CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005000460001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 31, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 22, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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22 April 1960
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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22 April 1960
DAILY BRIEF
April, 2,734 persons, including large, numbers of farmers
and craftsmen,. had been processed in the West Berlin refu-
gee center, and refugee. authorities reported that the actual
influx for. the week was double that figure. The apparently
extreme concern of the Ulbricht regime over the. mass exodus
the background of the regime's drive against private farmers
and. businessmen, appears to have surpassed all records
since the aftermath of the riots of 17 June 10 53. As of 19
1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
East Germany: The number of East German refugees
fleeing to West Berlin in-the week -of 13 to 19 April, against
of its citizens is shown by the reported attempt of East German
police--until stopped.by the West German police--to question
travelers and examine their baggage in West Berlin. stations
of the East German - operated elevated railroad.
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Laos: Progovernment elements are certain to win a major-
ity in Sunday's elections for the 59-member National Assembly.
The number of seats which will be won by the 20-odd Commu-
nist and pro-Communist candidates will depend in part on the
amount of pressure put on voters by local army and police ele-
ments. The exclusion of all or virtually all leftists from the
new assembly--whether by government rigging or as a result
of a possible last-minute protest withdrawal by the leftists--
would be likely to stimulate intensified guerrilla operations by
the insurgents.
South Korea: (Opposition elements are refusing to accept
the resignation of Rhee's cabinet as evidence of any real change
in the government or as an indication of willingness by Rhee to
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satisfy the demands of the people. Lt. Gen. Song Yo-chan, comb
mander of the troops enforcing martial law, has expressed the
opinion that riots will resume in Seoul if the police do not change
their present tactics. Rhee, meanwhile, is reported to have indi-
cated he does not contemplate easing of police-state methods and
has said those who demonstrated will be treated as traitors _J
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III. THE WEST
Cuba: The Cuban Labor Confederation is rent by dissen=-
sion over Communist efforts to control it. Secretary General
David Salvador is reported to be in hiding and may resign just be-
Jz_ _ fore May Day to bring the issue to public attention. Castro offi-
cials reportedly are infuriated and fear that Salvador's action will
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interfere with the large demonstration of support for the regime
planned for. 1 May.
22 Apr. 60
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Progovernment Elements May Win Sizable Majority
Ili Laotian Elections
Progovernment elements are expected to win a majority
which may reach substantial proportions in elections on 24.
April for the 59-member Laotian National Assembly. Ap-
proximately 120 candidates were at last report still in the race,.
including some 60 on the, government-approved slate--com-
posed mainly of members of former Premier Phoui's Rally of
.the Lao People .(RLP) and the Committee for Defense of National
Interests (CDNI)--and nine each from the Communist-front Neo
Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) and the fellow-traveling Santiphab party.
An estimated 25 of the 40=odd independents are in reality RLP
or CDNI. followers who failed to gain acceptance on the govern-
ment slate A few of the. remaining independents are considered
leftists who would probably vote with the NLHS if elected.
The number of seats won by candidates or allies of the NLHS
will depend in. part on the amount of pressure exerted on the voters
by local. police and army units.
admonishing . em
o assure free elections in. districts where no antiphab or NLHS
candidates are running," provides a strong if indirect indication
that the government is in fact planning to manipulate the voting
.where Communist or pro-Communist candidates are seeking of-
fice.
The exclusion of all or virtually all, leftists from the new as-
sembly--whether by government rigging or as a result of a last-
minute protest withdrawal by the leftists==would be likely to stimu=
late intensified guerrilla operations by the. Communist Pathet Lao
insurgents and would reflect adversely on Laos internationally.
French, Indian, jnd British officials, for example, have already
shown considerable concern.
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South Korean Opposition Unappeased by Cabinet Resignation
jOpposition elements refuse to interpret the resignation of
President Rhee's cabinet as evidence of any real change in the
government or as an indication of willingness by Rhee to satis-
fy the demands of the people. Opposition Democratic party
leader Chang Myon, the "lame duck" vice president defeated
by Rhee's unpopular running mate Yi Ki-pung in the elections
on 15 Marcl has called for "further demonstrations" and new
elections. Rhee reportedly was angered by Yi's flight from
Seoul during the rioting, and there has been some speculation
that he may be replaced.)
An uneasy calm appears to have settled over Seoul follow-
ing the establishment of martial law. Army Chief of Staff Lt.
Geri Song Yo-chan, commander of the troops enforcing martial
law, has warned, however, that riots will probably break out
again in the capital unless the police change their tactics.
Earlier, Song who fears the police will try to blame the army
for anything that goes wrong, commented that during the riot-
ing the police had "lost their heads" and had been in a "frenzy."/
[There are strong indications that President Rhee neither
comprehends the nature of the demonstrations nor appreciates
the extent of popular resentment against his regime. A high-
level Korean Government official reports that Rhee has indi-
cated he does not contemplate easing "police-state" methods
and intends to treat the demonstrators as national traitors.
If former Rhee strong man Yi Pom-sok is included in the cabi-
net, it would lend weight to this report. Rhee apparently has
interpreted statements of concern by President Eisenhower,
Secretary Herter, and Ambassador McConaughy as interest
in his own "welfare and safety" and has no strong impression
of US disapproval of his methods. Bloc propaganda is exploit-
ing the situation in South Korea, and free-world reaction is
almost unanimously negative to the Rhee government.
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hn Japan, where South Korean developments are followed
very closely, the government and press attribute the demon,-
strations to popular resentment over the elections and pent-up
dissatisfaction with the regime's high-handed policies, as well
as to economic factors. In an unofficial statement, Prime
Minister Kishi discounted possible Communist instigation, al-
though Foreign Ministry officials are concerned that the long-
latent opposition to the Rhee government may develop into
widespread disaffection which would be exploited by the Com-
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munists and eventually affect security in the Far East.
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III. THE WEST
Cuban Labor Troubles Annoy Castro Regime
The Cuban Labor Confederation (CTC) is rent by bitter dis-
sension over Communist efforts to control it.
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CTC Secretary
General David Salvador is in hiding in Havana and is planning to
resign just before May Day in order to bring the issue to public
attention. Salvador was chosen by Fidel Castro to run Cuba's
strong labor movement as an important component of the revolu-
tion. He and some other labor leaders have resisted the Commu=
nists, with whom they have had previous experience. Castro in
recent months has endorsed the support given the Communists by
his brother Raul and Raul's protege, pro-Communist Labor Min-
ister Martinez Sanchez.
Castro and his advisers are anxious to postpone a showdown
in the CTC until after the May Day rally they are staging to dem-
onstrate domestic and international support for the revolutionary
regime. They are infuriated by Salvador's action, which they see
as a threat to the rally's success. Martinez considers it impera-
tive that Salvador make a speech at the celebration.
Martinez evidently has already asked Conrado Becquer, head
of CTC's powerful sugar workers' federation who has avoided in-
volvement in the power struggle, to replace Salvador. Becquer,
opportunistic and politically astute, is reported to be reluctant
to accept and to have said that in the event he took the post, he
would demand government support for a non-Communist CTC di-
rectorate. The Castro government is unlikely to accept or hold
to such terms; if Becquer does replace Salvador, however, it
would indicate that he believes he can control the Communist la-
bor leaders, as he is too ambitious to share power with them.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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