CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A004900100001-6
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
11
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 17, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 14, 1960
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A004900100001-6.pdf631.53 KB
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/ Approved For Release 2 - 7 /- _ ~tt/ ~ ,~ 25X1 ;/ D1GUNilNT ii0. iva ~tiaxas: iN au~E:. r~ osci.~ssroisn `~C4AS"s. CNdtJp~G TAt Tb ~ 0 N~X'~ iRfVli~W i~A'tilt -,,,,,,, ..-~_.,. alft~lt tFtt 1'+7?Y 14 January 1960 Copy Na. State Department review completed Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004900100001-6 25X1 gpproved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004900100001-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004900100001-6 \\\\\\\\\\~\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\O\\\\\\\\\\\\\`\"`~\\\\\\\\\\\\\O\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\O"O"""""`O""`"""""""""?""`D"`""``` \\\~\\\\\\\\\\\~\\\\\\\\\\~\\\~\\\\\\\\~\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\O\\\\ \ Approved For Regis - AQ~900100001-6 \ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN ;~ 14 January 1960 ~ DAILY BRIEF 25X1 \ Ie THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR: Aleksey Kirichenko, who until recently ranked with Mikoyan and. Kozlov as one of Khrushchev's chief lieu- tenants in the party presidium, has been downgraded and 25X1 assigned to a provincial post. Kirichenko, a natu~r.a,l ta~geti ` in the struggle for precedence behind Khrushchev9 may have laid himself open to demotion by differing with Khrushchev ither over party operations or over general policy consid- rations. His reassignment was apparently approved at last onth's secret session of the party central committee, which lso approved decisions to be taken by the -~u reme Soviet 25X1 eetmg beginning 14 January, 25X1\ .\ Afghanistan-Fakistan: Afghan Foreign Minister Naim's conversations with Pakistani President Ayub this week appar- ently were primarily exploratory in nature9 although, judging from Naim's public statements following the talks, they may have helped to clear the way for further efforts to improve re- lationso Nevertheless, an early resolution of the major irritant Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004900100001-6 6 25 ~'~,,,, ~nnsin~i~~ ? r in Rnp~aTnna~~ ~ g00100001 ~ A p d F R _ _ _ ,, ~ p rove or es - ~\ between the two countries, the Pushtoonistan dispute, is un- likely, since this would require major adjustments in policy and popular attitudes, 25X~ 25X1 ~ ~\ ~~~.~~.: ,~. \` ' ._ ~~:; \ ~~~~ ~~ \\? III. THE WEST \\?\ ~:: ~\\ France: Finance Minister Pinay's departure from the cab- \ inet on~January may indicate a decision by .De Gaulle to allow \ ~~ greater government intervention in the economy for the purpose ,: ~~~" ~~~~ .\:j \ 14 Jan 60 DAILY $RIEF ii ~~" ~> \ 25~~.. . \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ \ \\ \\ \ \ \\\\\ \\ \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ \ \\ \ \ \ \ \ \\ \ \ \ \ O \ \ \ \ \ \ , .. Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004900100001-6 \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~``~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ \\\\\\\\\\\\\\.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\O\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\1\ ~\ ~~ ,.., Approved For Ruts Q~900100001-6 ~\ ~ ~ ~~' ~ ~ \\ ~\ ~,\ i\ \\ ~~\ \\ ~~ \~\ \\ ~\ \\ ' ~ 14 Jan 60 DAILY BRIEF 'i' \\ \ 1 1 \~ ~~"~\ ;~\ 25X1 25X1;; ~` \\ \\ ~~:~~ ~\ \~ \, ~~ ~~ \\ \\ f \\\\ French economy.. Two of the other three members of Pinay s Independent party still in the cabinet--the minister of Agri- ~~ culture and the secretary of state fc~r fnrPi~n r~ennnmie af_ may lessen the risk of a loss of investor confidence in the ~\ of diverting more resources to programs considered neces- \~ nary for France's "great power" aspirations9 and. to make concessions to labor and agriculture designed to allay their ~~ able and respected ~te hn cianme~Bank of France eGovernor ~\ Wilfrid Baumgartner, as Pinay's successor9 -while reducing. fairs--are re ortedly also planning to resign. Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004900100001-6 ~ Io THE COMMUNIST BLOC 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Khrushchev Demotes Top Party Aide Bible fo Kirichenko's rapid rise in top party circles since 19530 !n June 1959, however, Khrushchev told Governor Harriman that Kozlov had been picked as his successor and derided the suggestion that Kirichenko might be in the run- ning Since then Kirichenko has not engaged in the kind of Aleksey Kirichenko, who until a few months ago was functioning as Khrushchev's second-in-command in the p.ar.ty secretariat, has been demoted to the job of party chief in Rostov Oblast, .according to a Soviet press announcement of 13 Januaryo The assignment represents a serious rever- sal in his political fortuneso Kirichenko's status as a full member of the party presidium, a post he has held since July 1:955, was not mentionedo While- Kirichenko has not been reported involved in policy disputes, in recent months he no longer seemed to enjoy Khrushchev's full confidenceo Kirichenko, now 52, was a Khrushchev protege and as- sociate for many yearsa Khrushchev was apparently respon- substantive party activity which had previously marked him as one of the four top Soviet leader Factional infighting in the highest circles of the party is most?often observed in the areas of personnel appointment and policy decisionse There has been a rash of personnel changes recentlyo upheavals in the leadership of several re- publics, extensive changes in the secret police {KGB), shifts in the central party apparatus, .and more recently, the return of Presidium member Nikolay Ignatov to full-time work in -the party secretariat after several months in disfavox?e Some of these changes probably reflected :maneuvering inviolving ~Kirichenkoo The decision to reassign Kirichenko was probably made last month at a special secret session of .the pax?ty central committee which was held immediately following an open meeting devoted to agricultural problemsa A Soviet news- paperman stated that the secret session considered impor- tant domestic matters which would be formally approved b the Su reme Soviet meeting beginning 14 Januarye 14 Jan 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004900100001-6 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For R II. ASIA-AFRICA Afghan-Pakistani Conversation Produces Cautious Optimism Afghan Foreign Minister Naim's 10-12 January conversa- tions with Pakistani President Ayub will probably lead to fur- ther efforts by Afghanistan and Pakistan to improve their relations. The talks, which were exploratory and informal in nature9 appear to have been more useful thane either side expected. It was agreed that contacts should continue in an effort to solve "political differenceso' The government- monitored Pakistani press has welcvrned the talks as im- proving the prospects for better relations. Naim's public comments on th,e talks suggest he now be- lieves it may be possible to make progress in negotiations.- Kabul's earlier assessment that it would be impossible to do business with- .Ayub"s military government had been largely responsible for the deterioration in relations. Despite Ayub`s recent public dismissals of the Pushtoon- istan dispute as a "phony" issue, he has apparently convinced Naim that he is willing to consider the problem .and try to reach an accommodation. Although the hostile propaganda exchanges between the two countries may be moderated, a resolution of the Pushtoonistan dispute, the major irritant in Afghan-Pak- istani relations, is unlikely in the near future since such a development would recuire major ad'ustments in policy and popular attitudes, 25X1 25X1 14 Jan 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN gage 2 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004900100001-6 25X1 gpproved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004900100001-6 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004900100001-6 25X1 Approved For Rel~a P ~nnsin~i~~ ? cin_Rnp~aTnna~s r~n4900100001-6 IIIo THE WEST Implications of Pinay's Removal from Debra Cabinet The removal on 13 January of Finance Minister Pinayy the most influential leader of the previous .regime remaining in the cabinets indicates that De Gaul~,e may have decided t? subordi-. nate Pinay's "hard money" policy to other considerations. Ap- pointment of Bank of France Governor Wilfrid. Baumgartnerp an able and respected technician, to replace Pinay may lessen the risk of a loss of investor confidence in the French economy and will also reduce the political importance of the Finance Ministry portfolio, Premier Debrd has been subject to growing pressures to loosen Pinay's restrictions on consumption and economic expan- sion and to push programs stressing social benefits. He and other ministers drawn from the "Gaullist" Union for the New Republic (UNR~ favor selective rises in wages and farm prices and. have been working on plans to create a new national bank to aid. in the reconversion of depressed areas and. ir~dustriesp to organize agovernment-controlled. company for marketing Saharan oil, and to implement decrees embodying De Gaulle?s earlier proposals to give labor a voice in corporate management. -The political implications of the crisis may be more far reaching, Pinay represents a threat to the tTNR's attempt to build a new political base far the present regime. Ike still has considerable inf luence in the Independent pa.rtyy which has been showing signs of serious disagreement with ,De Gaulle's "liberal" offer of self-determination to Algeria, his highhanded. treatment of parliament, and his apparent downgrading of NATO and the Western alliance. Pinay?s withdrawal may widen the rift between the Independ- ents and the UNR, The situation will be further strained if other Independents in the cabinet, notably .Minister of Agriculture Henri Rochereau and Secretary of Stste for Foreign Economic Affairs Max Flechetq also leave9 especially if they are replaced by "technicians' as opposed to political figures. 25X1 25X1 1~ Jan 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4. Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004900100001-6 25X1 Approved For Re THE PRESIDENT The Yice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space. Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairmen, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secrekary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operatians, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United Skates Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant-Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004900100001-6 ji~i, viii ii i i i i i i i i i ~ i ~ i ~ i ~ i~ i,~ i.~ i ~ i.~ i i ~ i.~ i ~ i,~ i~ i ~ i~~~ Approved Rele'~~i/0~~-~79T00'~5A004900100001-6 y .~ Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975A004900100001-6