CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004600400001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 15, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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August 1959
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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15 August 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - Agriculture: A joint directive has
just been issued By Me central committee of the Chinese Com-
munist party and the State Council calling for "persistent un-
remitting efforts" to overcome the effects of drought, floods,
and insect pests. The drought in north-central China--where
rainfall over the past four to six weeks has been well below
normal--was described as the most serious current threat,
0 especially since Chinese weather forecasters predict continu-
11- below-normal rainfall in these important agricultural 25X1
areas during August and September. The directive reflects
concern over the agricultural prospects, which may well have
been discussed at an unpublicized meeting of top part leaders
that has apparently been in session for some time.
(Page 1) (Map)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
I
Indonesia. "Higher-level army authorities," presumably
efense Minister General Nasution, were behind the govern-
ment's decision to prohibit the Indonesian Communist party's
AD sixth national congress, which had been scheduled for 22-
31 August. Foreign Minister Subandrio believes that the Com-
munists will intensify their strategy of attacking the cabinet
i
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while trying to maintain good relations with President Sukarno
in the hoe of driving a wedge between the President and the
cabinet.
Burma: The government's announcement to Parliament
on 1st that general elections would be held some time
during the first two months of 1960 reflects Prime Minister
Ne Win's confidence that the Ba Swe - Kyaw Nyein faction will
O,win the elections and will cooperate in behind-the-scenes direc-
tion by the army. Ne Win's views on how best to perpetuate
army influence in the government thus appear to have prevailed
over those of his lieutenants who favored postponing the elec-
tions indefinitely.
Tunisia-France: [Another stalemate is reported to have
been reared in the Tunisian-French economic negotiations re-
cently resumed in Tunis. The Tunisians have been conferring
with the Moroccans, involved in similar negotiations with
France, on a united stand to resist French financial pressures.
The French ambassador in Tunis fears a complete breakdown
in negotiations could lead to the loss of Bizerte and to intensi-
fied Tunisian and Moroccan efforts to speed the liquidation of
French military and economic positions in both countries,'?
III. THE WEST
to resort to violence in an effort to restore the area to Austria)
In this event., Kreisky fears a "panicky Italian government")
Austria-Italy: 1ustrian Foreign Minister Kreisky believes
that the moderate pro-Austrian elements in the Italian South
Tyrol are losing control to extremists who may be prepared
15 Aug 59 DAILY BRIEF ii
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might send armed forces to the area and increase the danger
of bloodshed. The Austrian Government considers recent
Italian proposals regarding the situation "utterly inadequate;'
and Kreisky intends to treat the Tyrolean question as an "im-
portant subject" during his address to the UN General Assem-
bly this fall.
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DAILY BRIEF iii
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COMMUNIST CHINA WEATHER
00 NUMBER OF DAYS OF LESS THAN
50% OF NORMAL RAINFALL
AS OF 1 AUGUST
LOCAL RAINSTORM
Q MILES
INKIANG UIGHUR
111TONOMOUS REGION
!-L1N-4 AN
NORTH
VIETNAM
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MW Nr
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Peiping Orders More Intensive Fight Against Natural Calamities
The joint directive issued on 13 August by the central com-
mittee of the Chinese Communist party and the State Council
calls for "persistent unremitting efforts" to overcome the threat
to crops of such natural calamities as drought, flood, and in-
sect pests. The directive says that the most serious current
threat to crops is posed by a "severe" drought in areas of cen-
tral and north-central China which produce an important part
of China's rice crop.
Available weather information shows that rainfall in these
areas this summer has been less than half of normal for exten-
sive periods, and the directive warns that subnormal rainfall is
predicted for the same areas during August and September.
The extent of the damage to crops is not yet clear, since most
of the area involved is irrigated paddy land and less susceptible
to drought than nonirrigated land; however, if the weather con-
tinues as predicted, 'it wi71 reduce the late crop in China's "rice
bowl."
Peiping has been giving heavy publicity in the past several
months to "abnormalities" in China's weather, and growing con-
ditions do not in fact appear as favorable as last summer's. The
present directive is probably part of a campaign launched last
week to spur Chinese workers and peasants to greater efforts
during August and. September to overcome such difficulties,
regain some of the economic momentum lost in recent months,
and greet the tenth anniversary of the regime on 1 October
with "spectacular achievements." The need for such a spur may
well have been a key topic of discussion at an unpublicized meet-
ing of party officials that has apparently been in session some-
where outside Peiping.
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Situation in Laos
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Laos apparently has decided to request a UN observer.
It intends, however, to confine any observer's scope narrowly
to fact finding rather than mediation and is guarding against
any procedures that would associate Laos with the restrictive
provisions of the Geneva agreements]
The former L
Communist Pathet o battalion, which refused in egration into
the Laotian Army in May, is located in North Vietnam across
the border from Xieng Khouang in a position to give strong sup-
portJ The government's lack of success in its operation against
the rebellious Pathet Lao battalion in May and June can be at-
tributed in part to the antigovernment sentiment of a considerable
proportion of the local population.
LNew Delhi is reacting to developments in the Indochinese
states with a more flexible and sympathetic attitude toward
the Western position than it has shown in the past.
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Met probably has contributed to New Delhi's more balanced at-
titude on the Laotian situation
The explosion of five bombs in Saigon, South Vietnam, on
the night of 13 August--causing some damage but no casualties--
may foreshadow a new wave of Communist terrorism. The
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Indian irritation with Peiping's action in
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Vietnamese Government's concern that additional violence might
follow the assassination of two Americans near Saigon by Com-
munist agents on 8 July has been heightened by the recent out-
break of hostilities in Laos,
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Indonesian Government Prohibits Communist Party Congress
"M_9-her-:level army authorities" --presumably Defense
Minister General Nasution--have reversed, an earlier army rul-
ing and prohibited the holding of the Indonesian Communist
party's sixth national congress, which was scheduled from 22
to 31 August. The Communists, who have repeatedly postponed
the congress, had rescheduled. it following the army's decision
effective 1 August to ease the ban on political activities.
Communist reaction to the government's move will prob-
ably be carefully calculated not to draw army retaliation. It is
likely to follow the line established in early August by party
Secretary General D. N. Aidit. In a report to the central com-
mittee on 6 August, Aidit criticized the new Indonesian Govern-
ment and the army on various. scores including election delays
and. the remaining restrictions on political activities, but laid
no blame on President Sukarno. 'Foreign Minister Subandrio
told the American ambassador he believes Communist strategy
will aim at maintaining good. relations between Sukarno and the
party and, driving a wedge between Sukarno and the cabinet.
Subandrio thinks this conflict between the cabinet and, the
Communists will be intensified as a result of the cancellation
of the party congress; he expressed the hope that Sukarno would
be drawn into the conflict "on our side." Subandrio apparently
hopes that Sukarno will regard an attack on the cabinet as an at-
tack on himself. For almost two years, Sukarno has indicated
apprehension over increasing Communist strength,
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Burma to Hold General Elections in Early 1960
Judicial Minister U Chan Htun Aung told Parliament
on 13 August that general elections will be held in Burma
in January or February 1960. This announcement reflects
Prime Minister Ne Win's growing confidence that the
"Stable" faction of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom
League, led by former Deputy Prime Ministers Ba Swe
and Kyaw Nyein, will win over the "Clean" faction, led
by former Prime Minister U Nu. Ne Win has in the past
indicated considerable concern over the possibility of a
Nu victory on the ground that Nu would be too dependent
on support from the pro-Communist National United Front.
The announcement that elections will be held on schedule
indicates that Ne Win's views on how best to perpetuate strong
army influence in the government have prevailed. Some of
his lieutenants in the army hierarchy reportedly had argued
for indefinitepostponement of elections. Ne Win, who seems
genuinely desirous of` .,obeying the letter of the constitution,
has on several occasions indicated that he would prefer to
turn the government over to the majority party in Parliament
and let the army monitor governmental activities from behind
the scenes to assure continuation of the present reformist policies.
He apparently has an understanding to this effect with Ba Swe and
Kyaw Nyein.
Some of the military are reported to have argued for the
creation of a parliamentary "third force," composed of army
officers who were to resign their commissions and contest the
elections.. While the scheduling of elections does not necessarily
rule out this possibility., Ne Win is known to oppose open army
involvement in politics.
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Tunisian- French Talks Reach New Stalemate
Tunisian-French financial and customs negotiations, which
were resumed a few days ago, are again deadlocked, according
to the French Embassy in Tunis. Although agreement has been
reached on changing the 1955 French-Tunisian customs union and
on detailed commercial listings, the Tunisians refuse to reduce
their demands for overdraft privileges in the franc pool and for
a guaranteed price for Tunisian wheat exports to France and a
guaranteed market for Tunisian wines. Paris, likewise, is re-
luctant to give ini Premier Debr6 reportedly believes that
Tunisia has already been given too many concessions
Li eanwhile, Tunisian and Moroccan financial experts have
held several meetings, probably to establish a united stand on
the part of both governments to resist French financial pressures?
(French officials in Tunisia fear the alternative to further
concessions would be an economic break disastrous both to French
wheat and wine producers in Tunisia and to the Tunisian economy,
which depends largely on that of France. The French ambassador
in Tunis is reported to fear that a breakdown in economic talks
would lead to the loss of the Bizerte base, the status of which is
still unsettled, and to intensified efforts by Tunisia and Morocco
to hasten the liquidation of France's military and economic posi-
tion in both countries.?
lPresident Bourguiba, who habitually employes the technique
of establishing deadlines for desired actions, has said: that if, the
financial negotiations are not completed by 15 August, his govern-
ment will take "necessary measures.'?]
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Volpe NOW
III. THE WEST
Austrians Fear Violence in Dispute With Italy Over South
Tyrol
In a recent conversation with Ambassador Matthews in
Vienna, Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky expressed con-
cern that violence may develop in the long-simmering dis-
pute with Italy over the South Tyrol. Kreisky said that dur-
ing a trip to the area in early August he had found the mod-
erates losing control to the extremists, who now are demand-
ing a plebiscite to determine whether the South Tyrol should
revert to Austria)
LKreisky described recent Italian proposals regarding the
cultural autonomy of the German-speaking minority as "ex-
tremely disappointing" and "utterly inadequate." Although
under strong pressure from the Tyroleans to try to inscribe
the issue on the agenda of the UN, Kreisky said he would not
do that now, but would treat the issue as an "important sub-
ject" when he addresses the General Assembly this fall. He
stated that the Soviet bloc would probably be glad to support
Austria in the UN, but that this is the "last thing" his gov-
ernment would wish to stimulate)
Austria and Italy have been quarreling over the South
Tyrol since Italy acquired the area after World War I. A
bilateral agreement between the two countries in 1945 con-
firmed Italy's possession, but guaranteed cultural autonomy
to the large German-speaking minority.. Vienna has long
charged Rome with failing to fulfill this agreement, but has
not supported extremist demands for a territorial adjust-
ment. Kreisky himself is a moderate on the issue, and his
present concern contrasts with the comparative lack of agita-
tion on the subject during the past few months.'
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THE PRESIDENT
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The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
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The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
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Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
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Commandant, United States Marine Corps
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