CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005000470001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 23, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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23 April 1960
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Peiping again publicly warns that detente
should not lead Communists to abandon
long-term struggle against West; Khru-
shchev implicitly criticized.
USSR reportedly offers "unlimited"
amounts of crude oil to India.
President Rhee reportedly plans to relin-
quish power in favor of parliamentary
government headed by prime minister.
Effects of Korean disorder may provoke
protests in Nationalist China if irregu-
larities occur in local elections tomorrow.?
Laos--Murderers of French UN official
apparently thought he was American; in-
cident may be part of reported Commu-
nist plan to take "positive action" against
Americans in Laos.
Violent student demonstrations expected
in Japan next week in protest against
ratification of US-Japan security pact.
O7 Split developing in South African ruling
party on issue of revising apartheid
policy.
Guinea--Tours government moves to
suppress opposition elements.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
zsxi 23 April 1960
INE,
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vV
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China: For the second time in less than a
month, Me. inese. Communist party's top theoretical. jour-
nal, Red Flag, has emphasized that. negotiations between. the
bloc andthe. West, regardless of their success in "reaching
some sort of agreement," should not lead Communists to
abandon their long-term struggle against the. West. The ar-
ticle, apparently directed toward justifying the. continuation
of the "tense situation" in Sino-American relations, rebuts
the. "revisionist" view of Tito--and, by implication, the. views
of Khrushchev--that "nations can relax" and asks:. "Is there
.tranquillity in. our Taiwan Strait.?"
. USSR-India: Moscow has reportedly offered New Delhi
"unlimited' amounts of crude. oil .at discount prices in an at-
tempt to stress the USSR's ability to supply India's petroleum
needs. Despite the attractiveness of the offer, New Delhi
would encounter difficulty in utilizing. much Soviet crude, but
may use the Soviet offer. to exert pressure for pricing conces-
sions from the. three Western companies which operate most of
India's refining capacity.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
*South Korea: The announcement that President Rhee has
agr6ed to heach a parliamentary system of government with a
cabinet headed by a prime minister. is probably a device, to re-
solve. the present political. crisis by eliminating the contro-
versial vice presidency. The tactics used in the, 15 March
election of Xi Ki-pung to the vice presidency sparked the re-
cent outburst of popular violence. Under a parliamentary
system prior to 1954, Rhee as president was able to exercise
the powers usually associated with the prime minister. It is
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problematical whether any prominent members of the opposition
Democratic, party would participate in a coalition if such an ar- 25X1
rangement is proposed by Rhee.~~\\
(Chang Myon,. the leader of the Democratic party whose term
25X1 as vice president expires on 15 August, has resigned. His action
is probably intended to exert maximum pressure. on Rhee and
maintain. the momentum of the popular drive. The moves of both
Rhee and Chang will provide further unsettling effects on the South
Korean situation' 000
Meanwhile, restiveness continues throughout the.. country. One
major demonstration by students yesterday in Inchon was dispersed
by police. There were no casualties.
Nationalist China. The disorder. in South Korea has increased 7777 101
101
the possibility of protest demonstrations over any irregularities
during local elections tomorrow in Taiwan, where developments
2 ,
in Korea are followed closely. Defeat of any of several independ-
ent candidates by a narrow margin in . hotly contested races could
ncite open accusations against the ruling Kuomintang and result
in ub
aosa a wile of the French official, who. was mur-
dered on-21 21 April in a resort near Vientiane
says she received
,
25X1 the "clear impression" that her husband's assailants had mistaken
him for an American. The American Embassy in Vientiane com-
ments that if this is valid, it would tend to support previously un-
1 confirmed reports that the, Communist Pathet Lao insurgents had
issued a directive. early this month calling for "positive action"
against Americans. The embassy has prohibited Americans from
traveling outside- Vientiane until after the national elections
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aan__o The nationwide leftist campaign against ratification of
the US-Japanese security treaty is likely to be exploited by ex-
tremists who plan a violent student-led demonstration . in front of
the Diet building on .26 April. Government officials plan to mobil-
ize 10,000 police equipped with tear gas to cope with the demon-
strations. Leftist extremism could delay the ratification schedule,
but it will antagonize the Ja anese public and probably undercut op
1
position to the. treaty. 25X1
23 Apr 60 DAILY. BRIEF ii
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South Africa- The ruling Nationalist party has apparently
split over e. question of the government's future racial policy.
Acting cabinet chairman Paul Sauer's 19 April call. for "an im-
portant change" in the application of apartheid reportedly re-
flected views of moderate members of the cabinet. However,
most of the Nationalist members of Parliament remain opposed
to any weakening of apartheid, and the moderate. cabinet
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may hesitate. to give public support to Sauer's proposals}
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Guinea. President Toure and his leftist supporters are re-
p 1 `
orteded tote taking. vigorous measures to suppress opposition
elements, including some cabinet members. The opposition
movement which i
\ , is based primarily on a large hinterland tribe,
is reported to have attempted 2
to establish a rival political party. Toure and his group are be
V
1ie yed to be in firm control of the security forces and there a p- pears to be no immediate threat to their position. 25X1
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1110,
23 Apr 60 DAILY
BRIEF iii
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THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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Peiping Reaffirms Disagreement With Soviet Policy of Detente
For the second time in less than a month the Chinese Com-
munist party's top theoretical journal, Red Flamm, has emphasized
that negotiations between the bloc and the West, regardless of
their success in "reaching some sort of agreement," should not
lead Communists to abandon their long-term struggle against
the West. The article, apparently directed toward justifying
the continuation of the "tense situation" in Sino-American re-
lations, rebuts the "revisionist" view of Tito--and,by impli-
cation, the views of Khrushchev--that "nations can relax9"
and asks: "Is there tranquillity in our Taiwan Strait?" The
article strongly implies that foreign policy differences between
Peiping and Moscow arise mainly from the Chinese view that
China has nothing to gain from a policy of detente with the
West.
The latest Red Flag article suggests that Peiping may be
developing a strong propaganda line in anticipation of possible
developments at the summit and disarmament conferences. On
22 April the chief of the party's propaganda department stated
that although it is "entirely permissible and necessary" that
bloc countries conduct negotiations with. the West, they should
guard against reducing their "revolutionary spirit."
Peiping's claim to be "correctly" interpreting Lenin ap-
pears to be its answer to Khrushchev's attacks on "adventurous"
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policies. The article implies that Lenin's."original" con-
clusions and a Communist's "usual conception of Leninism"
have been distorted for policy reasons, by Moscow, particular-
ly on. the.. issue of the inevitability of war. It insists that local
wars still "count as wars" and emphasizes, in a tone contrary
to that of statements made. at the Soviet 21st party congress,
the. continuing possibility of war.
In another area of Sino-Soviet difference, the representa-
tive of Peiping's official news agency
in. East Berlin stated on
14. April that Mao Tse-tung is the most important living 1V{arxist
d
k
an
ran
s just behind Lenin. in interpreting Marxist philosophy
correctly. He characterized Khrushchev as "simply" premier
of the USSR and first secretary of the. Soviet party, implying
that the. Soviet, leader is a. theorist of little stature in Chinese
-eyes. These views
are.in. line with extravagant claims-being made publicly for
Mao in China.
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USSR Offers "Unlimited" Quantities of Crude Oil to India
Moscow reportedly has offered New Delhi "unlimited"
amounts of Soviet crude oil and some refined products at dis-
count prices with payment in Indian rupees. While couching
its offer in unusually attractive terms to stress its willing-
ness to supply a major part of Indiab petroleum needs, the
Soviet Union probably hopes to achieve only limited results
by partially replacing Western oil suppliers.
Despite the attractiveness of the Soviet offer, not only in
price but also in foreign-exchange savings, India would face
major difficulties in utilizing Soviet crude. The three Western-
owned refineries which process all of India's imported crude
(35,000,000 barrels in 1959) would not be obligated under their
present contracts to use the Soviet crude and would certainly
resist any Indian pressures in this direction. The only govern-
ment-owned refineries, Barauni and Gauhati, both of which are
being built with bloc assistance, are located well inland in east-
ern India and are designed to refine the relatively small quanti-
ties of crude oil produced by India. New Delhi may, therefore,
accept the offer of refined products as part of a long-term agree-
ment already reported in the offing, while using the offer of
Soviet crude as a lever to extract pricing concessions from the
Western companies.
This is the first time the USSR has offered crude oil to
India, Earlier Soviet-Indian oil negotiations resulted in the
inclusion, for the first time, of small amounts of Soviet pe-
troleum products in the annual trade agreement for 1960-61.
The USSR frequently has exploited trade opportunities in other
underdeveloped countries by agreeing to provide Soviet on in
barter or soft currency transactions.
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
South Korea
The announcement that President Rhee has agreed to a par-
liamentary system of government with a cabinet headed.by a
prime minister is probably a device to resolve the present po-
litical. crisis by eliminating the. controversial vice presidency.
The fraudulent tactics used in the 15 March election of Yi Ki-
pung to the. vice presidency sparked the recent outburst of popu-
lar violence. Under a parliamentary system prior to 1954,
Rhee as president was able to exercise. the powers usually as-
sociated with the prime minister. It is problematical whether
any prominent members of the opposition Democratic party would
participate in a coalition if such an arrangement is proposed by
Rhee.
Rhee may contemplate selecting a prime minister. from
among five former political lieutenants with whom he consulted
on 21 April. The five, whose. popularity is questionable, had
been dropped by Rhee after either. outliving their usefulness or
showing signs of acquiring political power of their own. Rhee's
objective may be to install a man who could assure the admin-
istration's control over the Liberal. Party and National Assem-
bly.
Rhee, who has maintained that the nationwide demonstra- 25X1 25X1
tions were Communist=instigated, may have belatedly recog-
nized to some extent the public resentment against his admin-
istration. Nevertheless,
Rhee is under pressure from leaders of the Liberal
Party, the police and the State. Council not to agree to decisions
which would work against them] The embassy and American
information officers throughout South Korea report that US state-
ments on the current situation have excited great interest among 25X1
the Korean people.
[vice. President Chang Myon, leader. of the opposition Demo-
cratic party whose term expires on 15 August, has resigned, and
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Ti Ki-pung has publicly said he is considering. renouncing his
election. Chang told the American army attache on 22 April
that, following his resignation, the party will file a resolution
in the National Assembly calling for the resignation of Pres-
ident Rhee, and Yi Ki-pung. Chang's resignation probably is
intended to maintain the momentum of the popular. drive, and
it will provide further unsettling effects on the South Korean
situation.-)
Student restiveness continues throughout South Korea, with
one major demonstration reportedly dispersed on 22 April by
police without casualties in the port city of Inchon, which is not
under martial law. Martial-law commander Lt. Gen. Song Yo-
chan has ordered restrictions relaxed in Seoul and other cities
under martial. law, and in the capital all but about 100 of the
1,700 demonstrators seized by the police have been released.
In the provincial capital. of Kwangju, however, there are wide-
spread rumors that some 600 students still held by the author-
ities are being tortured, and the city appears "cowed rather than
quiet:' Although army troops fired on student demonstrators on
21 April, the people of Kwangju reportedly tend to regard the sol-,
diers as "moderators" between themselves and police.
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Disorder in South Korea May Spread to Taiwan
The disorder in South Korea has increased the possibility
of protest demonstrations over any irregularities during local
elections on 24 April in Taiwan, where developments in Korea
are being followed closely. Major demonstrations on the day
of the elections appear unlikely, but blatant election irregulari-
ties could generate incidents such as fist fights at polling sta-
tions. Defeat of any of several independent candidates by a
narrow margin in one of the hotly contested races could incite
open accusations that the elections were rigged in favor of the
Kuomintang candidate.
Yang Chiu-hu, a member of the opposition Democratic So-
cialist party, petitioned President Chiang Kai-shek at a recent
session of the National Assembly to require the ruling Kuomintang
party to clean up elections on Taiwan. Independent Taiwanese
politicians and newspapers also have criticized the Kuomintang
for election irregularities- -such as ballot-box stuffing, plural
voting, and. unfair invalidation of ballots--and requested that op-
position as well as Kuomintang candidates be allowed to appoint
poll supervisors. Government and Kuomintang officials have re-
jected this demand.
The Kuomintang wants to display overwhelming popular sup-
port by winning a majority of the contests, but it is anxious to
avoid a shutout of minority representation. The party has re-
frained from nominating a full slate of candidates and in some
contests surreptitiously supports independent candidates to
foster a facade of oppositions Local party officials, however,
are conscious of the adverse effect independent representation
might have on their political careers and may ignore party
orders to avoid any actions which might give rise to demonstra-
tions.
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Japanese Demonstrations Against Security Treaty With US
The nationwide leftist campaign against ratification of the
US-Japanese security treaty is likely to be exploited by ex-
tremists, who are planning a student-led violent demonstra-
tion in front of the Diet on 26 April, about the time the lower
house plans to put the treaty to a vote. The opposition So-
cialists, who already have halted committee hearings on the
treaty by preventing the chairman from taking his seat, may
also resort to nonparliamentary action to delay or even pre-
vent a floor vote.
Some 30,000 members of Zengakuren, the radical uni-
versity students' association, are planning to exploit the
demonstration already scheduled by 70-80,000 members of
organizations participating in the leftist -sponsored People's
Council Against Revision of the Security Treaty. Zengakuren
leaders--many of whom have been expelled from the Japanese
Communist party for extremism, including the precipitation
of a riot at the Tokyo airport when Prime Minister Kishi
departed for Washington last January to sign the new treaty--
have rejected the council's program as "too passive and in-
effective."
Government leaders are concerned that Zengakuren,
prompted by the student riots in. South Korea, may resort to
its most violent action to date. Accordingly, they plan to
mobilize 10,000 police equipped with tear gas to cope with
the situation. In the final analysis, however, leftist ex-
tremism, while possibly upsetting the treaty ratification sched-
ule, will antagonize the general Japanese public and probably
prove counterproductive by undercutting opposition to the treaty.
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Split Developing in Dome n South ric arty
LA_ serious split has apparently developed within South Af-
rica's ruling Nationalist party over the question of the govern-
ment's future racial policy. A relatively moderate faction of
the. cabinet, led by acting chairman Paul Sauer and Minister
of. Posts, Telegraphs, and Health Albert Hertzog, has reported-
ly been exploring ways of easing racial tension by applying
the apartheid policy less harshly. These efforts were reflected
in Sauer's 19 April call for. "an important change in the practi-
cal application of government policy," involving revision. of the
stringent native pass laws, higher wages for urban Africans,
and increased interracial contac
[Sauer has been publicly rebuked by External Affairs Min-
ister Eric Louw and Minister of Bantu Administration M. D. C.
de Wet Nel, the spokesmen for the. conservative Nationalists.
Louw told Parliament on 20 April that the government's policy
"remains unchanged" and that changes could be made only by
Verwoerd. Sauer's speech was also criticized by the Nation-
alist newspaper Die Vaderland, whose board of directors in-
cludes Hertzog and three other cabinet members. Die Vader-
land's criticism may indicate that the other members of the
merate faction in the cabinet are hesitant to give public sup-
port to Sauer's proposals as a result of the ne-gative party re-
action to them.
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Guinea Regime Reported Moving Against Opposition
President Sekou Tours and the influential left wing of Guinea's
authoritarian regime are taking vigorous measures to suppress
elements which have recently moved to establish a rival political
party.
Toure's militant and highly disciplined Democratic party of Guinea
has been the sole political organization and the real governing
authority in the country since shortly after Guinea voted for inde-
pendence from France in September 1958.
The opposition movement, which reportedly is headed by Jus-
tice Minister Ibrahima Barry and includes several other ministers,
appears inspired in large part by the traditional hostility of the
hinterland Foulah tribe toward the Malinke and Soussous tribesmen
who predominate in Toure's regime. Rumors of increasing unrest
among the Foulahs have been circulating in Guinea since late 1959.
In the last few days, these have become more specific in nature,
pointing to an early attempt by Barry to establish an opposition
party pledged to moderating the regime's strongly socialist-oriented
internal policies and reversing its drift toward the Soviet bloc. The
opposition group reportedly favors the establishment of "Common-
wealth ties" with France.
There appears little likelihood that Tours and his group, who
are believed to be in firm control of the security apparatus, will
be overturned in the near future. Repressive action, including
house-to-house searches for antiregime propaganda and the arrest
of one minister-not Barry-and many second-echelon opposition
leaders, reportedly began on 19 April. However, a desire not to
reveal publicly the extent of the split within the government may
influence Tours to move against other top opposition leaders one
by one rather than to arrest them all now.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
T='e Under Secretary of Statefor Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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