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December 14, 2016
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September 24, 2002
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July 29, 1959
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Approved For Releas /2 ? C- RET00975AO04600250001-3 25X1 / / 29 July 1959 Copy No. -C State Dept. review completed DOCUMENT NQ. NO CHANGE IN CLASS_ I DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS NEXT REVIEW DATE: t AUTN?A Ank ~r . DATE. REVIEWER: J Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600250001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600250001-3 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600250001-3 Approved For ReI4 Chinese Communist shelling of Matsus on 27 July was retaliation for National- ist shelling of fishing boats. Laos--Guerrilla attacks on army out- posts produce 'grave' situation in Sam Neua Province; Communist propaganda charges joint US-French training pro- gram violates Geneva accords on Laos. Lebanon- -Assassination of Chamoun lieutenant could spark renewal of Christian-Druze vendettas. Cyprus--Grivas and Archbishop Makarios may be on verge of final break. 75AO04600250001-3 SO. Latin American Communists planning leftist conference in Chile to coincide with OAS foreign ministers' meeting on 12 August. 25X1 Conclusions of special USIB committee on Berlin situation. 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600250001-3 25X1 0 Approved F CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 29 July 1959 DAILY BRIEF Io THE COMMUNIST BLOC Taiwan Strait: Chinese Communist artillery shelling of Nationalist positions in the Matsu Islands with 263 rounds on 27 July was in retaliation for 16 rounds of Nationalist fire on Communist fishing boats. In May and June, Nationalist fire on fishing boats resulted in several similar bombardments of h6atsu by Communist guns.. Laos: he Laotian Army has lost control of the outlying areas of Sam Neua Province as a result of attacks on army posts, apparently by guerrillas of the former Pathet Lao Com- munist movement. According to the provincial governor, the capital of Sam Neua itself is threatened. While information on he attacks is sketchy, Premier Phoui considers the situation 'grave." The province of Phong Saly, the other former center f Pathet Lao activity, has reported no clashes, and it is too early to determine whether these actions indicate a mass return the bush by former Pathet Lao guerrillas. There is as yet o confirmation of reports that North Vietnamese are involved in the new fighting, but the US ambassador in Vientiane consid- ers it likely. The attacks may have been a reaction to the gov- ernment's increasing efforts to press its counter subversion. pro- gram in remote provincial areaso Both Hanoi and Peiping have launched a vigorous campaign of protests against the proposed joint US- French training program for the Laotian Army, tern irig a, violation of the Geneva ac- cords. They demand the immediate revival of the International Control Commission for Laos, warning that "the civil war in 1 Ell \mMENEEMI SECRET 1 LI \t IN Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600250001-3 2011 3 Approved Fqf el - 004600250001- 25X1 Laos portends "ominous consequences for peace in Indochina.' Laos threatens to expand," The USSR also appears to be giv- ing North Vietnam stronger support on the Laotian issue, The Soviet charge in London has warned that the present trend in Lebanon: The assassination on 27 July of Naim Mughabghab, one of the principal Christian guerrilla leaders who supported ex-President Chamoun in last year's civil strife, is likely to re- O~ sult in local disorders and communal clashes. The assassins appear to have been followers of the anti-Chamoun Druze lead- er, Kamal Jumblatt; if so, their arrest will be politically as well as physically difficult. 25X1 Cyprus: The recent exchange of recriminations between Archbishop Makarios and EOKA leader Grivas may result in a final break between the two Greek Cypriot leaders. Makarios appears to have the support of a majority of the Cypriots and would probably be victorious in a showdown with the former terrorist leader. Any attempt by Grivas to resume an active role in determining Cyprus' future, however, would weaken the unity of conservative Greek Cypriots at a time when they face a potentially strong threat from the Communists. It would also have political repercussions in Athens and rouse apprehension among Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaders, (Page 5.) III. THE WEST 25X1 Latin America - OAS: Latin American Communists appar- August meeting of American foreign ministers ently view the ff- in Santiago de Chile as a tailor-made opportunity to exploit anti- Americanism and attack the OAS as a US-dominated instrumen- tality to support dictatorships in the hemisphere, ey are organizing a leftist con erence un er 29 July 59 DAILY BRIEF ii 2 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600250001-3 2 M Approved FV0ease 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDMT009T #004600250001-3 - 1. The USSR continues to maintain its hard posi- tion on Berlin and has attempted to increase pressure on the Western governments for further concessions- -for examplel by the Soviet-Polish communiqu6. At Geneva., however, Gromyko is trying to keep the door open for negotiations, and no major developments are likely un- til the results of the Nixon visit have been evaluated by the USSR. 2. So long as the Soviet leaders estimate that the prospects for negotiation with the West over Berlin are favorable to them, they will not conclude a separate peace treaty with the GDR or turn over access control to the East Germans. The USSR will continue to use threats of such actions as a form of pressure on the West. The actual physical transfer of controls could be accomplished with httle or no warning. 3. While there are no reliable indications of a bloc in+,M"+ +.-I t4el Alli A nrlnoi~ t"~ +r, 111~ + IBM 1/00/1 I 2 ALJ %JA & 11AC"L OU Berlin, or to seal off West Berlin in the immediate future.. such actions could be taken with little or no warning. Re- cent attempts by GDR officials to interfere with normal 29 July 59 DAILY BRIEF 2 25X1 I auspices of FRAP, the Chilean Communist - Socialist coali- tion party, which is to coincide with the foreign ministers' meeting. Several Latin American Communist parties re- Portedly plan to send delegates. IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMNHTTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee pointed out that its conclusions are to be used in context with all SNIEs relevant to the Berlin situation. Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO04600250001-3 rlp~ Aaaroved For lease 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 4600250001-3 Western access procedures could stem from an in- creasing sense of importance and "sovereignty" in the GDR government as well as the long-range Soviet program to erode Western-access rights. 4. West Berlin's political leaders, more pessi- mistic than at any time since the crisis began in November, are concerned that the West may be forced to make concessions at Geneva. They would prefer a complete breakoff rather than any modification of the West's 16 June proposals. There has been no signif- icant change in West Berlin's favorable economic sit- uation. 5. There is also considerable concern among West German officials in Bonn regarding the outcome of the Geneva conference. They fear that the Western powers, under pressure from Britain, will make dan- gerous concessions. 6. There have been no significant changes in Soviet capabilities to respond to possible Western ac- tions in the event of turnover, harassment, or block- 25X1 ade. 29 July 59 DAILY BRIEF iv ME Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600250001-3 Approved F r Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004 00250001-3 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Communists Take Aggressive Line on Laos Both Hanoi and Peiping are warning that "the civil war in Laos threatens to expand" and that this dangerous situation can be resolved only by recalling the Laotian In- ternational Control Commission (ICC) to investigate the situation. Radio Hanoi, in the past week, has been alleging Lao army "attacks" on former Pathet Lao units to disprove Vientiane's claims that relative quiet had been. restored. The Communists insist that Laotian. neutrality, which they assert was promised by the 1954 Geneva agreements, has been undermined by various acts of. the Phoui regime, but is most directly and dangerously threatened by the proposed joint US- French program to train the Laotian Army--made public on 24 July. The North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry has issued a statement demanding that Vientiane expel American military advisers, return to the five principles of peace and coexistence, and refuse to allow Laos to be transformed into a military base for the imperialists who are "planning a new war." The USSR is pressing for an early meeting of the Geneva Conference cochairmen, and on 21 July the Soviet charge de- livered Moscow's reply"to Britain's formal refusal on 9 June to call for reactivation of the ICC in Laos. The new Soviet note proposed that since Britain and the USSR disagreed on what is happening in Laos, the ICC should conduct an "impartial" investigation. The note reiterated previous claims that the Ge- neva agreements were being violated, and the Soviet charge stressed .to Foreign Office, officials the "ominous conse uences" for peace in Indochina. 29 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600250001-3 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 04600250001-3 Now I II. ASIA-AFRICA Fighting Erupts in Laos C'I'he Laotian Government's military position in Sam eua Province in northeast Laos is threatened by a sudden onslaught of attacks on remote army outposts by dissident elements of the former Communist Pathet Lao movement. Reports on the fighting are still sketchy but several of the small outposts re- portedly have fallen, and the government fears an enemy at- tempt on the town of Sam Neua, where the airfield provides the principal access to this remote and mountainous region]- The government is taking steps for prompt reinforcement of the two infantry battalions, comprising some 1,200 men, which at present to a large degree are scattered throughout the province in units of platoon strength. Antigovernment guer- rilla forces in the province are believed to number upwards of 1,000 men, and include pro-Communist local tribesmen plus elements of the recently defected Pathet Lao battalion and prob ably some cadres from nearby North Vietnam. Ambassador Smith in Vientiane considers it likely that these attacks have been instigated and supported by the Vietnamese Communists, but direct evidence of this is lacking Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone has termed the situation "grave,` but he does not believe the fighting in Sam Neua her- alds full-scale civil war throughout Laos. Phoui believes the enemy?s primary purpose is to take possession of Sam Neua, and later Phong Saly Province--the two former Pathet Lao strongholds The government has shown concern over the possible re- sumption of armed dissidence since May when the Pathet Lao battalion, assembled at Plaine des Jarres in Xieng Khouang Province, refused to be integrated into the Royal Laotian Army and escaped from its encampment. At that time Prince Souphan- nouvong and other leaders of the Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ)--the political party formed by the Pathet Lao after the 1957 unifica- tion agreement--were briefly placed under house arrest. Phoui, in reaction to the Sam Neua fighting, now plans to place 25X1 25X1 25X1 29 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600250001-3 25X1 Approved Fo lease 2003103128 _ CIA-RfP79T0097004600250001-3 lwl~ %W Z leaders under close arrest. This would be further provo- cation for a full-scale return to guerrilla warfare by the Pathet Lao veterans who, together with Hanoi, have warned that con- tinuation of the government's repressive measures against the party would have this resuitJ attacks may be a reaction to the government's increas- ing efforts to press its countersubversion program against Com- munist influence at the grass roots. At the least, this develop- ment will throw the Phoui government off balance and hamper orderly implementation of an invigorated training program for its 25,000-man armyl 25X1 25X1 25X1 29 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600250001-3 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975 004600250001-3 r Lebanese Assassination Increases Tension The assassination of ex-President Chamoun's principal lieutenant, Naim Mughabghab, on 27 July could lead to local clashes and renewed communal disorders unless Lebanese authorities quickly produce likely culprits. Ambassador McClintock has stated that the assassins are believed to be anti-Chamoun followers of Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, in whose territory Mughabghab was slain. Mughabghab, a Greek Catholic, was the leader of Cha- moun's partisans during last summer's rebellion and fought Jumblatt in the Druze area. Although early reports suggest the killing was an act by vengeful Druze tribesmen, it might have been instigated by pro-UAR terrorists. Damascus radiobroadcasts are playing up the possibility that Jumblatt was involved. Jumblatt had been making overtures toward the Lebanese Christian community during the past few months, and pro-UAR elements may have desired to pre- vent resumption of traditional Druze-Christian cooperation. Chamoun, whose political activities have been circum- scribed since he left office last fall, can be expected to try to capitalize on Mughabghab's death and use it as a means to rally Christians around his Free Nationalist party. Even if the culprits are prosecuted, it is likely that some of Mughab- ghab's supporters will seek to take private revenge. Mu' hab- ghab's funeral may be the occasion for disturbances.I 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 29 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600250001-3 Approved For Release 2003/03/28: CIA-RDP79T00975A 04600250001-3 Makarios-Grivas Rift Widens Statements by Archbishop Makarios on 26 July and by former leader of EOKA General George Grivas the follow- ing day may signal the final break between the two Greek Cypriot leaders. Makarios denounced the "super patriots" and "demagogues" who seek to create confusion for their own "selfish aims." Grivas alluded to "dark forces who seek to enslave Cyprus" and denounced "several people" who in- tended to hand over "fertile ,areas of Cyprus:".for. inclusion in British military bases. Makarios has also denounced non-Communist opposition politicians in Greece who stand to gain by exploiting the split in the Greek Cypriot right wing. These politicians apparently hope to use the popular Grivas to bring down the present gov- ernment, believing that a break with Makarios would be followed by Grivas' foraal entrance on the Greek political scene. The Greek Government and many nationalist leaders on Cyprus have tried to heal the breach between Makarios and Grivas. The basic issues dividing the two involve: (1) the division of Cypriot municipalities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots; (2) the size of the British bases; and .(3) the inclusion of Cyprus in the Commonwealth] In an open contest for power on Cyprus, it appears that Makarios would have the necessary popular and organizational support to win. The struggle, however, would endanger imple- mentation of the Cyprus accords and could seriously weaken the Greek Cypriot nationalists, who are faced by a powerful and united Communist movement, 25X1 25X1 Grivas' recent statements that he might r against those who would "enslave" Cyprus and of a Cyprus united with Greece will cause appr Turkish Cypriots. On 27 July, Turkish Cyprio Kuchuk indirectly denounced Grivas' interferen fairs and praised the leadership of Makarios. enew the struggle that he still dreams ehension among the t spokesman Fazil ce in Cypriot af- 25X1 25X1 29 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600250001-3 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00 III. THE WEST Communists Reportedly Organizing a Latin American Conference of Le tints in Chile Latin American Communists reportedly are planning a leftist conference in Santiago to express solidarity with the governments and peoples of Cuba and Venezuela. The real intent of this conference, planned to coincide if possible with the meeting of American foreign ministers scheduled to be held in the same city on 12 August, is probably to promote anti-Americanism, attack the OAS as a US-dominated instru- mentality in support of dictatorships, and propagandize against the foreign ministers' meeting. the Chilean Pop- ular Action Front (FRAP), a Socialist-Communist coalition, is the sponsor of the leftist conference, and the Communist parties of Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Cuba,and Venezuela have accepted invitations. Mexico is said to have accepted tentatively. Cuban Prime Minister Castro, who apparently will be the hero of the gathering, stated on 26 July that he had accepted a FRAP invitation to visit Chile. 29 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600250001-3 Approved Fo Release 2003/03/28: CIA-RDP79T00975A THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : - 600250001-3 Approved For I ase T0928 R T00975 4600250001-3 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I TOP SECRET / Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600250001-3