reportedly expects "large numbers of Soviet technicians"
to Inter Ethiopia in connection with the aid program. This prob-
ably accounts for the feeling among some top officials that he has
gone too far, although the government'. officials generally are
elated over the prospect that Soviet aid may ease Ethiopia's eco-
nomic difficulties
dis Ababa, perhaps encouraged by what it considers strong
support from Moscow, now may be preparing to assume a more
aggressive attitude toward the West.- A remark by the American
adviser that the Ethiopian Government "contemplates strong ac-
tion" unless "full satisfaction" is forthcoming from London may
be an expression of this new policy
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16 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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West Germany ee uppor or enc in Debate on
pia
Bgnn is attempting to gain support for France during the
UN debate on Algeria this fall, possibly in return for continued
French support for the West German position on reunification.
Following up a personal letter from Chancellor Adenauer to
Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis, the West German ambas-
sador in Athens has urged the Greek Government to demonstrate
the unity of NATO by taking a firm stand behind France. Bonn's
action reflects the high level of personal agreement and mutual
support that has gradually developed between Adenauer and
French President de Gaulle since the latter's return to power.
Foreign Minister Averoff told US officials that Greece has
sought to be as helpful as possible to France in regard to Algeria
by not recognizing the Algerian rebel government, but that :Greece
has traditionally opposed colonialism and has good relations with
Arab countries which it is anxious to maintain. He expressed
annoyance with the timing of the request, pointing out that it
followed too soon after a sizable German loan to Greece'.]
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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