CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004800270001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 2, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
garding his peaceful coexistence line.
(Page 1)
2.December 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: In his speech to the Hungarian party congress on
1 December, Khrushchev maintained the moderate and flex-
ible line which has characterized his foreign policy pronounce-
ments since his visit to the US, He denied "fabrications" in
the Western press that the USSR no longer desires an early
summit meeting. He repeated the warning contained in the
TASS statement of 18 November that Moscow will sign a sep-
arate peace treaty with East Germany if the West refuses to
I~ conclude a treaty with both German states, but avoided any sug-
gestion that such unilateral action is imminent. This speech,
like his last two foreign policy speeches, contained evidence
that Khrushchev is concerned over Peiping's challenge to Mos-
cow's ideological primacy and hegemony in the Communist
world and the Chinese Communists' apparent misgivings re-
regime would be likely topics for discussion.
(Page 3)
forward- in 1960 and the disposition of "rightist" critics of the
Communist China: The absence from Peiping of several
key officials suggests that a meeting of top party leaders is in
progress or may be imminent. Mao Tse-tung and his first
deputy, Liu Shao-chi., have been away from the capital since
late October and may have been joined in November by Pre-
mier Chou En-lai and other politburo members, The US Con-
sulate General in Hong Kong believes that plans for a new "leap
II. ASIA-AFRICA
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ident Bayar visiting Ayub'J
for February, in Pakistan, with the Shah and Turkish Pres-
Minister Menderes in mid-November, wants a meeting of
Moslem CENTO members every three months, thus ex6lud-
ing Britain and US observers. The next meeting is scheduled
Pakistan-CENTO: Kakistani President Ayub apparently
intends to broaden the range of relationships between the re-
gional members of CENTO. According to a Pakistani official,
Ayub, as a result of his talks with the Shah and Turkish Prime
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(Page 4)
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III. THE WEST
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Cyprus: (London's decision to lift within the week the ban
against AKEL,, the Communist-front party on Cyprus, enhances
the prospect of a strong Communist bid for increased power
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2 Dec 59 DAILY BRIEF ii
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ad influence. Archbishop Makarios has endorsed the re-
moval of the ban, and the Turks offered no objection. AKEL,
apparently unsuccessful in gaining its demands from Makarios,
including a commitment for nearly half of the Greek Cypriot
seats in the new Parliament, has swung its support to opposi-
tion candidate Cleride
(Page 6)
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev's Speech in Budapest
In his speech at the Hungarian party congress on 1 De-
cember, Khrushchev reaffirmed the moderate and flexi-
ble line on negotiations and coexistence which has charac-
terized his pronouncements on foreign policy since his visit
to the United States. He denied "fabrications" in the West-
ern press that the USSR no longer desires an early summit
meeting and said the Soviet Government is ready to attend
such a meeting "at a time and place that would be acceptable
to all the participants:'
Although Khrushchev contended there is no reason why
a summit conference could not be held prior to his visit to
France beginning on 15 March, he said President de Gaulle's
desire to have an exchange of views with him prior to a con-
ference is "not unreasonable:" The Soviet premier's caution
in avoiding criticism of De Gaulle's position on the timing of
a summit meeting, coupled with other recent efforts to appear
responsive to French views, reflects Moscow's hope that De
Gaulle's bid to enhance France's international prestige can be
exploited to divide the Western allies and weaken their posi-
tion at a summit meeting.
In contrast to this generous treatment of De Gaulle, Khru-
shchev directed a harsh attack against Chancellor Adenauer as
the "most active" opponent of an improvement in East-West re-
lations. He repeated the warning contained in the TASS state-
ment of 18 November that Moscow will conclude a separate peace
treaty with East Germany if the West refuses to sign a treaty
with both German states. However, he avoided any suggestion
that such unilateral Soviet action is imminent or linked to the
outcome of a summit meeting.
Khrushchev's speech, like his last two foreign policy
statements on 31 October and 14 November, contained evidence
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that he is concerned over Peiping's challenge to Moscow's
ideological primacy and hegemony in the Communist world
and the Chinese Communists' apparent misgivings regarding
his peaceful coexistence strategy. In an effort to restore bloc
discipline and unity behind Moscow's lead, Khrushchev invoked
the "immutable principles of proletarian internationalism" as
the "irrevocable law of the international Communist movement."
He charged that the "enemy" is seeking to provoke quar-
rels among the socialist countries and warned that if the
leaders of any bloc country become "conceited," this "can
only play into the hands of the enemy:' In a further typically
oblique criticism of Peiping's policies, Khrushchev said, "We
must not fall behind or go too far ahead; we must, figuratively
speaking, synchronize our watches"--a reminder of his dictum
at the Soviet 21st party congress that all socialist countries will
"more or less simultaneously reach the highest phase of Com-
munist society:'
Khrushchev avoided any reference to the withdrawal of
Soviet forces from Hungary, but Hungarian party chief Kadar
in his speech on 30 November echoed the standard Soviet posi-
tion that Soviet troops would be removed only in connection with
an East-West agreement on a "mutual withdrawal of forces sta-
tioned in foreign countries:'
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Chinese Leaders May Be Meeting in Secret Session
The absence from Peiping of many of Communist China's
top leaders suggests that a high-level party meeting is in
progress or will soon be held. Mao Tse-tung and his first
deputy, Liu Shao-chi, have been away from the capital since
last October, and Premier Chou Ei -lai and other politburo
members are thought to have left Peiping in November.
Mao's tours in the past often foreshadowed conclaves of re-
gional and national leaders.
A high-level party meeting at this time would probably
be concerned with an evaluation of developments following
Peiping's admission of serious economic shortcomings last
summer. Plans for a new "leap forward" in 1960 and the dis-
position of "right opportunist" critics of the regime are likely
agenda topics. The absence of the foreign minister from Pei-
ping suggests that foreign policy may also come up for con-
sideration, e. g. , Peiping's deteriorating relations with India
and Indonesia, Sino- Soviet relations, and the Taiwan and Lao-
tian situations.
The pattern of Chinese Communist conferences in recent
years suggests that a national party conclave can be expected
before the end of the year. The meeting may take the form
of a central committee plenum, although a session of the party
congress- whichl.tmet in May 1958 and is supposed to hold
annual sessions--is also a possibility.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Pakistani President Trying to Strengthen CENTO
l akistani President Ayub, who is taking an increasingly
active part in foreign affairs, is moving to strengthen the al-
liance between the regional members of CENTO--Pakistan,
Iran, and Turkey. Furthermore, since his talk with Nehru in
September, some progress has been made in settling border
and financial disputes with India. Ayub is apparently moti-
vated in part by a desire to strengthen his personal prestige
and popularity.
As a result of talks with the Shah and Turkish Prime Min-
ister Menderes in Tehran in mid-November, Ayub believes
that there should be frequent high-level meetings of the regional
members of CENTO, excluding Britain and US:observers, ac-
cording to a Pakistani Embassy official in Tehran. The next
meeting is to be in February, in Pakistan.
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According to the same Pakistani official, it was agreed dur-
ing Ay6b's visit to. Tehran that Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey must
continually seek to reassure Afghanistan of their friendship and
their sincere desire for better relations, and that Qasim offered
the only prospect for a properly oriented government in Iraq.
He also said all three countries agreed that no new proposals
for US aid should be broached during President Eisenhower's
trip, but regional plannin and a supreme command for CENTO
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III. THE WEST
Proscription of Communist-front Party on Cyprus to End
Lndon's decision to end the state of emergency on Cyprus
soon, thus removing the four-year ban on the Communist-front
party AKEL, enhances the prospect of a strong bid by the party
for increased power and influence. Archbishop Makarios,
despite the prospect of AKEL opposition to his candidacy for
the presidency in the 13 December election, has endorsed
London's plan, AKEL claims 7,000 members and has many
times that number under its general influence. After it failed
to get a firm commitment from Makarios for seven of the 35
Greek Cypriot seats in the new Cypriot House of Representa-
tives, it swung its support to the dissident nationalist candidate
John Clerides.
Makarios has tried to promote a working relationship with
AKEL in order to maintain at least the facade of Greek Cypriot
unity. Formation of the basically rightist opposition party,
the Democratic Union, has shattered that illusion. The oppo-
sition opened its campaign by viciously attacking the London.-
Zurich agreements which form the basis for the Cyprus settle-
ment as a "victory for the Turks" and the authorization for
"three armies to act as our prison wardens:' Makarios, who
remains confident of political victory, has the support of all
influential newspapers on Cyprus except the Communist mouth-
piece.
AKEL probably views the current campaign and approach-
ing election as a prime opportunity to encourage the split in the
Greek Cypriot community. The greatest threat from AKEL may
not emerge until the second election, to be held within five years.
By that time, as a result of Greek factionalism, AKEL may have
b
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ecome
e strongest political force on the island.]
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'-ww IM
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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