CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004700100001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 11, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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11 September 1959
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
11 September 1959
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DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev visit: Recent Soviet moves apparently de-
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gned to dissociate the USSR from events in Laos and the
Sino-Indian border dispute suggest that Moscow is concerned
that these incidents may damage Soviet efforts to create a
both. Even so, Moscow felt bound: to, include a standard con-
demnation of alleged efforts by "Western circles," especially
in the United States, to exploit the dispute as a means of ob-
structing a relaxation of tension on the eve of,. Khrushchev's
bo either party, stressing the USSR's friendly relations with
non-Communist country, avoided an endorsement of the Chi-
nese Communist position and. refrained from assigning blame
Vrom Soviet practice in a dispute between a Communist and a
a move to soft-pedal the Sino-Indian dispute, Moscow issued
a TASS statement on 9 September which, in a unique departure
favorable climate for Khrushchev's visit.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Laos: Government sources report continuing scattered
1 D Communist attacks in northern Laos, particularly in Phong Saly
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Province, and limited harassing actions against government
posts in central Laos.
*Meanwhile, rumors- reported by the French Press Agency
that the Laotian Government and the Pathet Lao rebels may soon
begin negotiations lack confirmation. In the unlikely event that
the Phoui government would consider such talks, it seems prob-
able that the army would not sanction the move and would. even
seize control of the government to prevent any reconciliation
jwith the Pathet Lao.
uary and can be expected to exploit the issue again.
rest. The Communist party, which is eager to discredit army
leadership, successfully pressed the corruption issue last Jan-
Indonesia: A government crisis may be eve oping in Ina-01
nesia over the issue of corruption in army headquarters. Gen-L
eral Nasution, who is concurrently chief of staff and defense
minister, Lhas opposed efforts by the attorney general to rein-
vestigate trade irregularities involving the army intelligence
,-chief, andjhas now placed the attorney general under house ar-
some sort in the offing.
The American ambassador feels there may be "a showdown of
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of defense- -is waiting for the strategic moment to attempt a coup.
(Page 3)
III. THE WEST
Guatemala: (Rightist political groups are showing increased
determination in their continuing plotting against the Ydigoras
regime, and at least one key army officer--the undersecretary
(Page 4)
Bolivia: A top official of the ruling party states that mod-
erate President Siles is determined to resign if the Senate car-
ries out a planned interpellation designed to censure a member
of his cabinet, Although Siles has threatened similar action in
the past, the US Embassy in La Paz believes that he may be
serious in the present instance and that his actual retirement
11 Sept 59
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would be a victory for the increasingly powerful left-wing ele-
ment in the party which has consistently attacked the US-backed
stabilization effort and has called for closer relations with the
Soviet bloc. 25X1
(Page 5)
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
Probable Soviet Position on Nuclear Weapons Testing. 25X1
VON
SNIE 11-9-59. 8 Sept 59.
11 Sept 59 (Available during the preceding week)
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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Soviet Concern Over Effect of Asian Communist Actions
On Khrushchev Visit
Recent Soviet moves designed to create the appearance of
dangerous but also "very untimely just when the program of high-
level visits is taking place and we are all looking forward to a
summit meeting.")
dissociating the USSR from events in Laos and from the Sino-
Indian border dispute suggest that Moscow is concerned that
these incidents may jeopardize Soviet efforts to create a favor-
able climate for Khrushchev's visit. (Soviet Ambassador Malik,
in a talk with the British minister of state for foreign affairs,
on 7 September, remarked that the Laos situation is not only
In a move to soft-pedal the Sino-Indian dispute, Moscow is-
sued a TASS statement on 9 September which, in a unique depar-
ture from Soviet practice in a dispute between a Communist and a
non-Communist country, refrained from assigning blame to either
party and avoided an automatic endorsement of the Chinese Commu-
nist position. The statement stressed the USSR's friendly rela-
tions with both countries and said "Soviet leading quarters" are
confident that Peiping and New Delhi will reach a peaceful settle-
ment based on mutual interests and "traditional friendship."
As part of the effort to play down the importance of the dis-
pute, TASS added a routine condemnation of alleged attempts by
"Western circles," especially in the United States, to exploit the
situation as a means of obstructing a relaxation of tension on the
eve of Khrushchev's visit.
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11 Sept 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Indonesian Government Crisis May Be Developing
An intragovernment conflict which has developed in
Indonesia over the issue of corruption in army headquarters
may provoke a serious crisis. General Nasution, concur-
rently chief of staff and defense minister, has opposed efforts
by the attorney general, Gatot Tarunamihardja, to reinvestigate
trade irregularities involving army intelligence chief Lt. Col.
Sukendro. These irregularities were aired last January, and
Sukendro and two other colonels vvere transferred or suspended.
Sukendro has recently resumed his former post, and Nasution--
who presumably regards the case as closed--on 9 September re-
portedly placed the attorney general under house arrest on the
charge of false accusation.
(The attorney general claims President Sukarno ordered him
in late August to eradicate corruption. He also claims that first ~
minister Djuanda agrees Sukendro should be dismissed. A deputy
army chief of staff, however, claims Sukarno has taken no posi-
tion on specific cases and has left the Sukendro matter up to
Nasution and the attorney general
The Communist party, which is eager to discredit army
leadership, urged prosecution of real or alleged army corruption
cases last December and January, and can be expected to exploit
the issue again. The extent to which the situation develops, or
the army loses prestige, will depend largely on Sukarno and his
willingness to support Nasution.
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III. THE WEST
Sho down With Rightist o tern, May Be Near in Guatemala
(Rightist political groups- in Guatemala, encouraged by
rising public discontent over lack of significant achievement
by President Ydigoras and fearful of growing leftist political
strength, are showing increased determination in their plot-
ting against the regime? Plotting is centered in the National-
ist Democratic Movement (MDN), political machine of the late
President Castillo Armas, which is probably chiefly respon-
sible for the rash of nuisance bombings that have disturbed
the capital in recent weeks.. The government's inability to
bring an end to the bombings, despite extraordinary police
methods, has further weakened government prestige and may
be used. by ambitious elements in the military to justify a coup
(Col. Francisco Ardon, influential under secretary of de-
fense, is known to be involved in the plotting and to be waiting
for the strategic moment for an attempt to replace Ydigoras
with an interim military junta. The minister of defense, Col.
Ruben Gonzalez Sigui, informed the American Embassy on 8
September that he knows of certain officers who would support
a coup and added, in a comment; suggesting that he himself
might not oppose such action, that he thought he had reasonably
good prospects for an influential post after a coup. The actions
of the two commanders of army garrisons in the capital area,
who are not known to be disloyal to the President, are likely to
be decisive in any -attempted coup, however)
(Ambassador Mallory doubts that Ydigoras will wait much
longer before forcing a showdown with the plotters, though pres-
idential aides urging him to take such action admit that the Pres-
ident is reluctant to take a strong stand. A government offensive
might well be directed not only against the MDN. but also against
the rapidly growing leftist non-Communist Revolutionary party,
which stands to sweep the November congressional elections if
resent trends continue)
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11 Sept 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
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Bo ivian President Reportedly Threatens to Resign
According to a top official of the ruling Nationalist Revolu-
tionary Movement (MNR), moderate Bolivian President Siles is
determined to resign if the Senate carries out a planned interpella-
tion designed to censure one of his cabinet ministers. Such a move
would probably be a resounding victory for the long-divided MNR's
left-wing element, which has consistently attacked the US-backed
stabilization effort, and could endanger the continuance of the
program. The leftists appear to have made substantial political
gains recently at Siles' expense, and are calling for closer rela-
tions with the Soviet bloc and attacking the petroleum code, which
is favorable to foreign capital. Their recent pressures on the
government to attain these objectives carry strong anti-US
overtones and reinforce Communist propaganda campaigns
against Siles' policies,
(Although Siles--a stanch defender of stabilization measures--
has threatened to resign on previous occasions, the US Embassy
in La Paz believes that he may be serious in the present instance
and that he may no longer be able to mobilize mass support for
his continuance in office. Moreover, popular former President
Paz, chief of the MNR, who tends to favor the leftist faction of
the party, may view Siles' withdrawal as the removal of any
obstacle to his re-election to the presidency in 1960.)
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11 Sept 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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