CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A004700180001-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
12
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 23, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 21, 1959
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A004700180001-0.pdf583.73 KB
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i ~ i ~ i ~ i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i, h i i i iii i iiii ~ iiiiiiiiiiiiiii~ Approved F ro~Release~~p/2'1~,~~0097~5A004700180001-0 21 September 1959 / 25X1 State Dept. review completed Copy No. ~~rJ~~NTNO 1~ . too CMa~.G~ irv rLASS. f :' Uf;CLA~,~l~1Ep CL,458. CFlANciED Tb: WE7tT RErVIEtN 13a7E; ' AL T DATA X1 a~vrrrw~~: -0.,~ Approved For Releas~~~/2~~~~00975A004700180001-0 25X1 gpproved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004700180001-0 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004700180001-0 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T0097~A00~~0~80001-0 Reactions to Khrushchev?s. disarmament proposals: Non- communist comment on Khrushchev s is.armament proposals has been generally cautious. Official comment, while frequently expressing skepticism, has assured that the proposals will be carefully studied. Influential West European information media ,- are stressing the propagandistic nature of the proposals and are ~`- criticial of the absence of provis-ions for effective control. Nasir has lauded the proposals as consistent with long-standing desires, of the Arab world, and they have received. top billing in Iraq. Socialist and leftist elements in Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia, Italy, and elsewhere, urge that fullest consideration be given the proposals "as the best hope remaining in the world, but to this enthusiastic response is sometimes added the hope that Khrushchev is to acce tan effective ins ection and control mechanism. 21 Sept 59 DAILY BRIEF Approved For Rele~se 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975~100q~7~~1,,80001-0 Approved For Re ~~ 5A~~QQ0180001-0 25X1 25X1 III. THE WEST France-Algeria; Favorable reaction abroad to De Graulle's 17 September propos~als~ on Algeria, which were aimed partly at Free World countries whose support he is seeking for France's position in the United Nations, .are thus. far centered largely in Western Europe. In Latin America, where Paris had particu- larly hoped to retain support or to win over several countries-- Cuba, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela--which have indicated they would probably vote against France, the impact of the De C~a.ulle speech was considerably diminished because of preoccupation with Khrushchev's visit to the United States, Many important "neu- trals" such as India are likely t,o await the Algerian rebels? reply to De Gaulle's proposals before taking a stands The rebel govern- ment is now meeting in Tunis. Communist bloc reaction has been generally negative but to date has been a ressed rimaril in low- level propaganda commentary, Brazil. The- government may send a trade mission to Moscow The amount invo ve may a as much as $100,0009000, about this week to negotiate alarge-scale barter agreement involvin Soviet petroleum, a o Brazil's annual oil import requirements, The USSR has of- fered Brazil smaller amounts of oil several times in the past year and during the summer reportedly offered to buy large amounts of coffee as part of its continuing Effort to conclude a trade treaty4 Several high-ranking Brazilian officials are opposed. to large-scale transactions with the USSR9 but President Kubitschek may believe it offers the only politically feasible solution to the countr 's severe foreign exchange difficulties, 25X1 21 Sept 59 DAILY BRIEF iii 25X1 Approved For R - 75A004700180001-0 j j ~ j ////////////////////// ~ //////////// / % // // ~ / // / // / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / O / / / / / / / ~ ~ / / / / O % ~ % / / / % % % / / / % % % % % % % % % / / / % / % % % % % % % % % % / % % / % % % % % / / % % % / % % % / / % % % % / / / / / / / / / / i i i i i i i i i i i i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a ~ ~ a ~ ~ ~ ~ a 25X1 25X1 Approved For Rele 25X1 South Tirol: Renewed tension between Austria and Italy seems likely to result from Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky's declared intention of ref erring to the South Tirol dispute as an "important subject" in his forthcomin address to the UN Gen- eral Assembly. yen a mo era a re erence in e o e pro ems o e u 'rol will probably strike the Italians as provocative.' 25X1 21 Sept 59 DAILY BRIEF iv Approved For Rel ase - 5A00470018~01 0 ~~ ~,% 25X1 gpproved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004700180001-0 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004700180001-0 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T0097~A004700180001-0 25X1 Reaction to De Gaulle's Proposals on Algeria Favorable official reaction to French Pres-ident de Gaulle's proposals of 17 September for an Algerian solution has thus far been confined mostly to France's NATO allies, who in varying degrees have welcomed it as a "step in the right direction" which will facilitate their support of France in the United Nations de- bate on Algeria. ~ A British Foreign Office spokesman left the impression with US representatives that the United Kingdom is prepared to support De Gaulle's proposals and is hopeful of a UN resolution on Algeria favorable to France, Canadian representatives in London share this view, a Greek representative in London thought that the pro- posals would "ease" Greece's position in the United Nations, al- though)the opposition in Athens is said to be taking advantage of the proposals to taunt the Greek Government for having accepted an "unsatisfactory" Cyprus settlement. est German Chancellor Adenauer charac- terized De Gaulle's speech as "wonderful;' though the official press comment was considerably more restrained, The Italian Foreign Ministry has reportedly recommended that Foreign Min- ister Pella accept the speech as evidence of a progressive policy justifying continued Italian support of France. The American Embassy in Rome expects, however, that there will be "sniping" from center-left elements; including oil magnate Enrico Mattei, who are "interested in influencing Arabs and of avoiding the colonialist label:' Most other official comment in Western Europe is privately favorable, but officially restrained.. In Latin America, where Paris had. particularly hoped to re- tain support in the ~UN or to win over several countries,--such as Cuba; Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela--which had indicated. they would probably vote against France this year, the impact of De Gaulle's proposals was considerably diminished by preoccupation with Khrushchev's visit to the United States. There are few indi- cations of official thinking. The acting foreign minister of Uruguay Approved For Release 2Q~~/~~/21:CIA-RDP79T00975A004700180001-0 21 Sept 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A00~ 25X1 has commented hat he felt the speech did not change the situation much Tn traditionally pro-French Brazils the government must take into account important Syrian and Leb- anese minorities and general public sympathy for Algerian independence Reaction is scant in free Aria and Africa, with such im- portant "neutrals" as India apparently awaiting the Algerian rebels' reply to the proposals fallowing the rebel government meeting- now being held in Tunisq Arab reactian, though sharply critical except in Tunisia5 also appears to be played. down ;pending the rebel pronouncement expected early this weeks Communist bloc reaction has been negative and generally confined to low-level propaganda expres- sions? In the strongest statement to datep Moscow in a .broad;- cast of 19 September charged. that the speech supports the conviction that De Gaulle favors continuing the ward Peiping on 19 September characterized 'the proposals as "deceptive." 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/2~5~8`,1~1-RDP79T00975A004700180001-0 21 Sept 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 25X1 Approved For elease 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A00 700180001-0 Brazilian-Soviet Trade Negotiations President Kubitschek has asked the chief of Brazil's National Petroleum Council (NPC) to be a member of a "negotiating mission" which may leave for Moscow this week to discuss a lar a-scale barter agreement involving Soviet petroleum, The 25X1 amount invo ve may a as muc as , , , The NPC reportedly is drawing up a memoran- 25X1 um opposing a transaation9 probably because Soviet oil in trial shipments earlier this year proved unsuitable for process- ing in government-owned refineries. President Kubitscheky however, may believe such a deal offers the only politically feasible solution to Brazil's severe foreign exchange difficulties. While Kubitschek appears to have the backing of his new foreign minister, technicians in the For- eign Ministry are not yet persuaded that the transaction would be advantageous. Brazil has been urgently seeking long-term credits from American oil suppliers who normally provide most of the country9s. $250,000,000 annual oil import requirements. Dissatis- fied with the American counteroffers, the government reportedly has considered forcing the US-owned refineries to process Soviet crude oil. The USSR has notably stepped up its trade offensive in Brazil during 1959, offering to barter oil, wheat and other products which have been in short su 1 in Brazil due to foreign exchange prob- lems. he Soviet Union is wi mg o accep arge quan i ies o co ee m re- turn. In past talks with the USSR, Brazil has insisted on firm guarantees. against resale of coffee in Brazil's traditional markets-, apparently without successo and has shipped only small quantities. pprove or a ease - 0001-0 25X1 21 Sept 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN page 6 Approved For Re ease 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975 004700180001-0 25X1 Renewed. Tension Over South 'Tirol Expected to Follow Austrian UN Move Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky?s apparent determination to re er to the South Tirol issue as an "important subject" in his forthcoming address to the UN General Assembly seems likely to raise new obstacles to an early settlement of this long-standing Austrian-Italian territorial disputed Italy has long considered the South- Tirol an internal matter--or at worsts a problem to be resolved. in bilateral talks with Austria--and even a moderate reference in the United Natians; to 'the problem ~vsrill p~obab~:y strike Rome as provocative CKreisky has assured American officials in Vienna that his s eech will be as "moderate as he can make it " epro a ymen s- osress e " ragic social-economic situation of the South Tirolese who are strangers in their own lands" and. will call for full regional autonomy of the predominantly German-speaking part of the South Tirol Italy has shown no inte~ltion of granting such autonomy, probably feeling this would be followed by demands- for full self- determination and. return of the area to Austria Although Kreisky is generally cons-idered a moderate on the issues he has seemed especially anxious to champion the South Tirolean causes ands since he took office in the summer, he has had several conferences with- S~~uth Tirolean leaders, He evidently hopes his UN speech will satisfy these leaders and result in fur- ther talks with the Italiansa Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004700180001-0 21 Sept 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page ? 25X6 25X1 Approved For Rel THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for Internatianal Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States: Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for ,Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of S"kaff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of 5~taff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director 25X1 Approved For R~lease 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A0C~4700180001-0 25X1 Approved For ~aseR2~~/2~~1~~~~00975Ay~,4700180001-0 ~% // Approved For Releas/~:~~T00975A004700180001-0 ~~~~~iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii~i~~~~~~~%