CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004800280001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 3, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1
r
Approved For Rke se 20011%V: c t( RI1 75A004.800280001-8
DOCUMENT UI. 47
NO CHANGE IN #LA$$.
^ DEC1,A$!IcJID
Ctass. C1tIldti1O sat 1$ I I
*FIT R&VtLW DAM ?? . w
A{IT i k 12-2 dt"
9J.' Lu~ -19" IRVIEWIN,
3 December 1959
I I
Copy No. C f
...,NTELLIGENCE
25X1
State Department review completed /
1 Approved For Release T Op 9 0975A004800280001-8 /
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04800280001-8
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04800280001-8
 j
i
r
Approved For Rise
3 December 1959
D
AILY BRIEF
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Algeria: The rebels are willing to begin negotiations with
France in mid-December, following the current UN debate on
Algeria and a meeting of the rebels' Revoluti ouncil, ac-
cording to a senior rebel official. the Al-
gerian's recent nomination of five imprisoned leaders to nego-
tiate with De Gaulle was not final, and that a revised Algerian
delegation would probably be named later this month to take car
of French objections. He added that the rebels had no desire to
weaken De Gaulle's position, and would be satisfied with a mod-
erate UN Algerian resolution which would endorse the concept of a
negotiated cease-fire.
*Notwithstanding the rebel commitment to conciliatory tac-
tics, a considerable gulf exists between the French and the rebels
and Tunisian President Bourguiba continues to doubt whether De
Gaulle can go further in clarifying his self-determination propos
al T1
2003/01/29 : Q800280001-8
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Approved For ReI
25X1
 25X1111111
j
25X1
Approved For Ryas 2003/01/29 CIA-RDP79T00975
4800280001-8 25X1 j
j
Watch Committee Conclusions:'uations susceptible
0
of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would
0
/
jeopardize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East,
0
25X
0
particularly in, Iraq. Although situations in Laos and Iraq
appear relatively quiet at the present, there a
re many ele-
"
ments of continuing danger in both countries
25X
A
Burma: The sweeping municipal election victories of
former Premier Nu's political followers may soon force Bur-
mese Army leaders to make a firm decision regarding the
national elections scheduled for early 1960. The Nu party
has achieved victories in seven of eight municipalities, in-
cluding a sweep of all 35 council seats in Mandalay, Burma's
second largest city. This presents the army with the alterna-
tives of risking Nu's return to power, intervening vigorously
for Nu's op onents in the national elections, or canceling the
elections,
j
India: Finance Minister Desai estimates that India will
% need approximately $294,0009000 in additional foreign aid to 0
finance the remainder of the Second Five: Year Plan (1956-61). 0
This much foreign exchange will be required to meet the pay-
ments falling due in 1960-61 on foreign debts and current
imports which together will exceed India's expected earnings
plus foreign aid already provided. About half this amount is
likely to be covered by credits anticipated from the World
Bank, Britain, West Germany, and Canada. Desai intends 0
j to open negotiations with these creditors and with US officials j
early in 1960 on aid for 1960-61. The foreign exchange deficit 0
for India's Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66), now being drafted,
j j
probably will exceed $1 billion a year. Desai recently reported 0
to Parliament that prospects for foreign assistance for the 0
Third Plan were "good," althou h it was too early to say whether
the aid would be adequate. 25
j
25
j
r
3 Dec 59 DAILY BRIEF ii
4
Approved For Release 2037U1729 : - 280001-8 25X1 %
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04800280001-8
Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04800280001-8
 Approved For Re4ps
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Burmese Army Concerned by Domestic
Political Developments
The decisive local election victories of former Premier
Nuts "Clean" faction of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom
League (AFPFL), Burma's governing party until 1958, will
force the army, which now rules the country, to decide soon
whether to risk a "Clean" victory in the national elections
scheduled for early next year and the return of Nu to the
premiership, to intervene vigorously in the national elec-
tions themselves, or to cancel the elections. Despite the
army's known preference for former Premier Ba Swe and
his "Stable" faction of the AFPFL, Nu's followers have won
overwhelmingly in seven of the eight municipal council
elections held thus far, capping their victories by winning
all 35 seats in Mandalay, Burma's second largest city.
Leaders of the "Stable" faction have discounted these
victories, claiming that their own strength rests in the rural
districts which will provide 227 of the 250 members in Bur-
ma's lower house of parliament, the Chamber of Deputies.
Nevertheless, the decisive nature of Nu's victories, partic-
ularly in Mandalay, where his faction won even more de-
cisively than the united AFPFL had in the past, has seri-
ously undermined the "Stable" group's confidence and could
cause rural voters to climb on Nu's bandwagon.
Army leadership is still divided on the proper course
of action. Ne Win would probably be reluctant to cancel
the elections, to which he is publicly committed, but he
might sanction army intervention, Ne Win has no respect
for Nu's administrative abilities and little faith in his in-
tegrity because of his opportunistic association with the pro-
Communist National United Front in 1959,
Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04800280001-8
3 Dec 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
25X1
25X1
25X1
 25X1
Approved For Rase - 80001-8
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
Approved For RelIease 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0048001280001-8 25X1
 Approved For Rele 200TIQP:
0.1
Approved For Release 2MP9 P"
OTf 0975A004800280001-8