CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004600500001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 27, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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27 August 1959
C 4 NGE IN CLASS
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CUSS. CH?.PIGEQ TO:
NEXT f F-VIEW DATE:
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REVIEWIFF
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Copy No.
Department review completed
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
27 August 1959 Bill.
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DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China: A communique issued by the Chinese
Communist party central committee on 26 August discloses
Peiping's decision to "readjust" significantly downward China's
four main production targets for 1959--coals steel, grain9 and
cotton. The Chinese admit gross "over -assessment" of agri-
cultural production in 1958--grain and cotton output claims are
reduced. drastically. The readjustment of targets represents
a setback for the prestige of Mao Tse-tung and those of his
lieutenants
including Liu Shao-chi
who had encoura
ed the
,
,
g
most extravagant expectations of rapid economic development.
The call by the leadership for further intensive effort on the
economic front indicates that there is to be no relaxation of 25X1
1. r- I
SSR-Guinea: The Soviet Union and Guinea concluded in
o1L Moscow on 24 August an economic and technical cooperation
M
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agreement providing for the extension of a $35,000,000 long-
j term Soviet credit. The official communique stated the credit
will be used to purchase Soviet equipment for developing in-
and agriculture and for building roads. Moscow can
dustry
E nicians and specialists. Guinea has recently announced that
it presently is drafting a national plan for economic develop-
which, while emphasizing agriculture, also calls for an
ment
expansion of industry. Until the conclusion of this agreement,
bloc economic activity in Guinea, with the exception of a Czech
arms gift, had been limited to the development of closer trade
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j II. ASIA-AFRICA
j Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East; Situations
susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino Soviet bloc action
which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East,
0 particularly in Iraq and. Iran. The initiation of significant hos-
tilities is unlikely in this area in the immediate future.
0
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Watch Committee conclusion--Laos: Laotian Government
ed combat units in northern Laos in an at
forces have rede
lo
E
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27 Aug 59
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-
p
y
tempt to meet the threat posed by insurgent elements, but as
yet no significant military actions have taken place. Dissident
activity with probable North Vietnamese support and guidance
continues in the northern and, to a lesser extent, in the central
and north-central provinces. The North Vietnamese, by provid-
ing guidance and logistic assistance to the dissident elements in
Laos, have the capability of intensifying operations through these
elements, which, if they see government resistance weakening,
may extend the scope of their military operations to include the
greater portion, if not all, of the country.
Laos: The American Embassy states, that while guerrilla
combat action is still limited. basically to three provinces in
the north, there are continuing reports from other provinces
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that small bands have infiltrated to propagandize and organize
potential guerrilla forces. These activities may be in prepara-
tion for couritr
y-wide: expansion of guerrilla operations when the
)met season ends in about two months
continues to feel that such a move can serve no useful purpose
a e . e indiah Government on 22 August informed
the Da ai Lama that it would not stand in the way of any appeal
by him for UN consideration of the Tibetan question, New Delhi
with the American charge on 20 August. Indian, officials also
terfere in any UN action on Tibet. Nehru took a similar line
but apparently intends to do nothing either to support or to in-
sponsorship of UN discussion of Tibet
(Page 4)
gave clearance for a trip by the Dalai Lama's top adviser on 28
August to Manila, where he may explore possible Philippine
III. THE WEST
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West Germany - Poland: West Germany's leading news-
paper puBli s her., supported by Foreign Minister Brentano and
several top government fficials, is
urging Chancellor Adenauer to make a ama is eclaration"
of friendship toward Warsaw on 1 September, the twentieth an-
niversary of the German invasion. Their aim is to ease the way
for ultimate resumption of diplomatic relations. While Adenauer
is reported to have agreed to deal with the Polish question in a
speech,
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France-Algeria: (e Gaulle plans to propose soon that
Algeria become a member of the French Community, II
ijuring nis visit to ger a rom to August, e
Gaulle reportedly will try to convince the army that it should
accept this solution. De Gaulle had originally spoken of a
"choice place" for Algeria within the Community. Howev!
27 Aug 59
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in view of army insistence on continued close ties between
geria and France, the rebel goal of eventual independence,
and disagreements among African members of the Commu-
nity over the extent of association with France, it is doubtful
that a "Community solution" for Algeria satisfactory to all
elements could be achieved now
2? Aug 59
2s
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COMMUNIST CHINA'S "READJUSTMENT" OF
"THE FOUR MAJOR TARGETS"
(PRODUCTION IN MILLION TONS)
CLAIMED
FOR 1958
VERIFIED
1958 OUTPUT
1959 PLAN
(FEBRUARG PROMULGATED
ADJUSTED TARGET
FOR 1959
STEEL
11
11*
18**
12***
COAL
270
270
380
335
GRAIN
375
250
525
275
COTTON..
3.35
2.1
5
2.3
* 3 "Primitive" and 8 "Modern"
* * Both "Primitive" and "Modern"
* * All "Modern"
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1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China Cuts Back 1959 Targets
The communiqud issued on 26 August by the Chinese Com-
munist party, following its eighth plenary session at Lushan
during the first two weeks in August, discloses Peiping's deci-
sion to "readjust" significantly downward China's four main
production targets for 1959--coal, steel, grain, and cotton.
The new grain and cotton targets are only half the original
goals, and those for steel and coal are significantly reduced.
The Chinese admit to gross "over-assessment" of their
agricultural production in 1958. Exaggerated reports from
statistical units, together with hasty harvesting and storage
due to inadequate labor, resulted in verification of only
250,000,000 tons of grain (375,000,000 tons had been claimed)
and 2,100,000 tons of cotton (3,350,000 tons had been claimed).
The back-yard steel program was in effect conceded to be un-
successful. Output by local furnaces is no longer to be included
in the national plan, and local efforts toward that end. are to be
subordinated to other economic activities.
The communiqud confirms earlier indications that the slo-
gans "great leap forward" and "leap forward" have been rede-
fined in much more modest terms. The Second Five-Year Plan
targets proposed in 1956, previously set aside as too conserva-
tive, have been revived as realistic goals for 1959 which can be
overfulfilled by sustained maximum effort.
An accompanying resolution reaffirms that significant
changes have taken place in the organization and. operation of
the communes during the months of "tidying up." It emphasizes,
however, the superior qualities of the communes as an eco-
nomic organization.
Chinese Communist leaders have not all been committed to
the same degree to the original concept of the "great leap for-
ward:' Those whose prestige has seemed most heavily committed
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are Mao Tse-tung; Liu Shao-chi, the second-ranking leader;
Teng Hsiao-ping, the party's- secretary general; and Tan
Chen-lin, the secretariat's specialist in agriculture. These
men played the leading roles in exhorting the "leap" and in
threatening those opposed to a headlong course. Party lead-
ers who had seemed to have reservations about the "leap"
were senior administrators and economic specialists, pos-
sibly including Premier Chou En-lai.
Mao appears :still:.to dominate the party; the communique
notes that the party plenum was held under Mao's "guidance,"
and it concludes by urging the party and people to unite under
Mao's leadership. It is not yet clear whether Mao intends to
fix any blame for the leap's shortfall on other party leaders
rather than low-level cadres. F77 I
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Soviet Economic Aid to Guinea
Moscow, in a move designed to strengthen its relations
with Conakry as well as to enhance the bloc's position in West
Africa, concluded an economic aid agreement with Guinea on
24 August. According to TASS, the Soviet $35,000,000 long-
term, low-interest credit is to cover the cost of economic and
technical assistance to Guinea for constructing industrial enter-
prises, developing agriculture, and building roads. Moscow,
in keeping with its economic aid policy in the underdeveloped
areas, presumably will accept partial, if not complete, repay-
ment for its aid in the form of Guinean commodities.
Guinea has recently announced that it is drafting a national
plan for economic development which, while emphasizing agri-
culture, evidently also will provide for the expansion of its
nascent industry. The aid agreement will provide Moscow
with an opportunity to exploit Guinea's, need fore qualified tech-
nicians and specialists. The bloc, furthermore, may have of-
fered to guide Conakry in efforts to develop the industrial sector.
The Soviet aid program was agreed upon during the good-will
visit to the USSR of a Guinean government delegation which left
for home after a stay of about ten days. Since Guinea achieved
its independence last year, bloc economic activity--with the ex-
ception of a Czech arms gift this spring--has been essentially
limited to attempts to develop trade relations. There are, how-
ever, at least 30 bloc specialists, mostly Czechs, providing
technical assistance on public works projects being carried out
by the Guinean Ministry of Interior. In addition, there are re-
portedly a few Czech officers working with the army.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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India Adopts Hands-Off Policy on UN Consideration of Tibet
Indian officials, in response to a request for gulauneu
from the Dalai Lama on an appeal to the UN, informed his
advisers on 22 August that India would neither support nor
interfere with any action on the Tibetan question in the UN,
The Tibetans were told that New Delhi could not advise the
Dalai Lama on the public appeal he plans to make soon,
since it conflicts with India's recognition of Tibet as part of
Communist China. The Indian officials also suggested that
the Dalai Lama in future make his decisions independently
and act in his own interest without seeking clearance from
New Delhi. This position, which is in sharp contrast to the
Indian Government's earlier desire to restrict the Dalai
Lama's political activities, was explained as being necessary
to protect Indian interests but was interpreted by the Tibet-
ans as tacit encouragement of their resort to UN actie^1)
Lrime Minister Nehru also indicated to the American
charge on 20 August that he planned no definite move to op-
pose UN consideration of the Tibet issue, but he reiterated
his view that UN discussion could not lead to any useful ac-
tion on the matter. Nehru, apparently disillusioned with
Peiping, implied that his government would maintain a cor-
rect attitude toward the Chinese Communists at the interna-
tional level, but would be less cooperative toward them than
in the pasto
CDespite Nehru's unwillingness to support the Tibetans in
the UN, the Dalai Lama has been invited to make an official
visit to New Delhi and has been given travel clearance for
several Tibetan delegations to travel abroad for publicity
purposes. From 28 to 31 August, the Dalai Lama's brother
and chief adviser will visit Manila, where he probably will
explore the possibility of Philippine sponsorship of a request
for UN discussion of Tibet, Talks with officials of South Viet-
nam, Nationalist China, and Australia are also planned. There
is a possibility that some Latin American country may be will-
ing to initiate such a request and to organize support among
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Influential West Germans Urging Adenauer to Improve
Relations With Warsaw
LWest Germany's leading pubflsher, Axel Springer, is
urging Chancellor Adenauer to make some dramatic ges-
ture of friendship toward Warsaw on 1 September, the 20th
anniversary of the German invasion of Poland. Springer's
idea is that a declaration of German-Polish friendship could
ease the way toward establishment of diplomatic relations.
Poland has recently been irritated by German plans to in-
clude prominent refugee leaders in the German delegation
to the Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting in Warsaw,
Vice Chancellor Erhard, Bundestag President Gersten-
maier, and Minister for All-German Affairs Lemmer are
reported to support Springer's efforts. Foreign Minister
Brentano and Press Chief von Echardt have also backed
such a move in discussions with Adenauer..7
[Tile chancellor reportedly has promised Springer to
deal with Polish-German relations in a speech about 1 Sep-
tember, but he will probably not go beyond a declaration of
friendship and a promise not to use force in settling the
boundary question. While Adenauer agrees some under-
standing must be reached with the Poles, he does not intend
to take steps toward formalizing relations until after the
1961 elections.
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French Community
De Gaulle Reportedly to Propose Algeria Become Member
LDe Gaulle plans to propose soon that Algeria become a mem-
ber of the French Community,
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President is expected to sound out key French Army elements,
whom he has previously felt it necessary to reassure as to his
intentions,
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cif the F LN has not ac -
cepted De Gaulle's standing offer to negotiate a cease-fire be-
fore the French Community executive council meets on 10 Sep-
tember, De Gaulle will ask the council to propose that Algeria
become a member
I Several previous suggestions that an Algerian solution be
soug within the Community framework have been made by
various French officials and other political leaders. De Gaulle,
in his early public discussions concerning the Community, re-
served a "choice place" for Algeria. The conflicting demands
of the key elements involved in the Algerian problem indicate,
however, that a satisfactory "Community solution" will be dif-
ficult to achieve without considerable "give" on all side7
the French Army and. nationalists in France adamantly op-
pose any form of Algerian independence. The European settlers
in Algeria hope to maintain their privileges by total integration
of Algeria with France. FLN leaders- have recently indicated
some opposition to Community membership and probably would
not accept it without at least some recognition of their right to
independence. A further complication stems from disagree-
ments among the African members- of the Community over the
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extent of their association with France,)
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.4
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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