CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005000340001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 8, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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8 April 1960
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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8 April 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
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South Africa: International criticism of South Africa
is increasing, particularly in other African states, where
there. is a growing. movement to boycott South African goods.
The Afro-Asian. bloc in the. United Nations reportedly plans
to move for a second Security Council session on South
(Africa if Hammarskjold fails in his efforts to bring. about
a modification of the Jnion's racial policies. The majority
of the white South African population .has virtually ignored
outside. criticism and is stubbornly confident that the natives
can be permanently cowed.
Belgian Congo: Top officials in Brussels have. told the
JUS Embassy that there will be "economic and political tur-
moil" in the Congo if outside assistance of up to $135 mil-
lion does not become available before the Congolese achieve
Independence on. 30 June. Brussels' urgent plea to the United
States for help suggests that. the Belgians have been slow in
realizing the economic implications of the Congo's transition
to independence. The flight of capital from the territory since
the January announcement on independence, apparently out of
fear of expropriation, has been extensive. Some European
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British Somaliland: Colonial. officials in the protectorate
have, dropped their plan to reject outright the local demands
for independence by 1 July and an early association with Somalia.
London wants to stall independence but is concerned that complete
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Indonesia: Non-Communist political and army elements are
continuing to plot moves against Sukarno during his absence. It
is doubtful, however, that Army Chief Nasution will bring himself
to the point of trying to oust Sukarno at present, since he probably
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denial now of the Somali demands might lead to violence in the
protectorate. The British commander of local security forces
cannot guarantee the loyalty of his Somali personnel. Britain
plans to give the Somalis some latitude b offerin to "consult,"
in the hope that moderation will prevail.
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Ifears that he would not be able to consolidate enough strength to
.retain power. There is still an outside chance that Nasution or
others may decide to act.
Laos: Communist propaganda continues to accuse the gov-
ernment of planning to rig the elections to be held on 24 April
and warns that an "extremely dangerous situation" will be cre-
atedin Laos if "reactionaries" win a majority of the 59 seats.
The pro-Communist Neo Lao Hak Sat party and fellow-traveling
Santiphab party are putting up nine candidates each; additional
sympathizers may be hidden among independent candidates.
III. THE WEST
Cuba: The Communists are making a determined effort to
take complete control of the Cuban Labor Confederation before
the massive labor rally planned for May Day. Their move is
gaining momentum with support from the minister of labor, who
has Fidel Castro's endorsement. C777 1
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1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Increasing International Criticism of South Africa
International criticism of the Union of South Africa. is
increasing, particularly in Africa and Asia, and some Afri-
can nations are threatening to take direct economic and polit-
ical action. The Nigerian parliament has passed a motion
urging a ban on the importation of South African goods; simi-
lar action. is. being considered by nongovernmental groups
elsewhere in Africa. The' International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions has announced a two-month consumer boycott
beginning in May.
Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana, opening the three-
day "positive action" conference of African. nations in Accra
on. 7 April, called recent events in the Union "a signpost to
the beginning. of the. end of foreign supremacy" in Africa.
Moderate Tanganyikan leader Julius Nyerere has sent tele-
grams to Nkrumah and Indian Prime Minister Nehru urging
them to stay away from the forthcoming Commonwealth prime
ministers' conference unless the. South African prime minis-
ter is "excluded." In. Britain, the Committee of African Or-
ganizations, a. Communist-infiltrated group which coordinates
the activities of many African organizations. in London, has
invited all Commonwealth prime ministers at their meeting
in London next month to expel South. Africa from the Common-
wealth. The Afro-Asian bloc in. the United Nations reportedly
plans to move for a. second Security Council session. on. South
Africa if Secretary General Hammarskjold fails in his efforts
to moderate the Union's racial policies.
According. to the American, Embassy in. Cape Town, al-
though. recent events have. shaken some South African, leaders,
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the majority of the white population is blind to the significance
of the disturbances. External criticism, including the. Securi-
ty Council resolution of 1 April, is virtually ignored by both
the politicians and the press. Although business and indus-
trial leaders have stepped up their appeals for a change in
government policy, the embassy believes that most white South
Africans are stubbornly confident that the natives can be per-
manently cowed.
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Belgians Express Alarm over Congo's Situation
Top Belgian officials have told the US Embassy in Brus-
sels that there will be "economic and political turmoil" in
the Congo if measures are not taken immediately to head off
an impending. economic and. financial crisis. In, separate con-
versations with embassy officers on 5 April, both Congo Min-
ister de. Schrijver and his economic counselor insisted that
the future of the country can be secure only if outside financial
assistance of $120-135 million is obtained even before the
Congo achieves full independence on. 30 June. Failing this,
they foresee stagnation of the Congolese economy, a serious
aggravation of the already difficult unemployment problem,
and a resulting refusal of the Congolese to cooperate with
Brussels.
The flight of Belgian. capital from the Congo since inde-
pendence was agreed upon. last January is probably the most
immediate of the major problems confronting the Belgian Gov-
ernment. Although exchange controls were recently initiated,
the Congo central bank's reserves reportedly have fallen sharp-
ly, and there are apparently insufficient funds in. sight to meet
treasury requirements between now and 30 June. The longer
term problem, according to the Belgians, is the lack of funds--
over and above a $54,000,000 Belgian contribution- -to finance
the Congo's 1960 "extraordinary" or investment budget. Bel-
gian attempts to obtain aid from the French, Swiss, Germans,
and. the European. Common Market's investment bank are said
to have been unsuccessful, despite the Belgian Government's
willingness to guarantee all loans made to the Congo.
Brussels' urgent plea for US assistance. suggests that the
Belgians have been slow to realize the economic implications
of the Congo's transition, to independence, and they may be in-
creasingly nervous over the Belgian-Congolese economic con-
ference scheduled for 25 April. This conference is supposed
to decide such issues as commercial policy, Belgian economic
assistance to the Congo, the extent of public and private in-
vestments, and the Congo's future relations with the European
. Common Market.
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British Somaliland
Colonial officials in British Somaliland have dropped
their plan to reject outright the demands of the protectorate's
newly elected legislature for independence by 1 July and for
an early association with Somalia. Somalia, a UN trust terri-
tory which has been under Italian tutelage for nearly ten
years, is to achieve independence on that date.
Although London hopes to dampen the growing enthusiasm
among the inexperienced protectorate leaders for immediate
independence, it is fearful that complete denial of demands
in British Somaliland at this time might lead to serious dis-
turbances in the country. Furthermore, British officials are
concerned over a report by the British commander of local
security that the loyalty of his Somali personnel is uncertain;
therefore they plan to "give the Somalis their head or at least
a very loose rein" in.the hope that moderation will ultimately
prevail. The protectorate's governor will inform the local
Somalis that he is ready to begin discussing the problems of
independence.
London, in addition, will attempt to placate. Ethiopia's
traditional suspicion that the UK fosters the creation of a Great-
er Somalia--which would include nearly one third of Ethiopia's
territory--by issuing an early denial in Parliament. Addis
Ababa, however, has been further annoyed by refusal of local
Somali officials in the protectorate to permit the establish-
ment of an Ethiopian consulate in Hargeisa, the capital. II
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 Anti-Sukarno Plotting Continues in Indonesia
Political maneuvering and plotting, in Indonesia, which
were encouraged by President Sukarno's appointment of a new
Parliament on 27 March, have continued since he left on 1
April for a two-month global tour. The scope of the alleged
plots varies from merely preventing the installation of Parli-
ament to overthrowing Sukarno.
All anti-Sukarno plotters agree that army support or
leadership .is essential. The army's position, in turn, re-
portedly depends partially on the outcome of the current dis-
pute in the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), one of Indonesia's two major
Moslem parties. The dispute centers on whether the NU
should participate in the new Parliament when it is installed
in June or support a recently formed: anti- Sukarno political
coalition, the Democratic League.. Anti-Parliament elements
in the NU claim they are gaining strength and may win control
of the party. The American Embassy in. Djakarta believes
that if these elements can induce the party to support the Demo-
cratic League, this change would exert pressure on. the army
for action.
Despite unofficial support of the Democratic League, the
Indonesian Army leadership continues to give little indication
that it plans a. takeover during Sukarno's absence. The army's
attitude presumably is influenced by the lack of unity in the
army, itself, as well as. by the improbability that anti-Sukarno
political forces wouldhold together under stress.
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Laotian Election. Campaign
Communist propaganda continues to accuse the Laotian
Government of rigging the elections to be held on 24 April
and warns that an "extremely dangerous situation" will be
created in Laos if "reactionaries" win a majority of the 59
National Assembly seats. The. Communists are probably re-
ferring primarily to candidates sponsored by the reformist
Committee for Defense of National Interests (CDNI) and pos-
sibly to those elements of former Premier Phoui'S Rally of
the Lao People (RLP) considered by the Communists to be
hopelessly committed to the "American imperialists."
The Communist-front Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) and the
fellow-traveling Santiphab party are putting up nine candi-
dates each; there may be additional sympathizers among the
independent candidates. The Communists can probably hope
at best to elect only a small leftist bloc, but they may expect
the non-Communist majority to break up into contending groups
when. the new assembly convenes. The present Communist
propaganda line, by concentrating. its criticism on the CDNI,
seems designed in part to bring about such fragmentation or,
failing this, to build up a case for withdrawing from legitimate
political operations in Laos and relying essentially on a Pathet
Lao guerrilla campaign to gain control of the country.
King Savang has undertaken an extensive tour of the north-
ern provinces which he hopes will benefit the government-ap-
proved candidates. The RLP and the CDNI continue their
cooperation by withdrawing all but one progovernment candi-
date. in most districts where. there is leftist opposition, but
there are already indications that this collaboration may not
last beyond election day.
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III. THE WEST
Communist Tactics in the Cuban Labor Movement
Communists are making a determined effort to take com-
plete control of the Cuban Labor Confederation, where they
already have substantial influence in the national directorate
and in several constituent federations. Labor Minister. Mar-
tinez Sanchez has cooperated with them and, when CTC Pres-
ident David Salvador complained of this, Martinez' action was
endorsed by Fidel Castro, who said the labor problems could
be "solved calmly" after May Day.
The Cuban Communist party (PSP) is
planning to discredit Salvador by criticizing his role in
.preparing for a mammoth May Day rally ordered by Castro.
It claims. he has hung back while PSP leaders are organizing
"a million workers, civil militias, and the armed forces" to
demonstrate support for the regime.
The CTC, well organized and totaling half a million mem-
bers, was.dominated by Communists with the consent of Batista
when he was president in the early 1940s. Labor. leaders who
oppose them now include many leftists like Salvador, as well
as Catholics; original 26th of July members, and others who
are. familiar with. Communist, tactics under the guise of "unity:'
PSP leaders claim that. Salvador and other non-Commu-
nist CTC national officials know they will soon be dislodged and
that they hope to take asylum, claiming persecution by the Cas
tro government and the Communist party. Although Salvador
was Castro's choice to run the CTC as the labor arm of the re-
gime, rumors that he will. be replaced have arisen from his op-
position to the,purging of some 20 non-Communist. CTC leaders
by CTC organizational secretary. Jesus Soto and others believed
to be manipulated by Haul Castro. C
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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