CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A004800490001-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 16, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 29, 1959
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A004800490001-5.pdf452.36 KB
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Approved For Ruse 20Tafk: pRET975AQQQ 00490001-5 DC UMENT lICL kC CHANCE IN CLASS. n ID62LASSIFIE.D CLASS, CIItk LU TOt TS S C 1IEXT L'/IL W E JL1 A1'(H1 Hit 14.2 DATE? g"N, n$OREVIEIYERI State Department review completed V 25X1 / December 1959 / 29 25X1 7 Copy No. Approved For Release 20f10p: C EM75AO04800490001-5 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04800490001-5 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04800490001-5 Approved For Re 0{ 00490001-5 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 25X1 25X1 II. ASIA-AFRICA Petukhov, who has been serving as chairman of the Moscow sovnarkhoz (council of national economy). F_ I 29 December 1959 DAILY BRIEF L THE COMMUNIST BLOC 25 USSR: The removal of Yury Maksarev as head of the State Scientific -Technical Committee suggests that this committee has run into difficulties in carrying out its part of the industrial automation and mechanization program called for at last June's party central committee meeting. A number of specific measures under this program were to have been completed by this time, and the lack of progress reports also suggests that the program may be lagging. Maksarev has been replaced by Konstantin Approved For Relea 25X1 25X1 25X1 ON, 0111 1: Approved For R e 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975 0#~Q &0490001-5 MINIM E 2 5 X 1 m Laos: ~-P-remier Phoui's meeting with the King on 27 De- cember in an effort to resolve the current political crisis _proved ind.onclusive. The King apparently offered to rename Phoui as head of a provisional government which would in- 1) I clude some members of the Young reformist group (C DNI The King also insisted that the National Assembly agree: that its mandate had lapsed. Phoui anticipates some difficulty in persuading his political followers to accept this solution 25X1 ~ 4 ~ 25 j \ age , 1 '1100 MMOMMEM 011 29 Dec 59 DAILY BRIEF ii Approved For R lease 2003/01/29 CIA-RDP79T00975A0 4800490001-5 25X ::~\\\~000~~~~~~000~00000~00~~~~~~00~~~00~000000~~00000~ ~00~~~~~~~00~~~~0~~~~00~~~~~~~~~~0~~~~~00~0~~0000000000~~\O\0000~0~~~0~0~~~\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Afghanistan: With the death on 25 December of elder statesman Shah Mahmud, uncle of the King and of Prime Minister Daud, the Afghan Government has lost an influen- tial contact with the country's Pushtoon tribes. The govern- ment will view this loss as untimely, since it is facing mounting opposition to its modernization policies and is attempting to prevent the s read of unrest to the major tribes. 25X1 Approved For Rel a 2003/01/29: CIA-RDP79T00975AO 00490001-5 I. THE. COMMUNIST BLOC Chief of Soviet State Scientific- e - n ca Committee Replaced The removal of Yury Maksarev as head of the USSR State -.Scientific-Technical Committee suggests that this committee has run into difficulties in carrying out its part of the indus- trial automation and mechanization program called for at last June's party central committee meeting. The plenum had or- dered a series of specific measures designed to create an en- vironment within which all participants in Soviet industry-- from the lowest worker to Gosplan officials--would find tech- nological advances personally desirable and profitableo The success of this program is important for the fulfill- ment of industrial output goals for 1965 and for the achieve- ment of significant progress in "catching up with the West:' Many of.. the specific measures were scheduled to be drafted by the end of 1959 or earlier, and some plans may have been worked out. However, thus far these deadlines have passed without any public recognition, which suggests that the program may be .lagging (if the removal of Maksarev is, in fact., connected with a lag in he automation program, it suggests that the Soviet lead- ers are giving prompt and continuous attention to its progress and have no intention of allowing a default in the program. A default did occur in a similar program launched in 1955 and may have been a contributing factor in the abandonment of the Sixth Five-Year Plan in 19 Approved For Rele - 4800490001-5 29 Dec 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04800490001-5 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04800490001-5 25X1 Approved For Ree 2003/01/29: CIA-RDP79T00975A000490001-5 . Afghan Government Loses Influential Contact With Pushtoon Tribes he Afghan Government has lost an influential contact with-TIcountry's Pushtoon tribes with the death of elder statesman Shah Mahmud, uncle of the King and Prime Min- ister Daud.. Shah Mahmud had more prestige among the tribes than any other member of the royal family and, although he had been much less active in government affairs since Daud replaced him as prime minister in 1953, he helped placate tribal opposition to Daud's policies. The Daud government will. view his loss as untimely, since its modernization policies are meeting mounting resist- ance. The tribes fear that road improvements in their terri- tory will be used to extend the government's control over them. This fear has apparently been a main reason for the increas- ingly frequent and serious tribal incidents that began with the killing of a district official near the Pakistani border in Decem- ber 1958. Opposition apparently has become more widespread since the government began last August to encourage women to appear in public without the veil, its boldest social reform to date. The resulting antigovernment riots in Kandahar on 21 Decem- ber are probably viewed by Daud as a serious challenge to his control. Daud very likely intends, however, to press ahead with his modernization policies, believing that to give in to the country's conservative religious leaders or to allow Afghanistan's Push- toon tribes to remain beyond the government's control would ultimately lead to the downfall of the royal family and to inter- vention by foreign power, 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800490001-5 29 Dec 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 25X1 Approved For Rel a 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 4(00490001-5 Laotian Political Crisis Premier Phoui saw King Savang on 27 December in an effort to resolve the current political crisis, but the meet- ing was inconclusive. The King is reported to have insisted that the National Assembly deputies should publicly admit that the assembly's mandate lapsed on 25 December. This ac- complished, Savang would rename Phoui as the head of a pro- visional government based on the premier's present all con- servative cabinet. The King added, however, that as a "con- ciliatory gesture," Phoui should allow the reformist Com- mittee for Defense of National Interests (CDNI) to reenter the government "at once." Phoui anticipates difficulty in getting the assembly dep- uties of his conservative Rally of the Lao People (RLP) to admit publicly that they had erroneously interpreted the Con- stitution and a 1957 electoral law in an effort to continue par- liamentary government after 25 December. While Phoui can be expected to continue to maneuver to salvage as much of his position as is practicable,,. he is in a difficult position. He re- mains under the threat of military action by Generals Ouane and Phoumi, who are leading CDNI members, and with the King now openly prescribing a solution which substantially meets CDNI demands, the premier seems to have little choice but to find some face-saving means of acceding to their terms. While constitutional matters have been in the forefront of the dispute between Phoui and the CDNI, the crisis stems basic- ally from the efforts of the young CDNI activists to displace the older conservatives, who represent a few powerful clans, as the ruling elite of Laos. The CDNI accuses the conserva- tives of corruption and a lack of dynamism in meeting the serious problems facing the government. The conservatives, on the other hand, claim the young reformists are brash and inexperienced and tend to take ill-considered actions 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release - 4800490001-5 29 Dec 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved For R se 2003/01/29 :CIA-RDP79T00975A00 00490001-5 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The.Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director 25X1 Approved For lease 2003/01/29: CIA-RDP79T00975AO048 0490001-5 25X1 ~ A d F R V 200w(^P C&M-OMIrE0TT5A004 00490001 5 - "` L Approved For Release 20 75AO04800490001-5 e e