CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004700120001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 14, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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14 September 1959
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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14 September 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: remarks by Soviet spokesmen I I
F provide further evidence of the USSR_ ex-a.
rassmenf-ov-er events both in Laos and on the Sino-Indian bor-
de r. F- istressed the USSWs
desire to prevent any aggravation of the Laos situation and
said Moscow would "do everything possible" to avoid jeopard-
the chances for a detente with the United. States.
Peiping's actions in the border dispute were "in-
comprehensible" and could gain nothing valuable enough to
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justify the bad impressio . n being created. I I 25X1
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Communist China - India: In contrast to their silence up to
last Tve6k on the Sino-InMa-n border dispute., Chine ' se Commu-
nist propaganda media now are giving full publicity to the issue.
The resolution passed by the standing committee of the National
People's, Congress, press, editorials, and statements, at public
rallies held throughout the country profess a sense of injury that
New Delhi should "blow up" the matter and thereby give comfort
to elements who want to drive a wedge between India and China.
In this connection, strong exception is also being voiced to the
"unfriendly" activities of the Dalai Lama countenanced by New
Delhi. The Chinese are highlighting their firm opposition to the
McMahon line. Their statements, do not go so far. however. as
to insist that the line presently shown on Chinese maps is beyond
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Laos: Communist bloc propaganda continues to emphasize
the "wi lingness" of the Laotian dissidents to negotiate a settle-
ment with the Laotian Government on the basis of "respect for
the 1954 Geneva and 1957 Vientiane agreements:' By placing
the onus for continued fighting on the Phoui government, the
Communists probably hope not. only to exploit existing differ-
Cences within Laos, but also to divide free world attitudes on the
situation. Laotian officials., while admitting the possibility of
some unintentional exaggeration in communiques on the fighting
to date, express, confidence that the four-nation UN fact-finding
team about to arrive on the scene will bear out Laos' charges of
North Vietnamese involvement in the rebel activity. Laotian
Army sources report small-scale military action continues in
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14 Sept 59
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UAR Economics Minister Qaysuni--the first such visit of any
member of a Nasir government since the 1956 Suez interven-
Britain-UAR: (The present visit to the United Kingdom of
tion--points up the continuing improvement in relations between
the two countries. London has rbsponded favorably to a series
verse this trend.
of overtures from the UAR hoping they will lead. to a resumption
of diplomatic relations. Such a step still seems unlikely for sev-
eral months, however, and any sharp clash with Nasir over spe-
cial British positions or interests in the Arab world could re-
LATE ITEM
14 Sept 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
I Soviet Embarrassment over Events in Far East Indicated
provide further evidence of the USSR's embarrassment
over events in Laos and On the Sino-Indian. border,
he Chinese Commu-
nists' actions in the border dispute were "incomprehensible"
and could gain them nothing valuable enough to justify the bad
impression being created
denied any Soviet respon-
sibility for recent Chinese Communist actions in the Far East,
saying it was "hardly logical" to assume that the USSR would
"apply pressure" against non-Communist Asian countries on
the eve: of Khrushchev's visit, He asked why the Soviet Union
should be blamed for "everything that happens" in bloc coun-
tries and stressed that the USSR wished. to prevent any aggrava-
tion of the situation and would "do everything possible" to avoid
jeopardizing the chances for a detente with the United States.
remarks bore also on the relationship
between the USSR and the Communist Chinese, "We can urge
them to do things," he commented, "but we cannot push buttons
and. watch them jump to conform." He remarked that if the Chi-
nese Communists are not happy at the prospect of Khrushchev
exchanging visits with President Eisenhower--and he said he
had no information that this is the case--the USSR would still
go through with the visits. This would not meanthat.a break
was imminent between the USSR and China which, he added, the
Soviet Union would. do everything possible to prevent)
I expressed his conviction that some-
thing tangible must result from the Khrushchev-Eisenhower ex-
change of visits', and he mentioned the possibility of agreements
on the cessation of nuclear testing and on trade. He stressed the
importance of disarmament and. urged that the United States sign
a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union. Touching also on
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14 Sept 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
remarks by Soviet spokesmen
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he Berlin issue, he said. the USSR will try to work out
"something like a series of status quos-! He. denied any
Soviet intention of taking "dangerous" action on this ques-
tion and remarked, "We can keep talking about Berlin for
some time to come-' F
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Communist China's Propaganda Campaign on Sino-Indian
Border Dispute
Chinese Communist measures to publicize Peiping's side of
the Sino-Indian border issue are assuming the proportions of a
major propaganda campaign, with all the trappings. of long press
editorials and public rallies. Speakers in the standing committee
of the National People's Congress have echoed Premier Chou
En-lai's condemnation of Indian activities along the border, re-
iterated his readiness to negotiate a solution, and urged his pro-
posal to preserve the "status, quo" pending a final settlement.
Embarrassed by their bad press in India and probably irri-
tated as well by the failure of the USSR to voice unqualified. sup-
port for the Chinese position on the border issue, the Chinese
are voicing a sense of outrage that New Delhi by its, charges should.
give encouragement to elements hostile to Sino-Indian friendship.
Chinese stiffness toward New Delhi is based further on apparent
confidence that Communist China's legal position in the border issue
is every bit as strong as India's. Peiping cites, British maps to
support its, position, and the American Consul General in Hong
Kong points out that the Chinese could also draw on American maps
for this purpose, including military maps that were widely avail-
able during World. War II which give the Chinese version of the
Tibet-Assam boundary.
The Chinese are adamant in their insistence that the McMahon
line is "illegal" and unacceptable. They have not indicated, how-
ever, their minimum demands in the border area. None of their
statements so far insists that the line presently shown on their
maps is beyond discussion. New Delhi's position is that the McMahon
line is not subject to negotiation except for minor modifications,
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Some Indian Parliament members and newspapers in recent
days have queried why Nehru hid from the Indian public the news
of early Sino-Indian border clashes. They are now beginning to
question the validity of the moderate stand Nehru is taking in Par-
liament on the border issue and are pressing him to take firm ac-
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Laos: Communist bloc propaganda is giving increased prom-
inence to the declared readiness, of the Laotian dissidents to ne-
gotiate a peaceful settlement with the government. Both Peiping
and Hanoi have publicized the recent offer attributed to General
Kayson, ranking Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ) leader at large. Con-
ditions set for a settlement include withdrawal of United States
military personnel and weapons, cessation of Laotian Army op-
erations against the rebels, release of imprisoned NLHZ lead-
ers, and resumption of International Control Commission (ICC)
activities in Laos,. Kayson is quoted as warning that should the
Phoui government "continue to use American weapons to further
the civil warp.. ? the Laotian people will fight resolutely to the end:'
The Communists probably feel that the degree of success
achieved by the rebellion places them in an advantageous posi-
tion from which to bargain. By dangling the bait of a peaceful so-
lution, they apparently hope to bring domestic pressure on the
government and international pressure on the United States to ac-
cept a negotiated settlement along the lines of the November 1957
agreement guaranteeing Communist participation in a coalition
government.
The Laotian Government has spurned the NLHZ overtures,
and American Ambassador Smith feels this position will not change
so long as the Phoui regime stays, in power. The military and young
reformist group championed by influential Crown Prince Savang,
recently named regent, are also strongly opposed to any conces-
sion.
Probably anxious to head off UN or other external interven-
tion in Laos, the Communists are at some pains to deny "slander-
ous" charges of North Vietnamese participation in the conflict.
Some fighting reportedly continues in northern Laos; a complete
cessation of activity coincidental with the arrival of the UN mission
would tend to refute the Communist portrayal of a "popular upris-
ing.'
Laotian officials admit the possibility of some unintentional
exaggeration in communiquds on the fighting to date, but express
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confidence that the investigation by the United Nations fact-finding
team will bear out L'aos' charges that North Vietnam is actively
supporting the. dissidents. The Laotian Government is amassing
available evidence, including captured arms and equipment and
eyewitnesses to enemy attacks. Arrangements are also being
made to fly the investigators by light plane and helicopter to the
remote fighting areas. The hit-and-run tactics of the enemy and
the rugged terrain, however, virtually preclude effective obser-
vation.
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I 11. THE WE ST
Anglo-Arab Relations, Improving
(Relations between London and Cairo continue to show gradual
improvement. Political considerations bar any precipitate move
by either government, and. resumption of formal diplomatic ties
does not seem to be in prospect for many months, certainly not
until after the British elections, on 8 October. The British response
to the growing number of overtures from Cairo in the past two
months has been designed to point up the desirability of full dip-
lomatic relations
&he UAR's mid.-July invitation to participate in the Damascus,
trade fair from 21 August to 20 September, and then to send a
member of the Macmillan government to take part in the "British
day," was met by sending representatives of a semiofficial advisory
committee on Middle East trade. Several members of the govern-
ment-supported British Council are going to Cairo this week to
discuss the UAR desire to place students in British universities.
Greatest public evidence of the new cordiality is the present "pri-
vate" visit to the United. Kingdom of UAR Economics Minister
Qaysuni- -the first member of Nasir's government to visit there
since the 1956 Suez intervention, His informal discussions with
Foreign Secretary Lloyd. may shed some light on Nasir's intentions
to further the rapprochement. (Differences over the Suez Canal, while potentially trouble-
some, do not seem a present threat to this trend. Britain's ef-
forts to delay an IBRD loan for Suez Canal improvements have not
discouraged these overtures from Cairo. In any UN General As-
sembly discussions of the canal transit problem, London plans only
to support the general principle of freedom of transit rather than
specific Israeli claims. A reversal of the trend could nevertheless
result from any clash with Nas:ir over Britain's remaining special
positions elsewhere in the Arab world
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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