CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004900230001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 29, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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29 January 1960
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~EN~E BULLETIN
T
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~L
CEN AL IN
I
~~ Ja.nu~,ry X 9 fiQ
~?Al~.lr' BRIEF
I. THE GOMM~TNIST BLOC
USSR-Japan: The Soviet Union has responded to the
signing of the US-Japanese security treaty by a note for-
mally withdrawing its fledge to return the Habomai and
Shikotan a~slands off northern Hokkaido tp Japan after the
conclusion of aSoviet-Japanese peace treaty. Moscow now
will return the islands after such a treaty only if all foreign
troops are withdrawn frpm Japan. Although the Soviet lead-
ers probably do not expect this maneuver to prevent ratifica-
tion of the treaty by the Japanese Diet, they probably felt
impelled to follow up their prolonged propaganda warnings
about the dangerous consequences of the treaty with some re-
taliatory action. Withdrawal of the pledge to return the is-
lands is designed to emphasize Moscow's displeasure with
the Kishi government and to warn that there is no prospect
for_any improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations as long as
Kishi retains power. ~~.
~A top Japanese Foreign Ministry official has asserted
that the ministry believes the Soviet note may in fact be a
blunder that would strengthen Frime Minister I~ishi person-
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ally and improve prospects for ratification of the trea_
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either to rather Arab states. or to Israel, and the plan almost
certainly will arouse hostile criticism at the Arab League
meeting. (Page 3~
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a
~,~ z, an s resse a possa~bilaty
of civil war, He also emphasized that disruption of an impor
~' tant segment of the.tin-mining Industry would result in even
greater Bolivian financial difficulties. The American ,Army
attach8 characterizes the Huanuni episode as the most daring
exploit of the Bolivian Communist-party to date. Siles, who
may be reluctant to cause further bloodshed, is said to ques-
III. THE WEST
Bolivia: CPresident Siles has expressed to the US ambas-
sador grave concern over the situation resulting from the
Communist-led seizure last week of Huanuni, a key tin-min-
ing town in central Bolivia. Siles said the way is now open
for Communists to seize the major city of Oruro, 40 miles
away on the railroad to La F
d t d th
tion whether the army could dislodge the .Communist-led
miners' militia controlling the .town;
29 Jan 60 DAILY BRIEF
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LATE ITE M
*France-Algeria: Reinforced by assurances of support
from most political parties in France, De Gaulle seems to
be mounting a campaign_to isolate the insurgents in Algiers
and to convince the army that he has France solidly behind
him. His transfer of Delegate General Delouvrier and Gen-
eral Challe to a new command post 30 miles from Algiers
has been. officially explained as a move to put -them "out of
reach of .any pre-sure from the insurgents or any quarter;'
The move was accompanied by renewed appeals by Delouvrier
and Challe for unity of all elements in Algeria behind De Gaulle.
Meanwhile, the settler insurgents have seized the radio
station in Algiers--a move- which may offset in part their fail-
ure to rally significant Moslem support for their cause. Ex-
tremist spokesmen in Algiers have raised the threat of seces-
sion should De Gaulle fail to pledge .himself to a "French A1-
geria: ~
29 Jan 60 DAILY BRIEF
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Vietnamese Communist Guerrilla Raid in ou i ie ;na
~he persistent security problem faced by the Diem gov-
ernment in South Vietnam is underscored by a Communist
guerrilla attack this week against a regimental headquarters
near Tay Ninh, about 50 miles ,northwest of aaigon. The at-
tackers, numbering several hundred, fled toward the nearby
.Cambodian frontier after killing more than 30 government
soldiers and seizing considerable amounts of arms and equip-
ment
Poar security at the command post undoubtedly contrib-
uted argely to the success of the surprise attack, but its
nature and unprecedented scope suggest growing Communist
aggressiveness in South Vietnam. Communist armed. strength
there has long been estimated at about 2,5009 but there are
unconfirmed reports that an additional 19500 men recently in-
filtrated from North Vietnam via Cambodia. While not posing
a direct threat to the Diem regime, an increase in Commu-
nist guerrilla activity would divert. the government?s attention
from important economic development projects now begin-
ning to-take shape,
~UOn learning of .the attack, President Diem reportedly sent
an urgent appeal to the Cambodian Government for help in head-
ing off the fleeing dissidents. The implications of this attack
for both countries could have a beneficial effect on the informal
discussions of joint border security .measures,- Deep distrust
of each other's motives still-poses a serious obstacle9 but there
is already common concern over the Communist insurrection
in neighboring Laos, A temporary ar~?angement may be reached
aimed at curbing Communist and other dissident bands which
have long acted with relative im unit alon the frontier
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29 Jan 60
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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U SR
CHINA.'.
Mazar i
Sharif,
,~'/ /' INDIA
%~ J ~Salang Pass
_._ ,-~... USSR
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USSR to Build Military Airfield for estern g ants an
~he Afghan Government has approved an agreement for
Soviet construction of a militar airfield at Shindand, 40
miles from the Iranian border,
The new airfield, like the one just being complete
with Soviet assistance at Bagram, is to be capable of han-
dung most types of jet aircraf to It may be used as an alternate
landing field for civil aircraft using the international airport
being constructed at Kandahar with US assistance, Iran, .-
which has previously voiced anxiety about Soviet military aid
programs in Afghanistan, is likely to show concern aver this
new "Soviet threat" to its northeastern regionp
~,he work is probably to be done on a grant basis under
the terms of the technical and economic assistance agreement
signed on 28 May 1959, which also provided for Soviet improve-
ment of the Kushka-Herat?Shindand~Kandahar road, Moscow
announced on 15 December that Soviet technicians were about
to begin the survey for the road project Improvement of the
Kushka-Shindand section of this road would facilitate construc-
tion of the airfields
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Jordan to Propose Plan for Palestine Sett
~ecent proposals by Iraqi Fremier Qasim and the former
Grand .Mufti of Jerusalem for the establishment of a separate
Palestine state have aroused critical comment in Jordan and
have inspired a Jordanian counterproposal. The Jordanian
Government intends to submit a plan for an over?all settle-
ment of the Palestine question to the meeting of the Arab League
foreign ministers in Cairo on 8 February, Although King
Husayn has said .details .cif the plan have yet to be worked out,
he indicated it would involve abandonment of the "Arab legend"
that Israel should be pushed into the sea and would propose a
frontier somewhere between the 194? TJN partition. lines and
the present armistice lineso
~he plan repox?tedly also advocates Arab recognition of
Israel as a "religious state," estabi~sknmerat of Arab?Israeli
trade- relations, demobilization of Israel?s armed forces,
and suspension of Israeli immigration pending a settlement,
These terms as a. whole are unlikely to be acceptable either
to the other Arab states or to Israel, and since the plan would
reverse Arab attitudes toward Israel, it is bound to evoke hosm
file criticism at the Arab League meeting. Husayn neverthe-
less hopes the plan can be framed in a manner which will forem
stall charges that Jordan is a traitor to the Arab cause. Jor?
dan?s position will be kept secret until the conference.
~he Jordanians probably feel compelled to take some
counteraction in view of the direct threat to Jordanian sover?
eignty posed by proposals for a separate Palestine state and
army. Jordan?s West Bank (of the Jordan River), formerly
part of Palestine, was annexed by King Abdullah in x950, and
roughly two thirds of Jordan?s population of over 1,500,000 are
Palestinians, of whom about half -are refugees. Jordan?s annex?
anon of Palestinian territory has not been recognized by the
Arab League and has even been criticized as a traitorous act.
King Abdullah was assassinated in 1951, apparently .because of
his moderate attitude toward .Israel and his secret contacts with
the Israelis in an effort to achieve a settlementa7
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III. THE WEST
The Bol~,vian Situation
Communist-led miners have taken control of the key
mining town of Huanuni, which prior to the armed clash of
23 January served as a progovernment barrier separating
$,000- Communist-led miners in Catavi from the cities of
Oruro and La Paz. President Siles has expressed to the US
ambassador his grave concern over the situation, stressing
the possibility of civil war. He noted that control of Oruro,
a junction of railroads serving the tin mines, would permit
the Communists virtual control of the nation's economy.
Minerals make up 90 percent, of Bolivian exports.
~Siles emphasized the effect this would have on the coun-
try's already difficult financial situation, and requested US
good offices with the International Monetary Fund, where a
Bolivian reque st f ar aid is pending
~les is seeking to convince former President Paz Estens-
soro, right-wing leader Walter Guevara, and Ieft-wing.leader Juan
Lechin that they are playing into the Communists' hands by
their bitter rivalry over the government party's impending
presidential and congressional nominations. Paz and Guevara
have gone to the Cochabamba valley in central Bolivia to
pacify the opposing right- and left-wing units of rural militia
which were recently mobilized in response to the Huanuni. ep-
isode. Fighting began near Cochabamba on 25 January, -and
initial reports claim ten to thirteen dead.
~iles, who flew to Huanuni on 23 January to stop the fight-
ing there, said he was surprised to encounter "500 disciplined
militia, superbly led by Communists;' The workersQ militia
was the main force in 1952 in the MNR's defeat of the ruling
military junta and the armed forces. Since then, government
control has often depended on a precarious balance betwee~
29 Jan 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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~he right and left wings of the party, each backed by workers'
militia units which are still armed. In the present situation
Siles is reported to have questioned whether the army would
be able to dislodge the Catavi miners from Huanuni without
~xpo~ing La Paz itself to attack:
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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LATE .ITEM
The French-Algerian Situation
De Gra.ulle appears to be mounting a campaign to .isolate the
settler insurgents in Algiers and to impress the army there
that France is solidly behind him. Police action on the night
of 27 January against xightist extremist leaders in France was
probably the first step in this campaign. De Gaulle, in his state-
ment before the Council of State on 28 January, said he was re-
solved to "shoulder his responsibilities" and, "whatever happens,"
to maintain the "legitimate institutions and the functioning of the
state:'
Reports of the special cabinet meeting on 27 January sug-
~est hat De Gaulle has abandoned any intention to order the
army to use force against the insurgents and may m?ve to mix
some conciliation with firmness in his major speech scheduled
for 29 January.
Most political parties in France have indicated their support
for De Gaulle in his contest with rightist extremists. 'Socialist
party leaders and non-Communist labor union leaders, however,
have expressed fears that if the threat of antigovernment violence
grows., they may be forced into joint action with the Communist
partyd The Communists, anxious to break out of their long-stand-
ing political isolation, have already called for rigorous action by
the government against the insurgents, and for all "Socialists,
Communists, ,and Democrats" to unite in the "defense of democ-
racy;'
Paris' transfer of Delegate General Delouvr.i~r and General
Challe to a new command post about 30 miles from Algiers has
been explained by a government spokesman as a move to put them
"out of reach of any pressure from the insurgents or any quat?ter
whatsoever;' ? There is also speculation this move may be intended
to lay the groundwork for a possible future withholding of supplies
from an insurgent-dominated Algiers without penalizing the army
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at the same time. The command post shift was accompanied by
renewed appeals by Delouvrier and Challe to the insurgents, the
army, and the Moslems to unite behind De Gaulle.
The Algiers insurgents? seizure of the local radio station
provides them with a means of coordinating extremist activity out-
side Algiers, and. is a tactical success which may affset somewhat
the failure of their attempts to rally significant Moslem support
for a tfFrench Algeria: ? Efforts throughout 28 January to stimu-
late demonstrations of Moslem support for the extremists were.
conspicuously unsuccessful, and there are indications that most
Algerian Moslems support De Gaulle?s self-determination pro-
gram.
The number of extremists barricaded in downtown Algiers
reached about 6000 on 28 January, and the American consulate
general characterized the atmosphere as one of "fanaticism and
despair:' Both extremist and French Army attitudes will pxob-
ably be influenced b recent manifestations of support for De
Gaulle in France. Extremist spokesmen, however, have raised
the threat of secession should De Gaulle fail to pledge himself to
a "French Algeria:'
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget `
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director :,f Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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