CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A004600270001-1
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RIPPUB
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T
Document Page Count: 
18
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 24, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
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Publication Date: 
July 31, 1959
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A004600270001-1.pdf910.29 KB
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e.......~.ed F.., oe~e~~AiAl~ol~nQ.ld 2S-1 ftW Approved For RRelease'OP/2SE(R T0097 04600270001 31 July 1959 2~ State Dept. review completed DOCUMENT NO. _-_ NO CHANGE IN CLASS. I ! DECLASSIFIED W CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUT DAT REVIEWER: TOP SECRET COPY No. iC Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600270001-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600270001-1 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600270001-1 Approved For ReA 04600270001,q - 65X1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 31 July 1959 DAILY BRIEF Ia THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR-Geneva: Khrushchev9s renewed call for a summit meeting in his speech on 28 July, taken with the absence of any important modifications in Gromyko9s positions at Geneva, suggests that Moscow may agree to terminate the Geneva talks and then press for an early summit meeting. Gromyko may, however, make some last-minute adjustments on such prob- lems as the link between an interim Berlin arrangement. and all-German negotiations. If these do not produce agreement, he may propose that the foreign ministers prepare a docu- ment setting forth their differences and agree on a date for a summit conference. 25 (0 ' prises except in metropolitan areas. The law is directed 1 January 1960 will prohibit alien ownership of retail enter- Communist China - Indonesia: (piping has asked for reconsideration of the recent Indonesian decree which after 25X1 25^1 iii 2 5XT MON Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600270001-1 j Approved For~Re ase 2002/10/21. CIA-RDP79T009 5A ~0460~ Ob1-1 j j j j since enforcement could have severe repercussions on the [Primarily at the Overseas Chinese. Peiping is reported to be "very disturbed" and says that if the law becomes effec- tive, full compensation for those affected will be essential to continued good relations and. further economic aid for Indo- nesia. Djakarta may proceed cautiously with implementation Indonesian economy. II. ASIA-AFRICA Laos: Additional pressure for reactivation of the Inter- national Control Commission in Laos is being placed on the UK by its Geneva cochairman, the USSR. Although Britain has thus far opposed such a step, the current fighting and the hreat of expanded hostilities involving North Vietnam may orce it to reassess its position. Meanwhile the Laotian Government's military position in Sam Neua Province con- inues precarious despite the arrival of some reinforcements. Skirmishes in central Laos have also been reported. I a e$ uncon irme report states a an enemy bands al- eg edit' North Vietnamese elements, overran a government utpost in the far- northern Province of Phong Saly on 29-30 ul . 31 July 59 DAILY BRIEF ii 25X1 M 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600270001-1 -1 j 4600270 r1 Approved Forej 01/1 25X1 K Cyprus. The 29 July announcement in Athens by former EO ea er Grivas that he "dissociated" himself from the February agreements settling the Cyprus dispute has brought his rift with Archbishop Makarios into the open. Makarios ap- pears convinced he can defeat Grivas in a contest for political supremacy at this time. The outcome of the struggle between the two will depend largely on the attitude of former lieutenants of Grivas in the EOKA movement, several of whom are cur- rently working with Makarios in the transitional Cypriot cab- inet. *Meanwhile, the denunciation of Grivas and strong support for Makarios contained in Premier Karamanlis' 30 July state- ment will probably cause the ex-EOKA leader to.hasten his for- mal entrance on the Greek political scene. Opposition politicians in Athens have long hoped to capitalize on Grivas' popularity to bring down the government, Japan-Korea. South Korea officially proposed to Japan on 30 Jury the "unconditional" reopening of talks for the normal- ization of relations, which would include the question of repa- triating Koreans to. South Korea, Seoul's reported position that the talks would not touch on Tokyo's policy of repatriating some 31 July 59 DAILY BRIEF iii lJ 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600270001-1 VON 111111~~! - - - - -- - ---- MEN Approved Fo~&l ase 2002/10/21 CIA-R 7W04600270001 -1 25X1 on ME111 25X1 25X1 Koreans to North Korea, if adhered to, would be a significant reversal of the Rhee government's attitude. Norean officials have previously indicated their hope that a resumption of talks with Tokyo would delay any repatriation to North Korea,, and might even result in North Korea's abrogation of the agreement with JaP2,9 C&Pan has informed the US of its agreement in princ, to resume negotiations on the basis of Seoul's propos~alj I I I I I. THE WEST iple Italy: The re-election of former Christian Democrat Silvio Mila-zzo as chief of the Sicilian regional government- -mainly with Communist and Nenni Socialist votes- -threatens a period of instability in Sicily that will have repercussions at the national level. The Rome government's policy of collaboration with the right-wing parties received a setback in Sicily and has been the object of increasing criticism within the Christian Democratic ranks. I IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES (Available during the preceding week) Communist China. NIE 13-59. 28 July 59. 31 July 59 25X1 W PEI ?// DAILY BR1EF 25X.1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO04600270001-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975 004600270001-1 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Khrushchev Renews Call for Summit Meeting Khrushchev's statement in his speech at Dnepropetrovsk on 28 July that the "time has come" for the heads of govern- ment. to tackle "complex unsettled international issues" sug- gests that he is less hopeful about drawing further conces- sions from the Western foreign ministers on the key issue of all-German negotiations. The tenor of his speech and the absence of any important modifications in the Soviet positions on an interim Berlin arrangement and all-German talks in the paper Gromykb handed the Western ministers the same day may indicate the USSR will now press for an early summit meeting. Khrushchev made a perfunctory appeal to the ministers to "exert fresh efforts" to reach agreement "on what they can agree upon," but contended that the "other, more difficult matters, mat- ters of principle, will be considered by the heads of government." He rejected the "pessimistic estimates" of prospects at Geneva made by "some Western leaders" and claimed that the foreign ministers have already accomplished some "positive work," The Soviet premier, however, continued to insist on linking an all-German committee to an interim Berlin settlement, saying the USSR "attaches great importance to the solution of these ques- tions." In anticipation of an early conclusion of the foreign ministers' talks, Gromyko may make some last-minute adjustments on such Soviet positions as the link between a Berlin arrangement and all- German talks, the 18-month time limit on a Berlin agreement, and the 3,000- to 4,000-man ceiling for "token" Western forces in West Berlin. If these moves do not produce agreement, he may propose that the ministers prepare a document setting forth their differences and agree on a date for a summit conference, 31 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600270001-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600270001-1 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600270001-1 Approved For elease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0046 0270001-1 .Peiping Expresses Concern Over Indonesian Restrictions on Overseas Chinese L_; ommun s China is very disturbed" over the recent Indonesian decree prohibiting alien- owned retail enterprises outside metropolitan areas after the end of the year. The ban was directed at Overseas Chinese, who control most of the retail trade in Indonesian villages.] 25X1 25X1 25X1 Djakarta may proceed cautiously in implementing the decree, since its enforcement could have severe repercus- sions on the Indonesian economy. Chinese merchants may be able to evade the decree by hiring Indonesians as nominal heads of their businesses, 25X1 25X1 25X1 31 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600270001-1 Approved For elease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO0460 II. ASIA-AFRICA Laos Lhe Soviet charge in London, in a 28 July approach to the Foreign Office, repeated the USSR's arguments for the reconvening of the International Control Commission (ICC) in Laos, alleging that Laos, together with the United States, was violating the Geneva agreements in such a way as to be- come a military threat to its neighbors, Although the For- eign Office reiterated its opposition to the return of the ICC,. it may be forced to reconsider its position by the threat of expanded hostilities in Laos with North Vietnamese participa- tion. Hanoi has categorically denied Laotian accusations that it has instigated the current fighting-) .Indian Prime Minister Nehru will probably interpret cur- rent developments in Laos as confirmation of his long-standing fear that the Laotian Government's increasingly open identifica- tion with the West risks provoking Communist military reaction, upsetting the status quo established by the Geneva armistice in 1954. India can be expected therefore to bring additional pres- sure on Britain for reconvening of the ICC, at least on a tempo- rary basis. Canada, also a member of the ICC, has sided with the British on this issue but has stated that an outbreak of hostili- ties would put it in a vulnerable position vis-a-vis India. Laos, however, will continue to resist any move for the ICC's return j LThe Laotian-Government's military position in Sam Neua Province meanwhile continues precarious despite the arrival of some reinforcements, including paratroop forces. The in- habitants of Sam Neua town have panicked, and a general exodus of civilians and officials has begun by air and on foot. First- hand accounts report that infiltration of the area by Communist partisans is taking place during the confusion@J t least. two incidents of harassing attacks on small army detachments in central Laos have occurred since 27 July. These , 31 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600270001-1 25X1 Approved For Re appear on the surface to be designed to pin down troops other- wise available as reinforcements for the north, but may be part of a broader Communist clan for country-wide action. I government troops f Saly were at an outpost in the tar northern province o ivno dispersed with casualties after an attack on 29-30 July by an enemy band,allegedly North Vietnamese elements. Phong Saly, along with Sam Neua Province, was a stronghold of the Commu- nist Pathet Lao prior to the settlement reached with the govern- ment in 1957 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 31 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600270001-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600270001-1 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600270001-1 Approved For lease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79TO09 004600270001-1 South Korea Proposes Resumption of Talks With Japan . FIn a memorandum to the Japanese Foreign Ministry on 30 July, the South Korean Government has proposed an "uncon- ditional" resumption of talks to normalize relations between the two nations. The memorandum noted that the status and treatment of Korean residents in Japan is a major cause of tension which can be relieved by !'mu filly.arranging"-the re- moval of the difficulties blocking the repatriation to South Korea. If this-is done, Seoul is ready to encourage a mass return of Koreans and to expedite the exchange of Japanese fishermen now held in Korea and all Korean detainees in Japan. The Japanese press reports assert that Japan has been assured that the discussions would not involve Japan's policy of repatriating some Koreans to North Korea] Esouth Korea apparently hopes that a reopening of talks would delay action on Japan's present agreement to return Koreans to North Korea. As recently as 27 July, South Ko- rean Vice Foreign Minister Kim strenuously insisted to Am- bassador Dowling that if Japan wants an agreement with Seoul, Tokyo should not object to postponing further negotiations with Pyongyang. He noted that in order to obtain President Rhee's consent for proposing a resumption of talks with Tokyo, he found it necessary to assure him that both the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Japanese Government would cooperate in postponing repatriation to North Korea. Kim has also expressed the hope that a resumption of talks with Tokyo might lead Pyongyang to abrogate its agreement with Japans The question of Japan's compensating Koreans returning to South Korea probably will be a major issue in negotia- tions. Japan has been willing to provide some subsidy, pos- sibly as a resettlement payment, provided Japan can avoid liability for similar payments to Koreans going to North Korea. Seoul has been vague as to the criteria for deter- mining the amount of such payments although it has insisted that payments be publicized as compensation for "forced" Korean labor in Japan rwhile Japan. exp.re.sseditsswillingness to reopen negot _e tions with South Koreas:-it-,-has begun preparations for theJ 25X1 25X1 31 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600270001-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO046 2270001-1 [repatriation of Koreans to North Korea, and is unlikely to de- lay or abrogate this agreement. Pyongyang is also preparing to carry out the repatriation agreement and, while urging im- mediate signature of the pact, has not yet stated its demands as an ultimatum 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 31 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 11 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600270001-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600270001-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600270001-1 25X1 Approved Fo Sicilian Political Instability Accentuated by Milazzo Success Silvio Milazzo, leader of a dissident Christian Democratic faction in the Sicilian regional assembly, was re-elected presi- dent of the regional government on 28 July by a 45-43 vote, in which he was supported by 21 Communists and 11 Nenni Social- ists. Milazzo's victory marked the culmination of a long strug- gle against a coalition composed of Christian Democrats and rightist parties which succeeded in electing its candidate for regional assembly president on 8 July. The failure of the Christian Democrats to apply in Sicily the national pattern--a Christian Democratic government sup- ported by the Liberal Monarchist and neo-Fascist parties-- - will be interpreted by certain influential persons within the Christian Democratic party, notably ex-Premier Fanfani, as a vindication of the concept of an "opening toward the left," Similarly, the critics of the Christian Democratic leadership within the party will argue the merits of dissociating the par- ty from undue clerical influence, pointing to the evident popu- larity of Milazzo despite the Vatican injunction against collabora- tion with the Communists. A Sicilian "cabinet" has not yet been formed and the Ameri- can Embassy reports Rome political commentators as seeing some slim possibility that before it is formed there will be a reconciliation between Milazzo and the Christian Democrats. Failing such a reconciliation, Milazzo will be under pressure to assign an increasingly important role in the Sicilian admin- istration to the Nenni Socialists and Communists,who constitute his chief support. This will aggravate tensions between Rome and Sicily. Since Sicilian deputies are notoriously resistant to party dis- cipline, the slimness of Milazzo's majority leaves the possibility that the orthodox Christian Democrats--still the largest. single party in the Sicilian assembly--may upset his majority in subse- quent assembly votes. F_ I 31 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 13 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04600270001-1 Approved FoL F9elease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0q THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600270001-1 Approved For easeTCOI&21SIcMT0097 04600270001-1 / TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600270001-1