CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A004700270001-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
12
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 25, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 1, 1959
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A004700270001-0.pdf708.12 KB
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Or, Approved ForxReleaseT?ll/2'sMeRIETT00975 004700270001- 25X1 1 October 1959 Copy o.i 25X1 IMMOMMIN OEM DOCUMENT N() NEXT f?LVIES`d AUTf j: j t 7Q.2 REVIEWER; "5X1 25X1 State Dept. review completed Approved For Release/~/21 p 1T00975A004700270001-0 ,& 0 ~ yr ~e~~cE ~ 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04700270001-0 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04700270001-0 Approved For Rele se 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00 75A004MJ70001-0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 25X1 % DAILY BRIEF I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR: The substantial relaxation of jamming of Voice of America broadcasts to the USSR has continued since Khru- shchev's departure from the United States. Jamming of VOA broadcasts intended for Eastern European audiences, howevers has continued. Fln a talk with US officials on 15 September in Washington, Yuri Zhukov, chairman of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, said this relaxation was an "experiment" to see whether the VOA would cease "pur- suing the cold war:] * USSR - Communist China: Soviet Premier Khrushchev's emphasis on peaceful coexistence in his 30 September speech in Peiping is apparently designed to convey the impression to the West that he intends to maintain the atmosphere of detente by dissociating the USSR from Peiping's harder foreign policy line. His remarks that "we must do everything possible to 25X1 ME/ j A roved For Rel ase 2002/10/21: CIA-RDP79T0097 A004700270001-0 25X1 pp X1 Appr~Shc Fce - 004700270001-0 j preclude war" and that "we should not attempt to test the sta- bility of the capitalist system by force" vary markedly in tone from recent Chinese Communist pronouncements. Both Khru- shchev and. Soviet party presidium member Suslov, who spoke in Peiping on 28 September, reflected Moscow's continuing re- luctance to endorse Communist China's current economic pol- icies-, although they made the usual affirmations of Soviet sup- port and friendship. Both speakers avoided any reference to China's commune program and to the "leap forward;" and Sus- lov's extended. praise of Soviet industrial and agricultural tech- nology appears to be an indirect suggestion to the Chinese that they would profit cloaely to the USSIVs methods in these fields. 25X1 2 j Approved For Release 2002/10/21: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04700270001-0 1 mm 1!: p Approved Foe le - 5 004700270001-0 5X1 25X1 I Watch Committee conclusions. f-Situations susceptible of di- rect exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would. jeopard ize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East. particu- larly in Ira and. Iran Laos: (ssident activity has remained at a low level. The dissidents, however, with probable North Vietnamese assistant continue to have the objective of establishing themselves in a strong position which they could use as the basis for political bargaining or for the expansion. of military operations. Middle East:lounting tensions in Iraq have increased the possibility of early aL-ttempts to assassinate or overthrow Qasim. Whether successful or not, such moves might well be followed by anarchy or civil war between nationalist and Communist forc s. Under these circumstances, direct UAR involvement in Irach wi h a consequent increase in the danger of broader hostilities in the area, is possible.7~ 1 Oct 59 DAILY BRIE F 25X V A Approved For Relese 2002/10/21 : CIA-RD 004700270001-0 9 Anoroved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700270001-0 j Latin America - Communist China: The top leaders of the Argentine, Brazilian, and Venezuelan -Communist parties, who are in Peiping for the Chinese tenth anniversary celebra- tion, , each spoke: at the formal, opening ceremonies. The pres- ence of these and other prominent Latin American Communist leaders provides an opportunity for Chinese officials to discuss with them new tactical plans in furtherance of Chinese objectives in Latin America, and to review accomplishments since the last meeting of Latin American leaders in Peiping early this year. The Chinese, who are seeking to increase their role in the guid- ance of Latin American Communists, have stepped up their cul- tural and Propaganda activity in the area in 1959. 25X1 Cuba: Prime Minister Fidel Castro's attack of 28 Septem- ber on press and. other critics of his revolutionary program re- vealed a concern over his increasing difficulties. His high praise of "Che" Guevara, whom he placed in charge of industrial plan- ning, may reflect awareness of the distrust which many respon- sible Cubans feel for Guevara, who is generally regarded as pro- Communist. Castro may react vigorously to editorials on 29 September in leading Havana dailies which claim that freedom of the Cuban press, is limited. 25X1 IN 1 Oct 59 DAILY BRIEF iv Approved For Rel se 2002/10/21: CIA-RDP79T009 5A ~g0270001-0 Approv - 04700270001-0 ,w 5 25X1 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR Continues Selective Jamming LMonitoring of Voice of America transmissions to the USSR reveals that the selective relaxation of Soviet jamming has con- tinued since Khrushchev's departure from the United States. Jam- ming of all broadcasts, to the Eastern European satellites has continued. During the period 25-29 September, 88 percent of Russian-language broadcasts, 86 percent of Latvian, 92 percent of Lithuanian, and 54 percent of Estonian were audible CIn _a talk with US officials in Washington on 15 September, Yuri Zhukov, chairman of the State Committee for Cultural Rela- tions, with Foreign Countries, said this relaxation of jamming was, an "experiment" to see whether the VOA would cease "pursuing the cold. ware' He expressed hope that the US could halt transmis- sions by such anti-Soviet stations as Radio Baikal and Radio Free Russia and said if this, were done the USSR would stop jamming altogether. He warned, however, that if results were "negative," jamming would be resumed,j Zhukov further said the Soviet (lovernment was also prepared to enter into reciprocal agreements which would increase the cir- culation of Amerika and USSR magazines, open reading rooms in Moscow and New York public libraries, and. implement the article in the US-:Soviet exchange agreement concerning radio-television exchanges on political subjects]. 25X1 Approved For Release 2002(11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700270001-0 1 Oct 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04700270001-0 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04700270001-0 Approved F r Release 9009110191 - - err J04700270001-0 L 25X1 Key Latin American Communist Leaders Gather in Peiping The presence of several prominent Latin American Commu- nist party leaders at the Chinese tenth anniversary celebrations provides an opportunity for them to discuss with Peiping officials new tactical plans in furtherance of Chinese objectives in Latin America and to review their accomplishments since the last such meeting in Peiping early this years Luiz Carlos Prestes$ Victor Codovilla, and Jesus Faria, top officials of the Brazilian, Argen- tine, and. Venezuelan parties respectively, spoke at the opening ceremony. Key representatives of the Colombian, Cuban, Uru- guayan, Ecuadoran, Chilean, Panamanian, and Costa Rican Com- munist parties are also in Peiping, along with a number of non- Communist political, congressional, and cultural figures from several Latin American countries The Chinese, who are seeking to increase their role in the guidance of Latin American Communists, have registered some successes in the program they outlined to the representatives of 12 Latin American parties who met in Peiping after the 21st Soviet party congress in early 1959. These plans included in- creased. Latin American travel to China, the training of Latin American Communists in China, and. the development of a Chi- nese propaganda network in Latin America. Subsequently, a Chinese journalist delegation visited four Latin American coun- tries, and. the official New China News, Agency has opened a branch in Havana and reportedly hired correspondents in Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela, Latin American travel to China dur- ing the first six months of 1959 far surpassed the total for all of 1958.1 None of the 20 Latin American nations has diplomatic rela- tions with Communist China. Cuba, however, recently became the first Latin American nation since 1952 to abstain in a United Nations General Assembly vote on the question of Chinese UN representation, Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04700270001-0 1 Oct 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Status Report on Cuba Fidel Castro's preoccupation with growing economic prob- lems which threaten the realization of his reform program have heightened his marked sensitivity to criticism and his reliance on trusted companions from active revolutionary days. This was particularly evident in his TV appearance on 28 September. Castro made prolonged attacks on Havana dailies which have questioned government actions and on the decision of the In- ter-American Press Association to discuss whether freedom of the press exists in Cuba. Havana's leading newspaper, Diario de la Marina, which has Catholic and conservative backing, did not back down under the attack but charged ed- itorially on 29 September that press freedom is limited by the revolutionary government in many ways short of censor- ship. It was, surprisingly, joined by other independent pa- pers, in the first such strong and open exception to Castro's words since the revolutionary victory on 1 January. In the same speech Castro emphasized his great reliance on "true revolutionaries," naming among others "Che" Guevara, whose strident anti-Americanisrn and. suspected pro-Commu-' nism add to the general suspicion of him among Cubans. Castro announced that a government program for industrial planning would be headed by Guevara and that although private invest- ment would be accepted, outside help was not really needed. A reference to "investigation" of two large US-owned nickel and cobalt plants at Moa Bay and Nicaro indicated that the gov- ernment hopes to increase its income from them but has not yet decided by just what means. Castro's drastic solutions are only complicating the eco- nomic problems arising from his reform program. Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700270001-0 1 Oct 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 25X1 Approved F r Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975 004700270001-0 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director 25X1 Approved F4 pr G'I^-RD1279T00975n004700270001-0 ///////////AiZ /Z/ZZI IiZiiiiil Annrnvarl Fnr Pc Ic cX fl/9SE. TTnnQ79annd7ffl77nnni-fl 79 Approved For Release 1 tt-WjTf0975AO04700270001-0 / 000 oz~~j