CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004700240001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 28, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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28 September 1959
Copy No. C ~a ~~
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State Dept. review completed
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
sma sc
indicates a shift to the southern provinces, in what may bean 25X1
attempt to force the overnment to withdraw some of its trao s
September pledged to continue the late Prime Minister Han-
daranaike?s policies and indicated he intends to maintain Ban-
da.ranaike's party in power until the next regularly scheduled
national elections in 1961. He has retained all members of
Ba,nda.ranaike's cabinet, .and Governor General Goonetilleke
has issued no call for new elections. The views of other par-
ties apparently were nat con~,kdered prior to the Governor
General's appointment of Daliariayake, and. there is little rea-
son to believe they will support him. .Since Dahanayake does
committee members are said to be opposed to visiting combat
sites in the border areas for fear this would arouse North
Vietnam and Communist China. Meanwhile, the pattern of
11- ale enemy activity in Laos during the past few days
Neua town~ithin a few days, but how extensive and thorough
its field inspection will be is yet to be determined. Some sub- 25X1
Laos? The UN subcommittee has decide a y o am
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not command an absolute majority in Parliament, it i ues-
tionable how lon his overnmE;nt can in fact hold on.
I I Io THE ~ ST
j
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Dominican Republic: The Dominican economic and finan-
cial situation, already in serious condition, will rapidly worsen
between now and the end of the year unless the present abngrmal
I~ level of military expenditures is curtailed or an unforeseen
sharp price rise occurs in Dorinican export commodities. Dis-
content i~ mounting in upper- and middle=income rou s and
unemployment is rising.
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I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Bloe Representation at Peiping Celebrations
There is considerable variation in the composition of the
delegations from the Sino-Soviet bloc countries attending the
tenth anniversary celebrations in Peiping on 1 October.
The USSR is sending a particularly high-level, business-
like delegation. Led by Khrushchev, the group includes party
secretary Suslov, Foreign. Minister Gromyko, and secret po-
lice chief Shelepin. Xu. V, Andropov, the department head for
intrabloc affairs in the Soviet party apparatus, is in the delega-
tion, as is I, V. Arkhipov, former chief counselor of the Soviet
Embassy in Peiping- and now a deputy chairman of the State
Committee for Foreign Economic Relations. The delegations
from the three Asian satellites are headed by their respective
party chiefs,
In contrast, those attending; from Eastern Europe appar-
ently have been selected--presumably with Moscow's blessing--
on the basis of strict protocol r~equirernents, Each delegation
will be led, by the titular head of state except for those of Albania
and Rum~.ni,a, which are headed respectively by the premier a,nd
a deputy premier. None of the 'top political leaders will attend,
with $he exception of Shehu of Albania and Czechoslovak Pres-
ident,., and party First Secretary Novotny, which suggests that no
key political decisions or discu,~sions~ directly affecting Eastern
Europe are planned.
Ma,o himself attended the 4Qth anniversary celebrations in
Moscow in 1957, but Peiping has been represented at various
East European anniversary celebrations by leaders of lower
rank. Thus, the delegations from those countries seem to be
what reciprocity demands,; Peiping is likely to be piqued, how-
ever, in view of the unusual efforts they have taken to make the
celebration impressive.
The strength of the .Soviet delegation indicates that Khru-
shchev intends to use the occasion for serious talks with they
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Chinese. There have been a number of indications recently that
Soviet. and Chinese views have differed on certain issues, Soviet
officials have voiced concern over Peipingps handling of the Laotian
crisis and the border dispute with India. Feiping`s~ domestic prop-
aganda, on the other hand, has shown a degree of opposition to
Moscow's more moderate approach to the United States, Commu-
nist China apparently fears the effect which an improvement in
;3oviet^American relations might have on its, need for tension in
its domestic and foreign policies. Some irritation over the com-
munes is still evident both in Soviet and Chinese commentary~l
The presence of economic officials in the Soviet delegation
suggests that the USSR's role in Communist China's economic de-
velppment may also be discussed; however, the absence of senior
military leaders makes consideration of military issues unlikely
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Ceylon's new Prime Minister W. Dahanayake, appointed on
26 ieptember to succeed the late; S, W. R. D, Bandaranaike, has
said in a broadcast to the nation that he intends to continue
Bandaranaike's neutralist-socialist policies, thus indicating he
will try to maintain the :Sri Lanka Freedom party in power during
the year and a half. before the next regularly scheduled general
elections. Dahanayake reappointed the entire Bandaranaike cab-
inet, shifted ministerial duties slightly, assumed the ministries
of defense and foreign affairs himself, and appointed his parlia-
mentary secretary to be minister of education, the post Daha-
nayake formerly held.
Leaders of other- parties were not consulted concerning
Dahanayake's appointment, and i;he Governor General has not
indicated that he intends to call- for new national elections, The
new' government, which does not command a majority in Parlia-
ment~ will have to seek support from other parties if it expects
to remain firmly in power. No other party has indicated whether
it will support the new prime minister, although most probably
will accept the status quo pending their assessment of the situa-
tion. ~3ince Parliament is in session, the attitudes of other par-
ties should become apparent. shortly,
In view of the opposition's continuous attacks on Bandara-
naike's policies and the several attempts to force him out of of-
fice during the past year, Dahar~ayake may soon face a vote of
no-GOnfidence. While he has lo~1g been a prominent figure in
Ceylonese politics and has wide grass-roots support in his own
constituency, he has never been outside Ceylon and lacks the so-
phistication of most other Western-educated Ceylonese political
leaders. He is not held in the same regard by other politicians as
Bandaranaike, and he may not long be able to match Bandaranaike's
ability to hold together the dissident elements in his own ruling
party. Dahanayake may also have difficulty retaining a sufficient
number of independent and Tamil members to provide his own 38-
man group with a working majority in the 100-man Parliament.
There has been little indication of public unrest as yet,
walk-out by some Colombo port workers on 26 September does not
appear to have been directed by any of the powerful port unions of -
filitated with leftist opposition partied. While the walk-out may
have been occasioned merely by the ;prime .minister's death, it
could be the prelude to politically motivated labor disturbances
designed to weaken the ~overnmen .
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I I Io THE WE aT
Serious Dominican Economic Situation Likely to Worsen
A serious economic and. financial plight confronts the
Dominican Republic as a result of its abnormally high mil-
itary expenditures and the depressed world prices. for its chief
export crops, The American Embassy in Ciudad Trujillo sees
"a very real probability" that th.e situation will rapidly worsen
between now and the end of this yeax unless military expend-
itures are curtailed or there is a sharp rise in export earnings.
The government, having already pledged much of its, future ex-
port earnings far short- and medium-term loans, has nearly
exhausted its sources, of external credit,
Measures taken thus far hold little prospect for real im-
provement. Extremely heavy cutbacks in public works have
resulted in increased unemployment and a general business
slowdown. Upper- and middle-income groups are becoming
restive, .and embassy sources are notably less guarded in their
criticism of the Trujillo dictatorship, which is nearing its 30th
year.
On 24 September the government issued a decree which for
the first time acknowledged. the economic difficulties and or-
dered a 15-percent reduction in the salaries of high government
officials, The decree will have little practical effect in alle-
viating the government's economic plight, however, and may in
fact boomerang by creating uncertainties, if not genuine alarm,
among the people over the weakening economic situation and.
over the possible political repercussions.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Asaistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Asaistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Asaistant for Foreign Economic Folicy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretaxy for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air :Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Arrny
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Fac:ific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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