CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004600250001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 29, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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29 July 1959
Copy No. -C
State Dept. review completed
DOCUMENT NQ.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS_
I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE: t
AUTN?A Ank ~r .
DATE.
REVIEWER: J
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Chinese Communist shelling of Matsus
on 27 July was retaliation for National-
ist shelling of fishing boats.
Laos--Guerrilla attacks on army out-
posts produce 'grave' situation in Sam
Neua Province; Communist propaganda
charges joint US-French training pro-
gram violates Geneva accords on Laos.
Lebanon- -Assassination of Chamoun
lieutenant could spark renewal of
Christian-Druze vendettas.
Cyprus--Grivas and Archbishop
Makarios may be on verge of final
break.
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SO. Latin American Communists planning
leftist conference in Chile to coincide
with OAS foreign ministers' meeting
on 12 August.
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Conclusions of special USIB committee
on Berlin situation.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
29 July 1959
DAILY BRIEF
Io THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Taiwan Strait: Chinese Communist artillery shelling of
Nationalist positions in the Matsu Islands with 263 rounds on
27 July was in retaliation for 16 rounds of Nationalist fire on
Communist fishing boats. In May and June, Nationalist fire
on fishing boats resulted in several similar bombardments of
h6atsu by Communist guns..
Laos: he Laotian Army has lost control of the outlying
areas of Sam Neua Province as a result of attacks on army
posts, apparently by guerrillas of the former Pathet Lao Com-
munist movement. According to the provincial governor, the
capital of Sam Neua itself is threatened. While information on
he attacks is sketchy, Premier Phoui considers the situation
'grave." The province of Phong Saly, the other former center
f Pathet Lao activity, has reported no clashes, and it is too
early to determine whether these actions indicate a mass return
the bush by former Pathet Lao guerrillas. There is as yet
o confirmation of reports that North Vietnamese are involved
in the new fighting, but the US ambassador in Vientiane consid-
ers it likely. The attacks may have been a reaction to the gov-
ernment's increasing efforts to press its counter subversion. pro-
gram in remote provincial areaso
Both Hanoi and Peiping have launched a vigorous campaign
of protests against the proposed joint US- French training program
for the Laotian Army, tern irig a, violation of the Geneva ac-
cords. They demand the immediate revival of the International
Control Commission for Laos, warning that "the civil war in
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Laos portends "ominous consequences for peace in Indochina.'
Laos threatens to expand," The USSR also appears to be giv-
ing North Vietnam stronger support on the Laotian issue, The
Soviet charge in London has warned that the present trend in
Lebanon: The assassination on 27 July of Naim Mughabghab,
one of the principal Christian guerrilla leaders who supported
ex-President Chamoun in last year's civil strife, is likely to re-
O~ sult in local disorders and communal clashes. The assassins
appear to have been followers of the anti-Chamoun Druze lead-
er, Kamal Jumblatt; if so, their arrest will be politically as
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Cyprus: The recent exchange of recriminations between
Archbishop Makarios and EOKA leader Grivas may result in a
final break between the two Greek Cypriot leaders. Makarios
appears to have the support of a majority of the Cypriots and
would probably be victorious in a showdown with the former
terrorist leader. Any attempt by Grivas to resume an active
role in determining Cyprus' future, however, would weaken the
unity of conservative Greek Cypriots at a time when they face
a potentially strong threat from the Communists. It would also
have political repercussions in Athens and rouse apprehension
among Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaders,
(Page 5.)
III. THE WEST
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Latin America - OAS: Latin American Communists appar-
August meeting of American foreign ministers
ently view the
ff-
in Santiago de Chile as a tailor-made opportunity to exploit anti-
Americanism and attack the OAS as a US-dominated instrumen-
tality to support dictatorships in the hemisphere,
ey are organizing a leftist con erence un er
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- 1. The USSR continues to maintain its hard posi-
tion on Berlin and has attempted to increase pressure on
the Western governments for further concessions- -for
examplel by the Soviet-Polish communiqu6. At Geneva.,
however, Gromyko is trying to keep the door open for
negotiations, and no major developments are likely un-
til the results of the Nixon visit have been evaluated by
the USSR.
2. So long as the Soviet leaders estimate that the
prospects for negotiation with the West over Berlin are
favorable to them, they will not conclude a separate peace
treaty with the GDR or turn over access control to the East
Germans. The USSR will continue to use threats of such
actions as a form of pressure on the West. The actual
physical transfer of controls could be accomplished with
httle or no warning.
3. While there are no reliable indications of a bloc
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Berlin, or to seal off West Berlin in the immediate future..
such actions could be taken with little or no warning. Re-
cent attempts by GDR officials to interfere with normal
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auspices of FRAP, the Chilean Communist - Socialist coali-
tion party, which is to coincide with the foreign ministers'
meeting. Several Latin American Communist parties re-
Portedly plan to send delegates.
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMNHTTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached
by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee
pointed out that its conclusions are to be used in context with all
SNIEs relevant to the Berlin situation.
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Western access procedures could stem from an in-
creasing sense of importance and "sovereignty" in
the GDR government as well as the long-range Soviet
program to erode Western-access rights.
4. West Berlin's political leaders, more pessi-
mistic than at any time since the crisis began in
November, are concerned that the West may be forced
to make concessions at Geneva. They would prefer a
complete breakoff rather than any modification of the
West's 16 June proposals. There has been no signif-
icant change in West Berlin's favorable economic sit-
uation.
5. There is also considerable concern among
West German officials in Bonn regarding the outcome
of the Geneva conference. They fear that the Western
powers, under pressure from Britain, will make dan-
gerous concessions.
6. There have been no significant changes in
Soviet capabilities to respond to possible Western ac-
tions in the event of turnover, harassment, or block-
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communists Take Aggressive Line on Laos
Both Hanoi and Peiping are warning that "the civil
war in Laos threatens to expand" and that this dangerous
situation can be resolved only by recalling the Laotian In-
ternational Control Commission (ICC) to investigate the
situation. Radio Hanoi, in the past week, has been alleging
Lao army "attacks" on former Pathet Lao units to disprove
Vientiane's claims that relative quiet had been. restored.
The Communists insist that Laotian. neutrality, which they
assert was promised by the 1954 Geneva agreements, has been
undermined by various acts of. the Phoui regime, but is most
directly and dangerously threatened by the proposed joint US-
French program to train the Laotian Army--made public on 24
July. The North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry has issued a
statement demanding that Vientiane expel American military
advisers, return to the five principles of peace and coexistence,
and refuse to allow Laos to be transformed into a military base
for the imperialists who are "planning a new war."
The USSR is pressing for an early meeting of the Geneva
Conference cochairmen, and on 21 July the Soviet charge de-
livered Moscow's reply"to Britain's formal refusal on 9 June
to call for reactivation of the ICC in Laos. The new Soviet
note proposed that since Britain and the USSR disagreed on
what is happening in Laos, the ICC should conduct an "impartial"
investigation. The note reiterated previous claims that the Ge-
neva agreements were being violated, and the Soviet charge
stressed .to Foreign Office, officials the "ominous conse uences"
for peace in Indochina.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Fighting Erupts in Laos
C'I'he Laotian Government's military position in Sam eua
Province in northeast Laos is threatened by a sudden onslaught
of attacks on remote army outposts by dissident elements of
the former Communist Pathet Lao movement. Reports on the
fighting are still sketchy but several of the small outposts re-
portedly have fallen, and the government fears an enemy at-
tempt on the town of Sam Neua, where the airfield provides
the principal access to this remote and mountainous region]-
The government is taking steps for prompt reinforcement
of the two infantry battalions, comprising some 1,200 men,
which at present to a large degree are scattered throughout
the province in units of platoon strength. Antigovernment guer-
rilla forces in the province are believed to number upwards of
1,000 men, and include pro-Communist local tribesmen plus
elements of the recently defected Pathet Lao battalion and prob
ably some cadres from nearby North Vietnam. Ambassador
Smith in Vientiane considers it likely that these attacks have
been instigated and supported by the Vietnamese Communists,
but direct evidence of this is lacking
Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone has termed the situation
"grave,` but he does not believe the fighting in Sam Neua her-
alds full-scale civil war throughout Laos. Phoui believes the
enemy?s primary purpose is to take possession of Sam Neua,
and later Phong Saly Province--the two former Pathet Lao
strongholds
The government has shown concern over the possible re-
sumption of armed dissidence since May when the Pathet Lao
battalion, assembled at Plaine des Jarres in Xieng Khouang
Province, refused to be integrated into the Royal Laotian Army
and escaped from its encampment. At that time Prince Souphan-
nouvong and other leaders of the Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ)--the
political party formed by the Pathet Lao after the 1957 unifica-
tion agreement--were briefly placed under house arrest. Phoui,
in reaction to the Sam Neua fighting, now plans to place
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Z leaders under close arrest. This would be further provo-
cation for a full-scale return to guerrilla warfare by the Pathet
Lao veterans who, together with Hanoi, have warned that con-
tinuation of the government's repressive measures against the
party would have this resuitJ
attacks may be a reaction to the government's increas-
ing efforts to press its countersubversion program against Com-
munist influence at the grass roots. At the least, this develop-
ment will throw the Phoui government off balance and hamper
orderly implementation of an invigorated training program for
its 25,000-man armyl
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Lebanese Assassination Increases Tension
The assassination of ex-President Chamoun's principal
lieutenant, Naim Mughabghab, on 27 July could lead to local
clashes and renewed communal disorders unless Lebanese
authorities quickly produce likely culprits. Ambassador
McClintock has stated that the assassins are believed to be
anti-Chamoun followers of Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt,
in whose territory Mughabghab was slain.
Mughabghab, a Greek Catholic, was the leader of Cha-
moun's partisans during last summer's rebellion and fought
Jumblatt in the Druze area. Although early reports suggest
the killing was an act by vengeful Druze tribesmen, it might
have been instigated by pro-UAR terrorists. Damascus
radiobroadcasts are playing up the possibility that Jumblatt
was involved. Jumblatt had been making overtures toward
the Lebanese Christian community during the past few
months, and pro-UAR elements may have desired to pre-
vent resumption of traditional Druze-Christian cooperation.
Chamoun, whose political activities have been circum-
scribed since he left office last fall, can be expected to try
to capitalize on Mughabghab's death and use it as a means to
rally Christians around his Free Nationalist party. Even if
the culprits are prosecuted, it is likely that some of Mughab-
ghab's supporters will seek to take private revenge. Mu' hab-
ghab's funeral may be the occasion for disturbances.I
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Makarios-Grivas Rift Widens
Statements by Archbishop Makarios on 26 July and by
former leader of EOKA General George Grivas the follow-
ing day may signal the final break between the two Greek
Cypriot leaders. Makarios denounced the "super patriots"
and "demagogues" who seek to create confusion for their
own "selfish aims." Grivas alluded to "dark forces who seek
to enslave Cyprus" and denounced "several people" who in-
tended to hand over "fertile ,areas of Cyprus:".for. inclusion in
British military bases.
Makarios has also denounced non-Communist opposition
politicians in Greece who stand to gain by exploiting the split
in the Greek Cypriot right wing. These politicians apparently
hope to use the popular Grivas to bring down the present gov-
ernment, believing that a break with Makarios would be followed
by Grivas' foraal entrance on the Greek political scene.
The Greek Government and many nationalist leaders on
Cyprus have tried to heal the breach between Makarios and
Grivas. The basic issues dividing the two involve: (1) the
division of Cypriot municipalities between Greek and Turkish
Cypriots; (2) the size of the British bases; and .(3) the inclusion
of Cyprus in the Commonwealth]
In an open contest for power on Cyprus, it appears that
Makarios would have the necessary popular and organizational
support to win. The struggle, however, would endanger imple-
mentation of the Cyprus accords and could seriously weaken the
Greek Cypriot nationalists, who are faced by a powerful and
united Communist movement,
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Grivas' recent statements that he might r
against those who would "enslave" Cyprus and
of a Cyprus united with Greece will cause appr
Turkish Cypriots. On 27 July, Turkish Cyprio
Kuchuk indirectly denounced Grivas' interferen
fairs and praised the leadership of Makarios.
enew the struggle
that he still dreams
ehension among the
t spokesman Fazil
ce in Cypriot af-
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III. THE WEST
Communists Reportedly Organizing a Latin American
Conference of Le tints in Chile
Latin American Communists reportedly are planning a
leftist conference in Santiago to express solidarity with the
governments and peoples of Cuba and Venezuela. The real
intent of this conference, planned to coincide if possible with
the meeting of American foreign ministers scheduled to be
held in the same city on 12 August, is probably to promote
anti-Americanism, attack the OAS as a US-dominated instru-
mentality in support of dictatorships, and propagandize against
the foreign ministers' meeting.
the Chilean Pop-
ular Action Front (FRAP), a Socialist-Communist coalition,
is the sponsor of the leftist conference, and the Communist
parties of Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Cuba,and Venezuela
have accepted invitations. Mexico is said to have accepted
tentatively. Cuban Prime Minister Castro, who apparently
will be the hero of the gathering, stated on 26 July that he had
accepted a FRAP invitation to visit Chile.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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