CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004700500001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 28, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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28 October 1959
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28 OCTOBER 199
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet economic plan for 1960 calls for
8.1-percent rise in industrial output;
budget allows for continued expansion
of military programs.
Personnel shifts in Poland reflect re-
gime's concern over economic situation.
Algerian rebels seeking clarification of
De Gaulle's terms for a cease-fire.
French military chief in Algeria reports
army's concern over De Gaulle's policy.
UAR has postponed issuing decree that
would raise fees paid by Tapline.
III, THE WEST
Cuba--Castro's strong anti-American
line lays ground for more extreme
measures against US interests.
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(,LNIKAL IN r_LLIk.7CIN%.,C DULLLHIN
28 October 1959
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L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: The economic plan for 1960 presented to the
Supreme Soviet on 27 October calls for an increase of 8.1
percent in industrial production. The 1959 plan called for
I I C) 4. 1
an increase of 7.7 percent, but a rise of I - pukt~vn 0
now expected. The 1960 budget., also announced on the first
01~ day of the session, provides for the same level of explicit
military expenditures as in 1959. Unstated defense expend-
itures are included in other budget categories., however, and
the increase in total expenditures budgeted for 1960 permits
Poland: Party and government personnel shifts announced
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planning and administration. The changes reflect the extremely
serious view taken by the regime of its economic problems, which
include food shortages, the unsatisfactory level of worker pro-
ductivity, and rising living costs. The past record of the new
appointees suggests that more rigid control will be exercised.
over economic policies in some spheres. There probably will
be no fundamental change, however, in the liberal agricultural
collectivization policy which makes Poland unique in the bloc.
on 27 October were apparently designed to strengthen economic
II. ASIA-AFRICA
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Algeria: Liestions on the -terms for a cease-fire have been
presented by Algerian rebel leaders, through an intermediary, to
the French minister of justice, F_
This request for clarification of De Gaulle's proposals
included questions as to whether a cease-fire would permit the
rebels to retain their arms and military positions, and whetherl
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25
ebel negotiators could meet with French political as well as
military leaders in discussing a, cease-fire. A prolonged period
of covert bargaining is in prospect
(Page 3)
Algeria: neral Challe, commander of French forces in
Algeria, has reported to Paris that the army is "desperate and
feels abandoned." as a result of De Gaulle's Algerian policy.
Since De Gaulle's proposals of 1.6 September concerning Algeria,
General Challe has repeatedly assured the government of the
army's loyalty. The army in Algeria has thus far refused to
support the settler extremists, but several reports have indi-
cated opposition to any cease-fire negotiations
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Tapline: The UAR apparently has postponed issuing the de-
cree originally scheduled for the end of October, designed to
increase sharply the transit fees from the Trans Arabian Pipe-
line Company (Tapline). Nasir may be reluctant to disturb his
relations with the West at this time because of the critical sit-
uation in Iraq. Company officials state that they have received
intimations that the decree might be postponed until the new UAR
parliament meets next February. They point out, however, that
the closely linked. dispute of the Arabian American Oil Company
with Saudi Arabia is as "prickly as ever:' The Saudis are seek-
ing $185,000,000 in back profits which they claim the company il- 25X1
legally diverted.
Nov,
III. THE WEST
Cuba: Fidel Castro, in his . speech the night of 26 October,
took a stronger anti-American line than at any time since com-
ing to power, and gained. mob support for his mounting criticism
of the US base at Guantanamo. He reiterated his line that Cubans
were killed by bombs dropped by planes based in Florida, despite
evidence, supported 0 by Cuban military officials, that
the damage was from antiaircraft fire, counterattacking Cuban
Air Force planes, or grenades thrown from automobiles. The
ground has been. laid for more extreme measures against US firms
doing business in Cuba. Many Cubans who do not agree with Castro
now Sean eouipsepnt desnite reported misgivinLys. F_
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Soviet 1960 Budget and Plan
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The summary of the 1960o:)viet budget announced on 27 Octo-
ber calls for record total revenues and expenditures. However,
the increases--approxi.mately; 6 percent over 1959 plan levels--
are much smaller than the unusually large increases planned for
1959 over 1958,
The explicit defense allocation of 96.1 billion rubles is the
same as for 1959; it has remained virtually stable since 1956.
Defense expenditures are concealed in other budget categories,
however, and the increase in total expenditures budgeted for
1960 permits continuation of growth of those military programs.
Outlays for scientific research institutes, planned at 27.3 billion
rubles in 1959, are to increase by 15.4 percent in 1960.
In his speech on the 1960 annual plan, Gosplan Chief Kosygin
announced that the successful performance of the economy thus far
during the first year of the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65) has made
possible higher targets for 1960 than originally envisaged. Gross
industrial output, which is expected to increase approximately
11.5 percent in 1959 compared with the goal of 7.7 percent, is
projected at 8.1 percent in the plan for 1960. Soviet leaders
probably expect overfulfillment again in 1960; the average an-
nual rate of increase necessary to fulfill the Seven-Year Plan is
8.7 percent,
Labor productivity is planned to increase 5.8 percent, com-
pared with the annual 5.4 percent goals set for the last three-years.
The seven-hour day is expected to be extended to all workers in
all branches of industry during :L960, although progress toward
this goal has been lagging recently.
The new plan maintains the growth rate in capital investment,
scheduling"an 11-percent increase over 1959. The plan continues
the 1959 emphasis on metallurgy, chemicals, oil and gas, and
machine construction, although the rate of investment appears
scheduled to ease slightly. Preliminary reports imply that state
housing expenditure is to increase approximately 15 percent above
the level planned for 1959, thus maintaining the emphasis of the
last few years on housing construction.
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,*me
Polish Party and Government Changes
High-level changes in the Polish party and government on
27 October indicate the regime's concern over the economic sit-
uation and. its determination to take corrective action. Major
elements in this situation are the unsatisfactory level of worker
productivity, the rising cost of living, and the shortage of meat
and animal feed.
Edward Ochab was relieved of his post as agriculture min-
ister but remained, on the politburo and was named to the party
secretariat. Although Ochab has long been known as a Gomulka
>,upporter, he is reported to have come under fire for agricr:ul-
tural policies which allegedly contributed to the present difficul-
ties.
Eugeniusz Szyr and Julian Tokarski, chairman of the plan-
ning commission and minister of heavy industry respectively in
the Stalinist Beirut regime, were named deputy premiers. Szyr
was ousted from his planning post following the Poznan riots in
June 1956, but has since served on several ad hoc party com-
missions. At the central committee plenum last fall Syzr sharply
criticized. Gomulka and. his economic policies. Tokarski has not
occupied any significant government or party post since 1956.
Tadeusz Gede, currently ambassador to Moscow and a deputy
premier prior to October 1956, was appointed. first deputy chair-
man of the planning commission. These men are regarded as
competent administrators who would not be reluctant to imple-
ment sterner internal policies.
The party apparently is working toward greater government
control over economic policies in certain spheres--a step advo-
cated by some party members who believe that the regime has
permitted too much economic freedom. It is unlikely, however,
that Gomulka will abandon those features of his program--such
as his opposition to forced collectivization- -which make his re-
gime unique in the Sino-Soviet bloc.
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Il. ASIA-AFRICA
Algerian Rebels Query French Regardin, Terms for
Cease-fire
L iestions concerning terms for an Algerian cease-fire
have been relayed from Algerian
rebel leaders to French Justice Minister Edmond Michelet
I' I Rebel leaders asked whether a cease-fire would
allow the Algerian Army to retain its arms and military
positions; whether a post-armistice amnesty..would cover
rebel civilians as well as soldiers; and whet-ner rebel nego-
tiators could meet with French political as well as military
leaders to discuss the cease-fire.
the rebels will reject any arrangement which does not per-
mit contact with French "political leaders:
Paris is unlikely to provide assurances satisfactory
to the rebels on all these points. In particular, the French
Army's sensitivity to any hint of a "betrayal" in Algeria will
probably preclude assurances that the rebel army can retain
its arms and organizational integrity. De Gaulle has con-
sistently maintained that any talks with the rebels would con-
cern only a military cease-fire; while he may expand on his
16 September proposals- -possibly on an occasion such as
his late November visit to Algeria to inaugurate the bassi
Messaoud pipeline--a prolonged period of covert bargain-
ing appears in prospect.
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French Commander in Alfieri arns .ha rmy,1 sperate"
(The French commander in chief in Algeria, Air Force Gen-
eral Maurice Challe, informed Pre-
:nier Debr6 and Minister of the Armies Guillaumat on f~3 October
that the army in Algeria is "'desperate" and feels "abandoned.."
Challe stated that while r'rance is winning militarily, it is losing
out on the psychological front because of uncertainty created by
De Gaulle's 16 September proposals offering the Algerians self-
determinationa He reportedly requested the government to issue
directives clarifying the army's role in Algeria for the months to
come
Challe himself is con-
cerned. over the state of military morale, Heretofore he has
publicly assured De Gaulle of the army's loyalty, which has been
demonstrated to the extent that it has thus far refused to support
European settlers desiring to demonstrate their opposition overtly.
Nevertheless, there have been several reports indicating uneas-
iness among some officers, particularly elements identified with
the 13 May coup, concerning any cease-fire negotiations with the
rebels. Some appear to believe that any cease-fire short of com-
plete rebel surrender would be "against French interests:' There
is also umeasiness over whether the army is to continue to play a
major role in administration of Aigeri
CDespite evidence of widespread public support in France for
De Gaulle's 16 September proposals, the army- -particularly the
major portion which is in Algeria--hold:3 the key as to whether he
can make good on his proposals should the rebels finally decide to
accept them?
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Nww )%W
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of :Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint: Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence? The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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