CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004700250001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 29, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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/ 29 September 1959
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threat, the incident will widen the French-Laotian rift to the
ening further to impair relations between the two countries.
The French are reacting strongly to an American newspaper
article, based on an unattributed interview with Laotian Pre-
mier Phoui, stating that Laos would sever "major relations"
with France if the Communist threat were contained and US
support continued, While Laos is unlikely to carry out this
Laos.FStrong feelings within the Laotian Government over
French inadequacy in military training and over French efforts
to play down the seriousness of the current crisis are threat-
detriment of joint Western efforts to strengthen Laos
dicated his opposition to any immediate changes. At the same
time, in spite of elaborate government security precautions,
a group of dissident junior officers is continuin its efforts to
line up enough support for a new coup attempt.
itary government. Under similar pressure from several in-
fluential political leaders, Abboud has publicly declared his
willingness to "study" plans for such a transition, but has in-
itary regime and to ask for a shift to a mixed. civilian and mil-
Sudan. the leader of the powerful conservative Ansar re-
ligious sect intends to approach Prime Minister Abboud to
protest against the weakness. and instability of the present mil-
relations with the Saifoulaye element.
(Page 4)
results of his visits may have an important effect on Toure'.
Guinea: President Sekou Toure, who seems to be attempt-
ing to follow a generally neutralist foreign policy, is reported
to be encountering increased pressure from the pro-Soviet
element in the Guinea Government. Leading this element
is National Assembly President Diallo Saifoulaye, whose pres-
tige has been heightened by his. successful negotiation in Moscow
last month of the $35,000,000 Soviet loan agreement. Toure is
scheduled to visit the US late next month and then the UK. The
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Algeria-France: In its formal reply to De Gaulle's pro-
posals for Algerian self-determination, the Algerian rebel
provisional government stated on 28 September that it is pre-
pared to discuss with the French the terms for a cease-fire.
While in effect accepting De Gaulle's program as a basis for
negotiation, the statement attacked those provisions which
provide for the partition of Algeria from the Saharan depart-
ments should it eventually elect. independence, and reaffirmed
the rebels' willingness to continue the war.
The rebel statement--which will probably gain strong
backing from the Asia-Africa: bloc--is directed toward the
long-time rebel goal of direct negotiations with France. In
keeping with his previous practice on major policy, De Gaulle
is unli el to feel the need of a further public statement on his
Dart.
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Argentina: President Frondizi's position has been at least
temporarily strengthened by the failure of the Peronista and
Communist labor leaders to obtain majority worker adherence
to their obviously political strike of 23-24 September. Econ-
omy Minister Alsogaray considers this failure a setback to the
plans of extremist labor leaders but feels that labor troubles
will continue. The government plans new measures to control
union activity and to end the wave of terrorism by agitators.
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The Situation in Laos
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The strong dissatisfaction of the Phoui Sananikone govern-
men1with Frances performance in Laos was again manifested
in a background briefing Phoui recently gave to New York Times
correspondent MacGregor. The Laotian premier allegedly cas-
tigated the French in strong terms and stated that "major rela-
tions" with France would be severed once the Communist threat
were contained and if American support for Laos continued.
The French have indicated serious concern over the article
published following this interview; they fear the article will
have a disruptive effect on their position in Laos
Phoui's unfavorable attitude stems largely from Laotian dis-
satisaction with the poor record of the French military mission,
which has consistently been maintained at a fraction of the strength
authorized, under the 1954 Geneva agreement. Furthermore, Lao-
tian leaders associate the French Army with the military debacle
at Dien Bien Phu, In addition, Laotians resent what they consid-
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itary personnel in Laos, The Laotians would prefer that all mil-
itary training be taken over by the United States
Recent efforts by French representatives in Vientiane to be-
Clittle 'Laotian claims of North Vietnamese involvement in Commu-
nist insurgent operations and to blame the crisis on the shortcom-
ings of the Phoui government have added to tension between the
two countries. While an open rupture. in relations is unlikely,
joint Western efforts to strengthen Laos will be hampered
M- eanwhile, the UN subcommittee in Laos is going ahead with
plans for field inspection trips in some of the areas of fighting.
The austerity of living conditions in Vientiane and the confused
and inept manner in which the Laotian Government is making the
necessary arrangements for the subcommittee to carry out its
mission are said to have put subcommittee members in a bad
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Pro-Communist Elements in Guinea Stepping Up
Pressure on Toure
Elements within the Guinea Government which favor a pro-
Soviet orientation are making a serious behind-the-scenes bid
for greater influence, according to Ambassador Morrow in
Conakry. These elements are being led by National Assembly
President Diallo Saifoulaye, an extreme leftist with some grass-
roots support who is reportedly waging a quiet campaign to un-
dermine President Sekou Toure's prestige. Other members of
the group are presumed to be Minister of Interior and Security
Keita Fodeba, Minister of Public Works Ismael Toure--the
President's brother, and Guinea's Minister Resident in Ghana
Diallo Abdoulaye- -all of whom have been identified in the past
with the pro-Communist clique. Like Diallo Saifoulaye, they
are all also members of the powerful political bureau of Guinea's
only political party, the Democratic party of Guinea (PDG), of
which Sekou Toure is secretary general.
Ambassador Morrow believes President Toure is attempting
to follow a neutralist foreign policy, but is having increasing dif -
ficulty holding this line--especially since Diallo Saifoulaye suc-
cessfully negotiated a $35,000,000 long-term Soviet credit in
Moscow last month. At the PDG's annual congress in Conakry
earlier this month, especially invited delegations from five bloc
countries played a prominent role while representatives from
Western countries, except for a group of French Communists,
were conspicuously absent and apparently not invited.
Sekou Toure is scheduled to make a 10-day official visit to
the United States commencing on 26 October and then to visit
London en route back to Conakry. The results of these visits,
and especially his sojourn in the US, may have an important
bearing on Toure's ability or inclination to withstand. the pres-
sures emanating from the pro- Soviet group in his regime.
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III. THE WEST
Argentine Government Strengthened by Failure of General
Strike
The failure of the majority of Argentine workers to sup-
port Peronista and Communist labor leaders in their recent
general strike call has strengthened the position of President
Frondizi's government. The strike leaders' list of demands
was directed mainly at forcing Frondizi to abandon austerity
measures under the US-backed stabilization program. The po-
litical stability of the government is largely dependent on the
success of this program in promoting economic recovery.
The Communists appear to have contributed relatively
little to the strike. This may cause the Peronistas, who
have been disunited over a number of issues, to reassess
the value of the labor unity pact they signed with the Commu-
nists in August.
Economic Minister Alvaro Alsogaray views the failure of
the strike as a "great victory" for the government but anticipates
continued labor troubles. Real wages, for example, ad fallen
in July 1959 to about 60 percent of their level a year earlier.
Alsogaray announced on 26 September that the government plans
new measures to control labor unions and to end the wave of
terrorism by agitators. Numerous bombings occurred during
the strike, but there was no major violence requiring the
promised assistance of the army commander in chief.
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 Approved
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State! for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps,
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States. Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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