CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004700150001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 31, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 17, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For ReI..eas1OP2/S:BCMT00975A,004700150001-3
%woe
25XI
/
/
25X1
DOCUMENT NO.
pan
NO C1 JAN! F ,N CLASS.
17 September'1959
Copy No. -
C:LAi"c ( ;'. G t)TO: T S R
NEXT 1 EVIEW DAI E:
.
AUTH? 11
DATE REVIEWER;
25X1
Approved For Release 40PW"2700975A004700150001-3
State Dept. review completed
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04700150001-3
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04700150001-3
 25X1 Approved For elease 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79T 9975 4700150001-3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
17 September 1959
25X1
DAILY BRIEF
25X1 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China: Mao Tse-tung's personal convening of
a meeting in Peiping on 15 September appears, to be an attempt
on his part to regain j
forward" and in the latest t changes in the commune prothe gram.
The meeting, attended by most of the top party and nonparty
leaders, discussed the question using j
10th anniversary on 1 Octberto grant pardons to re re-
0
gime's, formed criminals and remove the label of "rightist" from those
who "behaved well." Formal implementation j
policies j
was pomptly initiated by a 16 September resolution of the Council and the party central committee. The moderating of j
also probably intended ohprovide nl atmosphere of nationals is 0
unity and to display the regime's "benevolence." 25X1 j
25X1
1
j a
j
25X1 Approved For Re 75 A004700150001-3
 rm!m
Apprc;NPor I ~;ase 2003102/27 C1A-RDP79T045AQ#700150001-3
INN II ASIA-AVRMA
Officials of the British Foreign Office have sug-
Laos: CC
gestecT-to American representatives, the advisibility of nego-
tiating a deal with the Communists, to restore the "sanitized"
status ot Laos along the line of the 1954 Geneva settlement.
The French have already begun an apparently well- coordinated
campaign to depreciate the military aspects and to advocate
some concessions to the Laotian dissidents by the Phoui gov-
ernment to "stabilize" the situation. Skirmishing in Sam Neua
and Phong Saly provinces, apparently continues.and small-scale
25X1
0
attacks on Laotian Army units have occurred in central Laos
within the past week)
(Page 2)
25X1
25X1
*Iraq-. The announcement in. Baghdad that Brigadier Tabaqchali
has ge-en sentenced to death for his association with the Mosul re-
volt last spring is likely to result in a further increase in polit-
ical tension in Iraq and might possibly trigger a nationalist, anti-
Communist coup attempt. Tabaqchali, by his defiance of the pro-
Communist court president, Colonel Mahdawi, has become a
symbol of resistance to Communist pressure. Prime Minister
Qasim must still approve the sentence before it can be carried
ou I t. and his decision may not be forthcoming for some time. Anti-
Communist elements might feel, however, that they cannot afford 25X1
to await Qasim's ~ d6c.ision,, since they have come to regard his ac -
tions as highly unpreljo_~ble. I I
.Iraq: Iraq is shifting its patronage of Western educational
institutions to those of the Communist bloc, During the coming
school year., a record number of government- sponsored students,
will be sent abroad, and it is expected that the Communist bloc.,
which had only 12 Iraqi students last fall, will receive many times
that number this year, with a commensurate reduction in the num-
ber of students sent to Western countries. About 425 scholarships
have been offered by bloc countries for the coming year, and
"bargain rate" educational costs in bloc countries provide an ad-
ditional incentive for Iraq to send many of the 2,000 government-
2EP1 17 Sept 59
101
 Approved For lease 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T0 97504700150001-3
IN
rity forces, and right-wing monarchists had urged a showdown
with left-wing members of the government)
tated by left-wing youth group criticism of the army and secu-
ment had. been anticipated because the King was recently irri-
MoY rocco:King Mohamed. V will probably permit the
Ibrahim government to remain in office for some time while
he searches- for a moderate successor, according to the
American ambassador in Rabat. An early change of govern-
Japan: Top Japanese Socialist party leaders have decided
to adjourn the party convention until October without resolving
the dispute between the left and right wings. Attempts to me-
diate the crisis have failed. to develop a basis acceptable to
Suehiro Nishio for returning his right-wing faction to the con-
vention. Nishio, apparently influenced by some members of
his faction who feel the time is not favorable, is delaying the
formation of a new anti-Communist Socialist party, although
he is committed at least to establishing a more aggressive in-
25X1 traparty opposition,
Watch Committee conclusions: Situations susceptible of
direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeop-
ardize US interests exist in the Middle East, particularly in
Iraq and Iran, and in Laos,
Middle East: The initiation of significant hostilities is un-
likely in this area in the immediate future.
Laos: The dissidents, with probable North 'Vietnamese as-
sistance, continue to have the objective of establishing themselves
in a strong position, particularly in the northern provinces, which
they could use as the basis for political negotiation or for the ex-
pansion of military operations to include the greater portion, if
not all of the country, should. government resistance weaken.
25X1
I I I. THE WEST
Uuoa: i i
25X1 Fide v Castro is planning important changes in key government
17 Sept 59
Approved For Relea
A0047001500%x,
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
j
 25X1 Approved For 4ease 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79TO475QP4700150001-3
0
positions. There have been numerous reports that some mod-
n+. 1-%,n fryrr-nA nii+ nf +hp mrPrnrnPn+ nnrl that nro-Com-
0, X&A".Y
munist Ernesto Guevara will have an influential industrial
9r.yi Dlannina role. F_
*France -Algeria: (be Gaulle's 16 September commitment to
-Algeria the choice of independence "within four years, of
give
pacification" has the immediate aim of isolating the FLN and 25X
neutralizing an anti-French resolution in the UN General Assem-
-C-4-4- --A 1-
Nov, . 1 -1-4 ' 4 4
ing integration of Algeria with France as an alternative he hopes
to mollify his army and rightist critics. Nevertheless,, his, pub-
lic espousal of self -determination indicates. confidence in suff i-
cient army support to control any overt opposition., and in eventual
Moslem willingness to choose close association with France. The
110.
most likely leader of any serious, opposition,, Deputy Premier
Jacques Soustelle, has reportedly assured De Gaulle of his sup-
port. FLN leaders, gathered in Tunis, appear certain to denounce
De Gaulle's unwillingness to negotiate a political settlement, and.
P E
probably view his. proposals as. an attempt to undercut their sup-
port in the UN and among Algerian MoslemsT, 25X1
25X1
me
17 Sept 59
25X1
5AO04700150001-3 25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04700150001-3
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04700150001-3
 25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04700150001-3
*1 Nwr
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Th OSituation in Laos
British Foreign Office officials have suggested, to Amer-
ican Embassy officers early British-American consultations
on the advisability of at least exploratory negotiations with the
Communists with the objective of restoring to Laos its previ-
ously "sanitized" status. Recalling their arduous 5-year anti-
guerrilla campaign in Malaya, the British officials doubt the
feasibility of a military solution, to the Laotian crisis. They
express preference for some kind of "deal" along the lines
of the 1954 Geneva agreements, in which the Communists, in
return for guarantees against Western intervention in Laos
and perhaps some concessions to the Pathet Lao, would refrain
from giving military support to the rebels)
(France, in line with its view that the trouble in Laos is
largely of domestic political origin, has rejected the Soviet
proposal for reconvening the 1954 Geneva conference which
ended the Indochina war. The French have accused the Lao-
tian Army of exaggerating external Communist assistance to
the dissidents in order to cover the army's "ineptness." A
French Foreign Ministry official recently commented to
American representatives that it "might not be a bad idea"
for the Laotian Government to make concessions to the dissi-
dents to stabilize the situation, Such a suggestion is in keep-
ing with France's long-standing preference for the neutraliza-
tion of the non-Communist states in Indochina.)
Small-scale attacks on Laotian Army units have occurred
in central Laos during the past two weeks. Skirmishing in Sam
Neua and Phong Saly s also continues, but on an a ar-
ently reduced scale rovince
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04700150001-3
17 Sept 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79T00975AA0004700150001-3
Iraq Shifting Students to Soviet :Bloc
During the coming school year a record number of Iraqi
government-sponsored students will be sent abroad, and it is
expected that the Soviet bloc will make serious inroads in the
number sent to Western countries. The bloc, which had only
12 Iraqi students last year, has offered about 450 scholarships
for the coming year. An additional incentive for Iraq to switch
students is "bargain rate" educational costs in the USSR. An
Iraqi educational official has stated that an Iraqi student in the
US costs his government $4,200 per year, as opposed to a cost
of $440 in the USSR. Moreover, he said, the USSR provides
free medical care and other amenities, "which are not avail-
able in most Western universities."
On 2 September the Iraqi Ministry of Education announced
that 2,000 students will be sent abroad on Iraqi Government
scholarships during the 1959-60 academic year, an increase
of 700 over this year. According to the ministry, the approx-
imately 3,200 Iraqi students abroad this year on government
scholarships and at their own expense were distributed as
follows. US 941, Britain 623, West Germany 197, France 143,
India 54, Switzerland 30, Austria 51, Italy 3, and Sweden 2.
In the Middle East there are 546 in Turkey, 297 in Lebanon,
279 in the UAR, 4 in Iran, and 3 in Pakistan. Of students in
the bloc, there are 11 in East Germany and one in Poland.
For the coming academic year, East Germany has granted
70 scholarships, Bulgaria and Hungary 22 each, Czechoslovakia
15, Poland 10, Rumania 6, Albania 5, and North Korea 5. The
USSR has agreed to accept 300 students--50 on full scholarships
--the costs of the remaining 250 being split between the USSR
and Iraq. In addition, Communist China has granted 18. Yugo-
slavia will give 14 scholarships..
In the past the tendency has been for Iraqi students to be
sent to the US and Great Britain. because of the widespread
use of the English language in Iraq.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700150001-3
17 Sept 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
 Approved For_ - 04700150001-3
Japanese Socialist Leaders Seek Time to Repair Party Schism
Top Japanese Socialist party leaders have decided to adjourn
the convention now in session at Tokyo in an effort to gain time in
which to repair the schism created. by the walkout of the right-wing
Suehir.o. Nishio faction on 14 September in opposition to the party's
trend toward extreme leftism. The leaders plan to resume the
convention in October, prior to an extraordinary Diet session
scheduled for that month. While feverish efforts thus far have
failed to develop a formula acceptable to Nishio for the return of
his faction to the party fold, the leaders apparently still hope to
fashion a compromise that will prevent a formal split in the party.
Nishio, apparently influenced. by some supporters who believe
the time is not favorable, has not decided to form a new party im-
mediately, but has said he would do so in October if forced by the
present Socialist leaders. He has asserted that such a party would
be non-Marxist with a broad. popular appeal which would garner
Socialist support from beyond. organized labor and farmer unions.
The moderate right-wing faction of Jotaro Kawakami, which
has about 65 of the party's 250 Diet members, appears to hold
the key to future developments in the Socialist party. Although
a majority of the Kawakami group is reported to support Nishio,
the faction agreed to participate in the party convention which re-
opened on 15 September with the understanding that action on the
reorganization plan and the election of officers would be carried
over to the October meeting. Kawakami, who initially defended.
Nishio, now has made clear by publicly criticizing the dissidents'
plan for a new party that he wishes to avoid a party split at any
cost. Even if Kawakami's position provides an avenue for a com-
promise, Nishio appears committed to establish a more aggres-
sive intraparty opposition.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04700150001-3
17 Sept 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
 Approved Forte - 4700150001-3
111. THE WEST
Cuban Government May Be Reshuffled
Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Cuban finance minister,
said on 14 September that "necessary and im-
portant changes" would soon be made in key revolutionary gov-
ernment positions. Lopez, who is highly regarded by Ameri-
can officials, appeared confident of retaining his post although
his replacement has been rumored, along with that of several
other moderate ministers.
Fidel
Castro is dissatisfied with the slow progress of the revolution,
particularly agrarian and educational reforms, and will shift
the directors of both to other positions. There is one report
that Castro will resign as prime minister and assume active
control of the agrarian reform institute. Most observers agree
that pro-Communist Ernesto Guevara will receive some im-
portant post directing the development or regulation of the in-
dustrialization program, which is another priority revolutionary
aim.
The retention of trained officials like Fresquet, Economy
Minister Boti, and National Bank president Pazos--who are
determined to keep the Cuban economy from collapsing- -would
serve as a counterbalance to the apparently increasing power
of Raul Castro, Guevara, and other extreme leftists.I
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04700150001-3
17 Sept 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79T00975A0 4700150001-3
w4w
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700150001-3
25X1
25X1
 0 Approved FoeleasTOP2/SRTT00974004700150001-3
040
Approved For Releas /2 00975A004700150001-3