CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004700200001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 23, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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 Approved For
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
~3 September 1959
DAILY BRIEF
II. ASIA-AFRICA
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*UARo CNasir told Ambassador Hare on 17 September that
he had concluded it is "virtually impossible" for anon-Commu-
nist country to come to basic agreement with the USSR and that
the trend of UAR-Soviet relations is "downward:' He added that
the USSR is following a "policy of pressure" toward, the UAR,
although this is not yet evident in the economic field. Hare com-
ments that Nasir's "disenchantment" points toward
the UAR's
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eventual assum Lion of a olic ~of neutralism in fact rather than
only. in words.
Sudano After taking a series, of precautionary measures
against possible new moves by dissident army officers and po-
litical leaders, the Abboud military government has announced
sentences of life imprisonment against the six officers primarily
responsible for the abortive coup attempt of 22 May, The govern-
ment ordered an army alert beginning on 10 September, In an
ffort to minimize hostile public reaction, Abboud commuted the
eath sentences recommended by the court martial. In an earlier
onciliatory move on 19 ...September, he announced he was studying
arious wa s for a radual shift to "representative government,"
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Cambodia - .South Vietnam: Evidence being accumulated
by the Sihanouk government indicating South Vietnam's encourag-
the likelihood
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ment of Cambodian dissident elements po
f a rapid deterioration in the recently improved Cambodian -
South Vietnamese relations. Anti-Sihanouk broadcasts, continue
o emanate from South Vietnamese territory, and Cambodian
security forces recently have intercepted several armed dis-
ident agents allegedly trained a an of fciags that thelbombtat-
Vietnam. The belief of Cambodi
tempt on Queen Kossamak's life last month was the work of
whom they are convinced is, still
S
ary,
dissident leader Sam
su orted covertl b South Vietnam adds to their suapicions.~
III. THE WEST
tion y are mounting between the Hon uran
i
F
c
r
Honduras:
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armed forces and armed partisans of the governing Liberal par y.
Reports of an imminent attempt by the military to effect a coup
y have caused. the Liberal-controlled police to prepare for action
~'` in defense of the Villeda Morales regime. Se 'ous fi htin could
be touched off by a relatively minor incident,
257;C~'f`
23 Sept 59 DAILY BRIEF
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II, A;IA-~~.F'E,ICI.
~Tas,ir Comments- on UAR-USSR Relations.
~~ a lengthy co?~versation with ~a~ba~-ti.ac'.or xare on 1?~ ~ep-
~e~.ber, ~i~~~R Pres-ie~ent :t~a~,ir reviewed. Isis diffic~~lties, with tree
USSR, beginning with iris, anti-Cous~~~nuni~s,t ca~~paign la~~c ceF~L-
ber, and concluded with the s-tater~zent t~:at it was "virtually in~-
possible" for any non-Cornmunist country to reach bas-ic agree-
ment with the Soviet Union. He complained of continued. Soviet
interference in matters related to "local" Comanunists, and.
stated that the recent ups and downs in Soviet-UAR relations
now have settled into a downward trend. Nasir prefaced, his.
remarks by commenting that he izoped the Khrus,hchev visit to
the United States would be successful in easing world tensions,,
but added pessimistically that it would be a "difficult matter"
because of the USSR's dedication- to the world-wide propagation
of Communism.
CNasir claimed that the USSR was following a policy of pres-
sure in its relations with the UAR, specifically- mentioning al-
leged. price increases and delays in arms deliveries.. I3e said
however, that the pressure was not yet evident in the economic
field9 presumably referring to commercial transactions and
Soviet commitments under economic aid programs)
~In the sharpest Soviet press, attack in recent months, Pravda
charged on 19 September that an "anti-Soviet campaign" was cur-
rently being waged by the UAR press and accused "certain ill-
disposed. persons" of using the press to worsen Soviet-Arab rela-
tions. The American Embassy in Moscow comments that Pravda's
reference to "nonpolitical" Soviet economic aid, particularly in
regard to the Aswan High .Damp suggests that 1Vloscow may have
wished to hint publicly that Cairo's present course if continued
could affect the Soviet economic aid nro~raml
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Sudanese Government Prepares for New Trouble
The Abboud military government anticipates a hostile public
reaction to the sentences for life imprisonment imposed on the
six army officers primarily responsible for the abortive coup at-
tempt of 22 May and the lesser sentences given six other impli-
cated. officers:, Abboud commuted the death sentences of the six
leaders.
The government delayed the announcement while it took steps
to minimize the expected reaction and adopted precautionary meas-
ures against possible moves by dissident army officers, and polit-
ical leaders. Abboud and his Deputy Commander in Chief 1-lasan
Das.hir Nasir used a series of officer transfers and reassignments
to strengthen their controls As a further precau 'on, the govern-
ment on 10 September instituted an army alerts
In response to growing popular pressure for "return of the
arrh7y to the barracks;' Abboud declared on 19 September that he
was considering various alternatives for a gradual return to
"r. epresentative governments' Lone plan submitted to him for study
is the single-party "national union" s stem used b Nasir in the
United Arab Republi.c;~
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23 Sept 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page ~
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Cambodian -South .Vietnamese Relations
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~A deterioration in relations between Cambodia and South
Vietnam may result from the Sihanouk government's growing
conviction that South Vietnam i:i actively encouraging Cambodian
dissident elei~aents. Spurred. by the ~1 August bomb attempt on
Queen Kossamak's life9 which t:he government attributes to dis-
sident leader Sam Sary, Cambodian officials have been quietly
gathering evidence to document their suspicions'
~T'hree "Free Cambodia" agents captured. recently by Cam-
bodian security forces- allegedly have confessed to hawing been
trained at a sabotage school in South Vietnamy in addition, ten
armed. Vietnamese s-eizedon Cambodian territory earlier this
month are reported to have admitted being agents of the small
Cambodian dissident movement? The continuation of clandestine
anti-Sihanouk broadcasts emanating from South Vietnamese ter-
ritory is an added factor. The arrest in Phnom Fenh of a Viet-
namese charged with delivering the gift-wrapped bomb to the palace
grounds addressed. to the Queen,, has particular significance in
view of the suspect's close identification with South Vietnam's for-
mer representative in Cambodi,~,, Ngo Trong Hieup wha was deep-
ly implicated in the abortive Dap Chhuon coup effort last spring'
The fregn.ently impetuous Sihanouk has, acted with great re-
straint9 seemingly reluctant to damage the "entente" with South
Vietnam which he claimed his top-level talks there in early August
had. achieved. He has also acted promptly to head. off propaganda
efforts by the pro-Communist press to implicate the ITnited States
in the bomb incident, and. has indicated he would welcome Amer-
ican help in trying to salvage relations with South Vietnam, In
this instance, Sihanouk's concern over Communist pressures
against Laos and India probably has deterred the normal tendency
of Cambodia to move clos-er toward the Sino-Soviet bloc durin
dis utes with South Vietnam
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Tensions Between Military and Government Party Dangerously
High in Honduras
Frictions are mounting daxigerously between Honduran armed.
forces and. armed partisans of the governing Liberal party. There
are reports of an imminent coup attempt by the military, which
has been accused by E1 Cronista--a Tegucigalpa newspaper with
Communists on its staff --of marily executing two members
of the civil police who allegedly killed an arm officer in a bar-
room brawl on 6 September.
parts of the army and the entire air force are on full alert.
e ou come probab y will de-
pend on the positions taken by I?resident Villeda Morales and. the
university students. A strong plea by the popular Fres,ident for
peace between the military and the Liberal party proba'raly would
be obeyed, but Villeda Morales has proved to be indeci.~ive and
equivocal during other crises, According to a press, report, the
main Honduran student federation, FEUH, which is influenced
strongly by Communists, joined E1 Cronista on 20 September in
demanding that those responsible far the alleged police deaths be
brought to justice.
E1 Cronista and. the FEUH :have acted as constant irritants to
the military and. periodically have revived the civil-military feud
that has existed since the constitution written in 1957 far the first
democratically elected government in Honduras gave the armed
forces an autonomous status within the government.
Serious fighting between the military and the "Black Army"
could be touched off by a relatively minor incident.
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23 Sept 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Fage 7
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under .Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
`The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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