CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A004700180001-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
12
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 23, 2002
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 21, 1959
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T00975A004700180001-0.pdf | 583.73 KB |
Body:
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Reactions to Khrushchev?s. disarmament proposals: Non-
communist comment on Khrushchev s is.armament proposals
has been generally cautious. Official comment, while frequently
expressing skepticism, has assured that the proposals will be
carefully studied. Influential West European information media
,- are stressing the propagandistic nature of the proposals and are
~`- criticial of the absence of provis-ions for effective control. Nasir
has lauded the proposals as consistent with long-standing desires,
of the Arab world, and they have received. top billing in Iraq.
Socialist and leftist elements in Japan, the United Kingdom,
Australia, Italy, and elsewhere, urge that fullest consideration
be given the proposals "as the best hope remaining in the world,
but to this enthusiastic response is sometimes added the hope
that Khrushchev is to acce tan effective ins ection and
control mechanism.
21 Sept 59 DAILY BRIEF
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III. THE WEST
France-Algeria; Favorable reaction abroad to De Graulle's
17 September propos~als~ on Algeria, which were aimed partly at
Free World countries whose support he is seeking for France's
position in the United Nations, .are thus. far centered largely in
Western Europe. In Latin America, where Paris had particu-
larly hoped to retain support or to win over several countries--
Cuba, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela--which have indicated they
would probably vote against France, the impact of the De C~a.ulle
speech was considerably diminished because of preoccupation with
Khrushchev's visit to the United States, Many important "neu-
trals" such as India are likely t,o await the Algerian rebels? reply
to De Gaulle's proposals before taking a stands The rebel govern-
ment is now meeting in Tunis. Communist bloc reaction has been
generally negative but to date has been a ressed rimaril in low-
level propaganda commentary,
Brazil. The- government may send a trade mission to Moscow
The amount invo ve may a as much as $100,0009000, about
this week to negotiate alarge-scale barter agreement involvin
Soviet petroleum,
a o Brazil's annual oil import requirements, The USSR has of-
fered Brazil smaller amounts of oil several times in the past year
and during the summer reportedly offered to buy large amounts of
coffee as part of its continuing Effort to conclude a trade treaty4
Several high-ranking Brazilian officials are opposed. to large-scale
transactions with the USSR9 but President Kubitschek may believe
it offers the only politically feasible solution to the countr 's severe
foreign exchange difficulties,
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South Tirol: Renewed tension between Austria and Italy
seems likely to result from Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky's
declared intention of ref erring to the South Tirol dispute as an
"important subject" in his forthcomin address to the UN Gen-
eral Assembly.
yen a mo era a re erence in e o e pro ems o
e u 'rol will probably strike the Italians as provocative.'
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Reaction to De Gaulle's Proposals on Algeria
Favorable official reaction to French Pres-ident de Gaulle's
proposals of 17 September for an Algerian solution has thus far
been confined mostly to France's NATO allies, who in varying
degrees have welcomed it as a "step in the right direction" which
will facilitate their support of France in the United Nations de-
bate on Algeria.
~ A British Foreign Office spokesman left the impression with
US representatives that the United Kingdom is prepared to support
De Gaulle's proposals and is hopeful of a UN resolution on Algeria
favorable to France, Canadian representatives in London share
this view, a Greek representative in London thought that the pro-
posals would "ease" Greece's position in the United Nations, al-
though)the opposition in Athens is said to be taking advantage of
the proposals to taunt the Greek Government for having accepted
an "unsatisfactory" Cyprus settlement.
est German Chancellor Adenauer charac-
terized De Gaulle's speech as "wonderful;' though the official
press comment was considerably more restrained, The Italian
Foreign Ministry has reportedly recommended that Foreign Min-
ister Pella accept the speech as evidence of a progressive policy
justifying continued Italian support of France. The American
Embassy in Rome expects, however, that there will be "sniping"
from center-left elements; including oil magnate Enrico Mattei,
who are "interested in influencing Arabs and of avoiding the
colonialist label:' Most other official comment in Western Europe
is privately favorable, but officially restrained..
In Latin America, where Paris had. particularly hoped to re-
tain support in the ~UN or to win over several countries,--such as
Cuba; Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela--which had indicated. they
would probably vote against France this year, the impact of De
Gaulle's proposals was considerably diminished by preoccupation
with Khrushchev's visit to the United States. There are few indi-
cations of official thinking. The acting foreign minister of Uruguay
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has commented hat he felt the speech did not change
the situation much Tn traditionally pro-French Brazils the
government must take into account important Syrian and Leb-
anese minorities and general public sympathy for Algerian
independence
Reaction is scant in free Aria and Africa, with such im-
portant "neutrals" as India apparently awaiting the Algerian
rebels' reply to the proposals fallowing the rebel government
meeting- now being held in Tunisq
Arab reactian, though sharply critical except in Tunisia5
also appears to be played. down ;pending the rebel pronouncement
expected early this weeks Communist bloc reaction has been
negative and generally confined to low-level propaganda expres-
sions? In the strongest statement to datep Moscow in a .broad;-
cast of 19 September charged. that the speech supports the
conviction that De Gaulle favors continuing the ward Peiping
on 19 September characterized 'the proposals as "deceptive."
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Brazilian-Soviet Trade Negotiations
President Kubitschek has asked the chief of
Brazil's National Petroleum Council (NPC) to be a member of
a "negotiating mission" which may leave for Moscow this week
to discuss a lar a-scale barter agreement involving Soviet
petroleum, The
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amount invo ve may a as muc as , , ,
The NPC reportedly is drawing up a memoran- 25X1
um opposing a transaation9 probably because Soviet oil in
trial shipments earlier this year proved unsuitable for process-
ing in government-owned refineries.
President Kubitscheky however, may believe such a deal
offers the only politically feasible solution to Brazil's severe
foreign exchange difficulties. While Kubitschek appears to have
the backing of his new foreign minister, technicians in the For-
eign Ministry are not yet persuaded that the transaction would be
advantageous. Brazil has been urgently seeking long-term credits
from American oil suppliers who normally provide most of the
country9s. $250,000,000 annual oil import requirements. Dissatis-
fied with the American counteroffers, the government reportedly
has considered forcing the US-owned refineries to process Soviet
crude oil.
The USSR has notably stepped up its trade offensive in Brazil
during 1959, offering to barter oil, wheat and other products which
have been in short su 1 in Brazil due to foreign exchange prob-
lems. he
Soviet Union is wi mg o accep arge quan i ies o co ee m re-
turn. In past talks with the USSR, Brazil has insisted on firm
guarantees. against resale of coffee in Brazil's traditional markets-,
apparently without successo and has shipped only small quantities.
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Renewed. Tension Over South 'Tirol Expected to Follow
Austrian UN Move
Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky?s apparent determination
to re er to the South Tirol issue as an "important subject" in his
forthcoming address to the UN General Assembly seems likely to
raise new obstacles to an early settlement of this long-standing
Austrian-Italian territorial disputed Italy has long considered
the South- Tirol an internal matter--or at worsts a problem to be
resolved. in bilateral talks with Austria--and even a moderate
reference in the United Natians; to 'the problem ~vsrill p~obab~:y strike
Rome as provocative
CKreisky has assured American officials in Vienna that his
s eech will be as "moderate as he can make it "
epro a ymen s- osress
e " ragic social-economic situation of the South Tirolese who
are strangers in their own lands" and. will call for full regional
autonomy of the predominantly German-speaking part of the South
Tirol Italy has shown no inte~ltion of granting such autonomy,
probably feeling this would be followed by demands- for full self-
determination and. return of the area to Austria
Although Kreisky is generally cons-idered a moderate on the
issues he has seemed especially anxious to champion the South
Tirolean causes ands since he took office in the summer, he has
had several conferences with- S~~uth Tirolean leaders, He evidently
hopes his UN speech will satisfy these leaders and result in fur-
ther talks with the Italiansa
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Internatianal Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States: Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for ,Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of S"kaff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of 5~taff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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