CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004600530001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 31, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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31 August 1959 /
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DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED or
CLASS. CHANGED TO: T /
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _ d /
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AUTH: alk-REVIEWER:
DATE.
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DIA and DOS have no
objection to declassification
and release.
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DIA and DOS
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completed.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
31 August 1959
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DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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USSR - Nuclear tests: In response to the recent announce-
ments by t e United States and Britain extending the suspension
of their nuclear tests beyond the original one-year period which
expires on 31 October, the USSR announced on 28 August that
it will not conduct any tests as long as the "Western powers" do
not resume their tests." This announcement formalizes the pledge
Khrushchev made in a letter published on 10 August to the lead-
ers of the "European Federation for Atomic Disarmament" that
the USSR is "ready to accept the most solemn obligation not to
be the first to conduct any further tests of nuclear weapons." The
USSR reaffirmed its insistence on a permanent and unconditional
test ban, seeking to undercut and evade Western proposals for an
atmospheric test ban and technical discussions on the problem of
detecting underground tests.
relations with France. (Page 1)
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USSR-Algerian rebels: Soviet ship departed Tangier,
Morocco,on 25 August with 96 Algerian rebel wounded for the
USSR, where the wounded are to receive free medical treatment.
The USSR has previously limited its open aid for the rebels to
support in the United Nations and the provision of food and cloth-
ing to Algerian refugees in Morocco and Tunisia. The USSR con-
tinues to withhold recognition of the provisional Algerian govern- 25X1
ment, as do the Eastern European satellites which have diplomatic
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areas,
Communist China - India: No incidents along the Indo-
Tibetan frontier have been reported since last week's clashes
between Indian and. Chinese border forces. The Indian outpost
in Assam captured by the Chinese on 26 August apparently has
not yet been retaken. Indian Army units in the northeast frontier
region are being moved to more advanced positions.but for the
present will not be deployed on the border itself. Peiping has
declined immediate comment on Nehru's 28 August statement
detailing Chinese border incursions. There is, no evidence of
Chinese Communist military movements in the border regions
Press reaction critical of Peiping, reported from the Arab
states and Ceylon, probably will spread soon to other Asian
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Thailand: Grumbling within the ruling military group over
Premier Sarit's alleged failure to consult it or to consider its in-
terests appears to be increasing. The latest to express dissatis-
faction is the commander of the key First Infantry Division in
Bangkok. Although he claims steps will be taken in "the foresee-
able future" to rid the country of "the Sarit-type operation," mal-
contents within the military group appear at present to lack a
leader strong enough to challenge Sarit j
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Indonesia: A Sumatran dissident leader has reportedly
threatened to sa otage Shell Oil Company installations in South
Sumatra if the company does not comply with a dissident re-
quest for financial help. The dissidents are said to be planning
to exploit allegedly rising popular unrest to launch an offensive
against oil fields in the Palembang area and claim they can rely
on the support of 50 percent of the central government troops in
South Sumatra; the troops are said to be disaffected as a result
of the recent currency devaluation. In the past, there has been
no serious rebel attempt to sabotage oil operations,
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Japan: Several prominent anti-Kis i Japanese conservative
leaders have arranged to be invited by Peiping to visit Commu-
nist China during the next two months. Their invitations appear
designed by both Peiping and the politicians themselves to weaken
Prime Minister Kishi. The visits seem likely to cause new pres-
sures on Kishi to relax his policy of firmness in dealing with Pei-
ping on the question of restoring trade and other relations. The
proposed trips are also provoking controversy in the governing
Liberal-Democratic party at a time when the prime minister is
already facing party difficulties over revision of the US-Japan se-
curity treaty, and Japanese Foreign Ministry officials view the
development as "most difficult" for both Japan and Kishi,
III. THE WEST
France: 1e Gaulle told the French cabinet on 26 August he
was preparing to find a solution for Algeria which would satisfy
"reasonable" and loyal Frenchmen "without disregarding those
who are fighting for France:' His recent statements to officers
in Algeria that the rebels must be subdued before Algeria's polit-
ical future can be decided are variously interpreted in the French
press to mean he feels the moment is not yet ripe for a political
move, or that he wants to reassure the army it will not be sold
31 Aug 59
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officers in Algeria nave a "national-socialist mentality and fa-
aster Pinay says De Gaulle still fears the army, and General
Petit, Premier Debre's military adviser, believes that key younger
[out as a result of a settlement by the politicians. Finance Min-
vor neither De Gaulle nor a liberal policy for Algeria/
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31 Aug 59 1 DAILY BRIEF
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1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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USSR Accepts Algerian Rebel Wounded. for rea men
(The USSR has honored its offer made earlier this year to the
Algerian rebels to accept their wounded for treatment at Soviet
hospitals. On 24 August the Soviet passenger ship Pobeda arrived
at Tangier, Morocco, where it was met by a 12-man delegation
from the Soviet Embassy in Rabat. The Pobeda, staffed by two
Soviet doctors and a number of nurses,, loaded 96 rebel wounded--
four were left behind because of lack of documentation- -and on
25 August left for Odessa, where the wounded are to receive med-
ical treatment
e rebel wounded had. been assembled in Tangier since April
awaiting completion of travel arrangements to the bloc. The USSR
is reported to have stalled on making final arrangements for trans-
portation; the responsible rebel officer threatened in late July to
arrange other accommodations for the wounded unless Moscow
made good on its promise by mid-August
The USSR has in past years voted on the rebel side when the
Algerian issue was considered in the UN General Assembly. Mos-
cow is, also known previously to have given assistance in the form
of clothing and food supplies to Algerian refugees in Morocco and
Tunisia through the Red Crescent organization. Transportation of
rebel wounded by Soviet ship for treatment in the USSR,, however,
is the Soviet Union's most direct involvement on the side of the
rebels to date)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Discontent Reported Increasing in u ing Z ai Military Group
Grumbling within the ruling Thai militar rou
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of Premier Sarit a J g p over the ppears to be increasing. Complaints be-
ing increasingly voiced against Sarit include his failure to consult
the military, the real basis of his power, on important policy mat-
ters; his reliance on civilian advisers and opposition leaders for
guidance in planning his ambitious programs; a recent cut in the
defense budget; and his alleged failure to provide satisfactory
recompense to second-echelon officers for their support of his
regime;
The latest important leader to express dissatisfaction with
Sarit's actions is Lt. Gen. Krit Sriwara, the commander of the
key First Infantry Division in Bangkok, a unit whose active coop-
eration would probably be essential for a successful coup attempt.
He recently told the American army attachd in Bangkok that the
political situation had deteriorated since early August and that
some members of the military group are seriously consulting on
ways to curb Sarit. Krit intimated that "something" would be done
in "the foreseeable future" to rid Thailand of "the Sarit-type opera-
tion: ~
N alcontents within the military group do not appear at pres-
ent to possess a leader willing and strong enough to challenge
Sarit, a resourceful and ruthless politician. The likelihood of
a coup attempt might be increased if Sarit's health improves
enough that it is apparent he will be able to stay on the job for an
extended period. Disaffected elements within the military group
until now have probably bided their time in the expectation that
Sarit's serious liver ailment would soon remove him from the scene.j
A[y successful coup group would probably call on Deputy Pre -
mier Thanom to form a new government, even though he would be
unlikely to be an active participant in a coup attempt. Thanom,
while not a strong leader, is universally respected in the armed
forces and would make an ideal front man for such a group. While
apparently still loyal to Sarit, Thanom has serious reservations
about the marshal's performance as premier and has had some
bitter policy arguments with him. A more remote possibility as
new premier in the event of a coup would be former Premier Phi-
b
un, now in exile in Tokyo
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Prominent Japanese Politicians Plan Visits to Communist China
The visits which several prominent Japanese politsi.ans have
arranged to make to Communist China during the next two months
probably are designed to weaken Prime Minister Kishi's position
as well as explore the possibilities for improving trade and other
relations between Tokyo and Peiping. All the invited men are
members of factions in the government party which are opposed
to Prime Minister Kishi and which received only a few posts in
the recent cabinet and party reshuffle. Each undoubtedly hopes
his discussions with Communist Chinese leaders may find a pos-
sible basis for the restoration of trade relations that he could ex-
ploit on his return to Japan.
The question of relations with mainland China,, while now
relatively quiescent, is a potentially important issue in domestic
politics since most Japanese believe they would benefit econom-
ically and culturally from closer relations with Peiping.
Former Prime Minister Tanzan Ishibashi intends to visit
Communist China next month at the invitation of Premier Chou
En-lai, and former Minister of Education Kenzo Matsumura is
expected to follow with a trip in October. Influential Liberal-
Democratic party leader Ichiro Kano has announced he will go
to Moscow in October and may also visit Peiping. Factional
leader Takeo Miki may also have been invited.
While Ishibashi and Matsumura are unlikely to accede to Pei-
ping's extreme demands, Kishi and some of his close supporters
have indicated concern over the trips. The visits are also likely
to stir up new demands in Japan for a relaxation of Kishi's firm
policy toward Peiping.
Peiping has thus far failed to soften its demands for political
concessions and a reorientation of Japan's foreign policy as the
price for resuming trade. Nevertheless, Chinese Communist hos-
tility has been directed primarily at Kishi, and the American Em-
bassy in Tokyo: believes Kishi will be in "real trouble" if the vis-
itors return with an offer from Peiping to end the trade embargo.
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I I Ia THE WEST
De Gaulle Readying Algerian Policy
esident de Gaulle told the French cabinet on 26 August that
the time had come to tackle the nub of the problem in Africa and
Algeria, De Gaulle said he
was preparing to find, a solution which could satisfy "reasonable"
and loyal Frenchmen."without disregarding those who are fighting
for France;' 0 expressed the opinion that De Gaulle is far
more liberal than 90 percent of his compatriots. expects
him to emphasize to President Eisenhower that Algeria is a
long-range problem and that while a course of action can be
initiated now, it will take years for it to be successful;]
De Gaulle
planned a public statement on Algeria before the UN Gen-
eral Assembly opens on 15 September. The tenor of his speech
will probably be outlined to President Eisenhower, and to the
Council of the French Community on 10 September, when a move
may be initiated to offer Community status to Algeria.
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[ any event, army sensibilities will be given careful con-
sideration. believes De Gaulle:isstill fearful of the army's
attitude, an25X1
feels that the army in Algeria, particularly the colonels, majors,
and captains, will not accept a proposal which would call for a vote
on the question of independence. He believes the younger officers,
rather than the generals, are the key figures, and he considers
them neither pro-De Gaulle nor pro-liberal Algerian policy. De
Gaulle took pains to stress, on his recent tour of Algerian military
installations, that the rebels must be subdued before there can be
any political decisions on Algeria's future. He re-emphasized that
the Algerians must decide for themselves after pacification has
ended, and warned that this may take a long time. The press spec-
ulates that his tour may have persuaded him that the moment is not
yet ripe for a political move on Algeria, or, on the other hand, that
he has been reassuring the army that it would not be sold out as a
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 Approved For
N"Pol
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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