CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005000430001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 19, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II, ASIA-AFRICA
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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19 April 1960
DAILY BRIEF
India-Communist Chinao [Nehru continues to feel that
his to ks w th hou n-lai which begin. tomorrow will result
in nothing beyond a routine statement of peaceful intentions.
and the establishment of a joint commission to pave the way
for future negotiations, Pressure from both domestic and in-
ternational quarters for holding firm- on India's stated posi-
tion seems to have restricted Nehru's room for maneuver,
Some form of concession however ma be unavoidable as
the talks progress.]
Indonesia o The anti-Communist press in Djakarta, with the
active encouragement of the army, is directing an unprecedented
campaign of criticism against President Sukarno and his projected
new parliament.. Sukarno is out of the country on the third week
of his eight-week world tour, ~,he American Embassy reports
that the consensus in informed circles in Djakarta is that the ~,r-
my is deliberately whipping up public sentiment as "groundwork"
in the event army leader General Nasution decides to take power.
Nasution thus far has not committed himself to such a move, part-
ly because of uncertainty over how much he could count on unified
anti-Communist support,
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Pakistan-UAR: Nasir's six~day official visit to Pakistan
ended on 16 April. with a bland joint communique announcing
a .cultural agreement and trade discussions. Although the
visit produced a show of amity on some issues such as Al~
geria and South Africa, Pakistan's alignment with the West
will probably limit the. extent of its cooperation with the neu-
tralist UAR. Nasir's public offer on 15 April of his good of-
fices in the Kashmir dispute will please. the Pakistanis but an-
noy the Indians, who claim that Kashmir is already n
part of India and that this is no longer a live issue.
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UAR Lebanon UAR and Lebanese dockworkers have de--~
Glared a boycott of all US shipping in retaliation for the picket-
ing of the UAR freighter Cleopatra in New York by the Interna~
tional Longshoremen's Association and-the Seafarers' Interna-
tional Union protesting the UAR boycott of ships which have
traded with Israel. American vessels may be denied supplies
and other facilities in UAR and Lebanese ports, but there is no
indication of any plans for restrictions on their use of the Suez
Canal. The UAR is ur in other Arab states to 'oin in the boy-
cott.
North African The Moroccan and Tunisian governments are
concerned over the possibility that anticipated stepped-up hostil~
ities between the French Army and the Algerian rebels will lead
to new incidents within Moroccan and Tunisian. boundaries. The
Moroccan Foreign Ministry has formally protested an alleged
French "bombardment" of Moroccan soil on 14 April. Tunisia's
President Bourguiba has publicly warned that his country will re-
sist any French incursions; he said Tunisia had rejected a French
request that Tunisian residents be evacuated from frontier areas.
Belgian Congo: The growing belligerency of leading Congo
lese nationalists toward Belgium's economic role in the Congo
suggests that the economic roundtable conference scheduled to
begin in Brussels on 25 April. will be acrimo~ous .and px~abab~y'in-
conclusive. The Congolese plan in particular to attack as inadequate
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Cuba: Fidel Castro is apparently worried about his. inability
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~% ged Sierra Maestra, where. outlaw bands have tr
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~~ ~ refugee
(~~ a guerrilla activity
w e a es o e support. Castro. claims to have among the peas-
.- % ants of the. Sierra N~aestra, since. the errillas cannot 2
%~ there Gong .without peasant supporto
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the. measures taken by the Belgians to prevent the .flight of cap
ital from the Congo, which- has amounted to about $150
000
000
,
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since. January 1959e The Congolese- are also likely to oppose 25
.Brussels' plan. -for Belgian. management. of the budget and of the
national. banking. systemo
IIIo THE WEST
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Indians Remain Dubious About Outcome of Nehru-Chou Talks
Official circles and press commentators in New Delhi are
increasingly doubtful that the talks between Prime Minister Nehru
-and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai beginning on 20 April will pro-
duce definitive results. Nehru reportedly continues to feel that
the meeting will result only in agreement on a general easing of
Sino-Indian tension, steps to eliminate the risk of further. border
incidents, and the establishment of some form of joint commis-
sion to study the border problem and prepare for future substan-
tive negotiations.
~Nehru's attitude toward the frontier question has hardened
recently, apparently as a result of domestic and international
pressures to maintain a firm position combined with increasing
indications that the Chinese intend to be less conciliatory in deeds
than in words. Nehru. probably has been influenced by admonition
from President Prasad, cabinet colleagues, opposition .leaders,
and the press, some of whom may fear that Nehru will be maneu-
vered by Chou into a position where he feels some concession is
required to maintain India's reputation for conciliatory policies.
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Chou, who arrives in New Delhi on 19 April following his stay
in Burma, probably will get a polite but cold reception from. most
of the Indian public during his six-day visit. Chou may offer to ex-
change. Chinese claims in Assam for clear title to Ladakh. In
Rangoon, he stated that a mutual "exchange" of territory had been
successfully negotiated--an effort. to use. the Sino-Burmese agree-
ment. as a precedent.
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Indonesian Army. Encourages Anti~Sukarno Press Campaign
Rumors and reports continue that the army, supported by
non~Communist political elements, will attempt a coup either
during President Sukarno absence or shortly after his return
from a global tour. in early June. Principal. evidence support-
ing these rumors is the army's active encouragement of a vig-
orous and unprecedentedly critical campaign by the anti-Com-
munist press against President Sukarno and his newly_,appointed
parliament. The .leftist press, which has defended Sukarno and
the parliament, is hampered by newsprint shortages, and the
Communist. daily has been banned for. the past. three weeks.
;The consensus in informed circles in Djakarta, however, is
that. the intent of the army's press campaign is to prepare. the pub-
lic in case Army Chief of Staff and Security Minister General
Nasution should decide to take some form of anti-Sukarno action.
Such action could be limited to blocking the installation of the new
parliament in June or to preventing Sukarno from including Com-
munists in a revised cabinets Nasution thus far has not com-
mitted himself to any decisive anti~Sukarno move, presumably
because of his assessment of Sukarno's power position and in
part because of uncertainty over unified anti-Communist support.
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UAR and Lebanese. Dockworkers Boycott American. Shipping
In retaliation. for the picketing of the UAR freighter Cleo-
patra in New York, UAR longshoremen. have declared a boy-
cott of American. ships, .which may also be denied supplies and
other facilities in. UAR ports. Longshoremen in Beirut and
Aden are reported ready to take similar action against Ameri-
can shipping. The UAR is urging dockworkers throughout .the
Arab world, to .join. in the boycott, the executive council of -.the
International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions reportedly
will meet on 20 April to discuss the situation.
Members of the International Longshoremen's Associa-
tion and the Seafarers' International Union have been picketing
the.: UAR freighter Cleopatra in New York since 12 April, and
loading of the ship has been halted. Their action. is in protest
against the UAR's boycott of ships which have traded with Israel.
Cairo news media. claim the demonstration is Zionist sponsored
and that it is. a "last desperate. effort by Zionists to break the
UAR economic blockade of Israel and force passage- of the Suez
Canal."
The picketing of the. Cleopatra has been hailed by the Israeli
press as a possible .turning point in Israel's struggle. for Suez
passage. The Israelis are hopeful that picketing of UAR ships
will spread to ports in other countries and that the .incident will
publicize the blockage- of .Israel's shipping. through the canal and.
inspire. support for overcoming these restrictions. The UAR,
on .the premise that a state of war still exists between it and
Israel, bans from the canal ships chartered by Israel or by
firms in which Israelis have part ownership, as well as Israeli
ships and cargoes. On 10 April the ~'ireek ship Astypalea was
released from Port Said after nearly five months of detention.
It had been. chartered by an Israeli firm to carry cement from
Haifa. to Djibouti Via. the canal. The cargo was unloaded before
the vessel's release. ~ Israeli Foreign Ministry official has
said that ships with cargoes from Israel will continue to be
sent throu h the canal "from time. to time,"
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Morocco and Tunisia Fear Expanded Algerian Conflict
The Moroccan and Tunisian governments are again ex-
pressing concern over the possibility that hostilities between
the French Army and the Algerian rebels will lead. to new. in-
cidents within Morocco and Tunisia. The possibility that the
rebels will launch a spring offensive has revived fears that
the French military forces will retaliate against Algerian
bases in Morocco and Tunisia.
The Moroccan. Foreign Ministry is reported to have for-
mally and energetically protested an alleged French bombard-
ment of Moroccan soil for several hours on 14 April. The
French Foreign Ministry claims the alleged incident occurred
inside Algeria. President Bourguiba publicly warned France
on 15 April that Tunisia would resist any French incursions.
He said that Tunisia had rejected a French note asking that
Tunisian residents be evacuated from the border area.
The French chargd d'affaires in Tunis told the American
Embassy he had pointed out to the Tunisian Government the
increased danger for Tunisians in the vicinity of rebel in-
stallations in Tunisia resulting from French fire against Al-
gerians who are. in the process of crossing the border. He
stressed, however, that France. had not raised any claim re-
garding the right of "hot pursuit" either by French ground or
air. forces, which remained under instructions against incur-
sions into Tunisian territory. In Paris, the- Foreign Ministry
issued a formal denial that the overnment had made an al-
lusion to the right of pursuit.
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Congolese- Critical. of Belgian. Economic Policies
Leading Congolese nationalists Patrice Lumumba and
Joseph Ka,savubu-are increasingly critical of Belgium's pol-
icies in regard to .the Congo's deteriorating economic situa-
tion. They believe that Brussels has taken inadequate meas-
ures to halt a serious capital drain which. since January 1959
has exceeded the normal capital outflow by at least $150,OO~y-
000. This represents the remissions of both. companies and
private individuals. The currency drain and a growing short-
age of .investment capital may have serious political conse-
quences for the government to be formed in. June.
Several months ago, Belgian and Congolese leaders agreed
to hold economic discussions beginning on 25 April. Brussels
.has hoped to obtain. agreements which would provide for Bel-
gium's continued controlling. influence. in the Congo's financial
affairs following. its independence on 30 June. SpecificaXly,
Belgians would. continue for several years to manage budget
affairs, the national banking system, and the comptroller's
office until Congolese could be trained in financial affairs.
Recently, Congolese criticism of Belgium's financial admin-
istration has mounted, and both Lumumba. and. Kasavubu will
probably come to the- Brussels talks in a belligerent mood.. They
are. likely to demand acomplete- inventory of official and private
Belgian .interests in the. Congo and -may seek extensive. financial
changes involving. the return of foreign exchange credits and
tax receipts-from semi-official companies operating in the Congo.
Further. complications would arise if the Congolese persist in
their argument that any agreements- reached at the April conference
would not be binding. on the government to be formed in June. In
this case, the Congo. would achieve: independence without giving
Brussels legal guarantees for Belgian property or ensurin .its
paramount influence in the local economic situation.
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III. THE WEST
Persistence of Guerrilla Action Apparently Bothers Castro
Fidel Castro. is apparently worried about his inability to
suppress the guerrilla bands now operating in the Sierra, Maestra.
Castro claimed on 17 April that there was only one guerrilla
band., of 14 men, but he remained in Oriente Province longer
than his purported "inspection trip" warranted. The govern-
ment~controlled daily Revolution and news agency Prensa
Latina are both taking great pains to discount the importance
of the uprisings.
e ommu-
nis s an _ e intervention in Cuba and evidently fear
that the insurrection, if not. soon suppressed, will hasten an ex-
ternal attack. ~
Guerrilla leader Manuel Beaton's continued ability to elude
Castro fgrces would indicate support from local peasants. ~
Beaton himself is a native of
e area w o gui a astro~s guerrilla fighters, Since the Sierra
Maestra peasants were Castro's chief supporters during much of
his revolt, and are supposed to be its chief. beneficiaries, their
desertion would be a significant .indication of disillusionment.
Some of Ca,stro~ opponents in Cuba had suspected that Beaton-~~
a revolutionary army captain who escaped to the mountains from
imprisonment for a murder he denies having committed`~was
planted by the regime to trap counterrevolutionaries. They con-
sidered his guerrillas chiefly outlaws, who traditionally hide from
justice in the Sierra Maestra,
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant-for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administratfon
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Folicy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
Th.e Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Adniinistratfon
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Departrr~ent of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Ol;eratians, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Farce
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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