CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004700010001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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1 September 1959
Copy No. C 63
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State Department review completed
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Khrushchev says Adenauer letter
produced "favorable impression."
Nehru labels Chinese Communist
border incursions as "aggression;"
press reports of further incursions
remain unconfirmed.
South Vietnam seeks to aid Laos with
troops disguised as civilians.
Bolivian Government under leftist
pressure to accept Soviet loan.
Cuba--More anti-Americanism ex-
pected as result of rift between inter-
American labor organization and its.
Cuban affiliate.
Communists riot in Calcutta; call
general strike for 3 September.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
1 September 1959
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that in June Peiping had protested as an "intrusion" into Tibet
IN
the establishment of the new outpost in Assam attacked on 25-26
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August. This suggests that the attack was intended to back up
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DAILY BRIEF
1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: Khrushchev's speech at Veshenskaya on 30 August
provides further evidence that one of the principal aims in his
forthcoming visit to the United States will be to establish the
impression that Western leaders, including even Chancellor
Adenauer, are moving gradually toward a general accommoda-
tion with the USSR based on Western acceptance of the status
quo, especially in Eastern Europe and East Germany. Khru-
shchev reaffirmed his "ardent desire" for a relaxation of ten-
sion and promised to "take measures which could melt the
cold war." In an abrupt shift from the usual vituperation di-
rected at Adenauer, Khrushchev said the chancellor's letter
of 28 August had produced a "favorable impression" and sug-
gested that Soviet - West German relations could be consider-
ably improved if Adenauer's words are "followed by deeds."
II. ASIA-AFRICA
India - Communist China: Nehru9s statement on 31 August
in Parliament labeling Chinese Communist border incursions in
Assam as "a clear case of aggression" is his strongest refer-
ence to the clashes to date. He emphasized, however., that New
Delhi, while strengthening its frontier defenses and repulsing
any incursions, would attempt to settle its border problems with
Peiping through diplomatic negotiations
Nehru has disclosed
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Chinese claims to the territory. There has been no confirma-
tion of press reports of further border incursions. The Indian
Communist party, shaken internally by Peiping's border actions,
has lined up with the view vehemently expressed by all other
sections of Indian opinion that India's territorial integrity must
be defended
Laos' Reports persist that South Vietnam is pressing Laos
-o accept truth Vietnamese troops disguised as civilians to bol-
ster the security of southern Laos. Vientiane, which has under-
aken contingency planning with Saigon, does not, however, be.-
lieve such a move is warranted at this time. It fears that North
Vietnam would retaliate by sending substantial numbers of "vol-
unteers" into Laos. A high-ranking Laotian official stated,
however, that if the military situation deteriorated to the point
where Laotian forces could not cope with the enemy, Laos would
request -SEATO assistance as well as South Vietnamese troops.)
III. THE WEST
Bolivia: [The Siles government faces concerted leftist pres-
sures to seek a Soviet loan amounting to about $60,000,000 for
the national oil company, YPFB, and to replace the present pe-
troleum code, which is favorable to private capital. The ele-
ments behind these moves may be attempting to oust private
foreign companies now engaged in developing the country's oil
resources. President Siles is likely to use this leftist pressure
in another effort to obtain sizable US aid for the YPFB before
accepting Soviet offers or bowing to demands for a new petroleum
code. (Page 3)
Cuba: There is a widening rift between the AFL,/CIO-backed
Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers and its affil-
iate, the Cuban Confederation of Workers. The result is likely
to be an increase in anti-US sentiment in Cuban organized labor,
where Communists have made gains by promoting "unity" with
1 Sept 59
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adherents of the dominant 26 of July Movement. The rift could
also lead to intensified opposition to US business operations and.
the US Naval Base at Guantanamo, which employs over 3,000
Cubans and has been sporadically denounced by Prime Minister
Fidel Castro.
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*India: The violent rioting which broke out in Calcutta on 31
August isthe latest in a series of demonstrations begun on 20
August by the Communists and other leftist parties in West Ben-
gal State in protest against high food prices. This campaign was
planned as retaliation for the Nehru government's recent dismis-
sal of the Communist government in Kerala State. A general
strike has been called for 3 September in Calcutta. Its success
may be jeopardizedby widespread arrests of leftist leaders and
by growing anti-Communist feeling in India following the recent
border clashes between Indian and Chinese Communist forces.
LATE ITEM
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DAILY BRIEF
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1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Sino-Indian Border Dispute
Prime Minister Nehru, expanding on his earlier disclosure
of Chinese Communist border incursions, told the Indian Par-
liament on 31 August that the attacks on outposts in Assam con-
stituted "a clear case of aggression:' He emphasized, however,
that New Delhi would strive to settle its border problems with
Peiping through diplomatic channels. Nehru outlined a "dual
policy"--to "defend our frontier and resolve all matters by con-
ference."
He drew a distinction between the frontier problem in Assam
and that in the Ladakh area of Kashmir: he specified that whereas
any incursions south of the McMahon Line in Assam must be re-
pulsed as a violation of Indian territory, disputes over Ladakh,
which were likely to occur because of the lack of a clearly demar-
cated border, should be resolved by mutual discussion.
Nehru has revealed that the Assam outpost set up in April
and attacked by Chinese troops on 25-26 August had been the sub-
ject of a protest by Peiping in June charging the Indians with "in-
truding" into Tibet. Although both the Chinese and Indians claim the
area, Indian troops had remained some miles below the McMahon
line until this outpost was established close to the line. The at-
tack on this particular Indian unit therefore seems intended by
the Chinese to back up the protest and demonstrate their readiness
to reinforce territorial claims. While Peiping probably would be
willing to discuss disputed boundaries in Assam and Ladakh, sig-
nificant Chinese concessions are unlikely. Peiping's past record
on border talks suggests that discussions with the Indians would
be prolonged.
Nehru will confer this week with top officials of Bhutan and
Sikkim and with the Dalai Lama, who published his appeal to the
United Nations on 30 August. Nehru may also discuss Peiping's
border moves in a brief airport meeting with President Ayub of
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Pakistan on 1 September; their meeting had been scheduled prior
to the latest incidents.
The Bhutanese prime minister has welcomed Nehru's reaffir-
mation that India would defend Bhutan in event of an external at-
tack and apparently desires further Indian military aid, but there
are increasing indications that Bhutanese leaders are concerned
over signs that New Delhi is assuming diplomatic and defensive
responsibilities exceeding its treaty rights. They are exploring
the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with several
major powers- -particularly the United States, the USSR, and
Britain--as a counterweight to Indian controls. Press reports
of major Chinese incursions into Bhutan and elsewhere along the
frontier remain unconfirmed, although the Bhutamese prime
minister has reported two minor incidents involving Chinese
troops,
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ILL THE WEST
Concerted Leftist Pressure in Bolivia in Favor of Soviet Aid
I- The government of Bolivian President Siles is facing
concerted leftist pressures to seek a Soviet loan amounting
to about $60,000,000 for the national oil company, YPFB, and
to replace the present petroleum code, which is favorable to
private capital. The campaign may be designed in part to oust
private foreign companies now engaged in developing Bolivia's
of resources. Among the powerful pressure groups behind
these moves are the principal labor confederation, the oil
workers' federation, the youth wing of the ruling party, and
leftist members of Congress -\
3 President Siles will probably use this leftist pressure
in another effort to obtain sizable US aid for YPFB before
reaching an agreement with the USSR or bowing to demands
for a new petroleum code. He advised the US Embassy in L
Paz in late July that the government had received informal
Soviet proposals totaling about $60,000,000 to assist YPFB
and that former President Paz had also received an offer
during his trip to Prague in June. Foreign Minister Andrade
says the government will defend the petroleum code, honor
existing contracts with private foreign companies in the un-
likely event a new code is adopted, and take no action on a
Soviet loan until after further investigation of US aid pros-
pects.
'The long-range outlook for increased Bolivian oil pro-
duction and exports through joint action of YPFB and private
foreign companies is one of the few bright spots favoring
Bolivian economic stability. The economy declined sharply
in 1958 and the trend has continued this year.\
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Communist Gains in Cuban Organized Labor
Relations have worsened between the AFI.,,/CIO-backed Inter-
American Regional Organization of Workers (OBIT) and its affil-
iate the Cuban Confederation of Workers (CTC). The Cubans, who
charge ORIT with having backed pro-Batista labor leaders before
the revolution, also appear convinced that ORIT is overly respon-
sive to AFL/CIO leaderships The American Embassy understands
that the AFL/CIO withdrew its conciliatory proposal for a meet-
ing with CTC leaders after the latter insisted that ORIT Assist-
ant Secretary Romualdi, a US labor representative, be excluded
from the meeting.
The growing rift between Cuban labor and the anti- Communist
regional labor body is likely to lead to an increase in the anti-US
attitude of Cuba's labor leadership and support for the strong anti-
ORIT campaign of the Communists. It could also lead to intensi-
fied, opposition to US business operations in Cuba and to the US
Naval Base at Guantanamo which employs over 3,000 Cubans and
already has been denounced sporadically by Prime Minister Fidel
Castro.
The Communists have made important gains in politically
powerful organized. labor since Castro's rise to power last Jan-
uary, although they are still far from recapturing the dominant
control of labor which they exercised from 1940 to 1947. They
have achieved their gains this year largely by promoting unity with
adherents of Castro's dominant 26 of July Movement, which is con-
sistent with their united-front tactics in other fields? In the 15 of
33 constituent federations of the CTC which have recently held
elections, Communists or suspected Communists were elected,
under 26 of July cover, to the executive committees of five.fed-
er tions, including Cuba's second, third, and fourth largest, Com-
munist gains were also significant in earlier, local union elections.
The election of top CTC officials is to be held soon, perhaps in
September.
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LATE ITEM
Leftist Violence in Calcutta
A Communist-led campaign launched in India's West Ben-
gal State on 20 August to protest the high prices of food grains
erupted into major violence in Calcutta on 31 August. This
campaign was instituted by most leftist parties as West Ben-
gal's contribution to the Communist party's nationwide agitation
program planned as retaliation for New Delhi's dismissal of the
Communist-run government in Kerala State on 31 July. The
Praja Socialist party declined to participate.
Starting slowly, the campaign was hampered at the outset
by the Congress party government's widespread preventive ar-
rests of leftist leaders. Demonstrations have occurred since
20 August, however, in a number of provincial towns, and ar-
rests now total over 3,200, according to press reports. The
Communist party leaders--in keeping with current policy--have
urged that demonstrations be kept peaceful, although other left-
ist parties have advocated violence. Until 31 August, the dem-
onstrations seemed to lack enthusiasm and were unimpressive.
The American consulate general in Calcutta reported on
27 August that the tempo of the agitation was rising, and that a
general strike is planned by leftist trade unions in Calcutta on
3 September. Nehru's revelations in Parliament on 28 and 31
August regarding Sino-Indian border clashes may dampen left-
wing enthusiasm even in the traditionally volatile city of Calcutta.
Following Nehru's statements, the West Bengal government is also
likely to deal even more firml with agitators than in the past.
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`wr"
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States "Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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